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In Justice and Natural Resources: An Egalitarian Theory (2017), Chris Armstrong proposes a version of global egalitarianism that – contra the default renderings of this approach – takes individual attachment to specific resources into account. By doing this, his theory has the potential for greening global egalitarianism both in terms of procedure and scope. In terms of procedure, its broad account of attachment and its focus on individuals rather than groups connects with participatory governance and management and, ultimately, participatory democracy – an essential ingredient in the toolkit of green politics and policy-making. In terms of scope, because it does not commit itself to any particular moral framework, Armstrong's theory leaves the door open for non-human animals to become subjects of justice, thus extending the realm of the latter beyond its traditionally anthropocentric borders. I conclude that these greenings are promising, but not trouble-free.

In Justice and Natural Resources: An Egalitarian Theory (2017), Chris Armstrong proposes a version of global egalitarianism that – contra the default renderings of this approach – takes individual attachment to specific resources into account. By doing this, his theory has the potential for greening global egalitarianism both in terms of procedure and scope. In terms of procedure, its broad account of attachment and its focus on individuals rather than groups connects with participatory governance and management and, ultimately, participatory democracy – an essential ingredient in the toolkit of green politics and policy-making. In terms of scope, because it does not commit itself to any particular moral framework, Armstrong's theory leaves the door open for non-human animals to become subjects of justice, thus extending the realm of the latter beyond its traditionally anthropocentric borders. I conclude that these greenings are promising, but not trouble-free.

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal property in one case and private property in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists a norm of investment and a norm of surplus division must coevolve. While the investment norm always supports the efficient investment profile, the surplus division norm may differ among these games depending on the size of investment cost gap. Under private property only the egalitarian surplus division evolves. Under communal property instead two different surplus division norms may evolve: the egalitarian one and an inegalitarian norm. We show that no cap to payoffs inequality emerges under private property while an inequality payoff cap endogenously evolves under communal property. The games have been proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.

PUBLISHED ; This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption.

This paper presents what luck egalitarianism, one of the major frameworks in contemporary political philosophy, has to say on the questions of what children are owed and who should pay for the children in a society. Luck egalitarianism seems to imply firstly, that children are owed equal life prospects to everybody else, and secondly, that parents should pay. However, it seems unacceptable to make parents pay the full costs of egalitarian justice when they themselves have been disadvantaged in an unequal society. In non-ideal theory, the luck egalitarian should translate this insight into some joint responsibility for children.

A number of philosophers working in applied ethics and bioethics are now earnestly debating the ethics of what they term moral bioenhancement. I argue that the society-wide program of biological manipulations required to achieve the purported goals of moral bioenhancement would necessarily implicate the state in a controversial moral perfectionism. Moreover, the prospect of being able to reliably identify some people as, by biological constitution, significantly and consistently more moral than others would seem to pose a profound challenge to egalitarian social and political ideals. Even if moral bioenhancement should ultimately prove to be impossible, there is a chance that a bogus science of bioenhancement would lead to arbitrary inequalities in access to political power or facilitate the unjust rule of authoritarians; in the meantime, the debate about the ethics of moral bioenhancement risks reinvigorating dangerous ideas about the extent of natural inequality in the possession of the moral faculties.

The significance of formal criteria which could help to sort out the problem of tolerance paradox has emerged in the background of cultural egalitarianism. Alas, such criteria have not been established so far. The conviction that the problem of tolerance is significant just in the context of social and political discourse might be questioned due to the fact that this attitude did not help to tackle this problem throughout the last centuries. The paper aims to show that the problem of tolerance can be solved taking into account systemic attitude and synergetic insights. The current study into the literature on tolerance concludes that the formal criterion, which defines the tolerance boundaries in the most general sense, is considered to be such deviations from the standard (as ideal parameters of social system) when tolerance can function normally (stably). Cultural egalitarianism, which requires equalizing the rights of the majority and the minorities facing discrimination, impinges on the ratio of necessary diversity, and thus has to be questioned. Tolerancijos ribos ir kultūrinis egalitarizmas Santrauka.Formaliu kriteriju, kurie leistu spresti tolerancijos paradokso problema, svarbaišryškejo kulturinio egalitarizmo akivaizdoje. Tokiu kriteriju nera iki šiol.Isitikinimas, kad tolerancijos problema prasminga tik socialinio ir politinio diskursokontekste, gali buti kvestionuojamas vien todel, kad per kelis šimtmeciusši nuostata problemos išspresti nepadejo. Straipsnyje parodoma, kad tolerancijosproblema galima spresti sisteminiu požiuriu ir sociosinergetikos ižvalgomis.Tolerancijai skirtos literaturos analize leidžia daryti išvada, kad bendriausiuatveju tolerancijos ribas nustatanciu formaliu kriterijumi galima laikyti tokiusnukrypimus nuo normos (kaip idealiu visuomenines sistemos parametru), kuriemsesant ji dar gali normaliai (stabiliai) funkcionuoti. Kulturinis egalitarizmas,reikalaujantis sulyginti daugumos ir diskriminuojamu mažumu teises, pažeidžiabutinos ivairoves proporcijas ir todel yra kvestionuotinas. ...

