Suchergebnisse

Esta investigación se concentra principalmente en los diagnósticos que las fuerzas políticas opositoras realizaron en relación a la emergencia del peronismo, su llegada al gobierno y la interpretación del mismo que establecieron a lo largo de toda la siguiente década (1943-1955). Es sabido que dicha etapa se caracterizó por una intensa polarización política que, a través de los años, evidenció una radicalización de las posturas del oficialismo y de la oposición. Este proceso se manifestó tanto en la aplicación de crecientes restricciones gubernamentales a la participación opositora como en la adopción de estrategias extra-institucionales por buena parte del campo antiperonista, principalmente a partir de la segunda presidencia de Perón, que habilitó la introducción de expresiones de violencia política hacia los últimos años de gobierno. De este modo, la presente tesis indaga en cómo se desarrolló el proceso de co-constitución de identidades políticas, polarización y apuestas extra-institucionales a lo largo de la década peronista. Este trabajo parte de la premisa de considerar al antiperonismo una identidad política, esto es, un campo identitario que fue capaz de articular expresiones políticas de diversa trayectoria y procedencia ideológica. Su surgimiento no puede ser entendido desde una óptica que se resuelva ni en una abrupta ruptura con su pasado ni en su mera reproducción. Contra la simplificación de la imagen de una ruptura total, en los últimos años la historiografía consolidó una mirada que comprende al peronismo, y también al antiperonismo, en relación a su pasado mediato, principalmente el posterior a 1930. No obstante, a pesar de la importancia de la tradición antifascista a la hora de proveer un marco de inteligibilidad bajo el cual fue interpretado el ascenso del peronismo por parte de la oposición partidaria, su emergencia -que asoció fuertemente a Perón a las políticas laborales y sociales- se dio de una forma que rebalsó aquel esquema interpretativo. En ese sentido, este trabajo propone un repaso por las caracterizaciones que establecieron del peronismo las principales fuerzas opositoras a lo largo de la década. El triunfo de Perón en las elecciones del 24 de febrero de 1946, aunque inesperado para las fuerzas opositoras, no modificó sustancialmente sus formas de interpretación del fenómeno peronista. La presente investigación se concentra particularmente en los márgenes de reconocimiento por parte de la oposición a la legitimidad y a la legalidad política del gobierno peronista, que serán variables a lo largo del período en estudio. En el lapso que va desde la reforma constitucional de 1949 a la reelección presidencial de Perón en 1951, el gobierno ensayó una agudización de los mecanismos de control y coerción política sobre los sectores disidentes u opositores. En ese sentido, aunque la denuncia al autoritarismo gubernamental no implicó para las fuerzas antiperonistas un pasaje abrupto a un tipo de oposición no institucional, la contundente reelección de Perón con alrededor de dos tercios del electorado reveló que la oposición estaba aún lejos de ser capaz de rivalizar a través de los sufragios con el oficialismo. A lo largo de toda la década en estudio, si bien es evidente que un proceso de creciente radicalización política atravesó la relación entre peronistas y antiperonistas, no es posible identificar un momento único y definitivo que opere como un punto de quiebre hacia la adopción de mecanismos extra-institucionales por parte de los grupos opositores. La dimensión relacional de este proceso permite comprender mejor las retroalimentaciones mutuas de ambos campos, que justificaban sus estrategias disruptivas de acuerdo a las trasgresiones del otro. Sin embargo, si hay un hecho que logró sintetizar las crecientes denuncias del antiperonismo al autoritarismo gubernamental y a las restricciones a las libertades públicas, ese fue la sanción del estado de guerra interno el 28 de septiembre de 1951, tras el fallido levantamiento militar de Benjamín Menéndez. La presente investigación sugiere que el estado de guerra interno, en general poco abordado por parte de la historiografía especializada, representó para el antiperonismo el establecimiento de un régimen ajeno al estado de derecho, condensando buena parte de los cuestionamientos existentes desde la asunción misma de Perón. En ese sentido, de forma transversal a todo el campo antiperonista, las fuerzas opositoras se vieron atravesadas por un debate en el que diversas tendencias reclamaban la adopción de la abstención electoral y el abandono de las bancas parlamentarias para desconocer la legalidad del régimen peronista. Este proceso de radicalización se coronó con el abierto respaldo de la mayoría de las fuerzas opositoras a la salida militar y en el entusiasta apoyo que dichos partidos le brindaron a la "Revolución Libertadora". ; This research focuses mainly on the diagnoses that the opposition political forces made about the emergence of Peronism and the Perón´s presidency between 1946 and 1955. It is known that this stage was characterized by an intense political polarization that, over the years, evidenced a radicalization of the positions of the ruling party and the opposition. This process manifested itself both in the application of increasing governmental restrictions on opposition participation and in the adoption of extra-institutional strategies by a large part of the anti-Peronist camp, which enabled the introduction of political violence towards the last years of government. In this way, this thesis explores how the process of co-constitution of political identities, polarization and extra-institutional strategies developed during the Peronist decade. This work is based on the premise of considering anti-Peronism a political identity that was able to articulate political parties from different trajectories and ideological origins. Its emergence cannot be understood neither in an abrupt rupture with its past nor in its mere reproduction. In recent years, historiography has consolidated a view that understands Peronism, and also anti-Peronism, in relation to its mediate past, mainly after 1930. However, despite the importance of the anti-fascist tradition under which the rise of Peronism was interpreted by the opposition parties, its emergence -which strongly associated Perón with labor and social policies- surpassed that interpretive scheme. In this sense, this work proposes a review of the characterizations established by Peronism of the main opposition forces throughout the decade. Perón´s victory in the presidential election of 1946, although unexpected for the opposition forces, did not substantially modify their ways of interpreting the Peronist movement. The present investigation focuses particularly on the recognition by the opposition to the legitimacy and political legality of the Peronist government, which will be variable throughout the decade under study. In the period from the constitutional reform of 1949 to the presidential re-election of Perón in 1951, the government tried to sharpen the mechanisms of control and political coercion over dissident or opposition sectors. In that sense, although the denunciation of governmental authoritarianism did not imply for the anti-Peronist forces an abrupt passage to a non-institutional type of opposition, Perón's resounding reelection with around two-thirds of the electorate revealed that the opposition was still far from being able to electorally defeat the ruling party. Throughout the decade under study, it is not possible to identify a single and definitive moment that operates as a turning point towards the adoption of mechanisms extrainstitutional by opposition groups. However, the state of internal war sanctioned by Perón on 1951, after the failed military uprising of Benjamin Menéndez, managed to synthesize the denunciations of anti-Peronism to governmental authoritarianism and restrictions on public liberties. A process of growing political radicalization crossed then the relationship between Peronists and anti-Peronists, which both justified their extra-institutional strategies according to the transgressions of the other. In this sense, across the anti-Peronist camp, the opposition forces were traversed by a debate in which various tendencies demanded the adoption of the electoral abstention and the abandonment of the parliamentary seats to ignore the legality of the Peronist regime. This process of radicalization was crowned with the open support of most of the opposition forces to the military exit and to the "Revolución Libertadora". ; Fil: Pizzorno, Pablo Ignacio. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Instituto de Altos Estudios Sociales; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina

This paper focuses on recent theoretical developments in political economy and what role they might play in explaining and reforming individual country and global distortions in food and agricultural markets. Four groups of forces are isolated: political governance structures emphasizing the role of democratic mechanisms; the design of polycentric structures for assigned governmental authority for setting policy instruments; market structure and other socioeconomic characteristics; and the role of sector mobility and asset diversification. Each of these forces are distilled and data sources are reviewed that will allow econometric specifications that have both explanatory and policy reform implications.

Tämä väitöskirja käsittelee parlamenttien ja kansalaisten välistä suhdetta vaalien välillä, mikä on keskeinen kysymys tutkittaessa parlamentteja. Lainsäädäntöelimiä tutkineet ovat tähän saakka keskittyneet tarkastelemaan parlamentaaristen instituutioiden muodollisia tehtäviä, lainsäädäntöelimen ja toimeenpanovallan välisiä suhteita sekä puolueiden vaikutusta parlamentin päätöksiin. Keskustelu demokraattisista innovaatioista taas jättää usein huomiotta sen, että parlamenteilla on keskeinen rooli hallituksen ja kansalaisten välisenä linkkinä. Näitä monitahoisia yhteyksiä lainsäädäntöelimien ja niiden valitsijoiden välillä ei ole tutkittu tarpeeksi, vaikka viime vuosina tutkimus onkin jonkin verran lisääntynyt. (Norton 2002; Leston-Bandeir 2012 a.) Koska useimmat vakiintuneet demokratiat kohtaavat nykyisin suuria poliittisia haasteita, tutkijoille on syntynyt tarve tarkastella parlamenttien ja kansalaisten suhdetta uusista näkökulmista. On lisääntyvä tarve tehdä käsitteellistä ja empiiristä tutkimusta parlamentaarisen demokratian muuttuvasta luonteesta, sekä vakiintuneiden edustuksellisten demokratioiden dynamiikasta ja jännitteistä suhteessa kansalaisosallistumisen uusiin muotoihin. Tämä tutkimus täyttää tutkimuskirjallisuudessa havaitun puutteen ja tarjoaa systemaattisen empiirisen tutkimuksen parlamenttien ja kansalaisten suhteesta suomalaisen demokratian kontekstissa. Suomen tapaus on tässä suhteessa erityisen tärkeä. Kuten muut Pohjoismaat, Suomi on vahvasti puolueisiin perustuva edustuksellinen demokratia. Samalla Suomi on usein poliittisten ja yhteiskunnallisten innovaatioiden etulinjassa. Vuoden 2000 perustuslakiuudistus vahvisti eduskunnan ja pääministerin asemaa kansallisessa politiikassa suhteessa tasavallan presidenttiin. Kansalaisaloitelaki tuli voimaan vuonna 2012, mahdollistaen kansalaisten osallistumisen lainsäädännöllisen agendan muodostamiseen. Tutkimus tarkastelee, kuinka eduskunta on vastannut julkiseen vaateeseen läpinäkyvämmästä, saavutettavammasta ja osallistavammasta päätöksenteosta. Se tarkastelee myös niitä poliittisia dynamiikkoja, joita laajeneva kansalaisten mukaan ottaminen on luonut. Väitöskirja esittelee (1) kokonaisvaltaisen viitekehyksen, joka yhdistää demokraattisten parlamenttien keskeiset normatiiviset periaatteet (IPU 2006; Arter 2012) – näkyvyys, saavutettavuus, läpäisevyys sekä kansalaisia mukaan ottava ja kestävä demokratia – empiirisiin indikaattoreihin koskien eduskunnan toimintaa; (2) 'valiokuntakuulemisindeksin', joka tarkastelee kansalaisten osallistumista eduskunnan valiokuntien toimintaan, ulottuen tavanomaisista (asiantuntija)kuulemisista kansalaisten kanssa käytäviin neuvotteluihin ('co-consultation') ja käytäntöihin koskien kansalaisten laajaa mukaan ottamista; ja (3) viisiulotteisen empiirisen kriteeristön kansalaisaloitteiden arvioimiseksi. Tutkimuksen aineisto on moninaista ja se koostuu (1) laajasta eduskunnan dokumentaatiosta; (2) pitkittäisestä ja vertailevasta tilastollisesta aineistosta, joka mittaa eduskunnan toimintaa kansalaisten mukaan ottamisessa; sekä (3) noin 30 syvähaastattelusta kansanedustajien, eduskunnan virkamiesten ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan edustajien kanssa. Tutkimus esittää, että eduskunta voidaan 'auditoida' tarkastelemalla empiirisesti sen avoimuuteen ja kansalaisten mukaan ottamiseen liittyviä käytäntöjä. Tarkastelun kohteina ovat (1) eduskunta julkisena tilana, (2) tietojen luovuttaminen, (3) kansanedustajien saavutettavuus, (4) eduskunnan läsnäolo mediassa ja digitaalisesti, (5) lainsäädäntöprosessin läpinäkyvyys, (6) kansalaisten varsinainen osallistuminen lainsäädännölliseen päätöksentekoon, (7) kansalaisten informoiminen ja kansalaisten pariin jalkautuminen, (8) parlamentti tulevaisuuteen suuntautuvana foorumina, sekä (9) strategia ja johtaminen. Tutkimuksessa identifioidaan joukko keinoja ja uudistuksia Kansalaisinfosta journalistien vapaaseen toimintaympäristöön sekä täysistuntojen televisioinnista Nuorten parlamenttiin ja tulevaisuusvaliokuntaan. Analyysiin sisältyy myös kriittinen arvio valiokuntatyöskentelyn suljetusta luonteesta. Väitöskirja tarkastelee erityisesti eduskunnan valiokuntien työskentelyä ja sitä, miten kansalaisaloitetta käytetään. Tapaustutkimus sosiaali- ja terveysvaliokunnasta koskien hallituksen esitystä alkoholilaiksi (HE 70/2013) sekä eduskunnan valiokuntien kuulemiskäytäntöjen kattava analyysi vuosilta 1998–2014 osoittavat, että valiokunnat pitäytyivät tavanomaisissa kuulemismenettelyissä. Huolimatta valiokuntien ja eduskuntaryhmien suljettujen ovien takana käytyjen luottamuksellisten neuvotteluiden hyvistä puolista, ja huolimatta laajasta uuskorporatistisesta yhdistysdemokratiaan perustuvasta 'funktionaalisesta' edustuksesta, valiokuntien rajattu läpinäkyvyys ja julkisen keskustelun puute (esimerkiksi hyödyntäen sähköisiä alustoja) muodostavat kasvavan haasteen eduskunnalle. Lisäksi tutkimus esittelee viimeisimmän empiirisen arvion kansalaisaloitteesta vaalikaudelta, jolloin se otettiin käyttöön (maaliskuusta 2012 huhtikuuhun 2015). Aloitemekanismi syntyi Suomen hallituksen projektina, siis eräällä tavalla ylhäältä annettuna. Kyseessä on 'agenda-aloite', ja sellaisena siihen liittyy rajoitteita, muun muassa yhteys mahdollisuuteen järjestää kansanäänestys puuttuu. Siitä huolimatta tämä osallistava instituutio on nopeasti vakiintunut vaihtoehtoiseksi kanavaksi lainsäädännöllisen päiväjärjestyksen muodostamisessa. Uusia poliittisia dynamiikkoja kehittyy, kun kansalaisyhteiskunnan suoria vaikutusmahdollisuuksia edistetään. Kun demokraattisten innovaatioiden merkitys yhdistetään formaaleihin päätöksentekoinstituutioihin, tämä suomalainen kokeilu saattaa tarjota tärkeän esimerkin vakiintuneen edustuksellisen demokratian ja jälkiedustuksellisen demokratian uusien muotojen välisestä dynaamisesta ja kilpailullisesta suhteesta ja sen kehittämisestä. Perustuen empiirisiin tuloksiin, sekä vertailuihin muiden Pohjoismaiden parlamentteihin sekä Iso-Britannian ja Skotlannin parlamentteihin, tutkimus esittää uudistuksia eduskunnan tekemiseksi avoimemmaksi ja kansalaisia enemmän mukaan ottavaksi. Näihin uudistuksiin sisältyy suljetun valiokuntajärjestelmän avaaminen ja kansalaisaloitteiden käytön edistäminen. Väitöskirjassa argumentoidaan myös uusien teoreettisten näkökulmien puolesta formalististen ja perinteisten lähestymistapojen sijaan, jotta parlamentaarisen edustuksen, samoin kuin pohjoismaisen ja suomalaisen demokratian, muuttuva luonne tulisi paremmin ymmärretyksi. ; This dissertation studies a frontier topic in legislative studies – the relationship between parliaments and citizens between elections. Legislative scholars have mainly focused on the formal functions of parliamentary institutions, legislative-executive relations or party influence on parliamentary decisions, while democratic innovations discourses often ignore or bypass the central roles that parliaments play when linking the government and the people. The multi-dimensional linkages between contemporary legislatures and their electorates have not been sufficiently explored, although recent years have seen an increase in related literatures. (Norton 2002; Leston-Bandeira 2012a) The transformational political challenges facing most of established democracies have urged scholars to investigate this 'ignored' agenda from new perspectives. However, there is an increasing need for conceptual and empirical studies about the evolving nature of parliamentary representation, and the dynamics or tensions between established systems of representative democracy and new forms of citizen participation. This study fills the gap in the literature by providing a systemic empirical study of parliaments and citizens in the context of