Suchergebnisse

The article provides a diachronic quantitative comparison of the political regimes of the First (interwar, LR I) and Second (contemporary, LR II) Republics of Lithuania, which is supplemented by synchronic comparisons with the neighbour countries. For this comparison, the data set and Index of Democracy by the Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen (known in the literature as the Vanhanen Index, VI) is used, whose values are calculated by multiplying those of the indicators of public contestation and of participation at the elections. The data of Vanhanen are corrected, extended, and some of his assumptions are criticised. (1) Calculating the VI values for interwar Lithuania, Vanhanen uses imprecise demographic and electoral statistical data for 1920–1923. (2) The III Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) election in 1926 and that of IV Seimas in 1936 are missing in his data. Therefore, the VI values for Lithuania in 1920–1939 are underestimated. In his calculations for the LR II, Vanhanen (3) used incorrect contestation data on the elections to the Restoration Seimas in 1990 and (4) misclassified the LR II after adoption of the 1992 constitution as a political system with parliamentary dominance. In fact, contemporary Lithuania is semi-presidential republic and should be classified as a system of concurrent powers. Vanhanen's data-set is extended with the data for 2001–2009. According to the author's recalculations with corrected data, the VI values in 1920–1925 were no less than in 1990–1995, and its value in 1926 is on a par with the highest VI values for the LR II. Importantly, participation in all four free Lithuanian Seimas elections in 1920–1926 was constantly high, while participation in the parliamentary elections in the LR II is steadily decreasing. In 1926, the value of the VI index for Lithuania caught up with those in the other Baltic States, which are reputed as more advanced in terms of social and political modernization. With 86.4% of all voters included into the lists going to the polls, the election to the III Seimas in 1926 set an absolute all-time participation record for all free elections in Lithuania (there is no reliable data on its most close competitor – elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1920). These and other comparisons reveal the Vanhanen's index to be a measure just of electoral democracy and not of the full-scale liberal democracy. In interwar Lithuania, liberal democracy existed only for 5 months in 1926, when the state of emergency (justified by the conflict with Poland) was recalled. In the LR II, the consolidation of liberal democracy made a rapid advance after 1992. The high participation in all Seimas elections (including unfree and unfair election in 1936) in the interwar Lithuania contradicts the established opinion that interwar Lithuanian society was not ready for democracy. Even if one indeed may doubt their maturity for liberal democracy, Lithuanians accepted and appreciated electoral democracy. As a matter of fact, Lithuania in 1920–1926 is quite on a par with or even surpasses the LR II in terms of the level of electoral democracy. The LR II surpasses the LR I in terms of liberal democracy. Vanhanen's index is not a valid tool for measuring liberal democracy. However, the application of Vanhanen's index to the time of the 1926 coup helps to highlight in the decorative parliamentarism of the IV Seimas in 1936–1940 some non-fictive elements of a genuine electoral regime, which have survived because of the obstacles for the complete entrenchment of authoritarianism set by the autonomy of the Klaipėda region under defense of international treaties.

