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The article provides a diachronic quantitative comparison of the political regimes of the First (interwar, LR I) and Second (contemporary, LR II) Republics of Lithuania, which is supplemented by synchronic comparisons with the neighbour countries. For this comparison, the data set and Index of Democracy by the Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen (known in the literature as the Vanhanen Index, VI) is used, whose values are calculated by multiplying those of the indicators of public contestation and of participation at the elections. The data of Vanhanen are corrected, extended, and some of his assumptions are criticised. (1) Calculating the VI values for interwar Lithuania, Vanhanen uses imprecise demographic and electoral statistical data for 1920–1923. (2) The III Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) election in 1926 and that of IV Seimas in 1936 are missing in his data. Therefore, the VI values for Lithuania in 1920–1939 are underestimated. In his calculations for the LR II, Vanhanen (3) used incorrect contestation data on the elections to the Restoration Seimas in 1990 and (4) misclassified the LR II after adoption of the 1992 constitution as a political system with parliamentary dominance. In fact, contemporary Lithuania is semi-presidential republic and should be classified as a system of concurrent powers. Vanhanen's data-set is extended with the data for 2001–2009. According to the author's recalculations with corrected data, the VI values in 1920–1925 were no less than in 1990–1995, and its value in 1926 is on a par with the highest VI values for the LR II. Importantly, participation in all four free Lithuanian Seimas elections in 1920–1926 was constantly high, while participation in the parliamentary elections in the LR II is steadily decreasing. In 1926, the value of the VI index for Lithuania caught up with those in the other Baltic States, which are reputed as more advanced in terms of social and political modernization. With 86.4% of all voters included into the lists going to the polls, the election to the III Seimas in 1926 set an absolute all-time participation record for all free elections in Lithuania (there is no reliable data on its most close competitor – elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1920). These and other comparisons reveal the Vanhanen's index to be a measure just of electoral democracy and not of the full-scale liberal democracy. In interwar Lithuania, liberal democracy existed only for 5 months in 1926, when the state of emergency (justified by the conflict with Poland) was recalled. In the LR II, the consolidation of liberal democracy made a rapid advance after 1992. The high participation in all Seimas elections (including unfree and unfair election in 1936) in the interwar Lithuania contradicts the established opinion that interwar Lithuanian society was not ready for democracy. Even if one indeed may doubt their maturity for liberal democracy, Lithuanians accepted and appreciated electoral democracy. As a matter of fact, Lithuania in 1920–1926 is quite on a par with or even surpasses the LR II in terms of the level of electoral democracy. The LR II surpasses the LR I in terms of liberal democracy. Vanhanen's index is not a valid tool for measuring liberal democracy. However, the application of Vanhanen's index to the time of the 1926 coup helps to highlight in the decorative parliamentarism of the IV Seimas in 1936–1940 some non-fictive elements of a genuine electoral regime, which have survived because of the obstacles for the complete entrenchment of authoritarianism set by the autonomy of the Klaipėda region under defense of international treaties.