Finnish democracy. Finland offers a particularly important case. While exercising a strong model of party-based representative democracy like the other Nordic countries, Finland is currently standing on the frontline of political and social innovations. Its 2000 constitutional reform has strengthened the roles of parliament (Eduskunta) and the PM in national politics while reducing the powers of the president. It also established the Citizens' Initiative Act in 2012, which enables the public to participate in legislative agenda-setting. The study primarily seeks to investigate how the Eduskunta has responded to the increasing public demands for more transparent, accessible and participatory decision-making and what political dynamics have been created through expanding public engagement. To this end, this dissertation sets up a series of new analytical frameworks: (1) a comprehensive framework combining core normative principles of democratic parliaments (IPU 2006; Arter 2012) – visibility, accessibility, permeability, and inclusive and sustainable democracy – with full-scope empirical indicators for parliamentary public engagement activities; (2) 'Committee Consultation Index' scaling the civic engagement practices in parliamentary committees, ranging from standard (expert) consultation, co-consultation, to extensive outreach practices; and, (3) five-dimensional empirical criteria for evaluating the citizens' initiatives. Multiple types of data are utilized: (1) a wide range of parliamentary documents; (2) longitudinal and comparative statistical data measuring the engagement activities of Eduskunta; and (3) around 30 in-depth interviews with MPs, parliamentary staff and civil society leaders. Guided by systemic analytical frameworks, the study presents a 'legislative audit' style of empirical assessment on the public engagement of Eduskunta – (1) parliament as public space, (2) sharing of information, (3) accessibility of MPs, (4) media and digital engagement, (5) transparency of legislative process, (6) actual participation in legislative decision-making, (7) civic education and outreach, (8) parliament as future forum, and (9) strategy and leadership. A variety of measures and reforms are identified, from Citizen Information Center, free working environment for journalists, broadcasting of plenary sessions, Youth Parliament, to the unique role of the Committee for the Future. The analysis also includes a critical review of the closed nature of committee procedures. The dissertation scrutinizes specifically the working methods of Eduskunta committees and the practical use of citizens' initiatives. Through a case study on the Social Affairs and Health Committee and its dealing with the Governmental Proposal of the Alcohol Act (HE 70/2013 vp) in 2013, as well as a full-scale analysis of the Eduskunta committees' legislative consultation practices during 1998-2014, it shows the committees held to the standard mode of consultation. Despite the advantages of confidential negotiations between committee members and party groups behind the closed doors, as well as a wide-scope 'functional' representation based on neo-corporatist mode of associational democracy, limited committee transparency and lack of public consultation channels like e-Parliament platforms cast a challenge on the future role of Eduskunta. The study submits the latest empirical assessment on the institutional implementation of the citizens' initiative in Finland during its first parliamentary term (March 2012 – April 2015). The mechanism was introduced through a 'top-down' project of Finnish government. It has basic limitations of an 'agenda initiative' without a link to popular vote. Nevertheless, this participatory institution has been rapidly consolidated as an alternative channel of legislative agenda-setting. New political dynamics are developed by enhancing direct inputs from civil society. Demonstrating the potential of democratic innovations 'coupled' with formal decision-making institution, the Finnish experiment may provide a significant example of cultivating a dynamic and compatible relationship between established representative democracy and new forms of post-representative democracy. However, the adaptive capacities of parties and interest groups, and its long-term influence on democratic citizenship remain to be observed during the second parliamentary term (2015-2019). Based on empirical findings and comparisons with the other Nordic legislatures, as well as the UK and Scottish Parliaments, the study finally presents key agendas for making the Eduskunta a more open and inclusive legislature, including opening up the closed committee system and facilitating the role of citizens' initiatives. It also argues for new theoretical perspectives to conceptualize the changing nature of parliamentary representation, as well as of Nordic / Finnish democracy, beyond formalistic and conventional approaches.

The article described the attitude of Ukrainian leftist parties to church and religion in the late nineteenth century – the first third of the twentieth century. Ukrainian Galicia left hand – is a special phenomenon of the Ukrainian movement in this period. It is significantly different from similar political camp on the Dnieper. First, it soon took shape organizationally, thoroughly used in political practice European traditions left movement, clearly defined Ukrainian aspirations. At the same time left Galicia and Dnieper been characterized by an increase in performance of social justice, political, religious, national equality, democratization of the electoral law so on. In the late nineteenth century left­wing parties experienced a period of ideological formation, search of basic vectors. They varied size, ideology, ethnic composition, the territory in which the distributed activities. During this period Ukrainian Galicia left hand has made his views on religion and the church, which is reflected in the party programs, theoretical heritage of outstanding representatives of socialist and communist parties. In the interwar period of the twentieth century. representatives of leftist political parties of Western Ukraine further critical and negative attitude to the institution of the church and religion, however, given the high religiosity local population had to adapt software principles to the realities of the time. During this period there were also significant differences between the Socialists and the Communists. The first criticized religious dogma based on national principles (criticism «Polish Church» compromise some Greek Catholic bishops, etc.), the latter guided the works of classics of Marxism­Leninism, which denied the need for religion in general society. The article noted that position to the churches and religious representatives held communist forces, mostly professed atheist beliefs, fought for the deepening of Marxist ideology among the population of the region. Despite the fact that declarative Communists proclaimed religion a private matter, emphasized that everyone should be entirely free in order to manifest religion or anything that does not recognize any religion, in practice, members KPSH, CPWU fought for spreading the atheistic worldview. High religiosity of the population of Western Ukraine, minor impacts communist forces in the socio­political processes have not allowed CPWU, Sel­Rob implement the program positions in the church and the religious sphere. Moreover, the Church also poboryuvala spread of Communism in Galicia. Socialists considered attitude to church and religion. Noted that in general, despite his priestly descent, representatives of radicals and social democrats were quite critical of the clergy. The latter, in particular, considered the church «the largest natural enemy of all free thought, progress.» The Social Democrats accused the church of «suppressing the national feelings» not only Galician people in general but young clergy. In the interwar period of the twentieth century. Social Democrats exposed to communist ideas that influenced the change in the ideological platform of the party in the church and religious issue. Radicals in their practice using theoretical work Franko, who sharply criticized the Galician clergy. However, PSA dystantsionuvalasya of church issues, stressing that its electorate itself selects how to treat religious institutions and religion in general. Socialist­Radical Party continued line PSA, but has transformed national­cultural program to the requirements of the time. While in terms of the political system of the Second Commonwealth, MSzMP church considered as a means of national osvidomlenya population opposed the elimination of Orthodox churches, an increase of church land ownership, emphasized the need for separation of church and state. Nevertheless, sometimes, frankly erroneous judgment, theoretical and practical heritage activities Ukrainian Galicia from the left end of the XIX i in the first third of the twentieth century church religious sphere remain valid and instructive. ; У статті охарактеризовано ставлення українських лівих партій до церкви та релігії наприкінці ХІХ ст. – першої третини ХХ ст. Українська лівиця в Галичині – це особливий феномен українського руху в зазначений період. Вона істотно відрізнялася від подібного політичного табору на Наддніпрянщині. Передусім, вона швидше оформилася організаційно, ґрунтовніше використовувала у політичній практиці європейські традиції лівого руху, виразно визначала соборницькі прагнення українців. Водночас лівим Галичини і Наддніпрянщини були притаманні виступи за збільшення рівня соціальної справедливості, політичного, релігійного, національного рівноправ'я, демократизацію виборчого права тощо. Наприкінці ХІХ століття партії лівого спектра пережили період ідеологічного становлення, пошуку базових векторів діяльності. Вони різнилися чисельністю, ідеологією, національним складом, територією, на яку поширювали діяльність. Саме у цей період українська лівиця Галичини виробила власні погляди щодо релігії та церкви, що відображено у партійних програмах, теоретичній спадщині визначних представників соціалістичних та комуністичних партій. У міжвоєнний період ХХ ст. представники лівих політичних партій Західної України надалі критично і негативно ставилися до інституту церкви і релігії, проте, зважаючи на високу релігійність місцевого населення, були змушені адаптувати програмні принципи до реалій часу. У цей період існували також суттєві відмінності між соціалістами і комуністами. Перші критикували релігійні догми виходячи з національних принципів (критика «польського костелу», угодовства окремих греко­католицьких єпископів тощо), другі керувалися працями класиків марксизму­ленінізму, які взагалі заперечували необхідність релігійності суспільства. У статті відзначено, що найнепримиреннішу позицію до церкви та релігії займали представники комуністичних сил, які, здебільшого, сповідували атеїстичні переконання, боролися за поглиблення марксистського світогляду серед населення регіону. Незважаючи на те, що декларативно комуністи проголошували релігію приватною справою, наголошували, що кожен повинен бути цілком вільний у тому, щоб сповідувати яку завгодно релігію або не визнавати ніякої релігії, на практиці члени КПСГ, КПЗУ боролися за поширення атеїстичного світогляду. Висока релігійність населення Західної України, незначні впливи комуністичних сил на суспільно­політичні процеси не дозволили КПЗУ, Сель­Робу реалізувати програмні положення у церковно­релігійній сфері. До того ж, церква також поборювала поширення комуністичних ідей у Галичині. Розглянуто ставлення соціалістів до церкви та релігії. Зауважено, що загалом, незважаючи на своє попівське походження, представники радикалів та соціал­демократів ставилися до духовенства доволі критично. Останні, зокрема, вважали церкву «найбільшим, натуральним ворогом всякої вільної думки, поступу». Соціал­демократи звинувачували церкву у «придушенні національних почуттів» не лише галицького люду загалом, а й молодого патріотичного духовенства. У міжвоєнний період ХХ ст. соціал­демократи підпали під вплив комуністичних ідей, що вплинуло на зміну ідеологічної платформи партії у церковно­релігійному питанні. Радикали у своїй практичній діяльності використовували теоретичні напрацювання І. Франка, який гостро критикував галицьке духовенство. Проте УРП дистанціонувалася від церковної проблематики, наголошуючи, що її електорат сам вибиратиме як ставитися до церковних інституцій та загалом релігії. Соціалістично­радикальна партія продовжила лінію УРП, проте трансформувала національно­культурну програму до вимог часу. Перебуваючи в умовах політичної системи Другої Речі Посполитої, УСРП розглядала церкву як один із засобів національного усвідомлення населення, виступала проти ліквідації православних храмів, збільшення церковного землеволодіння, наголошувала на необхідності відокремлення церкви від держави. Попри, інколи, відверто помилкові судження, теоретична спадщина і практична діяльність української лівиці Галичини від кінця XIX i в першій третині ХХ століття у церковно­релігійній сфері залишаються актуальними і повчальними. ; У статті охарактеризовано ставлення українських лівих партій до церкви та релігії наприкінці ХІХ ст. – першої третини ХХ ст. Українська лівиця в Галичині – це особливий феномен українського руху в зазначений період. Вона істотно відрізнялася від подібного політичного табору на Наддніпрянщині. Передусім, вона швидше оформилася організаційно, ґрунтовніше використовувала у політичній практиці європейські традиції лівого руху, виразно визначала соборницькі прагнення українців. Водночас лівим Галичини і Наддніпрянщини були притаманні виступи за збільшення рівня соціальної справедливості, політичного, релігійного, національного рівноправ'я, демократизацію виборчого права тощо. Наприкінці ХІХ століття партії лівого спектра пережили період ідеологічного становлення, пошуку базових векторів діяльності. Вони різнилися чисельністю, ідеологією, національним складом, територією, на яку поширювали діяльність. Саме у цей період українська лівиця Галичини виробила власні погляди щодо релігії та церкви, що відображено у партійних програмах, теоретичній спадщині визначних представників соціалістичних та комуністичних партій. У міжвоєнний період ХХ ст. представники лівих політичних партій Західної України надалі критично і негативно ставилися до інституту церкви і релігії, проте, зважаючи на високу релігійність місцевого населення, були змушені адаптувати програмні принципи до реалій часу. У цей період існували також суттєві відмінності між соціалістами і комуністами. Перші критикували релігійні догми виходячи з національних принципів (критика «польського костелу», угодовства окремих греко­католицьких єпископів тощо), другі керувалися працями класиків марксизму­ленінізму, які взагалі заперечували необхідність релігійності суспільства. У статті відзначено, що найнепримиреннішу позицію до церкви та релігії займали представники комуністичних сил, які, здебільшого, сповідували атеїстичні переконання, боролися за поглиблення марксистського світогляду серед населення регіону. Незважаючи на те, що декларативно комуністи проголошували релігію приватною справою, наголошували, що кожен повинен бути цілком вільний у тому, щоб сповідувати яку завгодно релігію або не визнавати ніякої релігії, на практиці члени КПСГ, КПЗУ боролися за поширення атеїстичного світогляду. Висока релігійність населення Західної України, незначні впливи комуністичних сил на суспільно­політичні процеси не дозволили КПЗУ, Сель­Робу реалізувати програмні положення у церковно­релігійній сфері. До того ж, церква також поборювала поширення комуністичних ідей у Галичині. Розглянуто ставлення соціалістів до церкви та релігії. Зауважено, що загалом, незважаючи на своє попівське походження, представники радикалів та соціал­демократів ставилися до духовенства доволі критично. Останні, зокрема, вважали церкву «найбільшим, натуральним ворогом всякої вільної думки, поступу». Соціал­демократи звинувачували церкву у «придушенні національних почуттів» не лише галицького люду загалом, а й молодого патріотичного духовенства. У міжвоєнний період ХХ ст. соціал­демократи підпали під вплив комуністичних ідей, що вплинуло на зміну ідеологічної платформи партії у церковно­релігійному питанні. Радикали у своїй практичній діяльності використовували теоретичні напрацювання І. Франка, який гостро критикував галицьке духовенство. Проте УРП дистанціонувалася від церковної проблематики, наголошуючи, що її електорат сам вибиратиме як ставитися до церковних інституцій та загалом релігії. Соціалістично­радикальна партія продовжила лінію УРП, проте трансформувала національно­культурну програму до вимог часу. Перебуваючи в умовах політичної системи Другої Речі Посполитої, УСРП розглядала церкву як один із засобів національного усвідомлення населення, виступала проти ліквідації православних храмів, збільшення церковного землеволодіння, наголошувала на необхідності відокремлення церкви від держави. Попри, інколи, відверто помилкові судження, теоретична спадщина і практична діяльність української лівиці Галичини від кінця XIX i в першій третині ХХ століття у церковно­релігійній сфері залишаються актуальними і повчальними.

