Comparing Electoral Systems
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 329-333
ISSN: 1475-6765
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In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 9, Heft 3, S. 329-333
ISSN: 1475-6765
In: The insurgent sociologist, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 27-31
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 8, Heft 4, S. 423-446
ISSN: 1475-6765
ABSTRACTHow proportional are the results of electoral systems designed to ensure proportional representation? How large is the deviation from proportionality for relative majority systems? Does a given system favor large, small or medium‐sized parties? Are some parties consistently advantaged? Is the system predictable or erratic? Plotting the percentage of seats–percentage of votes ratio versus percentage of votes for all parties, is found to be a simple and yet powerful graphical method to answer such questions. Application of such "proportionality profiles" to West European multi‐party systems leads to a typology of electoral systems based on their actual effect (rather than their formal procedure or intended effect). District magnitude, the number of rounds, and nationwide adjustment rules are found to be more important than formal seat distribution rules such as d'Hondt or Sainte‐Laguë.
How proportional are the results of electoral systems designed to ensure proportional representation? How large is the deviation from proportionality for relative majority systems? Does a given system favor large, small or medium‐sized parties? Are some parties consistently advantaged? Is the system predictable or erratic? Plotting the percentage of seats–percentage of votes ratio versus percentage of votes for all parties, is found to be a simple and yet powerful graphical method to answer such questions. Application of such "proportionality profiles" to West European multi‐party systems leads to a typology of electoral systems based on their actual effect (rather than their formal procedure or intended effect). District magnitude, the number of rounds, and nationwide adjustment rules are found to be more important than formal seat distribution rules such as d'Hondt or Sainte‐Laguë. Copyright © 1980, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved
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In: Journal of political & military sociology, Band 9, Heft 2, S. 310-311
ISSN: 0047-2697
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 8, Heft 4
ISSN: 0304-4130
In: The First European Elections, S. 92-119
In: Routledge library editions. Political science, v. 22
This book provides a concise and accessible account of the historical experience of European parliaments - why different electoral systems were adopted, how they have functioned, how they have affected the development of political parties, and in what respects they have been found over time to be either suitable or unsatisfactory. The book begins with a summary of the main electoral systems, analysing and re-assessing each in the light of historical experience. The core of the book, however, is a country-by-country account of the systems which have operated in each of the main West European.
In: Revista española de la opinión pública, Heft 50, S. 253
In: American political science review, Band 75, Heft 3, S. 795-796
ISSN: 1537-5943
In: Italian Political Science Review: IPSR = Rivista italiana di scienza politica : RISP, Band 11, Heft 2, S. 355-356
ISSN: 2057-4908
In: Scandinavian political studies, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 249-264
ISSN: 1467-9477
Studies of the properties of different electoral systems have generally concentrated upon the question of proportionality. This article introduces the concept of electoral justice which also incorporates the decision‐making process into models of proportionality. Hypotheses derived from the concept are then tested against post‐1945 Finnish electoral data.
In: Public choice, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 69-85
ISSN: 0048-5829
Electoral systems with single-member districts in which plurality of votes determines victory tend to develop two-party competition. The US Electoral College is a two-level version of this system; within each state, competition focuses on two candidates, while more than two candidates may be viable nationwide if voters in different states are choosing between different pairs of alternatives. The Electoral College has a measurable effect on the propensity of a rational voter to vote for the candidate he most prefers. The 'slippage' between the individual's articulated preference ordering & his actual vote is analyzed with respect to the voter's strategic position in his state, utilizing 1968 presidential election survey data collected by the Instit for Social Research from 1,298 persons in a sample drawn from 36 states. The direction of the findings supports the theoretically derived propositions. However, the low overall incidence of shifts & the reluctance of voters to shift from nationally viable candidates demonstrates the overwhelming influence of the national electoral environment. 8 Tables. Modified HA.
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 1-26
ISSN: 1475-6765
ABSTRACTIn recent years it has become increasingly difficult to maintain that the European party systems are stable and that they reflect the societal cleavage structures of the past. One developmental aspect of the party systems is singled out for description and analysis in this paper. It is argued that European party systems in terms of electoral volatility, i.e. rates of net change in the electorates, are drifting away from each other. Some of the party systems which have traditionally been considered volatile, apparently are becoming less so, while some other systems are taking on the character of highly volatile party systems. A simple set of hypotheses, based upon the notion of party space, is proposed in order to account for the variation observed. The data lend support to the hypothesis that electoral volatility is a function of the format of the party system and of short‐term changes in that format.