Suchergebnisse

Institutional factors have considerable impact on the success of regional minority parties. This can be seen clearly in the cases of Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland and their minority parties; the PQ, the CiU and the SNP. The combination of party systems and electoral systems as well as the degree of regional autonomy has played an important role for their ability to govern and their capability to act on the regional level. After having been elected into government, regional minority parties need to play the game of politics in which actors, driven by their respective interests, have to compete and govern within a specific institutional context. From a neo-institutional perspective, regional minority parties influence these institutions over the long, but they are also constrained by the institutional context. Governance means here the reciprocal interaction between societal and political/institutional factors. These processes can contribute to the disintegration and integration of a multi-level government system. This is connected to a specific leeway of societal mobilization, in which generations are socialized politically in such a way that they become a so-called 'Unabhangigkeitsgeneration' (a generation of people seeking independence). Those generations can then put pressure on the institutional system in different degrees. Adapted from the source document.

Italian Governments are often instable and their acting capabilities are limited. One of the main reasons is to be seen in the electoral system. Reforms of this system should find a just balance between representation and stability. During the First Republic (1946-1994) a proportional system also offered small parties the possibility of parliamentary representation. As a consequence it was very difficult to form stable majorities and governments. During the severe crisis of the party system 1992/1994 it therefore was replaced by a mixed system of proportional representation and major. It favored the bipolarization and concentration of the party system during elections, but it did not create parliamentary and governmental stability. In 2005 the Berlusconi government III returned to the proportional system of the First Republic, but added a 4% barrage and a premium for the majority. So it had the effect of a majority system with the distribution of the seats of the winning coalition to its components. It produced large, but instable majorities and governments with limited acting capabilities. The discussion about the electoral system is therefore going on. Adapted from the source document.

Hans Herbert von Arnim is a phenomenon. No other jurist possesses the notoriety of this man who celebrated his 70th birthday on 16 November 2009. His publicly effective criticism on parties is fierce & severe. In the media he proclaims provocations in a friendly manner. This article appraises his newest work "People's Parties without People" that has been published on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Constitution & the 20th anniversary of the peaceful revolution in the GDR. Arnim's main concerns are the deficits in elections & election laws. He dramatizes & often paints reality black. He compares reality with an ideal without examining whether the theory can effectively be implemented. The author concludes that this book is one of the weaker books by Arnim. Adapted from the source document.

To eliminate the "negative weight of votes" effect of the German electoral system, Pappi and Herrmann have recommended a reform model in which the Lander party lists are detached from each other and the seats for each party list are allocated separately. However, this suggestion is not suitable for several reasons. First of all, the Pappi-Herrmann model would not eliminate the essentially problematic effect of the current electoral system, i.e. the emergence of surplus seats. These seats cannot be considered a desirable "majority bonus" for constitutional reasons. Furthermore, the argument that surplus seats favor those government coalitions that have been announced by the respective parties before the polls proves to be untenable for empirical reasons. Surplus seats may rather reverse earned majorities of other party coalitions and thereby undermine the legitimating function of parliamentary elections. Viable reform options include a reduced share of single-member districts or the introduction of two-member districts, complemented by compensation seats for the other parties. In so doing, the "negative weight of votes" effect and the emergence of surplus seats could be eliminated at the same time. Adapted from the source document.

Parties play no more than a marginal role in the political life of contemporary Belarus. As a result of the absolute majority vote electoral system, restrictive controls, & strict regulations governing registration, they have no real way of obtaining access to political power. However, President Lukashenka's authoritarian system of rule is not the only reason why the efforts of the opposition parties have largely failed. The parties themselves have shown little ability to form alliances or to serve as a forum where the protest potential present in the population can be articulated. Adapted from the source document.

The article pleads for (the introduction of) the majority vote system, including an additional proportional list, & at the same time, against proportional representation. It is argued that the latter either leads to ungovernability or at least a "never ending grand coalition," or to a small coalition & with that to a "conception of electoral fairness without consequence." A specific kind of electoral reform called "moderate majority vote system" is suggested, which can be seen as an optimal electoral system for Germany. It would also serve as a good model for other democracies, for example Austria. The new system, combining majority voting & an additional proportional list, would have the advantage of a single-party government. Despite that, it would still allow the possibility of representation of small parties in parliament. Figures. Adapted from the source document.

The year of 2010 was the first time in the post-communist history of Hungary when one party/party alliance won a two-third majority of parliamentary seats. This means new possibilities for huge changes but also ambivalent outcomes. For the first time ever, Hungary holds the EU-Presidency from January 1 to June 30, 2011, putting the country in the limelight. The Hungarian electoral system with its mixture of proportional and majority elements clearly contributed to the overwhelming majority won by FIDESZ in 2010. An account is given of the parliamentary parties, with special attention to the newcomer green and radical right formations, of the election campaigns, strategies and programs and of the attitudes of voters and their sociological backgrounds. The forming process of the government is discussed as well as the new structure and possible ways of future changes in the political arena. Adapted from the source document.