Over the last decade, Australia's tropical north has featured front and centre in big national debates about the nation's future. As in the past, the north has again been cast as the nation's frontier saviour through bold new resource and agricultural developments, both real and imagined. Yet others have dreamt of the north's expansive landscapes being secured as an iconic wilderness. Big human rights-centred debates have raged about the success or otherwise of Commonwealth, State and Territory interventions in Indigenous communities. Quick-draw policy responses on complex issues like the live cattle trade have had devastating impacts on the confidence of northern industries and communities. Finally, the daily media images of refugees heading to the coast keep the north's strategic importance on centre-stage, raising unresolved tensions about relationships with our Asian-Pacific neighbours. With some exceptions, these national debates have played out across southern Australia's media, policy-making and academic institutions and think-tanks; a debate largely crafted by, and for, a southern audience. For those of us in the north, it is forgivable to think that the south looks upon northern Australia as one might look upon their own troubled child; a youngster on the precipice between adolescence and adulthood. There seems to be, on one level, that great hope and expectation of a gifted life ahead; the north stepping forth into untold prosperity and longevity. At the same time, there remains a fear that, left to its own devices, the north will spiral into delinquency; a failed state perhaps. While it could be too easy to cast a discussion about the future of northern Australia in simple north-south terms, the south does have the political power, money and population to deliver big changes in the north. Many in the north, however, would argue that, on a daily basis, they experience flaws in the south's contribution to its governance. There is a common perception that major policy decisions are often made in the interest of a southern electorate without real concern for the rights and interests of those in the north. Other concerns relate to programs that are too short term, fragmented and restrictive to make any genuine changes for the better. Without further extending the "troubled youth" analogy, this might just be a sign that the north is maturing and is champing at the bit to be more in control of its own destiny. The north, however, is indeed different to the south. It has a far thinner human and institutional capacity. Its land tenure foundations are largely public or communal versus private. It is primarily an Indigenous domain. Its climate and annual cyclonic risk is beyond the typical experiences of those in the south. Much of the north is closer to populous Asian and Pacific capitals than to Perth, Brisbane or Canberra. As such, northerners, by and large, are looking for different governance models. There is a desire to cast existing models aside and to at least explore, in partnership with State and Federal Governments, innovative new approaches. Northern Australians want people in the south to better understand this unique, majestic land and its importance to the nation. Over recent years, several columnists and academics have had a go at building a narrative about the north, but few have tried to start a genuine dialogue between northern and southern Australia; a dialogue focused on how the nation as a whole might work towards a better future for northern Australia through governance reform. This discussion piece aims to start a national debate about the purpose and direction for such reform. It is not, however, a return to Theodorian-style calls for political separatism. Northern Australia needs southern Australia and vice versa. This means that, at the very least, the nation needs a bolder and united north Australian narrative that takes us from being the post-colonial backwater of three separate governments to a more northern-driven but nationally integrated governance system. It is about Australian and State/Territory Governments radically and collectively reconfiguring their current fragmented and geographically distant approach, to one that negotiates big policy decisions in the north and that manages government policy and programs in radically different ways. With mature economies in the south, fresh opportunities for major national economic, social and environmental advances rest in the north. Southern powers need to explicitly support the emergence of these opportunities from within the north itself for the benefit of the nation as a whole. This could emerge through a stronger northern Australian policy, fiscal and delivery architecture; perhaps one directly integrated into the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) framework. Such an architecture and associated processes, however, must be powerfully engaged with a cohesive and strong pan-tropical alliance of northern Australia's sectoral interests, inclusive of traditional owners, local government, industry, human service, conservation and other sectors. It must also be independently informed by a cohesive and engaged knowledge-based relationship with the north's key research institutions. If this approach recasts the way decisions are made for the north, then there are several big reform agendas that need to be the foundational focus of attention. First, as the foundation for both economic development and rights protection, the north needs real innovation in the efficient resolution of land use and tenure conflicts across the landscape. This requires a long-term, cohesive and regionally-driven approach to planning of the north's strategic land use and infrastructure needs. This contrasts the current approach, driven both by either high profile southern conservation campaigns or major development projects that emerge in bull markets. On the economic front, we also need a more targeted and consistent approach to negotiating major project development in ways that lift investor-confidence while not trashing our crown-jewel environmental and cultural assets; approaches that also can build the long-term foundations for regional community development. Alongside this, we have an opportunity to create the basis for an eco-system services economy specifically designed for, and focussed on, northern Australia; one that delivers land owners/managers real economic reasons for managing landscapes explicitly for their cultural, conservation and wilderness values while also keeping the economic foundations for remote communities intact. At the community-scale, over the past 30 years, the core government model for Indigenous policy and program delivery shifted from assimilation to self-determination, but the policy failures of both have culminated in (the largely top-down) interventions of the last decade and their focus on service normalisation. While addressing critical needs, the new normalisation-based approaches continue to disempower and deliver stop-start progress. The architecture for government delivery largely remains welfare-oriented, inflexible and annualised. Such approaches simply do not build lasting human capacity and often do not work for a region with a rugged landscape, limited human resources and a cruelling wet-dry seasonality. Similarly in that time, local governments across the north have been gradually lumbered with big new policy and delivery responsibilities without linked improvements in revenue. To shift the whole economy from an historically boom-bust cycle, however, the nation must build the foundations for a tropical knowledge-driven economy that both underpins productivity improvements in our existing industries (mining, agriculture, fishing, tourism) and creates real export-oriented engagement. This outward looking engagement needs to be not just into the Asia-Pacific, but right across the globe's tropical latitudes. This will rely on Australia investing in tropical knowledge development (e.g., tropical health, agriculture, environmental and disaster management, tropical design and energy) within the north. These strengths then need to be brokered into the wider tropical region via long-term partnership building, trade and innovation clusters and the strategic attraction of foreign investment. This palette of reforms could deliver a progressive and productive northern Australia with a strong identity and lifestyle values to-die-for. Despite the challenging climate, the north could become a place where a great diversity of people (with a wide skills base) want to live, escaping our reputation as the southern hemisphere's salt mines. The cost of failure would be great: a permanent boom and bust economy with more bust and less boom, whole regions of multi-generational disadvantage and the nation's environmental and cultural jewels degraded. If progressed through the right governance reforms, however, securing these opportunities in the north may hold the keys to the whole nation's future. This paper outlines first why good governance for northern Australia is important to the nation. It details how things actually function in a pan-tropical sense, in northern Western Australia (WA), the Northern Territory (NT) and northern Queensland, and at regional and local scales. It then looks at how the north has been governed through the lens of major conflict themes from our recent history. It also looks at the outcomes that might emerge from a business-as-usual scenario; what happens if the flaws in the governance of the north continue unabated into the future? Finally, it explores (or perhaps dreams) of some of the alternative possibilities for northern governance.

In spite of all the good news about the economy and the swift confirmation of Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court, the headlines this stormy week have been dominated by town hall brawls. As congressional representatives went home to their districts for their August recess, they were greeted by a volatile mixture of high temperatures, monsoon-like storms and furious mobs who stormed town hall meetings to protest against health reform. Several politicians, terrorized by the voters, suspended the meetings and ran past the mobs and into their getaway cars. They later announced they would take phone calls or meet voters individually in scheduled appointments. Journalists and TV talk show personalities were left wondering as to the origin of this new movement of storm troopers: were they real people, from the grassroots, fed up with the way Washington is dealing with health care reform, or was this manufactured, "Astroturf" mobilization, organized by the health insurance and drug companies, scared of losing a large share of their profits if a government-run plan is included on the final bill? Most likely it is a mixture of both. But whether fabricated or not, the tone of the debate and the images of scuffles and fist fights shocked the nation and left many asking what happened to American civility. More importantly, where was the President's leadership?Granted, it is difficult to defend a bill that is not even ready, and Obama has avoided giving bottom lines that may come back to haunt him: his larger political purpose is to pass some kind of health care reform, even if serious compromises have to be made. Having taken the 1994 Clinton-care defeat lesson to heart, President Obama decided from the beginning that he could not dictate to Congress and therefore stated the general principles of health care reform (universal coverage and cost control) and then gave Congress leeway in writing the detailed legislation. But from the beginning, there was a deep chasm between progressives, who insist that a public-plan option is the best way to meet both goals, and conservatives, who adamantly oppose the government-run plan claiming it would bankrupt private insurance companies, and see this and the mandate of universal coverage as "socialized medicine". The Blue Dog Democrats, fiscally conservative, have joined ranks with the opposition and effectively killed the public option in some versions of the bill, replacing it with a vague alternative of co-ops (mutual care).The result so far has been a confusion of bills and versions that no regular voter can understand. Indeed, not even those that are following the debate closely can tell with clarity what each version entails. But because health care is close and personal, it is easy to whip up a frenzy over it just by letting out a few misleading judgments, half truths and exaggerations, and hammering at them until they have the ring of truth. Corporate interest groups from the health insurance and pharmaceutical industries are fiercely organizing fringe elements on the right, mainly instructing them to be disruptive of town hall meetings and to interrupt any serious discourse. And most of the average, less-educated voters use "easy" sources of information such as radio talk commentators (read: Rush Limbaugh) or TV news shows which are anything but "fair and balanced", instead of hard sources (newspaper editorials, op-ed and factual news articles). In the end, when topics are complex and conflicting information saturates the media, people believe what they want to believe, what confirms their feelings and their ideological bent, what reassures them they are correct in their assumptions and emotions.It is this state of confusion that has allowed the crazy mobs, aided and abetted by the likes of Rush Limbaugh and Sarah Palin, to make the most outlandish claims, from accusing the government of Socialism and Nazism in one voice, to vociferously asserting the Democrats' plan includes euthanasia (of course it does not; it includes a voluntary option for terminal patients to get "counseling on end-of-life options"). But these are the same kind of people that kill abortion-clinic doctors and nurses in their crusade to "save innocent lives". And exactly of the same kind as the "birthers", those who do not believe President Obama was born in the United States, a fact very easily verifiable, since the White House has made his birth certificate available!The point is, extremists are taking over that national scene and are attacking a bill that is not yet ready, based on false claims and preposterous characterizations. The left is now mobilizing union representatives to counteract the right wing crazies. Perhaps it would be better to cancel all town hall meetings, since it is expected that a bill will be passed by the end of the month. It will be most likely be a watered down version of what Obama initially wanted, but it will allow him to claim yet another victory, another check mark on his campaign promises.The debate over health care has accomplished something that seemed unfathomable only a month ago: it has united Republicans. Economic conservatives, libertarians and extreme right social conservatives are all against the public plan option. However, even if they were successful in defeating this bill, as long as they continue on this course of adamant opposition, they will not be well-positioned for the 2010 elections. They will have no other policy initiatives or legislative accomplishments to boast of and they will still be easily characterized as the "party of no." Their political calculations made them oppose a highly qualified Supreme Court nominee in a futile exercise that has put them on the wrong side of history and set them back at least for a decade in getting electoral support from the Latino community, the largest and fastest- growing minority group in the country. The void of Republican political leadership has been filled by extremist groups and irresponsible radio talk commentators, reducing the party's appeal to moderates and independents.This dramatic realization is one incentive to get Republicans to work harder in passing health care reform in some bipartisan shape or form. But this is not likely, since their preference so far has been to deny Obama any chance of bipartisanship. Another motivation to bring them to the table should be the awareness that, if the rising cost curve of health care is not brought under control, the economic recovery that is starting to show will only be temporary, the deficit will continue to grow and other countries will not be so accommodating in holding US debt. But political expedience on their part may overtake even this fundamental concern about the future economic stability of the country.On his part, Obama will have the problem of dealing with the liberal wing of his party: the left will be furious if, with