The article provides a diachronic quantitative comparison of the political regimes of the First (interwar, LR I) and Second (contemporary, LR II) Republics of Lithuania, which is supplemented by synchronic comparisons with the neighbour countries. For this comparison, the data set and Index of Democracy by the Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen (known in the literature as the Vanhanen Index, VI) is used, whose values are calculated by multiplying those of the indicators of public contestation and of participation at the elections. The data of Vanhanen are corrected, extended, and some of his assumptions are criticised. (1) Calculating the VI values for interwar Lithuania, Vanhanen uses imprecise demographic and electoral statistical data for 1920–1923. (2) The III Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) election in 1926 and that of IV Seimas in 1936 are missing in his data. Therefore, the VI values for Lithuania in 1920–1939 are underestimated. In his calculations for the LR II, Vanhanen (3) used incorrect contestation data on the elections to the Restoration Seimas in 1990 and (4) misclassified the LR II after adoption of the 1992 constitution as a political system with parliamentary dominance. In fact, contemporary Lithuania is semi-presidential republic and should be classified as a system of concurrent powers. Vanhanen's data-set is extended with the data for 2001–2009. According to the author's recalculations with corrected data, the VI values in 1920–1925 were no less than in 1990–1995, and its value in 1926 is on a par with the highest VI values for the LR II. Importantly, participation in all four free Lithuanian Seimas elections in 1920–1926 was constantly high, while participation in the parliamentary elections in the LR II is steadily decreasing. In 1926, the value of the VI index for Lithuania caught up with those in the other Baltic States, which are reputed as more advanced in terms of social and political modernization. With 86.4% of all voters included into the lists going to the polls, the election to the III Seimas in 1926 set an absolute all-time participation record for all free elections in Lithuania (there is no reliable data on its most close competitor – elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1920). These and other comparisons reveal the Vanhanen's index to be a measure just of electoral democracy and not of the full-scale liberal democracy. In interwar Lithuania, liberal democracy existed only for 5 months in 1926, when the state of emergency (justified by the conflict with Poland) was recalled. In the LR II, the consolidation of liberal democracy made a rapid advance after 1992. The high participation in all Seimas elections (including unfree and unfair election in 1936) in the interwar Lithuania contradicts the established opinion that interwar Lithuanian society was not ready for democracy. Even if one indeed may doubt their maturity for liberal democracy, Lithuanians accepted and appreciated electoral democracy. As a matter of fact, Lithuania in 1920–1926 is quite on a par with or even surpasses the LR II in terms of the level of electoral democracy. The LR II surpasses the LR I in terms of liberal democracy. Vanhanen's index is not a valid tool for measuring liberal democracy. However, the application of Vanhanen's index to the time of the 1926 coup helps to highlight in the decorative parliamentarism of the IV Seimas in 1936–1940 some non-fictive elements of a genuine electoral regime, which have survived because of the obstacles for the complete entrenchment of authoritarianism set by the autonomy of the Klaipėda region under defense of international treaties.

The article provides a diachronic quantitative comparison of the political regimes of the First (interwar, LR I) and Second (contemporary, LR II) Republics of Lithuania, which is supplemented by synchronic comparisons with the neighbour countries. For this comparison, the data set and Index of Democracy by the Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen (known in the literature as the Vanhanen Index, VI) is used, whose values are calculated by multiplying those of the indicators of public contestation and of participation at the elections. The data of Vanhanen are corrected, extended, and some of his assumptions are criticised. (1) Calculating the VI values for interwar Lithuania, Vanhanen uses imprecise demographic and electoral statistical data for 1920–1923. (2) The III Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) election in 1926 and that of IV Seimas in 1936 are missing in his data. Therefore, the VI values for Lithuania in 1920–1939 are underestimated. In his calculations for the LR II, Vanhanen (3) used incorrect contestation data on the elections to the Restoration Seimas in 1990 and (4) misclassified the LR II after adoption of the 1992 constitution as a political system with parliamentary dominance. In fact, contemporary Lithuania is semi-presidential republic and should be classified as a system of concurrent powers. Vanhanen's data-set is extended with the data for 2001–2009. According to the author's recalculations with corrected data, the VI values in 1920–1925 were no less than in 1990–1995, and its value in 1926 is on a par with the highest VI values for the LR II. Importantly, participation in all four free Lithuanian Seimas elections in 1920–1926 was constantly high, while participation in the parliamentary elections in the LR II is steadily decreasing. In 1926, the value of the VI index for Lithuania caught up with those in the other Baltic States, which are reputed as more advanced in terms of social and political modernization. With 86.4% of all voters included into the lists going to the polls, the election to the III Seimas in 1926 set an absolute all-time participation record for all free elections in Lithuania (there is no reliable data on its most close competitor – elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1920). These and other comparisons reveal the Vanhanen's index to be a measure just of electoral democracy and not of the full-scale liberal democracy. In interwar Lithuania, liberal democracy existed only for 5 months in 1926, when the state of emergency (justified by the conflict with Poland) was recalled. In the LR II, the consolidation of liberal democracy made a rapid advance after 1992. The high participation in all Seimas elections (including unfree and unfair election in 1936) in the interwar Lithuania contradicts the established opinion that interwar Lithuanian society was not ready for democracy. Even if one indeed may doubt their maturity for liberal democracy, Lithuanians accepted and appreciated electoral democracy. As a matter of fact, Lithuania in 1920–1926 is quite on a par with or even surpasses the LR II in terms of the level of electoral democracy. The LR II surpasses the LR I in terms of liberal democracy. Vanhanen's index is not a valid tool for measuring liberal democracy. However, the application of Vanhanen's index to the time of the 1926 coup helps to highlight in the decorative parliamentarism of the IV Seimas in 1936–1940 some non-fictive elements of a genuine electoral regime, which have survived because of the obstacles for the complete entrenchment of authoritarianism set by the autonomy of the Klaipėda region under defense of international treaties.