The article provides a diachronic quantitative comparison of the political regimes of the First (interwar, LR I) and Second (contemporary, LR II) Republics of Lithuania, which is supplemented by synchronic comparisons with the neighbour countries. For this comparison, the data set and Index of Democracy by the Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen (known in the literature as the Vanhanen Index, VI) is used, whose values are calculated by multiplying those of the indicators of public contestation and of participation at the elections. The data of Vanhanen are corrected, extended, and some of his assumptions are criticised. (1) Calculating the VI values for interwar Lithuania, Vanhanen uses imprecise demographic and electoral statistical data for 1920–1923. (2) The III Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) election in 1926 and that of IV Seimas in 1936 are missing in his data. Therefore, the VI values for Lithuania in 1920–1939 are underestimated. In his calculations for the LR II, Vanhanen (3) used incorrect contestation data on the elections to the Restoration Seimas in 1990 and (4) misclassified the LR II after adoption of the 1992 constitution as a political system with parliamentary dominance. In fact, contemporary Lithuania is semi-presidential republic and should be classified as a system of concurrent powers. Vanhanen's data-set is extended with the data for 2001–2009. According to the author's recalculations with corrected data, the VI values in 1920–1925 were no less than in 1990–1995, and its value in 1926 is on a par with the highest VI values for the LR II. Importantly, participation in all four free Lithuanian Seimas elections in 1920–1926 was constantly high, while participation in the parliamentary elections in the LR II is steadily decreasing. In 1926, the value of the VI index for Lithuania caught up with those in the other Baltic States, which are reputed as more advanced in terms of social and political modernization. With 86.4% of all voters included into the lists going to the polls, the election to the III Seimas in 1926 set an absolute all-time participation record for all free elections in Lithuania (there is no reliable data on its most close competitor – elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1920). These and other comparisons reveal the Vanhanen's index to be a measure just of electoral democracy and not of the full-scale liberal democracy. In interwar Lithuania, liberal democracy existed only for 5 months in 1926, when the state of emergency (justified by the conflict with Poland) was recalled. In the LR II, the consolidation of liberal democracy made a rapid advance after 1992. The high participation in all Seimas elections (including unfree and unfair election in 1936) in the interwar Lithuania contradicts the established opinion that interwar Lithuanian society was not ready for democracy. Even if one indeed may doubt their maturity for liberal democracy, Lithuanians accepted and appreciated electoral democracy. As a matter of fact, Lithuania in 1920–1926 is quite on a par with or even surpasses the LR II in terms of the level of electoral democracy. The LR II surpasses the LR I in terms of liberal democracy. Vanhanen's index is not a valid tool for measuring liberal democracy. However, the application of Vanhanen's index to the time of the 1926 coup helps to highlight in the decorative parliamentarism of the IV Seimas in 1936–1940 some non-fictive elements of a genuine electoral regime, which have survived because of the obstacles for the complete entrenchment of authoritarianism set by the autonomy of the Klaipėda region under defense of international treaties.

The article provides a diachronic quantitative comparison of the political regimes of the First (interwar, LR I) and Second (contemporary, LR II) Republics of Lithuania, which is supplemented by synchronic comparisons with the neighbour countries. For this comparison, the data set and Index of Democracy by the Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen (known in the literature as the Vanhanen Index, VI) is used, whose values are calculated by multiplying those of the indicators of public contestation and of participation at the elections. The data of Vanhanen are corrected, extended, and some of his assumptions are criticised. (1) Calculating the VI values for interwar Lithuania, Vanhanen uses imprecise demographic and electoral statistical data for 1920–1923. (2) The III Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) election in 1926 and that of IV Seimas in 1936 are missing in his data. Therefore, the VI values for Lithuania in 1920–1939 are underestimated. In his calculations for the LR II, Vanhanen (3) used incorrect contestation data on the elections to the Restoration Seimas in 1990 and (4) misclassified the LR II after adoption of the 1992 constitution as a political system with parliamentary dominance. In fact, contemporary Lithuania is semi-presidential republic and should be classified as a system of concurrent powers. Vanhanen's data-set is extended with the data for 2001–2009. According to the author's recalculations with corrected data, the VI values in 1920–1925 were no less than in 1990–1995, and its value in 1926 is on a par with the highest VI values for the LR II. Importantly, participation in all four free Lithuanian Seimas elections in 1920–1926 was constantly high, while participation in the parliamentary elections in the LR II is steadily decreasing. In 1926, the value of the VI index for Lithuania caught up with those in the other Baltic States, which are reputed as more advanced in terms of social and political modernization. With 86.4% of all voters included into the lists going to the polls, the election to the III Seimas in 1926 set an absolute all-time participation record for all free elections in Lithuania (there is no reliable data on its most close competitor – elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1920). These and other comparisons reveal the Vanhanen's index to be a measure just of electoral democracy and not of the full-scale liberal democracy. In interwar Lithuania, liberal democracy existed only for 5 months in 1926, when the state of emergency (justified by the conflict with Poland) was recalled. In the LR II, the consolidation of liberal democracy made a rapid advance after 1992. The high participation in all Seimas elections (including unfree and unfair election in 1936) in the interwar Lithuania contradicts the established opinion that interwar Lithuanian society was not ready for democracy. Even if one indeed may doubt their maturity for liberal democracy, Lithuanians accepted and appreciated electoral democracy. As a matter of fact, Lithuania in 1920–1926 is quite on a par with or even surpasses the LR II in terms of the level of electoral democracy. The LR II surpasses the LR I in terms of liberal democracy. Vanhanen's index is not a valid tool for measuring liberal democracy. However, the application of Vanhanen's index to the time of the 1926 coup helps to highlight in the decorative parliamentarism of the IV Seimas in 1936–1940 some non-fictive elements of a genuine electoral regime, which have survived because of the obstacles for the complete entrenchment of authoritarianism set by the autonomy of the Klaipėda region under defense of international treaties.