a majority in both Houses, their version of health care reform does not pass, and the President settles for a weaker, watered down version. Indeed, in general terms, the biggest and most immediate test for Obama will be how far he allows the left in Congress to go before he decides to rein them in. In order to regain control of the health care debate, the President held his own town hall meeting in New Hampshire this past Tuesday. His message was clearer and more focused as he answered genuine concerns and questions from the audience. But to what extent he was able to calm down the prevailing anxiety in the country at large still remains to be seen. Outside the town hall, two groups of irate citizens on the opposite ends of the political spectrum confronted each other, yelled and shook their fists, but the police were able to restrain them without much effort.In spite of the turbulent TV images that have inundated the airways this week, the majority of the electorate in this country is still moderate, rational and centrist. They want health care reform and they want it to include a government-run option, which they may or may not buy into, but which they see as an important way to spur competition, in the understanding that it is competition and not monopolies that help control costs. They also want reform of the way private insurance companies ration care, for example, by denying coverage to those with pre-existing conditions. They are appalled at the crazies on the right, with their false claims about a bill they have not read, and their outrageous claims of Socialism and Nazism, which they merge into one demonic ideology. They are tired of their pseudo-religious zeal and self-righteousness, their insistence on rejecting Darwin's theory of evolution along with global warming, climate change and stem cell research, their violent outbursts, and their tendency to speak in terms of Good (themselves) and Evil (the rest). And they are embarrassed at the subtext of racism that underlies most of the extremists' demented claims, and which becomes crystal clear in their assertion that President Obama is not an American citizen.On the other hand, most citizens are also wary of ultra-liberals on the left, who want to use the Democrats' prevalence to entrench new vast social programs, over-regulate the financial system and corporate pay, and raise taxes to levels that would choke growth and productivity; they are afraid they will forever bankrupt the government and the country.Six months into his presidency, Obama faces sinking approval numbers and the possibility of a major defeat. After a string of solid successes that included, among others, passing an 800 billion dollar economic stimulus plan, expanding children's health insurance, and rescuing the banking system, his agenda may get bogged down in the politics- as- usual Washington culture he promised to change. It will take all his will power and discipline to stay focused, get back on message and resist the blows. His ambition will have to be tempered by patience, caution and political skill. As his aura wears off, the coming battles will be the final test of his courage and determination to succeed. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

"There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial one." - Alexis De Tocqueville Over the Memorial Day long weekend, the White House announced President Obama's nominee to replace retiring Judge David Souter in the Supreme Court. Barring any unforeseen circumstances, Circuit Court of Appeals judge Sonia Sotomayor will be confirmed by next September, in time for the new Supreme Court term starting in October of this year. Obama has pressed the Senate Judiciary Committee to start hearings and be ready to vote before the August Congress recess, but Republicans would like more time to scrutinize her sizable record and score some political points in the process.Because the nomination was announced during the Senate's Memorial weekend recess, the first reaction on the Conservative side came from anonymous blogs, from radio talk host Rush Limbaugh and from former speaker of the House Newt Gingrich. Needless to say, the attacks were fierce. Sotomayor was alternatively portrayed as an "activist judge" intent on making policy from the bench, a "reverse racist" and a candidate with "insufficient credentials" (the latter being the most laughable of all and the one that gives you the measure of the lack of seriousness of the rest: a Princeton summa cum laude graduate, and Yale Law Review editor, with over 17 years of experience as a federal judge, and over 3,000 decisions made, Sotomayor's credentials are anything but impeccable). This week the Republican Senators, who will actually be in charge of the process, tried to regain the initiative and significantly moderated the tone of the discourse. Indeed, the vetting process to the highest tribunal of the land should focus on Sotomayor's earlier decisions from the bench (she has been both a US district and a circuit court judge), her views on the Constitution and the law, on the rights of states and on the importance of precedent, and not , as her anonymous detractors would like us to think, on empty slogans, her taste for Puerto Rican food or the way she pronounces her name (accentuating the last syllable, which is seen by these ignorant critics as lack of assimilation to the Anglo culture). But having been born in the Bronx from poor immigrants, and risen in class and status to where she is today, Judge Sotomayor is more than ready for the fight. Her life experiences have taught her to see the world through different perspectives. She is not in the least intimidated by other groups' prejudices presented as righteousness, and by those who are targeting her, as Mary Sanchez from the Florida Sentinel so aptly puts it, "as if a weaker species had wandered into their den".The Republican Party is in such disarray that different elements within it are constantly and recklessly trying to score points with the electorate, using any tactic at hand without much consideration of its consequences. Given the solid majority of Democrats in the Senate, and the fact that several Republicans are likely to vote in favor of Sotomayor (she was, after all, nominated by George H.W Bush for the federal bench the first time (1992) and approved unanimously by the whole Senate), the question for Republican elected officials is how far to go in their attacks without producing an irreversible backlash at the polls from women and Hispanics for years to come. At the same time, they will be pressed by the extreme right to do some damage to the nominee and through her, to the President. Judicial fights are part and parcel of the political struggle over the court's direction, and even if the replacement of Souter with Sotomayor is not likely to change the balance of the court, the hearings should be used as a stage to present the philosophical differences between the two parties, rather than as a nasty squabble over personal characteristics, anonymous character attacks and meaningless slogans. The ideological mix in the Court (5 conservatives-4 liberals, with Justice Kennedy as the swing vote, sometimes voting with the liberals) will remain the same; the Democrats right now have a filibuster-proof majority, and there will be other Supreme Court nominations by this President to come, so the Republicans should recognize that the only battle worth fighting in this case is a clean one, free from vitriol and toxicity. Scholars have identified four primary selection criteria used by presidents in their appointments of Supreme Court justices: merit, ideology, friendship and representation. Obama's choice of Sotomayor was based on her impressive credentials, her experience of seventeen years in the federal judiciary, which offers some insight into her judicial philosophy (similar to Obama's), and her charisma and compelling biography as a Latina born in the Bronx. She therefore clearly meets three of those four criteria. Obama's short list included three other women with similar credentials, all close friends of his, but none of them Latinas.Sotomayor's ideology appears to match Obama's, himself a constitutional scholar, in that both share a penchant for pragmatism and a conscientious quest for justice and fairness under the law. For example, although she has a thin record on abortion cases and therefore her position is not clear, in one case concerning the right of the federal government to attach conditions to the use of its foreign aid money, she ruled against the pro-abortion group. In several cases of gender or racial discrimination she decided against the minority or female plaintiff. This makes some groups on the Left somewhat apprehensive. It would not be the first time that a President nominates a judge based on compatible ideology and is later disappointed when his appointee votes with the "other" block. But her vote affirming the decision by the city of New Haven to scrap a promotion test which only white firefighters had succeeded in (Ricci v. De Steffano) is what is making the headlines: the Right's intention is to portray her as a "reverse racist" and an unequivocal defender of affirmative action. Ironically, this case will come before the Supreme Court this summer, and many think her decision (unanimously made by a panel of three judges) could be overturned just before her hearings get under way, thus providing more ammunition to the opposition. Also making the headlines is her 2001 statement, during a La Raza Law Symposium, that "a wise Latina woman, with the richness of her experience, would reach "better"conclusions than a white male"who hasn't lived that life." This week Obama regained control of the debate that Republicans had been craftily shaping, by excusing her for the wrong choice of the word "better" and by explaining that what she meant was that "her life experience will give her more information about the… hardships people are going through." This was an allusion to the fourth criteria listed above, that is, the one of representation, in this case, of Hispanics/Latinos. Since the Supreme Court is not an elected body, it follows that its representativeness is not a must. Credentials, wisdom and judicial temperament should suffice for judges to fulfill their role as interpreters of the Constitution and neutral arbiters of the law.However, the history of the Supreme Court suggests that Presidents do make efforts at representativeness when choosing their nominees, certainly to gain the political sympathies of new groups, but also to give legitimacy to the body and its main function of judicial review. (Indeed, such legitimacy has been disputed on and off since the Marbury v. Madison decision of 1803 gave its judges, appointed for life, unelected and unaccountable to nobody, the exclusive authority to decide on the constitutionality of laws for all spheres, including those of the other branches of government. This was a power that Thomas Jefferson vehemently opposed because it was nowhere to be found in the Constitution and it undermined the principle of checks and balances.)In the early part of the twentieth century, religious affiliation became a major focus, and by 1916 both a Catholic and a Jewish judge had been appointed. As different religious groups became more assimilated and religion became a non-issue to the appointment process, the imbalance of race and gender became the major considerations. But a quick review of the "representatives" of those categories shows that their representation can at times be symbolic or passive. While Sandra Day O'Connor, a conservative appointed by Reagan to close the "gender gap", actively represented women's interests in her jurisprudence and many times voted with the liberal block, Clarence Thomas, the second black judge to accede to the Supreme Court, has actively opposed affirmative action, which he regards as a noxious policy that undermines personal merit and creates resentment in the majority group. In contrast, the justice he replaced, Thurgood Marshall, the first African American in the court, was a leader of the civil rights movement who had made his reputation as a young lawyer, successfully arguing before the court the unconstitutionality of segregation in public education inBrown v Board of Education. Finally, both Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia are Catholic but find themselves at opposite sides of the ideological spectrum.In sum, to paraphrase Justice Day O'Connor, if human beings are the sum total and the product of their experiences, they cannot be defined by their gender, ethnicity, race or religion alone. Sonia Sotomayor is a very experienced federal judge with remarkable credentials who will, according to her own statements, attempt to decide every case based on its merits as it relates to the law, using objective legal standards. She also happens to be a woman of Puerto Rican origin, proud of her humble origins and of her cultural roots. And she meets all of the criteria Obama was looking for in a Supreme Court judge. Given the predominance of Democrats in the Senate, her confirmation is almost certain. Let us hope that the confirmation process itself is guided by honest inquiries and arguments on the merits of her appointment, on her judicial temperament and philosophy, and not turned into a media circus of innuendo, slurs and empty slogans that can scar a nominee for life, and in the process, devalue our democracy.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

Brazil grew 2.4 percent per year on average in the last 25 years-somewhat less than Latin America, a good deal less than the world, far less than the emerging countries of Asia in the same period, and indeed far less than Brazil itself in previous decades. If anything stands out favorably in recent Brazilian experience, it is not growth but stabilization and the successful opening of the economy. The purpose of this paper is more modest. It is limited to setting out the authors' particular view of recent efforts to consolidate democracy in Brazil while controlling inflation and resuming economic growth. At the same time the paper presents, as objectively as possible, some thoughts on the limits but also the relevance of action by political leaders to set a course and circumvent obstacles to that process. Here and there, the paper refers to the experiences of other Latin American countries, especially Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, not to offer a full fledged comparative analysis but merely to note contrasts and similarities that may shed light on the peculiarities of the Brazilian case and suggest themes for a more wide-ranging exchange of views.

Abstract: This research devoted to analyze relationship between social media political marketing through trust, knowledge & voting intention of youth voters, regarding with Indonesia Presidential Election 2019. In total hundreds of respondents, with 51 women and 49 men, thus majority are Tanjungpura University students. With age 17-35 as young adults, actively on social media, indeed aware with presidential candidates 2019 of political marketing, for at least six months. By using online questionnaire and spread through social media, the data processed with SmartPLS 3.2.8. software. The methods is a causal research, based on Likert seven-point scale. Results, however revealed no significant relationship between social media political marketing with youth voting intention (H3). 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This paper uses a case study of Costa Rica to identify the reasons why democracy is conducive for development. By the mid-twentieth century, Costa Rica had begun to depart from the all-too-common mixture of political instability and economic stagnation characteristic of much of the developing world. This paper claims that this country has benefited from better-than-average public policies, a conclusion based upon an original assessment of policy effectiveness and a major comparative ranking of state policies. It largely rejects the interpretation that uncommon development performance stems from institutions created during the colonial period and instead emphasizes how unending political stalemates gradually made the struggle for power more democratic. A central conclusion of this paper is that political competition-as well as steady economic growth rates and development, more generally-interact with and reinforce each other so that the exercise of power foments rather than retards economic growth.

