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At least four criterions/methods to measure mechanical effects of electoral systems can be distinguished: measuring disproportionality, the reduction in number of parties, the party advantages & the threshold percentages. In this manuscript we focus on the thresholds. We first concentrate on a description of legal, theoretical, & empirical thresholds as measures of mechanical effects. Further, we analyse the relationship between (the natural logarithm) of district magnitude & the empirical threshold & between the empirical threshold & the effective number of parties. As starting point we take districts in Spain, Portugal & Hungary as the level of analysis. We clearly show that there is a negative causal connection between district magnitude & the threshold percentage & between threshold percentage & the number of parties. Tables, Figures. Adapted from the source document.

Electoral reforms are a popular research topic for political scientists. Noted Lijphart (1985, 3) almost 30 years ago that research on electoral systems was 'the most underdeveloped subject in political science', now we have numerous research publications on electoral systems and choose system changes. Adapted from the source document.

In the literature on the impact of gender quota party magnitude appears as one of the most critical explanatory variables. A high party magnitude has long been argued to be a necessary condition for quota to be effective. However, recently a number of studies have shown that gender quota can be equally effective in the case of low party magnitude. An analysis of the Belgian regional elections for the years 1999, 2004 and 2009 shows that for quota to be effective it is crucial that they are tailored to the electoral system in which they are applied. Quota prove to be particularly effective when party magnitude is high while a placement mandate is effective when it covers a substantial part of the eligible list positions. We therefore conclude that effective quota can be designed for both high and low party magnitude. Adapted from the source document.

In comparative electoral studies, the Belgian electoral formula is classified in different, sometimes rather conflicting, classes. This paper is primarily concerned with the question of whether the Belgian electoral system truly is a D'Hondt system? In the first part, I argue that the D'Hondt method, as a divisor sequence, can be applied alternatively. This modified method departs from a Hare-quota in the first phase. To allocate the rest seats in the second phase, the parties' aggregated vote totals (& not rest totals) are divided by the number of seats obtained in phase one, added by 1, then 2, then 3, etc. Like all divisor methods, the highest averages are used to assign the rest seats. This alternative D'Hondt method produces exactly the same results as the classical one. Thus, it is also used in the Belgian two-tier districting system. Further, the Belgian electoral system can be classified as a proper D'Hondt system (in its form & results) while ignoring the primary districts. 4 Tables, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix. Adapted from the source document.