Suchergebnisse

Two parties bargaining over a pie, the size of which is determined by their previous investment decisions. Investment costs are heterogeneous. The bargaining rule is sensitive to investment behavior. Two games are studied which differ for the considered sociopolitical structure: communal property in one case and private property in the other. We hereby show that in both games when a unique stochastically stable outcome exists a norm of investment and a norm of surplus division must coevolve. While the investment norm always supports the efficient investment profile, the surplus division norm may differ among these games depending on the size of investment cost gap. Under private property only the egalitarian surplus division evolves. Under communal property instead two different surplus division norms may evolve: the egalitarian one and an inegalitarian norm. We show that no cap to payoffs inequality emerges under private property while an inequality payoff cap endogenously evolves under communal property. The games have been proposed to explain the social norms used in modern hunter-gatherer societies.

Abstract
Relational Egalitarianism focuses on the construction of equal social relationships between persons. It strongly opposes luck egalitarianism, which understands equality as a distributive ideal. In Cohen's theory of justice, luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously exist, and Cohen provides arguments corresponding to each. In this paper, we explore the manifestation of tension between these two forms of egalitarianism in his theory. In addition, we also reconstruct some possible solutions provided by Cohen to soften this tension, including the three approaches of market mechanism, egalitarian ethos and value pluralism, and find them to be unsuccessful. This tension is a serious challenge that needs to be addressed in Cohen's theory of justice.

PUBLISHED ; This paper argues that the philosophy of explanation can help inform core debates in value theory. Specifically, it argues that there is a consistent parallelism between the properties of explanation and the properties of justification such that one can reasonably infer that any property of explanation has a counterpart property of justification. Thus, by appealing to facts about the nature of explanation, one can derive various conclusions about the justifications offered by normative theorists. The paper illustrates this point by considering a debate within political philosophy over whether inequality requires justification in a way that equality does not. Egalitarians typically presume an affirmative answer to this question. However, libertarian critics note that this justificatory asymmetry cannot be simply assumed without argument. This paper argues that, by appealing to the explanation-justification parallelism, one can resolve this debate in favor of the egalitarians, as there are two properties of explanation, the justificatory analogs of which vindicate the egalitarian presumption.

This paper presents what luck egalitarianism, one of the major frameworks in contemporary political philosophy, has to say on the questions of what children are owed and who should pay for the children in a society. Luck egalitarianism seems to imply firstly, that children are owed equal life prospects to everybody else, and secondly, that parents should pay. However, it seems unacceptable to make parents pay the full costs of egalitarian justice when they themselves have been disadvantaged in an unequal society. In non-ideal theory, the luck egalitarian should translate this insight into some joint responsibility for children.

A number of philosophers working in applied ethics and bioethics are now earnestly debating the ethics of what they term moral bioenhancement. I argue that the society-wide program of biological manipulations required to achieve the purported goals of moral bioenhancement would necessarily implicate the state in a controversial moral perfectionism. Moreover, the prospect of being able to reliably identify some people as, by biological constitution, significantly and consistently more moral than others would seem to pose a profound challenge to egalitarian social and political ideals. Even if moral bioenhancement should ultimately prove to be impossible, there is a chance that a bogus science of bioenhancement would lead to arbitrary inequalities in access to political power or facilitate the unjust rule of authoritarians; in the meantime, the debate about the ethics of moral bioenhancement risks reinvigorating dangerous ideas about the extent of natural inequality in the possession of the moral faculties.