The article provides a diachronic quantitative comparison of the political regimes of the First (interwar, LR I) and Second (contemporary, LR II) Republics of Lithuania, which is supplemented by synchronic comparisons with the neighbour countries. For this comparison, the data set and Index of Democracy by the Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen (known in the literature as the Vanhanen Index, VI) is used, whose values are calculated by multiplying those of the indicators of public contestation and of participation at the elections. The data of Vanhanen are corrected, extended, and some of his assumptions are criticised. (1) Calculating the VI values for interwar Lithuania, Vanhanen uses imprecise demographic and electoral statistical data for 1920–1923. (2) The III Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) election in 1926 and that of IV Seimas in 1936 are missing in his data. Therefore, the VI values for Lithuania in 1920–1939 are underestimated. In his calculations for the LR II, Vanhanen (3) used incorrect contestation data on the elections to the Restoration Seimas in 1990 and (4) misclassified the LR II after adoption of the 1992 constitution as a political system with parliamentary dominance. In fact, contemporary Lithuania is semi-presidential republic and should be classified as a system of concurrent powers. Vanhanen's data-set is extended with the data for 2001–2009. According to the author's recalculations with corrected data, the VI values in 1920–1925 were no less than in 1990–1995, and its value in 1926 is on a par with the highest VI values for the LR II. Importantly, participation in all four free Lithuanian Seimas elections in 1920–1926 was constantly high, while participation in the parliamentary elections in the LR II is steadily decreasing. In 1926, the value of the VI index for Lithuania caught up with those in the other Baltic States, which are reputed as more advanced in terms of social and political modernization. With 86.4% of all voters included into the lists going to the polls, the election to the III Seimas in 1926 set an absolute all-time participation record for all free elections in Lithuania (there is no reliable data on its most close competitor – elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1920). These and other comparisons reveal the Vanhanen's index to be a measure just of electoral democracy and not of the full-scale liberal democracy. In interwar Lithuania, liberal democracy existed only for 5 months in 1926, when the state of emergency (justified by the conflict with Poland) was recalled. In the LR II, the consolidation of liberal democracy made a rapid advance after 1992. The high participation in all Seimas elections (including unfree and unfair election in 1936) in the interwar Lithuania contradicts the established opinion that interwar Lithuanian society was not ready for democracy. Even if one indeed may doubt their maturity for liberal democracy, Lithuanians accepted and appreciated electoral democracy. As a matter of fact, Lithuania in 1920–1926 is quite on a par with or even surpasses the LR II in terms of the level of electoral democracy. The LR II surpasses the LR I in terms of liberal democracy. Vanhanen's index is not a valid tool for measuring liberal democracy. However, the application of Vanhanen's index to the time of the 1926 coup helps to highlight in the decorative parliamentarism of the IV Seimas in 1936–1940 some non-fictive elements of a genuine electoral regime, which have survived because of the obstacles for the complete entrenchment of authoritarianism set by the autonomy of the Klaipėda region under defense of international treaties.

This article aims to analyze how the distrust of a significant portion of Brazilians both in their democratic institutions and in relation to democracy itself, influenced or the election of President Jair Bolsonaro. For this, we conducted a bibliographic research, using institutionalist and, especially, culturalist theories. Thus, we perceive as possible explanatory factors, on the one hand, the recent Brazilian democracy that preserves traces of the dictatorial past in its political culture. On the other hand, as distortions between the functioning of democratic institutions, in a context of incentive to "delegative democracies", which "guides" part of the citizens to identify themselves with charismatic leaders who present themselves as outsiders within this discredited political system. In the scenario in which the media played a central role in electoral disputes.

The analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court shows that the main principles, whose content was best revealed, are universal, equal, direct, free suffrage and secret ballot. The content of the principles of electoral law are revealed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court case by case. In every case the Constitutional Court reveals as much of the content of the particular principle as is necessary for the fair resolution of the case. The constitutional principles of electoral law are applicable not only in the elections of national representative political institutions, but also in the elections of the European Parliament which is the representative political institution of the European Union. The constitutional principles of electoral law are important for the implementation of both active and passive electoral rights. These principles are the criterions on the grounds of which the democracy of the elections and the validity of the results of the election, are assessed and they are the criterions for assessment whether the representative political institutions are instituted properly, whether the constitutional rights to vote and to stand for election are not violated.

The analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court shows that the main principles, whose content was best revealed, are universal, equal, direct, free suffrage and secret ballot. The content of the principles of electoral law are revealed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court case by case. In every case the Constitutional Court reveals as much of the content of the particular principle as is necessary for the fair resolution of the case. The constitutional principles of electoral law are applicable not only in the elections of national representative political institutions, but also in the elections of the European Parliament which is the representative political institution of the European Union. The constitutional principles of electoral law are important for the implementation of both active and passive electoral rights. These principles are the criterions on the grounds of which the democracy of the elections and the validity of the results of the election, are assessed and they are the criterions for assessment whether the representative political institutions are instituted properly, whether the constitutional rights to vote and to stand for election are not violated.

The most important task of this notice is to reveal what allows to approve or to deny the existence or absence of democracy as political-social phenomena. While looking for a solution more attention was paid to such political processes as a electoral system and rule system in order to reveal their relation with implementation of democracy and the degree of this implementation. This notice will convince us that the historical basis of democracy is association as civil community where the decisions are made by the members of this association who are equal to each other among themselves. What is more, those chapters where electoral and rule systems are discussed show that the way how the the rule apparatus is ordered has a lot of influence to any political regime, in our case to democracy. That means, for example, that the majority electoral system is efficient and covers up the criterions of democracy only in those states where two-party system is predominant or, for example, that it is impossible to imagine undisciplined parties that rule efficient and in democratic way in parlametary state. More over, the aim of the last chapter was to get readers familiar with cosmopolitan model of democracy and with the global degree of democracy, further more, to reveal the lookouts of democracy development and means that are the most suitable to implement that development.

O PRESENTE artigo relata os resultados de um exercício de cenários políticos realizado pelo Instituto de Estudos Avançados (IEA-USP) no quadro de um projeto mais amplo patrocinado pelo Executivo federal. Os autores traçam inicialmente um cenário positivo, caracterizado por estabilidade política, aperfeiçoamento do sistema de partidos e do Legislativo, e melhores políticas sociais. Passam, em seguida, a dois cenários negativos, nos quais aqueles objetivos dificilmente serão atingidos. Dado que a ocorrência do cenário positivo provavelmente exigirá reformas políticas substanciais, os autores analisam algumas das propostas debatidas ao longo das últimas duas décadas, notadamente as que objetivam fortalecer o sistema partidário, melhorar as relações Executivo versus Legislativo e tornar o sistema como um todo mais representativo (accountable). ; THIS article reports the results of a political scenario-building exercise carried out by the Institute of Advanced Studies within the framework of a larger project sponsored by the federal government. The authors first draw a positive scenario, characterized by political stability, improvement of the party system and of the legislative machinery, and better social policies. Next they turn to two negative scenarios, under which the above-mentioned goals seem unlikely to be reached. The positive scenario is unlikely to come about without substantial political reforms. An effort is therefore made to analyze reform proposals debated in the country over the last two decades, with special reference to those aiming to strengthen the party system, improve Executive versus Legislative relations and increase accountability in the political system as a whole.