The virulent strain of nativist, anti-establishment, anti-corporatist and anti-immigrant sentiment is rocking the foundations of traditional party systems in all industrialized democracies. Its causes are many, but in broad terms it is safe to say they surfaced right after the 2008-09 economic collapse, an era that was characterized by intense polarization and confrontational approaches against governments, corporations and financial institutions which crossed party lines and traditional political cleavages. The sweeping changes brought about by globalized capital and corporate interests, and the blurring of national borders that accompanied them, have alienated big swathes of the population and given rise to new forms of strident populism everywhere.In the United States the main manifestation of this phenomenon is taking the form of a populist revolt, a singular form of class warfare inside the Republican Party, between the established party hierarchy and the Tea Party movement.As the next legislative election approaches, the internecine feud within the Republican Party continues to create challenges for its top candidates who must veer more right-wing to secure the nomination and then turn back to the center of American politics to win the general election. Before 2012, the GOP tried to co-opt the extreme right and used their rhetoric, but after the 2012 election losses, the party took uncertain steps to distance itself from the movement. Today, the movement rather than the establishment seems to be dictating the party line, so there is paralysis in Washington once again. The leadership will still have to govern and legislate on some central issues-increase the debt limit, fund the government, and renew the authorization charter of the Export-Import Bank, among other things, and in so doing, further alienate Tea Party voters. The Republican-dominated House will no doubt stay away from the avoidable taboos, such as considering immigration reform (for which the Senate already passed its own bill one year ago!) and in consequence, one more time unintentionally secure the Latino vote for the Democratic Party. They will continue blocking the minimum wage raise and the Fair Paycheck Act, thereby losing the minorities and women's vote. In this context, the 2016 presidential horizon looks brilliantly promising for Democrats and their two presidential hopefuls, Hillary Clinton and Elizabeth Warren.The defeat of Virginia Representative and House Majority Leader Eric Cantor in the June 10th Republican primary for the seventh Congressional district is symptomatic of deep divisions not only within the Republican Partybut in the electorate at large. Eric Cantor, a Republican with impeccable conservative credentials who had been re-elected seven times and who was first in line for House Speaker,lost by ten solid points to a little known college professor who ran against him by portraying him as the pro-Wall Street, pro-K Street typical Washington insider, indifferent from Main Street needs and demands. This race is very significant for several reasons. For starters, the anti-Washington, anti "corporate welfare" and anti-Wall Street sentiment is widespread among independent voters and those GOP legislators that have been "pro-bailout, pro-Obama stimulus spending and pro-immigration," as articulated by Tea Party leaders, live in fear of being chastened by voters.That is why this week Republicans in Congress who were holding their breath, are exhaling with a sense of relief as Senator Thad Cochran wins the primary runoff against Tea Party challenger ChrisMcDaniels who ran on a promise to voters that he would add his voice to the fight against Obamacare and big government spending. It appears then that the anti-incumbent sentiment has not been strong enoughto become a sustained trend: so far, only two sitting representatives have not won re-nomination in the House and all 18 Senate races have been won by those holding the seats, including Lindsay Graham of South Carolina, who was a leader in favor of Immigration Reform in the Senate, but has been vocal in confronting Obama with his dismal record in foreign policy, from Benghazi to Syria to Ukraine, and now all the way back to Iraq. But even pollsters have been taken by surprise in most cases, whether as to the narrowness of results (such as the one is Mississippi, which required a runoff election) or to the unfathomable upsets (Cantor's represents a historical defeat: no Majority leader had been voted out in a primary election since the nineteenth century). There are many reasons why nobody saw this coming, first among them the constant problem of voter turnout, especially in primaries, followed by new strategies by candidates (David Bratt, the college professor that beat Cantor, did door -to -door canvassing, taking time to speak to prospective voters, and he beat a competitor who had outspent him 40 to 1) and by the strong commitment of a small group of activists that mobilized the grassroots against Cantor's pro-business stance. The outcome of these races is further complicated by the fact that many Democrats are taking part in open primaries, which makes them even more unpredictable. Democrats participated in both races, voting against the incumbent, Cantor, in Virginia (he was perceived as the main obstacle for bringing to the floor a vote on immigration bills that apparently would have had the votes to pass) and in favor of incumbent, veteranSenator Thad Cochran in Mississippi (he courted the African American vote, pointing out the amount of federal funds he had brought to the state in his 36 years as Senator, and they acquiesced, fearing Mc Daniels would be a worse choice for their interests in such a red state as Mississippi).These idiosyncratic variations and distortions should not distract us from the fact that the defeat of ultra-conservative House Majority leader from a white, affluent Richmond suburb is extremely significant and will have many ramifications in the near future. First and foremost, it has led to an immediate reshuffle of the party internal House leadership, as Cantorresigned his post as Majority leader. The first in line to fill his post, House whip Kevin McCarthy from California, used his insider skills to mobilize his contacts and call in his favors fast enough to pre-empt a challenge by a Tea Party congressman from Idaho, Raul Labrador, in a secret, internal party ballot. He has thus become Majority leader only eight years after he was first elected to Congress for California 23rd district. If re-elected in November, he will be first in line for House Speaker when Rep. Boehner gives up his post. This coveted position would have been Cantor's crowning achievement after a solid career of 14 years in Congress: he had hoped to become the first Jewish Speaker of the House.In spite of McCarthy's success in pre-empting challenges from outside the party leadership, the next one in line to move into McCarthy's whip position, deputy whip Peter Roskam from Illinois, lost the ballot to Tea Party challenger Steve Scalise from Louisiana, who mobilized the vote of Southern legislators and won, thereby establishing a presence for the movement inside the GOP hierarchy. Scalise, who was elected to Congress in 2008, has also risen rapidly through the ranks, as chairman of the ultra-conservative Republican Study Group and as a vocal advocate against big government.Party Whips in Congress are in charge of counting votes for and against legislation. They are enforcers, offering incentives and doling out punishments for votes among their caucus members. Their role becomes particularly important in close votes. The whip is also the main liaison between the party leadership and the rank and file.Primaries are proving to be much more dangerous for establishment Republicans than a prospective national election at the end of this year, in which they are poised to win both some Senate and House seats, mainly due to slow economic growth and low support for Obama, but more pointedly due to the opportunity created by the retirement of a significant number of long-serving senior legislators. Rather than the November election challenge against Democrats, primaries have become the main obstacle to surmount and the main focus of funding for incumbents and party establishment candidates. Memories of seats lost due to Tea party primary winners in the national 2010 and 2012 election still loom heavily in GOP minds. Karl Rove's words of advice to both the Tea Party activists and the GOP leadershipin February of 2010 still resonate in the halls of Congress:"If Tea party groups are to maximize their influence on policy, they must now begin the difficult task of disassociating themselves from cranks and conspiracy nuts. This includes 9/11 deniers, "birthers" who insist Barack Obama was not born in the U.S., and militia supporters espousing something vaguely close to armed rebellion.""The GOP is also better off if it foregoes any attempt to merge with the tea party movement. The GOP cannot possibly hope to control the dynamics of the highly decentralized galaxy of groups that make up the tea party movement. There will be troubling excesses and these will hurt Republicans if the party is formally associated with tea party groups" (Wall Street Journal, Feb. 18 2010).Because they are extremely vocal as well as media favorites (whether to disparage or to endorse them) and have made some undeniable inroads into the halls of power, the Tea Partiers have indeed made a splash in US politics, and they have re-shaped the agenda on issues of taxes and spending (with mixed success). But so far this term, 273 of 275 House incumbents and 18 out of 18 Senators have won re-nomination, even if in most House cases these contests were won by small margins. This is evidence that there is still somediscipline in party ranks, and newcomers are forced to follow the party leadership. For example in Kentucky, Sen. Rand Paul, largely recognized as the presidential candidate for Tea-Partiers and libertarians alike, did not campaign in favor of the Tea Party candidate who was running against Senate Minority leader Mitch McConnell, and gave the former only lukewarm support. Senator McConnell, a tough, seasoned veteran, was reported to have had a private, one-on-one, closed-doors conversation with Rand Paul before the primary campaign started…It then becomes clear that membership still has its privileges, and the Tea Partiers' disdain for insider politicking and the compromises required by politics in general won't take them very far. That is the stuff of politics, so now these political neophytes are getting into the fray, they will have to learn a few organizational lessons from the savvy insiders they are trying to replace. Nonetheless, one of the first comments made by Kevin McCarthy Fox News as he moved into Cantor's position was that "Yes, he would let the Export-Import Bank (reauthorization) to expire because it is something the private sector can do better". This represents a reversal from his 2012 position, and one that distances him from the business community and the party establishment, who want the Bank to remain. (Tea Partiers want to do away with the Ex-Im, the IRS and the Department of Education, among other institutions they find superfluous). In another interview, McCarthy asserted that the GOP had more to gain (politically) if it moved closer to libertarian ideas. So it has become apparent then, that the Tea Party as a movement and as a faction of the Republican Party is here to stay, at least for the near future. Its strength will depend on how they can accommodate their desires to the realities of governing the United States of America in the XXI century.María Fornella-Oehninger - Comparative Politics Professor, Old Dominion University in Norfolk, Virginia.

After two difficult weeks of bad press during which President Obama was accused of rashness (for his quick trip to Copenhagen in an unsuccessful bid on behalf of Chicago before the International Olympic Committee) and of dithering (for taking too long to decide on a new strategy for Afghanistan), on Friday October 9th Americans woke up to the news that their President had won the Nobel Peace Prize. With a mixture of surprise and exhilaration, he addressed the media and tried to be graceful in accepting it while at the same time pre-empting the inevitable criticism that would follow. He made it clear that he "did not view this as a recognition of his own accomplishments but rather as an affirmation of American leadership on behalf of the aspirations held by people in all nation. as a means to give momentum to a set of causes…as a call to action…for all nations to confront the common challenges of the 21st century". The reactions in the United States were mixed, but in general, they were the reverse image of those in Europe, where Obama is still widely admired and idealized. Surprise, outrage and skepticism were the three main responses by the American public. On the Right there was outrage because the prize came so early into his presidency, and at a time when his lack of achievements is starting to haunt the administration and has become the object of comedy sketches, from Jon Stewart's Daily Show to Saturday Night Live. Moderates were pleasantly surprised, even if somewhat puzzled, and immediately fretted that the prize would have more negative than positive consequences in the domestic realm. Indeed, recognition by the rest of the world makes even his supporters a little uncomfortable, and it is used as ammunition against the President by those who accuse him of being too apologetic to foreign powers. Skeptics on the Left felt that it was a strange choice because the country under his leadership is still involved in two wars, and about to escalate one of them. To this there is the added perception by many in his own party that he is doing little on the human rights front, especially with respect to Iran, where several protesters are about to be executed while diplomatic talks on the nuclear issue continue. It would be ludicrous to think that the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded only to those who succeed. In that case, it would only be awarded once every a hundred years. Instead, the prize is meant as a reward and an encouragement to leaders who fight for peace. When German Chancellor Willy Brandt was awarded the prize in 1971, he had just launched his "Ostpolitik" and he had made headlines when he visited Warsaw to sign the Warsaw Treaty and spontaneously knelt at the steps of the memorial to the Warsaw ghetto uprising against the Nazis. His acts did not per se bring an end to Cold War confrontation but it can be argued that Brandt started a process that culminated with détente and more concretely, with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which established a framework of cooperation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries and gradually became a manifesto for the dissident movement against Communism in the Eastern bloc. Later, and as part of the same process, the Nobel Peace Prize would be awarded to Lech Walesa in 1983 for his leadership in the union movement against the Polish Communist regime, and finally to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Their combined efforts finally led to the fall of Communism, and proved that peace, in the words of Nobel Peace prize awardee Oscar Arias, "has no finishing line, no deadline, no fixed definition of achievement…it is a never ending process, the work of many decisions by many people in many countries…" In only nine months of his presidency, Obama has changed the international climate of confrontation and preemptive aggression established by Bush, who alienated even our national allies. He has restored the principles of the New World Order envisioned by Bush's father: one based on international law and diplomacy, consensus-building and on progressive nuclear disarmament. It is this renewal of promises by the US to abide by international treaties, to use dialog instead of confrontation and to cooperate with the rest of the world through the United Nations that the Oslo Nobel Committee was rewarding. But as Eugene Robinson of the Washington Post has observed, if Obama were to find a cure for cancer, his critics would "blame him for putting some hard-working, red-blooded American oncologists out of work". In sum, his critics cannot have it both ways: they derided Obama for his unsuccessful trip to Copenhagen and made fun of his excessive self-confidence and his belief that by his actions alone he can improve American standing in the world. On the other hand, when Oslo honored him with the Nobel Prize, a sign that he is trusted and admired because of his approach to doing exactly that, they use this as proof that he cannot be trusted because foreigners like him too much!Almost a century ago, another US President found himself in a similar situation: admired by the rest of the world but shunned at home, Woodrow Wilson, who had led the way to peace at the end of World War I through the Versailles Treaty and the creation of the League of Nations (based on his famous Fourteen Points), received the 1919 Nobel Peace Prize at the end of his Presidency but after public opinion had already turned against him. Afflicted by a stroke and embittered by his battles with Congress, he never had a chance to see his work come to fruition: the Republican Senate voted against the United States' membership in the League. The consequences of this mistake are well-known: the United States turned inward, became isolationist and protectionist, only to find itself mired in the Great Depression by 1930. A weakened League was unable to stop the rising fascist states, and another world war followed. Later in the conflict the United States had to come out of its isolationism to defend Europe and establish peace. Wilson had died in 1924, but in many ways his vision of multilateralism and war prevention survived in the signing of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, this time under the leadership of the United States. Peace is even more elusive today, in a global world of unstable states and violent non-state actors, of deep resentments and irreconcilable views and values. It would be ludicrous to think that the US can bring about peace by itself or for that matter, to solve any of the problems that confront it without the cooperation of others. From global warming to transnational crime to terrorism, the only relatively acceptable solutions can be found through diplomacy and multilateral action. It is in this light that the Nobel Peace Prize Committee's intention has to be interpreted. For the first time in eight years, the United States is led by a President who understands that the complexity of post-modern conflict and the depth of the challenges faced can only be managed (not solved) by states acting in concert.The intricacy of global politics today is further enhanced by the immense and unprecedented political awareness of the masses everywhere. This new reality of massive political awakening is especially destabilizing in the early stages of national consciousness, during which emotions and feelings related to identity, ethnicity and geography are greatly intensified and thus become destabilizing. It is this climate of resentment, fragmentation and political awakening that the West has to confront not only in the battlefield (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq) but also at home, where immigration has altered the national face of states and where the North-South conflict has to be confronted every day. This changing geopolitical context, together with economic realities, is affecting the US place in the world and is resulting in the relative weakening of the West in general and of America in particular. Increasingly, the West is going to need the cooperation of a China that is "rising peacefully" and a