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Considers the alleged incompatibility between individual autonomy and the achievement and subsequent maintenance of an egalitarian society. Argues that it is only where an egalitarian society is in place that a like autonomy can be exercised by each citizen. Discusses the 3 main grounds that have been advanced to show there is such an incompatibility. (Abstract amended)

In this article I consider the alleged incompatibility between individual autonomy and the achievement and subsequent maintenance of an egalitarian society. I argue that not only is there no incompatibility, but that it is only where an egalitarian society is in place that a like autonomy can be exercised by each citizen. To make out my case I discuss the three main grounds that have been advanced to show there is such an incompatibility. Opponents of egalitarianism contend that egalitarian goals can only be achieved with losses in autonomy; in particular, losses through infringements on the civil liberties of individual citizens, losses in the scope individuals have to exercise and exploit their own talents and losses in control over the income and wealth to which individuals are entitled as a result of the exercise of their talents. The first of these contentions is dealt with quite briefly but the second and third go to the heart of the matter and accordingly are given fuller discussion. None of the three can be convincingly made out because it is precisely where there are significant inequalities in income and wealth that significant differences exist in the scope individuals have to fulfil their life-plans and thus to exercise their individual autonomy.

I will, in this paper, set out the philosophical foundations and the basic structure of a new theory of justice. I will argue that both these foundations and the theory which is based upon them are intuitively attractive and theoretically sound. Finally, I will argue that both are supported by the fact that they lead to attractive implications such as the following:(1) One can justify at least some governmental redistributive programs which presuppose that those receiving the wealth have a right to it, without being committed to any form of egalitarianism.(2) The justification for these redistributive programs respects property entitlements; it argues, in effect, that property entitlements and rights to some redistribution of wealth presuppose each other, rather than being in conflict with each other.(3) The amount of redistribution to which each indigent person is entitled is directly proportional to the wealth of the society in question (the wealthier the society, the greater the entitlement) and inversely proportional to the number of indigents in the society in question (the more indigents, the less to which each is entitled).There are at this stage in the history of Western thought few entirely new ideas in philosophy. Too much has been written about the important issues to allow for entirely new approaches. My theory is no exception to these generalizations, for it draws upon the tradition of John Locke, of the agrarian reforms such as Paine, Spence, and Ogilvie, and of libertarian writers such as Robert Nozick. Nevertheless, I will argue, the resulting theory is a significant advance over the ideas of these earlier writers.

Analysis of secondary data from surveys of the 1970s contradicts propositions that egalitarianism was or is accepted by the great majority of Yugoslavians. Nonegalitarian values are shown to exist in the Yugoslavian population; in fact, nonegalitarianist thought prevails in higher social strata. Ideological implications of this finding are discussed, & the functions of egalitarianism in Yugoslav society are explored. It is determined that the "egalitarian syndrome" helps integrate & stabilize the society, but also contributes to long term economic stagnation, which undermines societal integration & paves the way for actualizing inert social tensions & conflicts. Short-term responses to these tendencies are discussed, & it is determined that only through radical changes in how political power is legitimated can long-term regulation for these inherent contradictions be provided. 31 References. D. Dennis

Richard Miller in his Analyzing Marx specifies a number of different forms of equality and argues that they all are mistaken ideals and that Marx was not, and indeed rightly was not, an egalitarian in any of these ways. If his arguments were sound, their import for moral and social theory would be very significant indeed, so they need careful examination. Argues the key ones are unsound. (JLN)

Using the methods of reasoned history and comparative statistics, this work arrives at an assessment of egalitarianism. It traces the rise of egalitarianism from the Renaissance and Reformation onwards. A complementary approach is provided by a wide survey of actual distributions of income and wealth

Intro -- Contents -- Introduction -- Part I. The Rise Of Egalitarianism -- 1. Early Principles of Inequality and Equality -- 1.1 The Greek view of inequality -- 1.2 Equality before the law of nature -- 1.3 The medieval view of inequality -- 2. The Transition to Liberalism -- 2.1 The sources of change: the breaking up of authority -- 2.2 The sources of change: the shaping of new habits of mind -- 2.3 The impact of change: Sir Thomas More's Utopia -- 2.4 Individualism -- 3. The Equality of Man in the Eighteenth Century -- 3.1 Locke and equality -- 3.2 The Declaration of Independence -- 3.3 The Declaration of the Rights of Men and Citizens -- 3.4 Social inequality as the British eighteenth century saw it -- 3.5 The English tradition of revolt and levelling -- 3.6 The limits of eighteenth-century liberalism -- 4. Eighteenth-Century Developments Propitious to Egalitarianism -- 4.1 Monetization and political arithmetick -- 4.2 Taxation as an instrument of redistribution -- 4.3 The bond of common humanity -- 5. Action Delayed -- 5.1 The obstacles to redistribution -- 5.2 Early socialism-was not primarily egalitarian -- 6. The Movement into Redistribution -- 6.1 The rise of administration -- 6.2 The later development of administration -- 6.3 The expansion of resources -- 6.4 A new view of society -- 6.5 Marx and equality -- 7. The Formation of Modern Egalitarianism -- 7.1 Changes in the setting -- 7.2 The growing awareness of social need -- 7.3 Changes of outlook -- 7.4 The years of application -- 7.5 The difference of attitudes in the United States -- 8. Issues and Influences Reviewed -- 8.1 The justification of inequality -- 8.2 The grounds of belief in personal equality -- 8.3 The possibility of changing society -- 8.4 The promotion of egalitarianism as a practical policy -- 8.5 A consideration of causes.

1. A NOTE ON INTERPRETATIONIt became clear in the discussions at the conference at which Professor Brody's paper was given that he and I had slightly different interpretations of his paper. He apparently regards the rights violations to be justified (having to do with the initial appropriation of land) as events in the distant past, and any resulting compensation as being due to our contemporaries only as heirs of people injured in the distant past. To me, one of the attractions of his analysis is that it allows one to dispense with such tenuous arguments and consider rights violations occuring at this very moment, and the compensation due for them. If every individual has the right to use all uncreated resources, then when I use force to keep you out of my living room I am violating your rights; although (according to Professor Brody) that may be an appropriate rights violation, it still imposes on me the obligation to compensate you. These comments were originally written on the assumption that Professor Brody intended the argument to be interpreted in this way; since I believe it is a more interesting argument in that form than in the form apparently intended by its author, I will maintain that interpretation throughout my comments.2. CRITIQUEProfessor Brody's solution to the problem of Lockean entitlements is ingenious and in some ways attractive, but I find it unsatisfactory in the form presented here. The problem is that, in spite of the author's claims to the contrary, it seems impossible, in principle, to decide how much compensation each person is entitled to.