The article provides a diachronic quantitative comparison of the political regimes of the First (interwar, LR I) and Second (contemporary, LR II) Republics of Lithuania, which is supplemented by synchronic comparisons with the neighbour countries. For this comparison, the data set and Index of Democracy by the Finnish political scientist Tatu Vanhanen (known in the literature as the Vanhanen Index, VI) is used, whose values are calculated by multiplying those of the indicators of public contestation and of participation at the elections. The data of Vanhanen are corrected, extended, and some of his assumptions are criticised. (1) Calculating the VI values for interwar Lithuania, Vanhanen uses imprecise demographic and electoral statistical data for 1920–1923. (2) The III Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) election in 1926 and that of IV Seimas in 1936 are missing in his data. Therefore, the VI values for Lithuania in 1920–1939 are underestimated. In his calculations for the LR II, Vanhanen (3) used incorrect contestation data on the elections to the Restoration Seimas in 1990 and (4) misclassified the LR II after adoption of the 1992 constitution as a political system with parliamentary dominance. In fact, contemporary Lithuania is semi-presidential republic and should be classified as a system of concurrent powers. Vanhanen's data-set is extended with the data for 2001–2009. According to the author's recalculations with corrected data, the VI values in 1920–1925 were no less than in 1990–1995, and its value in 1926 is on a par with the highest VI values for the LR II. Importantly, participation in all four free Lithuanian Seimas elections in 1920–1926 was constantly high, while participation in the parliamentary elections in the LR II is steadily decreasing. In 1926, the value of the VI index for Lithuania caught up with those in the other Baltic States, which are reputed as more advanced in terms of social and political modernization. With 86.4% of all voters included into the lists going to the polls, the election to the III Seimas in 1926 set an absolute all-time participation record for all free elections in Lithuania (there is no reliable data on its most close competitor – elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1920). These and other comparisons reveal the Vanhanen's index to be a measure just of electoral democracy and not of the full-scale liberal democracy. In interwar Lithuania, liberal democracy existed only for 5 months in 1926, when the state of emergency (justified by the conflict with Poland) was recalled. In the LR II, the consolidation of liberal democracy made a rapid advance after 1992. The high participation in all Seimas elections (including unfree and unfair election in 1936) in the interwar Lithuania contradicts the established opinion that interwar Lithuanian society was not ready for democracy. Even if one indeed may doubt their maturity for liberal democracy, Lithuanians accepted and appreciated electoral democracy. As a matter of fact, Lithuania in 1920–1926 is quite on a par with or even surpasses the LR II in terms of the level of electoral democracy. The LR II surpasses the LR I in terms of liberal democracy. Vanhanen's index is not a valid tool for measuring liberal democracy. However, the application of Vanhanen's index to the time of the 1926 coup helps to highlight in the decorative parliamentarism of the IV Seimas in 1936–1940 some non-fictive elements of a genuine electoral regime, which have survived because of the obstacles for the complete entrenchment of authoritarianism set by the autonomy of the Klaipėda region under defense of international treaties.

The analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court shows that the main principles, whose content was best revealed, are universal, equal, direct, free suffrage and secret ballot. The content of the principles of electoral law are revealed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court case by case. In every case the Constitutional Court reveals as much of the content of the particular principle as is necessary for the fair resolution of the case. The constitutional principles of electoral law are applicable not only in the elections of national representative political institutions, but also in the elections of the European Parliament which is the representative political institution of the European Union. The constitutional principles of electoral law are important for the implementation of both active and passive electoral rights. These principles are the criterions on the grounds of which the democracy of the elections and the validity of the results of the election, are assessed and they are the criterions for assessment whether the representative political institutions are instituted properly, whether the constitutional rights to vote and to stand for election are not violated.