The significance of formal criteria which could help to sort out the problem of tolerance paradox has emerged in the background of cultural egalitarianism. Alas, such criteria have not been established so far. The conviction that the problem of tolerance is significant just in the context of social and political discourse might be questioned due to the fact that this attitude did not help to tackle this problem throughout the last centuries. The paper aims to show that the problem of tolerance can be solved taking into account systemic attitude and synergetic insights. The current study into the literature on tolerance concludes that the formal criterion, which defines the tolerance boundaries in the most general sense, is considered to be such deviations from the standard (as ideal parameters of social system) when tolerance can function normally (stably). Cultural egalitarianism, which requires equalizing the rights of the majority and the minorities facing discrimination, impinges on the ratio of necessary diversity, and thus has to be questioned. Tolerancijos ribos ir kultūrinis egalitarizmas Santrauka Formaliu kriteriju, kurie leistu spresti tolerancijos paradokso problema, svarbaišryškejo kulturinio egalitarizmo akivaizdoje. Tokiu kriteriju nera iki šiol.Isitikinimas, kad tolerancijos problema prasminga tik socialinio ir politinio diskursokontekste, gali buti kvestionuojamas vien todel, kad per kelis šimtmeciusši nuostata problemos išspresti nepadejo. Straipsnyje parodoma, kad tolerancijosproblema galima spresti sisteminiu požiuriu ir sociosinergetikos ižvalgomis.Tolerancijai skirtos literaturos analize leidžia daryti išvada, kad bendriausiuatveju tolerancijos ribas nustatanciu formaliu kriterijumi galima laikyti tokiusnukrypimus nuo normos (kaip idealiu visuomenines sistemos parametru), kuriemsesant ji dar gali normaliai (stabiliai) funkcionuoti. Kulturinis egalitarizmas,reikalaujantis sulyginti daugumos ir diskriminuojamu mažumu teises, pažeidžiabutinos ivairoves proporcijas ir todel yra kvestionuotinas. Reikšminiai žodžiai: egalitarizmas, tolerancijos paradoksas, tolerancijos ribos,butinos disharmonijos konstanta

In the spring of 2009, a novel strain of the H1N1 influenza virus, containing a never before witnessed combination of gene segments from human influenza, two forms of swine influenza, and avian influenza, 1 was declared a global pandemic. The UK Government had to decide whether to undertake, at a cost of £1.2 billion (USD 1.9 billion at the time, equivalent to 1 percent of that year's health budget), an extensive set of preparatory measures, including the purchase of both antiviral medication and a novel vaccine in quantities sufficient to cover the entire UK population, or whether instead to take substantially less costly measures, which would involve having only a limited supply of these medicines and vaccines at hand.2 The possible.

Two prominent relational egalitarians, Elizabeth Anderson and Niko Kolodny, object to giving people in a democratic community differential voting weights on the grounds that doing so would lead to unequal relations between them. Their claim is that deviating from a "one-person, one-vote" scheme is incompatible with realizing relational egalitarian justice. In this article, I argue that they are wrong. I do so by showing that people can relate as moral, epistemic, social, and empirical equals in a scheme with differential voting weights. I end the article by showing that from the perspective of relational egalitarianism, it is sometimes true that differential voting weights are more just than equal voting weights.

The concept of responsibility plays a crucial part in the debate between proponents of democratic equality, like Rawls, and defenders of luck egalitarianism, such as Dworkin. In this paper it is argued that the two theories can be combined, and that they should be combined to achieve a theory of justice that puts personal responsibility in its proper place. The concept of justice requires two different conceptions. The two theories can be combined because they deal with different problems of justice. They ought to be combined because, first, luck egalitarianism needs a theory of background justice, and second, a theory of justice must supply an answer to the question of just individual allocations, something that is not provided by democratic equality. Democratic equality and luck egalitarianism solve each other's problems. The combined theory will lead to allocations of goods that respect both the difference principle and the envy test.

published_or_final_version ; Politics and Public Administration ; Doctoral ; Doctor of Philosophy

Individual differences in social and political attitudes have their roots in evolved motives for basic kinds of social relationships. Egalitarianism is the preference for the application of the one of these relational models-equality—over that of another—dominance—to the context of societal intergroup relations. We present recent research on the origins of egalitarianism in terms of universal social cognitive mechanisms (activated as early as infancy), systematic (partly heritable) individual differences, and the affordances and constraints of one's immediate and macro-structural context. Just as the psychological impact of socioeconomic conditions depends on the mind being equipped to perceive and navigate them, so the expression of the evolved underpinnings of inequality concerns depends critically on social and societal experiences.

Anthony Forge was a pioneer in the anthropology of art and established an international reputation in this field. His work on the political anthropology of egalitarianism, by contrast, has been virtually ignored because of the demise of British Social Anthropology as a method, and the rise of inequality as the problem to be investigated. Some fifty years have passed since Forge did his fieldwork in the Sepik District of Papua New Guinea; a critical reappraisal of his method and ideas in light of the political history of democracy in Oceania is called for. Equality as a male value has re-emerged as a key concern for the new 'Big Shot', so too has equal exchange, but in the form of the commercial gift. If we are to grasp the general principles, and paradoxes, that inform transactions of this kind, anthropologists need to reassess their prejudices about the method of British Social Anthropology.

Anthony Forge was a pioneer in the anthropology of art and established an international reputation in this field. His work on the political anthropology of egalitarianism, by contrast, has been virtually ignored because of the demise of British Social Anthropology as a method, and the rise of inequality as the problem to be investigated. Some fifty years have passed since Forge did his fieldwork in the Sepik District of Papua New Guinea; a critical reappraisal of his method and ideas in light of the political history of democracy in Oceania is called for. Equality as a male value has re-emerged as a key concern for the new 'Big Shot', so too has equal exchange, but in the form of the commercial gift. If we are to grasp the general principles, and paradoxes, that inform transactions of this kind, anthropologists need to reassess their prejudices about the method of British Social Anthropology.