still-belligerent Russia to settle most problems in the Middle East and Central Asia. As the United States and the West come to terms with their loss of power, as Europe still struggles to speak in one voice, as their military resources are tied down for the long term in areas where the political awakening is particularly virulent, it is ludicrous to expect peace with capital letters. In the best case scenario, these will be challenges that will require serious negotiations and tough diplomacy in order to be managed, and those should include the rising powers and even some unsavory interlocutors like Iran (which can be a partner in Iraq and Afghanistan) and the Taliban (some elements of which can be brought into local agreements and peeled away from Al Qaeda). Obama should use the encouragement of the Nobel Peace Prize to move these negotiations forward, without ultimatums, without immediate deadlines, with the guiding purpose of accommodation and de-escalation, of managing conflict more than forever solving it.On the home front, Obama publicly refused to celebrate the passing of the Baucus health-care reform bill yesterday, although this is a major stride towards the final legislative product. By a vote of 14 to 9, with only one Republican voting in favor, the Senate Finance Committee cleared the way for a full vote on the Senate floor once it is merged with the version from another committee that was approved a month ago. Senator Olympia Snowe, the only Republican to vote for it, said she was responding to "the call of History, and that consequences of inaction dictate the urgency of Congress" to act. Once it passes the Senate, it will be merged with the House bill and become law. This puts Obama in a very good position to succeed in health care reform before the end of the year, but he underplayed the achievement, saying it was just one more step and there still remained a long way to go. He did, however, thank Senator Snowe for her "political courage and seriousness of purpose."Finally, on November 3rd, all eyes will be on the state of Virginia. Virginians will be voting for governor in a close race in which Bob McDonnell, the Republican candidate has been consistently ahead in the polls. Because Northern Virginia is so close to Washington, not only geographically but also culturally and politically, it is deemed the most important race for governor in the country. After eight years of excellent leadership under two Democratic governors, Mark Warner and Tim Kaine, (there is no re-election for governor in the state of Virginia), the electorate seems ready for a change, even as political pundits are portraying the race as a poll on the President himself. That is why, at the end of this month Obama will be campaigning for Creigh Deeds, the Democratic candidate for Governor of Virginia. It is another political gamble by the hyperkinetic president and one he should reconsider for at least two reasons. First, Virginians are a tough lot and usually prefer to balance the party ticket of state and federal government. Indeed, according to Larry Sabato of the Center for Politics at the University of Virginia, for the last eight consecutive elections, Virginians have voted for governor the nominee of the party opposite to the one that held the White House. That means they will vote for Republican candidate Mc Donnell and Obama's candidate will lose. Second, until this last election when Obama won the state, Virginians had voted Republican in nearly every presidential election since 1952. It was thanks to the youth vote that he won, and those voters are the least likely to come out and vote in the election for governor. The older crowds that vote religiously in every election are more likely to vote Republican this time. For Obama to campaign for Deeds is then a repeat of the Copenhagen Olympic bid effect.Passing the health care bill and achieving a Democratic win in at least some of the governor races would represent incredible boosts for the President that he will need as his support numbers dwindle, especially if he makes the unpopular decision of sending more troops to Afghanistan. By the time all those questions are settled, the Copenhagen Olympics and the Oslo Peace Prize will be distant memories. But then, he will have to go back and address Copenhagen II, namely, climate change. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

"If there was ever a doubt about just how American Mr. Obama is, Sunday's raid eliminates it better than any long-form birth certificate. This was his finest hour." Bret Stephens, the Wall Street Journal Late at night on Sunday May 1st President Obama announced to the nation that Osama Bin Laden had been found and killed by a US Navy Special Operations team. The Navy SEAL team Six, as it is known here, landed two helicopters inside a walled three-story compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where years of painstakingly gathered intelligence had led authorities to believe there was a high chance the Al Qaeda leader may be hiding. This may well have been the largest, most successful intelligence operation in US history; the President acted boldly and decisively and for that he received accolades from both sides of the political divide. Coming as it did just a month after the President launched his re-election campaign, this victory immediately boosted his approval rate by eleven points, according to surveys.Even if the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda has not yet been accomplished, this was a huge milestone and the closing of a chapter that started ten years ago when the hunt for Osama Bin Laden was launched by the Bush administration. Last week's operation resulted in the largest trove of data ever found on Al Qaeda, including information on immediate threats being planned, location and structure of its leadership, and scores of data that will help piece together a deeper understanding of their long-term tactics, techniques and procedures.Disposing of such a reviled figure who, for over ten years had ordered the killing of innocent civilians around the world, is undoubtedly a great blow both symbolic and real, to Al Qaeda, a decentralized movement whose members are tied together mainly by feelings, emotions and mythology. But does it sound the death knell for the organization? What are its short and long term implications? Al Qaeda has proven to be quite resilient, but is it still spreading and growing? More importantly, how relevant is it in the face of the Arab Spring moving throughout the Middle East and Northern Africa?All these questions need to be pondered carefully, since they have deep implications for US foreign policy in the region, for the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for its difficult and troubled relation with Pakistan. This unexpected win will lead to a comprehensive reassessment of US military presence in the area, its strategies of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and its alliance with Pakistan.American reaction to Osama Bin Laden's death was one of noisy, overt celebration in New York and DC, and of relief and jubilation in the rest of the country. It was indeed the reverse of the deep shock, terror and bereavement of 9-11, but both instances had one common denominator: there was a sense of collective emotion, of a long-forgotten and now recovered national unity. However, this did not last long as incipient criticism and second-guessing started 24 hours later over Bin Laden's burial at sea and the decision by the administration not to show pictures of his death. It came from both sides of the ideological spectrum and, in some cases, it was bolstered by strong arguments. For example Alan Dershowitz, the Harvard Law professor, considered the burial at sea a "willful destruction of evidence that may arise suspicions that there was something to hide." Others used the occasion to stir up doubts and demanded pictures to certify Bin Laden's death, but then again, these are not to be taken seriously sine they were the same groups that had to be shown a long version of the President's birth certificate as evidence he was American. A second criticism coming mainly from some Neo-conservatives, was the administration's failure to recognize publicly that the intelligence gathering that led to the finding and killing of Bin Laden was a vindication of the "enhanced interrogation techniques" (read: water boarding) used by the Bush administration in foreign detention centers and at Guantánamo, which Obama had consistently and very publicly condemned during the 2008 campaign and into his years in office.To the first, members of the administration responded that the point was to dispose of his body in a respectful manner, not because he deserved it but to deny a source of friction with other Muslims and to deprive his followers with a shrine and an opportunity to exploit him as an iconic martyr. A similar argument was used to explain the decision not to release the pictures: the President wants to avoid ostentatious displays of triumphalism that may come back to haunt him. His sobriety and restraint further reinforce the boldness of his decision and his steadfast determination to "disrupt, dismantle and defeat" Al Qaeda and not be distracted from his goal by premature claims of "mission accomplished".To the second claim, the White House responded that the success of the operation is far from a vindication of such unconstitutional techniques, since it was the result of the hard work of professionals over time and across two administrations, who integrated thousands of small pieces of intelligence gathering coming from human and technological sources into one gigantic puzzle, and that no one single piece led the US to Bin Laden. It took all the resources only the US can muster, from military bases to networks of human intelligence, to electronic eavesdropping, to specially trained forces, to locate and kill one hidden individual in a foreign country, and then match his DNA in an aircraft carrier before disposing of the corpse. But it also took a courageous American president to make such a risky call, namely, authorizing a covert operation deep into Pakistani territory based on circumstantial evidence at best, and without alerting the Pakistani authorities about it. Fortunately, wide recognition was given to the President's courage and many on the Right called it "Obama's Finest Hour". Both former President Bush and his prickly vice-president Cheney congratulated Obama and gave him full credit.A more productive conversation that has already started in academic and diplomatic circles is how relevant Bin Laden's death is for the Arab world. If he had died eight years ago, says one French scholar, he would have instantaneously become a martyr in the Arab street, an icon of anti-Western sentiment. However, in 2011, he had receded into the back of the consciousness of young Arabs for several reasons. First, because he had been in hiding for so long that his presence in the media had been noticeably diminished: out of sight, out of mind. Time spent out of the limelight erases mystiques and cools down emotions. Secondly because many saw him as the culprit for bringing the United States into Iraq and Afghanistan, which in turn gave an excuse for authoritarian regimes in the region to become even more repressive and extend their time in power. In Iraq, local Sunnis blame Al Qaeda for bringing the Shiites to power and expanding the influence of Iran in their country. Also, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda had increasingly lost the allegiance of many Muslims around the world for their indiscriminate bombings of hospitals, mosques and shrines and the killings of non-combatant Muslims in Baghdad, Basra and Amman (even if many were Shiite, the slaughter of innocent women and children caused revulsion in these populations).More importantly, the wave of pluralistic revolutions sweeping the Middle East and North Africa has rendered Al Qaeda irrelevant. There is an emerging sense of strong national identities, whereby the masses are thinking of themselves first as Egyptians, Tunisians or Libyans, with ethnicity and religion taking a secondary role. Indeed, Nasser's Pan-Arabism died the 1960sm, and the dream of a Caliphate "extending Islamic rule from Indonesia to Spain", which Bin Laden proposed as Al Qaeda's ultimate goal is no longer an interesting proposition to the extremely young populations of the region, many of whom have access to the new social media in the Internet, and who crave freedom and modernity more than anything else. The "Arab Spring" may spell the end of Al Qaeda's political aspirations for the region: the Turkish model of a secular, modern state with an overwhelmingly Islamic population and a pluralistic party system is far more appealing than the pan-Islamic caliphate of the Prophet's era. In the words of Professor Fouad Ajami, "It is risky to say, but Arabs appear to have wearied of violence…It was Bin Laden's deserved fate to be struck down when an entirely different Arab world was struggling to be born."Time and treasure spent in a ten-year war have also changed perspectives in America, especially for the younger generations. There is an on-going unofficial revision of the Bush doctrine of invading whole countries "that harbor, train or fund terrorists" in favor of narrower, more focused actions against the terrorists themselves. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken their toll on the American military as far as recruitment and resources. The main concern of voters is the American economy, especially unemployment and the ever-expanding national debt. A hundred and forty thousand American and NATO troops are involved in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, with no endgame in sight. Killings of Americans by despondent Afghan soldiers and other groups whose "hearts and minds" the US is supposed to win, occupy the headlines daily. Counter-terrorism increasingly seems to be a much more appealing and productive strategy. Expressing this widely-held sentiment, Senator Kerry recently declared: "There is no possible victory to be had in Afghanistan".Even though President Obama called it a war of necessity and has invested deeply in it, this is no longer a popular war: two-thirds of the American electorate is against it. Therefore, there will be pressure on President Obama to accelerate the phased withdrawal from Afghanistan, and complete it before the set deadline of 2014. He is a rational decision-maker who does not easily cave under pressure, but the 2012 election is likely to enter into his calculations. As a champion of counter-terrorism and opposing counter-insurgency from early on, Vice-president Biden might still be vindicated in his wisdom. When Obama opted for the surge in Afghanistan two years ago, he overruled Biden and sided with the military. Will he change his mind and speed up the withdrawal now? The killing of Bin Laden certainly gives him an opening to change his initial timetable. "Al Qaeda is no longer there, and the Taliban must be beaten by Afghans themselves", says Leslie Gelb, president emeritus of the Council of Foreign Relations.Finally, the fact that Pakistan has proved to be an unreliable partner in the war against terrorism is also putting pressure on the President to review his Afghan policy. The alliance is frayed; Pakistan is giving sanctuary to violent militants of all sorts, and another high Al Qaeda operative now in American custody, Khalid Sheik Mohammed, was also found in Pakistan (Rawalpindi). Indeed, by the rationale of the Bush doctrine, the US should be invading Pakistan next. The White House says they have no evidence that there was any "foreknowledge" by the Pakistani leadership that Bin Laden was holed up in a one-million-dollar compound, in a military town, only 30 miles away from Islamabad. Pakistan will conduct its "own investigation" and will have to prove itself a worthy ally, for example, by sharing information gleaned from Bin Laden's three wives and several children now held under Pakistani custody. On the other hand, veteran security experts retort, more terrorists have been arrested by the Pakistani authorities since 2001 than anywhere else in the world. In this case, was it incompetence or complicity? Pakistan is a very complex country, where the military are an autonomous force above civilian rule, and they also control the Intelligence Services (ISI). It is a house divided against itself. It harbors numerous militant groups, and goes after some but not others. It hedges its bets this way so as not to lose influence and power in the region, for example by supporting the Taliban and Haqqani networks fighting to seize power in Afghanistan, and the Lashkar-e-Taiba organization against India in Kashmir. Pakistan's foreign and national security policy is built around its obsession with India, its most vilified enemy and against which it has fought several wars. It is clear now that ISI gave sophisticated support to the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2009. Pakistan needs a friendly government in Afghanistan so that it can maintain its "strategic depth" vis à vis India. Armed with over a hundred nuclear weapons and with some control over this wide array of militant groups, Pakistan is pivotal in the stability of South Asia. Those are the two main reasons why the US-Pakistani relationship survived after the Cold War ended. Because of the weakness and corruption of civilian governments, past and present, the US has preferred to engage with the military, who control the nuclear arsenal, and has made them the recipient of most US aid (indeed, by the end of this year alone the Pakistani military will have received $3 billion from the US). But this may be about to change if Pakistan rejects the US request to be in charge of the internal investigation on whether Bin Laden was given sanctuary, and if so, by whom.Now that its main leader has been killed, and in spite of its virtual irrelevance, Al Qaeda is likely to undergo an internal struggle to determine its future. The mystique of its international role has already somewhat dissipated and the different groups in the network are shifting their focus to their national agendas. Indeed, this has already been the case in Egypt, where after days of ominous silence on the Tahrir Square Revolution, Al Qaeda's second in command, Egyptian-born Al-Zwahiri injected himself in the process by supporting the leader of an Islamist party that wants post-Mubarak Egypt to adopt Sharia law. But his attempt did not resonate with the young revolutionaries, most of which want a pluralistic society and are much more concerned with jobs and government accountability than with religious utopia. However, revolutions are just the beginning of a long process, transition periods are by definition unstable, and post-revolutionary regimes have historically been highjacked by extremists. So one can only be cautiously optimistic about what will come next, but it appears as if the Middle East and the Arab world are moving on and beginning to spell the end of Al Qaeda's aspirations. Bin Laden's demise is the appropriate end of this chapter in the region's history.Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goods and reduce poverty vary across countries. Even in democracies, politicians often have incentives to divert resources to political rents and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at the expense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfections in political markets that are greater in some countries than in others. This article reviews the theory and evidence on the impact on political incentives of incomplete information for voters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and social polarization. The analysis has implications for policy and for reforms to improve public goods provision and reduce poverty.