The analysis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court shows that the main principles, whose content was best revealed, are universal, equal, direct, free suffrage and secret ballot. The content of the principles of electoral law are revealed in the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court case by case. In every case the Constitutional Court reveals as much of the content of the particular principle as is necessary for the fair resolution of the case. The constitutional principles of electoral law are applicable not only in the elections of national representative political institutions, but also in the elections of the European Parliament which is the representative political institution of the European Union. The constitutional principles of electoral law are important for the implementation of both active and passive electoral rights. These principles are the criterions on the grounds of which the democracy of the elections and the validity of the results of the election, are assessed and they are the criterions for assessment whether the representative political institutions are instituted properly, whether the constitutional rights to vote and to stand for election are not violated.

The most important task of this notice is to reveal what allows to approve or to deny the existence or absence of democracy as political-social phenomena. While looking for a solution more attention was paid to such political processes as a electoral system and rule system in order to reveal their relation with implementation of democracy and the degree of this implementation. This notice will convince us that the historical basis of democracy is association as civil community where the decisions are made by the members of this association who are equal to each other among themselves. What is more, those chapters where electoral and rule systems are discussed show that the way how the the rule apparatus is ordered has a lot of influence to any political regime, in our case to democracy. That means, for example, that the majority electoral system is efficient and covers up the criterions of democracy only in those states where two-party system is predominant or, for example, that it is impossible to imagine undisciplined parties that rule efficient and in democratic way in parlametary state. More over, the aim of the last chapter was to get readers familiar with cosmopolitan model of democracy and with the global degree of democracy, further more, to reveal the lookouts of democracy development and means that are the most suitable to implement that development.

In the last decade of twentieth century the third wave of democratization caused transition in many of Sub-Saharan African countries. This research studies the role of Tanzania's and Zambia's political parties along with the effectiveness of democracy and institutionalization process in transition. The transition of African countries is not a fast overturning process. Today most of those countries stay in the frame of the second (transformation) and the third (democratic consolidation) levels of transition. The results of institutionalization research of party system showed that Tanzania's party system is assigned to medium level of institutionalization and pertain to transitional stage. Zambia's party system is assigned to medium-low level of institutionalization and pertain to the category of weakly formed party system. Tanzania and Zambia have not reached the full democratic consolidation yet. Therefore democracy process slowup reasons put the countries in the semi-democracy and grey zone category.

In the last decade of twentieth century the third wave of democratization caused transition in many of Sub-Saharan African countries. This research studies the role of Tanzania's and Zambia's political parties along with the effectiveness of democracy and institutionalization process in transition. The transition of African countries is not a fast overturning process. Today most of those countries stay in the frame of the second (transformation) and the third (democratic consolidation) levels of transition. The results of institutionalization research of party system showed that Tanzania's party system is assigned to medium level of institutionalization and pertain to transitional stage. Zambia's party system is assigned to medium-low level of institutionalization and pertain to the category of weakly formed party system. Tanzania and Zambia have not reached the full democratic consolidation yet. Therefore democracy process slowup reasons put the countries in the semi-democracy and grey zone category.

In the last decade of twentieth century the third wave of democratization caused transition in many of Sub-Saharan African countries. This research studies the role of Tanzania's and Zambia's political parties along with the effectiveness of democracy and institutionalization process in transition. The transition of African countries is not a fast overturning process. Today most of those countries stay in the frame of the second (transformation) and the third (democratic consolidation) levels of transition. The results of institutionalization research of party system showed that Tanzania's party system is assigned to medium level of institutionalization and pertain to transitional stage. Zambia's party system is assigned to medium-low level of institutionalization and pertain to the category of weakly formed party system. Tanzania and Zambia have not reached the full democratic consolidation yet. Therefore democracy process slowup reasons put the countries in the semi-democracy and grey zone category.

The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.

The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.

The ame of this article -nvestigate the nature and results of electoral politics in Serbia during the period of the beginning of violent dissolution of ex-Yugoslavia and the first multiparty elections in 1990. Two levels of elections are taken into consideration: presidential and parliamentary. Oppositely to other Central and East European states, Serbia in the beginning of 1990s has not been involved into the process of political transformation from totalitarian one-party elections controlled system into democratic multi-party free elections model. "Transition without transition" was a formula implied by the ruling party to political life of Serbia during the process of Yugoslavia's dissolution. Political life has seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy, but without the stable institutional support to that system. The ruling Socialist Party of Serbia imposed its own rules and control over presidential and parliamentary elections in order to discredit the democratic values. As a result, authoritarian political system was thriven to serve the interests of the former ruling nomenclature rather than represent the majority of Serbia's citizens.