The close relationship between money and votes has been exposed in contemporary democracies through the influence of the former in election results and in the creation of public policies. Studies have pointed out that the progressive inequity of financial resources available to the candidates running for elections unbalances democracy and promotes plutocracy, increasing the oligarchical ruling over the political processes by the wealthiest citizens and groups. This work contributes to this debate by analyzing the relationship between fundraising and electoral performance and the success of 317,107 candidates running in local legislative elections in 2008, 2012, and 2016 in 441 Brazilian municipalities with over 50,000 inhabitants. This is an unprecedented study regarding its period, filling a gap in electoral studies on sub-national elections, particularly regarding elections for the legislative branch. Data was collected from the Brazilian Superior Electoral Court, from candidate lists, results, and accounting. The tests and data analysis and information employed correlation and regression statistical resources, along with central measures and odds ratio. The results confirmed a strong association between money, vote, and electoral success, including in the 2016 election when company donations had been prohibited. The maintenance of a pattern, regarding both time and geography, indicates the existence of structural characteristics of a plutocratic character in the election funding of those running for the council in the municipalities studied and, consequently, in the creation of public policies in Brazil. ; La intimidad entre dinero y voto ha sido expuesta en las democracias contemporáneas a través de su influencia en los resultados electorales y en la producción de políticas públicas. Los estudios muestran que la desigualdad progresiva entre los recursos financieros de los candidatos en las elecciones debilita la democracia y promueve la plutocracia, es decir, aumenta el dominio oligárquico en los procesos políticos por parte de los ciudadanos y grupos más ricos. Contribuyendo a este debate, el presente trabajo analiza la relación entre los ingresos por financiamiento y el desempeño y el éxito electoral de 317.107 candidatos a concejal en las elecciones de 2008, 2012 y 2016 en 441 municipios brasileños con más de 50 mil votantes. Es un estudio sin precedentes en su alcance temporal que permite suplir la falta de estudios sobre elecciones subnacionales, especialmente en disputas relacionadas con el Poder Legislativo Municipal. Los datos utilizados provienen del Tribunal Superior Electoral, de los cuadros de candidaturas, resultados y rendición de cuentas. Las pruebas y análisis de datos e información utilizan recursos estadísticos de correlación y regresión, además de medidas centrales y razón de probabilidades. Los resultados confirman una fuerte asociación entre dinero, votación y éxito electoral, incluso en las elecciones de 2016, cuando se prohibieron las donaciones corporativas. El mantenimiento de un patrón tanto temporal como geográfico indica la existencia de características estructurales de carácter plutocrático en el financiamiento electoral de los candidatos a concejal en las ciudades encuestadas y, en consecuencia, en la producción de políticas públicas en Brasil. ; A intimidade entre dinheiro e voto tem sido exposta nas democracias contemporâneas por meio de sua influência nos resultados eleitorais e na produção de políticas públicas. Estudos apontam que a progressiva iniquidade entre os recursos financeiros dos candidatos nas eleições abala a democracia e promove a plutocracia, ou seja, amplia o domínio oligárquico dos processos políticos pelos cidadãos e pelos grupos mais ricos. Contribuindo para esse debate, o presente trabalho analisa a relação entre receitas de financiamento e o desempenho e o sucesso eleitoral de 317.107 candidaturas a vereador nas eleições de 2008, 2012 e 2016, em 441 municípios brasileiros com mais de 50 mil eleitores. Trata-se de um estudo inédito em sua abrangência temporal, que permite suprir uma carência de exames sobre eleições subnacionais, em especial nas disputas ao Legislativo municipal. Os dados utilizados têm origem no Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, nas tabelas de candidaturas, nos resultados e na prestação de contas. Os testes e as análises de dados e informações utilizam recursos estatísticos de correlação e regressão, além de medidas centrais e razão de chances. Os resultados permitem confirmar uma forte associação entre dinheiro, voto e sucesso eleitoral, inclusive no pleito de 2016, quando estiveram proibidas as doações empresariais. A manutenção de um padrão, tanto temporal quanto geográfico, indica a existência de características estruturais de caráter plutocrático no financiamento eleitoral dos candidatos a vereador nas cidades pesquisadas e, consequentemente, sobre a produção de políticas públicas no Brasil.