Dottorato di ricerca in Storia d'Europa: Società, politica e istituzioni(XIX-XX Secolo) ; Una curiosa espressione di Jacques Delors, più volte utilizzata nel corso della sua carriera, definì le istituzioni comunitarie come un "O.P.N.I., oggetto politico non identificato". L'affermazione di Delors appare come un compromesso tra l'interesse a tutela dei diritti degli Stati e la necessità di attribuire al processo di integrazione europea istituzioni stabili e soprattutto autonome. In realtà, i caratteri di profonda instabilità mostrati dal modello di Comunità ne fecero scaturire due orientamenti interpretativi differenti. Il primo considerò il raggiungimento dell'obiettivo prefissato nella realizzazione di una unione politica; come sostiene Riccardo Perissich, "Ai limitati trasferimenti di sovranità già decisi, altri ne sarebbero seguiti, anche se sempre in modo graduale. Coerentemente con questo approccio, le istituzioni avrebbero dovuto evolvere verso un modello classico. La Commissione si sarebbe trasformata in un esecutivo federale; il Consiglio dei ministri in un "Senato degli Stati"; l'Assemblea parlamentare in un vero Parlamento federale"1. Il secondo orientamento si basò sull'idea che il principio di sovranità non potesse essere frammentato e che il conferimento di potere previsto dai Trattati fosse più di carattere tecnico che politico. Questa seconda interpretazione aumentò i dubbi e la diffidenza nei confronti della Commissione e ancor più del Parlamento. C'è da dire inoltre, che gli Stati firmatari dei Trattati si riconobbero più nella prima lettura del modello, con un necessario distinguo per la Francia che, all'epoca dell'entrata in vigore era presieduta dal generale Charles De Gaulle, fortemente contrario, come noto, all'idea di una qualsiasi minima cessione di potere a livello sovranazionale. A seguito della fusione di CECA, CEE ed EURATOM una sola Commissione unificò l'apparato amministrativo mentre al Parlamento europeo venne assegnato unicamente il compito di esercitare il potere in materia di bilancio, oltre ad una funzione meramente consultiva; l'elezione diretta del Parlamento fu contemplata nell'articolo n.138 del Trattato istitutivo della Comunità europea nel quale, oltre ad essere indicato il sistema di elezione dei parlamentari europei delegati come provvisorio, 1R. Perissich, L'Unione Europea una storia non ufficiale, Milano, Longanesi, 2008, p.54. venne previsto che il Parlamento avrebbe elaborato progetti volti alla realizzazione di una procedura di elezione uniforme per tutti gli Stati membri. Di fatto, negli anni che intercorsero tra il 1951 e il 1976, furono presentate numerose proposte orientate all'istituzione della procedura di elezione a suffragio universale diretto che, dopo molte difficoltà, trovarono soltanto nel 1979 la loro attuazione; questo risultato rappresentò l'inizio di una nuova era in cui l'importanza della comunicazione politico-istituzionale giocò un ruolo fondamentale per creare il necessario contatto con i cittadini, in previsione della loro partecipazione al voto europeo. Ricordiamo come nel 1974, al vertice francese presieduto da Valéry Giscard D'Estaing, venne adottata la decisione di istituire il Consiglio europeo e l'elezione diretta del Parlamento. L'evento avrebbe esercitato una notevole influenza nella dinamica istituzionale europea; nonostante il suo assetto di Assemblea diversa da quelle nazionali, il Parlamento europeo direttamente eletto avrebbe preteso un aumento della propria influenza politica così come del proprio peso istituzionale. Attraverso le elezioni, i cittadini europei avrebbero potuto accrescere progressivamente il loro interesse nei confronti dei temi comunitari riuscendo a percepire meglio l'esistenza di un'istituzione fino ad allora poco conosciuta. Su questo aspetto federalisti e "gradualisti" si collocarono su posizioni discordanti, in quanto i primi da sempre consideravano il Parlamento eletto come "Congresso del popolo europeo" e quindi come il potere costituente della futura Federazione europea. Personalità di spicco sui singoli piani nazionali, costantemente impegnate nella causa dell'integrazione europea (solo per citare alcuni nomi si ricordano Altiero Spinelli, Simone Veil, Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac), oltre ad esponenti politici ed intellettuali che interpretarono un ruolo di forte influenza all'interno dei loro partiti riguardo alla scelta europeista (per l'Italia ricordiamo Giorgio Amendola, Enrico Berlinguer, Mauro Ferri, Gaetano Arfè), si impegnarono con l'intento di legittimarne il ruolo rispetto alle altre istituzioni, in particolar modo la Commissione. I parlamentari eletti nel primo suffragio universale diretto si trovarono quindi ad affrontare temi che andavano dalla questione dei paesi comunisti ai rapporti con il Terzo mondo, alla progettazione di una televisione europea fino alla necessità di redigere una prima bozza di Costituzione europea. Il ricorso alle candidature di personalità politiche ben note all'opinione pubblica quali Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil, Willy Brandt, si pensò potesse offrire un maggiore potenziale all'organizzazione della propaganda. La campagna elettorale del giugno 1979, così come le altre due successive, fu tuttavia caratterizzata, soprattutto in Italia e Francia, da argomenti troppo spesso collegati alla dialettica politica della propria nazione. In ogni caso l'informazione data ai cittadini europei fu in grado di suscitare un inevitabile interessamento ai problemi comunitari, ma soprattutto alla realtà sovranazionale. L'affluenza al voto fu comunque inferiore rispetto alle elezioni nazionali. Nei motivi della scarsa partecipazione al voto, oltre l'assenza di dibattito propriamente europeo vi fu anche il fatto che le strategie dei partiti tesero ad una sorta di strumentalizzazione delle elezioni europee, puntando attraverso le campagne elettorali al perseguimento di obiettivi nazionali. Il primo scrutinio diretto fu in grado comunque di dare una ventata di novità al concetto di democrazia europea. La nuova legittimità consentì al Parlamento di consolidare nel tempo i propri poteri e di interpretare un ruolo all'interno del processo decisionale comunitario che all'epoca poteva dirsi quanto meno "nebuloso". Una volta fissato il periodo di svolgimento delle prime elezioni, le forze politiche nazionali dovettero sostenere una sfida che le avrebbe costrette a rimettersi in gioco, cercando di rinnovare gli argomenti e i temi individuati per le campagne elettorali nazionali. Una maggiore consapevolezza riguardo alla necessità di allargare l'orizzonte, senza trascurare tuttavia il contatto con i propri elettori e cercando le possibili somiglianze con gli altri partiti europei, avrebbe consentito di conciliare la propria ideologia in un contesto più ampio. Occorre tener presente come tra il 1975 e il 1979 si fossero create all'interno dell'Assemblea parlamentare non eletta, formazioni politiche rappresentative di partiti accomunati da un orientamento affine a quello nazionale. La diversità di ideologie, tuttavia rendeva queste coalizioni molto deboli, soprattutto per via della tanto difficile integrazione ostacolata dalla predominanza degli interessi nazionali anteposti a quelli comunitari. La primazia dei partiti nazionali ha sempre costituito un ostacolo all'autonomia di azione dei gruppi e delle federazioni lasciando, fino ad oggi, inattuata la costituzione di veri e propri partiti europei. All'indomani del primo suffragio universale diretto, tuttavia, il nuovo parlamentare europeo avrebbe assunto il ruolo di trait d'union tra il proprio elettorato, il proprio partito, la coalizione europea e il Parlamento stesso. I tratti caratterizzanti il percorso politico-istituzionale del Parlamento europeo sono stati oggetto di approfondimento nello studio dei casi relativi ai tre Paesi considerati rivelando le differenze che, per la natura stessa del ruolo giocato nel contesto sovranazionale, non hanno risparmiato il processo di integrazione e, nel caso specifico, la partecipazione alle elezioni dirette del Parlamento. Accomunando Italia e Francia, paesi fondatori della Comunità europea che si dimostrarono troppo intenti a trattare temi nazionali durante le campagne elettorali, nel Regno Unito l'idea di Europa si coniugò con la costante valutazione di tutti gli elementi che sarebbero risultati convenienti per partecipare, senza che tutto ciò costringesse a modificare o rinunciare a quanto già in possesso, atteggiamento che trovò nella linea di governo di Margaret Thatcher una perfetta interpretazione durata per l'intero decennio esaminato. Se per il primo suffragio universale diretto l'attività maggiore fu quella di approntare nuovi metodi organizzativi per le campagne elettorali, adatti alla ricerca di un consenso più ampio, diretto a legittimare l'istituzione sovranazionale, nella seconda e terza tornata le riflessioni delle forze politiche si resero necessarie per cercare di individuare le cause del progressivo calo partecipativo. I difetti di una comunicazione politica spesso basata su issues nazionali, soprattutto riguardo la Francia, ha di sicuro rappresentato una delle possibili cause, ma l'atteggiamento stesso dei partiti, apparso frequentemente poco incline a credere seriamente nell'importanza delle elezioni, ha lasciato percepire incertezza ai cittadini europei. Per altro verso, anche le campagne elettorali comunitarie, sebbene abbiano investito molte risorse per cercare di catturare il consenso dell'opinione pubblica, hanno mostrato la parziale efficienza dei mezzi messi in atto. Elezioni di second'ordine quindi? E' possibile parlarne ancora in questi termini? Da quanto emerso nel corso della ricerca condotta sul versante storico-politologico, il livello delle elezioni europee non risulta affatto secondario. Il dato partecipativo, anzi è inversamente proporzionale alla quantità di lavoro preparatorio sia dal punto di vista politico che amministravo-istituzionale, ben superiore a qualsiasi suffragio nazionale. Ci si chiede allora perché gli elettori non abbiano risposto con altrettanto entusiasmo. Qui le risposte trovano differenti possibilità da tenere nella giusta considerazione: la poca attenzione ai temi comunitari, la qualità della comunicazione, l'errore di propagandare l'evento troppo a ridosso delle date di svolgimento, l'eccessiva distanza tra istituzioni e cittadini, il livello culturale degli elettori, i giorni della settimana individuati per i suffragi spesso troppo vicini ad elezioni nazionali appena svolte, la classe politica poco convinta. In realtà tutti questi fattori rappresentano concause della scarsa partecipazione. Il cittadino europeo in mezzo a questo guazzabuglio è il personaggio principale di una performance in cui lui stesso determina la riuscita. Nonostante i numeri evidenzino una progressiva flessione nei dieci anni esaminati, i cittadini non sono rimasti indifferenti di fronte alle novità introdotte dal processo di integrazione europea. Spesso, soprattutto durante i sondaggi, accanto ad una percentuale di "indifferenti" o "euroscettici", molti intervistati hanno lamentato la poca autorità del Parlamento europeo nel contesto istituzionale comunitario2 confidando in ulteriori progressi strutturali. Il mancato raggiungimento di questo obiettivo, preannunciato già prima del 1979, insieme alle vicende politiche legate al proprio Paese, ha gradualmente provocato negli elettori reazioni di protesta attraverso il non voto o il voto negativo3, comportamenti capaci di delineare una partecipazione differente rispetto alla decisione di esprimere la propria scelta. Questo tipo di elettore ha mostrato di essere stato raggiunto dall'informazione diffusa durante le campagne elettorali e, sulla base di quanto appreso, ha deciso consapevolmente di non votare o di esercitare un voto diverso annullando o votando scheda bianca; quindi si è recato ai seggi, 2 Si vedano a questo proposito i risultati emersi nella pubblicazione della Commissione delle Comunità europee, Eurobarometro – L'opinione pubblica nella Comunità europea, Vol.1, 32/89, Direzione generale Informazione, comunicazione e cultura, Bruxelles, 1989. 3 Cfr. A. Gianturco Gulisano, La fenomenologia del non voto, in R. De Mucci (a cura di), Election day. Votare tutti e tutto assieme fa bene alla democrazia?, cit. non è rimasto inerte disinteressandosi di quanto stava accadendo. L'auspicio di un consolidamento istituzionale del Parlamento e di una maggiore coesione politica della Comunità europea non ancora raggiunti, anche per responsabilità delle politiche nazionali, ha posto l'elettore in condizione di negare il proprio contributo o protestare verso il mancato conseguimento dei risultati. L'accrescimento della conoscenza e del coinvolgimento, sebbene presenti, non sono andati di pari passo con la partecipazione. Elementi di insoddisfazione hanno caratterizzato il comportamento dell'elettore realmente europeista. I cittadini europei possono in realtà collocarsi in tre macro aree nelle quali si ritrovano gli europeisti, gli euro avversi e gli euroscettici. Se le aspettative degli europeisti sono rimaste deluse, gli euroavversi hanno parzialmente esercitato il diritto di voto alimentando quelle liste comunque presenti nella competizione europea. Gli euroscettici, invece hanno rappresentato il punto nevralgico dell'elettorato. Trovandosi in quella parte di popolazione attenta ad osservare quali e quanti cambiamenti sarebbero avvenuti a partire dal 1979 hanno avuto modo di consolidare la loro posizione continuando a percepire la Comunità ancora lontana e prevalentemente scomoda se non inutile. A differenza dell'europeista deluso che comunque ha continuato a partecipare, magari protestando, e dell'euroavverso che ha espresso il suo disappunto preferendo i partiti antieuropeisti, l'euroscettico ha proseguito nell'osservazione, affiancandosi agli incerti che sono rimasti a casa. A questo punto sono apparse inevitabili ulteriori valutazioni verso quegli elementi che caratterizzano le elezioni in genere. Ciò che attrae il cittadino ai seggi elettorali è prevalentemente il peso che le elezioni possono esercitare sui cambiamenti del governo nel proprio Paese. Il "less at stake" delle elezioni europee ha rappresentato sicuramente uno dei motivi scatenanti i sentimenti appena descritti; lo scenario si profila diverso, In such 'marker-setting' elections, voters have an incentive to behave tactically, but in a sense of the word 'tactical' that is quite different from what we see in National elections, where large parties are advantaged by their size. In a markersetting election the tactical situation is instead characterized by an apparent lack of consequences for the allocation of power, on the one hand, and by the attentiveness of politicians and media, on the other4. La mancanza di conseguenze sul livello nazionale garantita dalle elezioni europee ha "alleggerito" l'elettore della responsabilità di orientare con la propria scelta il corso della politica nazionale. Sebbene nel 1979 vi fu un'attività partitica a livello transnazionale, consentita anche dalla disponibilità di fondi in quel periodo, l'attenzione dell'elettorato fu minima. In termini di risultati transnazionali la percezione fu praticamente irrilevante; circa il cinquanta per cento dei votanti ammise di non aver idea di quali gruppi avessero ottenuto maggiori consensi. Altro aspetto da non sottovalutare si collega allo sproporzionato successo ottenuto dai partiti più piccoli rispetto ai grandi; è in questo caso che si può parlare di voto punitivo nei confronti della politica del governo nazionale. Molte le sfaccettature e tutte fondamentali per riuscire a capire il perché delle differenze comportamentali dell'elettorato, differenze che nei tre Paesi oggetto di studio si sono rivelate estremamente rappresentate. In linea con la tradizione, gli elettori dell'Italia e della Francia hanno mostrato una partecipazione considerevole, evidentemente legata alle vicende che hanno caratterizzato il dibattito politico nazionale negli anni 1979 – 1989. Il voto "pseudo-obbligatorio" dell'Italia ha mantenuto alta la percentuale dei votanti, ma i risultati hanno mostrato orientamenti variabili nelle tre tornate esaminate. Il caso francese ha mostrato una escalation della destra attraverso i consensi ottenuti dal Front National in risposta ad un importante declino del Partito comunista, anche in considerazione di una progressiva dispersione di voti dovuta alla presenza di numerose liste, in particolar modo nel 1989. Il caso anglosassone si colloca in una posizione particolare rispetto agli altri due Paesi, ma sarebbe più giusto dire rispetto a tutti gli altri. A fronte di un orientamento nazionale tendenzialmente contrario alla Comunità europea, fra le ideologie maggiormente rappresentative si è distinto un Partito conservatore desideroso di giocare un ruolo importante nel contesto europeo, consapevole quindi del significato che la competizione europea 4 C. Van der Eijk, M. Franklin, M. Marsh, What voters teach us about Europe-Wide Elections: what Europe-Wide Elections teach us about voters, in "Electoral Studies", vol. 15, n. 2, p. 157. avrebbe potuto assumere per la riuscita dell'intento. L'importanza del suffragio sovranazionale non fu invece immediatamente compresa dai Laburisti, che di fatto ottennero una pesante sconfitta nel corso del primo appuntamento con lo scrutinio europeo, ravvedendosi in seguito e riuscendo a superare i Conservatori anche grazie all'inizio del declino del governo Thatcher. Un elemento che ha accomunato tutti i Paesi della Comunità è stato rappresentato dalla progressiva affermazione dei Verdi. Lo studio effettuato attraverso una costante attenzione al dibattito politico di ciascun Paese, insieme alle strategie attuate dagli attori, consapevoli fin dall'inizio che la sfida europea li avrebbe impegnati non più o meno di quella nazionale, ma sicuramente in modo diverso, ha condotto ad un approfondimento verso il singolo cittadino che assumendo in sé il ruolo di attore principale ne ha determinato gli esiti. Le risultanze dei dati emersi dalle consultazioni avvenute negli anni 1979 – 1989 non possono considerarsi soltanto per il puro dato numerico. La molteplicità dei fattori che hanno influito sulla scelta di votare o meno ha mostrato un elettore che, pur appartenendo a paesi diversi e con differenti livelli culturali, è stato in grado di decidere basandosi su considerazioni affatto superficiali, operando un'attenta scelta dei numerosi elementi che avrebbero potuto favorire il rafforzamento politico-istituzionale europeo: una tacita selezione dell'elettorato, che inevitabilmente ha lasciato fuori tutti coloro che non hanno ritenuto importante impegnarsi per una consultazione ritenuta priva di un qualsiasi tornaconto. Classe politica poco convinta, informazione discutibile, scarsa conoscenza da parte dei cittadini riguardo al ruolo del Parlamento europeo, inefficacia della comunicazione, hanno contribuito a costruire un elettore diverso dal solito, più attento, in possesso di maggiore senso critico nei confronti di uno scenario nuovo e molto più complesso rispetto a quello nazionale5. Dalla pluralità di elementi emersi durante la ricerca attraverso il ricorso all'interdisciplinarietà per cercare di comprenderne maggiormente i significati, sono emersi dettagli che hanno stimolato ad ulteriori approfondimenti. 