Fundamental Status of the Public Election Committees Public Election Committees are new political formations open to non-party people and are formed only during the election period. Election committees became very popular in Lithuania and created fierce competition for political parties. Nonetheless, Public Electoral Committees soon started to be questionable as they became an excellent space for businessmen, convicts and politicians who, after achieving nothing with their previous parties, join the Public Electoral Committee and thus are able to remain in the frontlines of politics. In addition to this, the legal regulation of Public Election Committees is ambiguous, allowing committee members to avoid both, responsibility against voters and financial transparency, which often leads to legal disputes. The aim of this thesis is to identify the root causes of disputes between Central Electoral Committees and the Central Electoral Commission as basis for changing the regulation of Public Election Committees. To do this, three tasks of the thesis are being solved: to present the constitutional concept of elections based on democratic values; to disclose the legal aspects of the validation and registration of Public Election Committees and to present the differences and similarities between political parties and Public Election Committees; to analyze legal election disputes and to identify the causes of these legal disputes. The analysis of legal and scientific literature has shown that elections, as the constitutional value of democracy, manifests itself by the fact that democratic elections are essentially a mechanism for expressing the will of citizens on the establishment of public authorities and political representatives who by governing the affairs of the state and through descition making are responsible for both – the life of the country and its citizens. The analysis of legal acts revealed that in order to participate in the elections, Public Electoral Committees are required: to make a list of its candidates; conclude an operating agreement, collect signatures of residents who support them; sign up; pay the election bail. The analysis of legal electoral disputes revealed that the disputes are classified into two groups: electoral disputes by election period and election disputes by election organization and execution. The analysis of legal electoral disputes allowed to distinguish the following main reasons of legal electoral disputes: misunderstanding of legal acts, misinterpretation and lack of precise legal regulation; uncertainties, gaps, ambiguities in the legal regulation of registration, funding and liability of election committees; Election Committees have strict requirements for registering new members; the actions of the election authorities and their staff are not clearly defined; electoral campaigning rules are often violated

Fundamental Status of the Public Election Committees Public Election Committees are new political formations open to non-party people and are formed only during the election period. Election committees became very popular in Lithuania and created fierce competition for political parties. Nonetheless, Public Electoral Committees soon started to be questionable as they became an excellent space for businessmen, convicts and politicians who, after achieving nothing with their previous parties, join the Public Electoral Committee and thus are able to remain in the frontlines of politics. In addition to this, the legal regulation of Public Election Committees is ambiguous, allowing committee members to avoid both, responsibility against voters and financial transparency, which often leads to legal disputes. The aim of this thesis is to identify the root causes of disputes between Central Electoral Committees and the Central Electoral Commission as basis for changing the regulation of Public Election Committees. To do this, three tasks of the thesis are being solved: to present the constitutional concept of elections based on democratic values; to disclose the legal aspects of the validation and registration of Public Election Committees and to present the differences and similarities between political parties and Public Election Committees; to analyze legal election disputes and to identify the causes of these legal disputes. The analysis of legal and scientific literature has shown that elections, as the constitutional value of democracy, manifests itself by the fact that democratic elections are essentially a mechanism for expressing the will of citizens on the establishment of public authorities and political representatives who by governing the affairs of the state and through descition making are responsible for both – the life of the country and its citizens. The analysis of legal acts revealed that in order to participate in the elections, Public Electoral Committees are required: to make a list of its candidates; conclude an operating agreement, collect signatures of residents who support them; sign up; pay the election bail. The analysis of legal electoral disputes revealed that the disputes are classified into two groups: electoral disputes by election period and election disputes by election organization and execution. The analysis of legal electoral disputes allowed to distinguish the following main reasons of legal electoral disputes: misunderstanding of legal acts, misinterpretation and lack of precise legal regulation; uncertainties, gaps, ambiguities in the legal regulation of registration, funding and liability of election committees; Election Committees have strict requirements for registering new members; the actions of the election authorities and their staff are not clearly defined; electoral campaigning rules are often violated