The national elections of 2004 exposed growing structural problems with America's democracy. The good news of higher turnout & the lack of a constitutional crisis resembling the Florida debacle of 2000 could not hide the continuing difficulties with registration, inconsistent election laws, inequality in access to the voting booth, comparatively low turnout, non-competitive legislative elections, district gerrymandering, & partisan oversight of elections. While many of these aspects of the American electoral system are of long standing, almost all of them have been exacerbated in recent decades. What are the prospects for reforming American democracy in the 21st century? Adapted from the source document.

Writing from Islamabad, the author describes the present political situation in Pakistan & discusses earlier attempts to reach democracy through the electoral process. He contends that it would be absurd to try to predict the future of Pakistan, this country that faces challenges that few others have had to confront. However, it appears that Pakistan is going to make a third attempt to become a democracy. S. Stanton

Democracy in Brazil is recent and poses challenges to citizens in terms of political positioning, especially in the 2018 presidential elections, which were characterized by polarization, the spread of fake news and the use of social media to promote the candidates' agenda. In this context, we aim at analysing the discursive resources of pre-candidates to the 2018 Brazilian presidential elections. The Critical Discourse Analysis (FAIRCLOUGH, 2003) and Systemic Functional Linguistics (HALLIDAY, 2014) approaches were used to analyse the transcription of excerpts of six interviews from the Roda Viva TV show. The results point out that the discourse of: a) Álvaro Dias shows a pre-candidate willing to invest in education financially; b) Ciro Gomes constructs the image of experience and authority in the field of education; c) Henrique Meirelles emphasizes the relation between education and workforce development; d) Manuela D'Ávila supports the states and municipalities autonomy in their capacity to manage education locally and is aligned with women's experience as mothers, workers and citizens; e) Geraldo Alckmin will direct efforts to kindergarten education, aiming at reducing inequality; f) Jair Bolsonaro advocates eliminating the low-income and minorities quotas in public universities by investing in Basic Education in order to provide equal access to all students when they finish high school. ; A democracia no Brasil é recente e coloca desafios aos cidadãos em termos de posicionamento político, especialmente nas eleições presidenciais de 2018, que foram caracterizadas por polarização, disseminação de boatos e uso de redes sociais para promover as propostas dos candidatos. Nesse contexto, objetivamos analisar os recursos discursivos de pré-candidatos às eleições presidenciais do Brasil em 2018. A Análise Crítica do Discurso (FAIRCLOUGH, 2003) e a Linguística Sistêmico-Funcional (HALLIDAY, 2014) são utilizadas para análise da transcrição de excertos de seis entrevistas do Programa Roda Viva. Os resultados apontam que o discurso de: a) Álvaro Dias mostra um pré-candidato disposto a investir financeiramente na educação; b) Ciro Gomes constrói a imagem da experiência e autoridade no campo educacional; c) Henrique Meirelles enfatiza a relação entre educação e desenvolvimento de força de trabalho; d) Manuela D'Ávila apoia a autonomia dos estados e municípios para administrar localmente a educação e está alinhado à experiência das mulheres como mães, trabalhadoras e cidadãs; e) Geraldo Alckmin irá direcionar esforços para a educação infantil para diminuir a desigualdade; f) Jair Bolsonaro é favorável à eliminação das cotas no ensino superior por meio de investimentos na Educação Básica para proporcionar condições de acesso igualitárias a todos.PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Educação; Discurso político; Eleições presidenciais de 2018.

In the last decade of twentieth century the third wave of democratization caused transition in many of Sub-Saharan African countries. This research studies the role of Tanzania's and Zambia's political parties along with the effectiveness of democracy and institutionalization process in transition. The transition of African countries is not a fast overturning process. Today most of those countries stay in the frame of the second (transformation) and the third (democratic consolidation) levels of transition. The results of institutionalization research of party system showed that Tanzania's party system is assigned to medium level of institutionalization and pertain to transitional stage. Zambia's party system is assigned to medium-low level of institutionalization and pertain to the category of weakly formed party system. Tanzania and Zambia have not reached the full democratic consolidation yet. Therefore democracy process slowup reasons put the countries in the semi-democracy and grey zone category.