5 Cfr. Commissione delle Comunità europee, Eurobarometro – L'opinione pubblica e l'Europa, 9/89, Direzione generale Informazione, comunicazione e cultura, Bruxelles, 1989. Successivamente alle considerazioni storico – politiche , ciò che si è voluto sottolineare, attraverso l'analisi sociologica, riguardo alle elezioni europee nel loro complesso e nella loro perpetua considerazione di elezioni secondarie, è che tutti i fattori esaminati ne mostrano un'immagine differente, che non vuole assolutamente porsi in contrasto con l'interpretazione dei dati puri, ma vuole indurre a considerare maggiormente i numerosi fattori, che per la qualità e la quantità riscontrata permettono di ottenere un quadro più completo dei fatti, andando oltre al mero dato partecipativo sul quale, indubbiamente, la differenza con la partecipazione nazionale è di tutta evidenza. L'esame approfondito è apparso ancor più necessario alla luce del tortuoso processo di costruzione europea e del macchinoso assetto istituzionale comunitario, al fine di poter tenere nella giusta considerazione il maggior numero di elementi possibile, non tanto per giustificare i risultati, ma quanto, piuttosto, per riflettere su di essi cercando di distribuire una responsabilità policentrica a partire dalle forze politiche per finire al cittadino stesso. ; Jacques Delors used to talk about European institutions as an O.P.N.I Object Politique Non Identifié. His opinion appears a compromise between his interest to protect National rights and the need to give lasting and autonomous governance to the European integration process. Actually from the European Community model, two different ways of thinking the governance derived both influenced by the instability of the model itself. The first one aimed at a political union; as Riccardo Perissich says: "Ai limitati trasferimenti di sovranità già decisi, altri ne sarebbero seguiti, anche se sempre in modo graduale. Coerentemente con questo approccio, le istituzioni avrebbero dovuto evolvere verso un modello classico. La Commissione si sarebbe trasformata in un esecutivo federale; il Consiglio dei ministri in un "Senato degli Stati"; l'Assemblea parlamentare in un vero Parlamento federale"6. The second one tried not to neglect the sovereignty principle by transferring technical and political power according to the Treaties. This second view increased doubts and mistrust towards the European Parliament and Commission as well. European Member States agreed above all with the first view, except for the France of Charles De Gaulle who was still convinced of his idea of not giving power to supranational level. Following the unification between ECSC, EEC and EAEC there was a single Commission for the whole administrative system while the Parliament had competence on the European budget; direct election to European Parliament was referred to as "temporary" in Article 138 of the European Community Treaty; then the Parliament would plan the way for a single procedure election regarding all Member States. Between 1951 and 1976 there were many proposals to define a direct universal suffrage, but only in 1979 this target was achieved. This result meant a significant change also for the polical and institutional 6R. Perissich, L'Unione Europea una storia non ufficiale, Milano, Longanesi, 2008, p.54. communication that became fundamental to reach citizenship during the election campaign. In 1974, during the French summit chaired by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, were both established the European Council and the direct election of the European Parliament. The European Parliament finally elected by European citizens would require an increase in both political and institutional influence. The direct elections would enhance popular interest in European affairs as well as raise people's awareness of the Parliament itself. This last aspect emphasized the differences between the federalist and the "gradualist" trend. The first one considered the direct elected Parliament as a "Congress of European People", that is to say the constituent power of the future European Federation. Many famous people were constantly engaged in the European integration cause as politicians and intellectuals did by committing themselves to legitimizing the role of the European Parliament in relation to other institutions, particularly the European Commission. Reference can be made to Altiero Spinelli, Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil, Helmut Kohl, Jacques Chirac, just to mention some of them. Members of the European Parliament (MEP's) began their job by addressing many issues such as the question of communist nations or planning for a European TV or preparing a draft for the European Constitution. Appointing political celebrities such as Enrico Berlinguer, Simone Veil, Willy Brandt was a way to make the propaganda more effective. The 1979 election campaign as well as the other two following ones was, however, characterized by arguments too often associated with the national political discourse. All the information given to European citizens succeeded in generating interest in supranational reality above all. The turnout was lower than in national elections and the reason has to be found in the behaviour of political parties in discussing mostly national issues aiming at national targets. In spite of this, the first direct election to the European Parliament gave a breath of fresh air to the meaning of European democracy. The newly acquired legitimacy gave the European Parliament the opportunity to consolidate its power by acting a definite role inside the European decisional process that was, at that time, nebulous to say the least. Once the electoral date was scheduled all the national political parties had to face a challenge that forced them to renew their themes and topics previously chosen in national campaign. There was greater awareness of the necessity to broaden the horizon without loosing contact with voters by looking for similarities in other European political parties. This is what would allow single ideologies to merge in a wider context. We must to consider that between 1975 – 1979 inside the European Parliament there were representatives of parties sharing outlooks similar to the national ones, but different ways of thinking made these coalitions too weak, above all because of the predominant national interests. The primacy of national parties has always been an obstacle to the autonomy of groups and federations, neglecting the implementation of European parties. After the first direct European elections the new MEP's were a kind of "trait d'union" with their own electorates, their own party, the European coalition and the Parliament as well. The peculiar features of the political-institutional path of the European Parliament concerning the three countries studied showed differences that have characterized their participation in European elections. While Italy and France, founding members of EC, were too busy to deal with national issues during electoral campaign, the UK was more attentive to evaluate the benefits of participation and Margaret Thatcher, who was Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990 was particularly suited for such an attitude. While during the first direct election there was a need to bring some new element in organizing the electoral campaign in order to reach a wider consensus, the following two elections made political forces more reflective about the decline in turnout. Too many national issues made the communication weak, particularly for the French campaign. What citizens perceived was the little confidence of political parties and that was the reason for such a large incertitude among the people. On the other hand, the Community campaign too showed a partial efficiency. So what kind of elections are we talking about? Still "second order" elections? This is not the picture that emerged from my research conducted on the historical and political fields. Participation is inversely proportional to the preparatory work, both from a political point of view and from an administrative-institutional one, which was far superior to any national suffrage. So, why didn't voters participate so enthusiastically? Many answers are possible because many are the causes of such an odd behaviour: little attention to European issues, quality of communication, propaganda too close to the election date, distance between citizens and istitution, the cultural level of voters, election dates too close to those of national elections, lack of confidence of the political class were all contributing factors in low participation. In the middle of this mess the European citizen becomes the protagonist for the success of such a performance. Despite numbers reveal a gradual decline in the ten years examined, European citizens have not remained indifferent to the changes introduced by the European integration process. Many surveys showed that in addition to a percentage of "indifferent" or "eurosceptical" people, there were citizens who asked for a stronger Parliament hoping that this result would be reached sooner or later. The failure to achieve this goal as well as the political events of each nation have gradually caused an outcry against the vote expressed either in nonvoting or in negative-vote; these different behaviours show a different way of participating . The voter who, though informed by the electoral campaign, decided not to vote or to give a different vote by cancelling his vote or returning blank−voting ballot, went nevertheless to the polling station and didn't stay at home ignoring what was happening. The unfullfilled hope for an institutional strengthening of the Parliament and for greater political cohesion of the European Community, due to political responsibilities, didn't allow the voter to contribute or protest against the non-achievement of results. Citizens' increased knowledge and involvement did not keep pace with the participation; some elements of dissatisfaction have characterized the behaviour of the pro-Europe voter. The three main groups in which European voters may be included are pro- Europe, anti-Europe and eurosceptics. Whereas the pro-Europe voters' expectations have been disappointed, the anti-Europe voters have partially exercised the right to vote feeding this kind of lists in the European competition. Eurosceptics, on the other hand were the centerpiece of the electorate. Being careful observers of which and how many changes have occurred since 1979, citizens have been able to consolidate their position by continuing to perceive the Community as still too distant and mostly uncomfortable if not useless. They have continued their observation by standing together with those uncertain people who stayed at home. At this point it appeared inevitable to assess also those elements that characterized the elections in general. What attracts people to the polling station is mainly the weight that elections may have on the governmental changes in their own countries. The "less at stake" of European elections surely showed one of the reasons just described. We are therefore facing a different context, In such 'marker-setting' elections, voters have an incentive to behave tactically, but in a sense of the word 'tactical' that is quite different from what we see in National elections, where large parties are advantaged by their size. In a markersetting election the tactical situation is instead characterized by an apparent lack of consequences for the allocation of power, on the one hand, and by the attentiveness of politicians and media, on the other7. The lack of consequences on the national level where European elections are concerned lightened voters by taking away their responsibility in directing the national political course. Although in 1979 there was a political activity at the transnational level, the electorate's attention was very scarce. The result showed 50% of voters admitting to their disinformation about the groups that achieved greater consensus. 7 C. Van der Eijk, M. Franklin, M. Marsh, What voters teach us about Europe-Wide Elections: what Europe-Wide Elections teach us about voters, in "Electoral Studies", vol. 15, n. 2, p. 157. Another issue is the large success gained by smaller parties; in this case it is possible to talk about a "punishment vote" against the policy of the national government. The three cases studied showed different ways of participating. Italian and French voters showed a considerable participation according to their tradition also because in the 1979 – 1989 period there was an interesting political debate. The Italian "pseudo-compulsory" vote kept the percentage of voters high, but the outcome showed changing directions during the above mentioned period. Looking at the outcomes got by the Front National the French case showed an escalation of the Right next to to a significant decline of the Communist Party. There was also a substantial dispersion of voting because of so many rolls, particularly during the 1989 elections. The British case is a special one for the particular behaviour towards the European integration process. The Conservative Party wanted to play an important role in the European context and for this reason European elections were considered as a way to succeed in it. On the contrary the Labour Party did not immediately understand the importance of such a crucial opportunity; the outcome of the 1979 European elections was disastrous and they met an evident defeat that therefore was useful to understand many things for future elections. All three countries have seen the progressive growth of the Green Party. The present study has paid constant attention to to the political debate in each country, and to the strategies implemented by the actors, who were aware from the beginning that the European challenge would engage them in different ways. It was, moreover, focused on the individual citizen's ability to determine the election outcome. Considering the outcome through the mere numerical data gives a partial view of the whole context. There are so many aspects that influenced the decision to vote or not. There was a selection among voters that showed citizens who desired a more political union operating a political and institutional strengthening in opposition to those who did not want to engage themselves in an election without any gain. An unconvinced political class, questionable information, lack of knowledge among citizens about the role of the European Parliament have built a different voter, a more attentive one, with a greater critical sense towards a newer context different from the national one. The diverse elements which have emerged from this interdiciplinary study have led to further insights. After historical considerations, a sociological analysis has been carried out on European elections as a whole and their "second order" perception. From these considerations a new picture has emerged, which is not in absolute contrast with the interpretation of the raw data. The quality and the quantity of so many factors allow a more complete picture of the facts, going beyond the mere participation on which, undoubtedly, the difference with the national presence is quite evident. Detailed examination appeared necessary in the light of the tortuous European building process, in order to take into account as many elements as possible, not only to justify the results, but rather because, to reflect on them trying to deploy a polycentric responsibility from the political forces to the citizens themselves.