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AbstractPublic policy is often about numbers that affect people's lives in fundamental ways. Given the central importance of numbers, we examine anchoring, a heuristic in which people are influenced by an initial number in expressing a preference. Across a series of experiments and three unique surveys, we find evidence of anchoring effects, but not uniformly so. In contrast to experiments in psychology and behavioral economics, we find no evidence that irrelevant or arbitrary anchors shape policy preferences. Yet, when provided politically relevant anchors that clearly correspond to the policy proposal, we find evidence of strong effects, even in the face of party cues or in the absence of a status quo policy point. Taken together, our results demonstrate that there is a psychological explanation for why the status quo occupies a powerful position in policy debates as well as why agenda setting is so influential.

THE MAIN PURPOSE OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO CONTRIBUTE TO the continuing debate on the manner in which power is exercised in Western-style democracies from a democratic–elite — or what I prefer to term a demo–elite — perspective. This is to be done through a theoretical exposition placing this perspective in the spectrum of the main theories on the same topic, with special reference to the classical democratic–elite theories of Max Weber, Gaetano Mosca, Joseph Schumpeter, and Raymond Aron, and the contemporary pluralistelitist theories of Robert Dahl and Giovanni Sartori.

A contribution to the debate about the exercise of power by elites in Western democracies, first examining the theory in the context of other models of power, & second arguing that the relative autonomy of elites can explain how power is used & limited by other forces in Western societies. The analysis of power often neglects or treats as aberrant abuses of power such as manipulation & corruption. Theories of power are illustrated on two dimensions: the nature of relations between economic & political power, & the degree of dispersion of power centers. The theory of "demo-elites" falls mid-way between the extremes on both axes. The relative autonomy of nongoverning elites leads the governing elite to use state resources as strategies of control, through manipulation & corruption, at the same time that other elites use their resources to curb such abuses. Weakening of the independence of nongoverning elites, on the other hand, facilitates unchecked abuses of state power. 1 Figure. A. Waters

Under Xi Jinping, the cadre recruitment policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been adapted. What are the political implications of these adaptations? This paper argues that Xi has sought to consolidate his power among the political elite and strengthen grassroots governance by introducing a new cadre recruitment policy. We propose the concept of "dual elite recruitment logic" as an aid to interpreting the cadre recruitment strategy in the Xi era: the CCP's system for appointing and promoting cadres at the full provincial/ministerial level (正部级 zhengbuji) and the grassroots follows' criteria that are different from those formulated under the previous "rejuvenation of cadres" principle. While China under Xi may be able to maintain political stability and promote socio-economic development in the short term, the lack of a new succession mechanism is the biggest obstacle to China's future political development.

AbstractRandom selection for political office—or "sortition"—is increasingly seen as a promising tool for democratic renewal. Critics worry, however, that replacing elected and appointed officials with randomly selected citizens would only exacerbate elite manipulation of political processes. This article argues that sortition can contribute to democratic renewal, but that its genuine promise is obscured by the excessive ambition and misplaced focus of prevailing models. Casting random selection as a route to accurate representation of the popular will, most contemporary proposals require randomly selected citizens to perform legislative tasks, whose open‐endedness grants substantial discretion to elite agenda setters and facilitators. The real democratic promise of sortition‐based reforms, I argue, lies in obstructing elite capture at critical junctures: a narrower task of oversight that creates fewer opportunities for elite manipulation. In such contexts, the benefits of empowering ordinary people—resulting from their immunity to certain distorting influences on career officials—plausibly outweigh the risks.

Random selection for political office—or "sortition"—is increasingly seen as a promising tool for democratic renewal. Critics worry, however, that replacing elected and appointed officials with randomly selected citizens would only exacerbate elite manipulation of political processes. This article argues that sortition can contribute to democratic renewal, but that its genuine promise is obscured by the excessive ambition and misplaced focus of prevailing models. Casting random selection as a route to accurate representation of the popular will, most contemporary proposals require randomly selected citizens to perform legislative tasks, whose open-endedness grants substantial discretion to elite agenda setters and facilitators. The real democratic promise of sortition-based reforms, I argue, lies in obstructing elite capture at critical junctures: a narrower task of oversight that creates fewer opportunities for elite manipulation. In such contexts, the benefits of empowering ordinary people—resulting from their immunity to certain distorting influences on career officials—plausibly outweigh the risks.

William Parish in "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," ( The China Quarterly, No. 56, p. 667) argues that military factions only assumed political importance during the Cultural Revolution. Part of this argument is based on the claim that Yang Ch'eng-wu, when acting chief of staff and secretary-general of the Central Committee's Military Affairs Committee, attempted to influence the appointment of PLA cadres to provincial revolutionary committees in favour of the 5th Field Army. This influence, he demonstrates, by considering the distribution of PLA cadres with known Field Army affiliations on two groups of provincial revolutionary committees: those formed before and those formed after 8 March 1968 – the date of Yang's last public appearance. Parish argues that a significantly greater proportion of military cadres with a 5th Field Army background were appointed to those Provincial Revolutionary Committees formed before 8 March 1968, than one would have expected given the distribution of such cadres in military posts in 1966. Since he had previously argued that military appointments before 1967 were made without reference to Field Army affiliations, he concludes that Yang was engaged in factional politics. However, Parish's account of Yang Ch'engwu's activities is very much open to question on the grounds that the available evidence suggests that most military appointments to the leading positions (i.e. chairman or vice-chairman) on Provincial-level Revolutionary Committees were determined well before the formal establishment of these institutions and before Yang's dismissal.

Taking the studies of Herbert Schiller as a basis, we shall carry out a reinterpretation of the myths that uphold the Market Economy, within which the media shall act as instruments that have control over public opinion. The multinationals of the sector, with multiple interests, thus forget their role of public function and instead join together with the political/economic elite which aims at the survival of inalterability. In order to do so, the doses of manipulation are to be administered on a daily basis by means of multiple mechanisms and shall reach their highest levels at moments of crisis. This is what was to happen at the different phases of the invasion in Iraq in 1991, 1998 and 2003, just as can be seen in the case of American journalism.