Suchergebnisse

R. G. Collingwood's New Leviathan (1942) presents an account of two 'dialectical' political processes that are ongoing in any body politic. Existing scholarship has already covered the first: a dialectic between a 'social' and a 'non-social' element, which Collingwood identifies in Hobbes. This essay elucidates a second: a dialectic between Liberals and Conservatives, which regulates the 'percolation' of liberty and the rate of recruitment into what Collingwood calls 'the ruling class'. The details of this second dialectic are to be found not in Hobbes, but in the work of Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, yet Collingwood's connections to these fathers of 'classical elite theory' have not previously been discussed.

This article reviews different theoretical perspectives on elite theory, raises the long neglected elite question as a central issue in the analysis of power structure in modern organizations, and offers, for the first time, a normative elite theory of organization that is both descriptive and prescriptive and that has predictive as well as prescriptive powers. Noting the deficiencies of the traditional theories of organization premised on instrumental rationality and void of normative dimensions of politics and power structure, the article stresses the need for research in the neglected area of organizational elite to understand better and predict organizational behavior for the elites and nonelites, especially in the age of rapid structural changes that affect billions of people around the globe. Discussions cover the concept and assumptions of organizational elite, the macro and micro levels of organizational elite analysis, the concept of organizational elite cohesion, and the significance and implications of the theory of organizational elite to organization theory and behavior in modern society.

"Max Weber's portrayal of modern elftes shows clear proximity to 'classical elite theory,' modern 'elite perspective,' and 'democratic elitism.' This portrayal - stressing power concentration in the state apparata, legitimacy of rule, centrality of leadership groups, and the capacity of these groups to form cohesive power actors - anticipates many central themes in the work of contemporary elite theorists, such as John Higley, whose theoretical attention focuses on patterns of elite integration and ruling consensus as the key 'elite variables.' Higley's seminal studier, especially those linking such elite integration and ruling consensus with political outcomes and regime types, combine the classical elite-theoretical heritage with the Weberian 'supplements,' the latter stressing the variable internal structure of 'ruling minorities' that form in modern nation states. The Weberian elite perspective and theoretical model have been substantiated, elaborated and extended in research undertaken by John Higley and his collaborators." (author's abstract)

The linkage between ethnicity, religious polarization and electoral violence in Africa has become one of the most recurring theme in the literature on democracy and elections in the continent. The electoral process in these emergent democracies have been observed to be marred by electoral violence which many have blamed on the diversity that characterize the socio-political configuration of these states which were inherited from European colonial powers at independence. In an attempt to explain the electoral violence phenomenon, existing works have limited the depths of their enquiry just below the surface by attributing the phenomenon to ethno-religious diversity which is prompted by competition for power and resource control. This paper makes an invitation for a deeper analysis by making a proposition based on the elite theory- which will serve as a framework for future studies on the subject matter. It proposes that the elite in Africa derive their support from their ethno-religious enclave and therefore have ethnic-based support structures. Since every society is shaped by the values and preferences of the elite, the demand of an ethno-religious enclave is therefore a reflection of the interest of the elite class in dominance of such enclave. As a result of this, ethnic competition and by extension electoral violence in African democratic experiments are a result of the clash of interest between these ethnic-based elite classes and their failure to harmonize their interest. To this end, we therefore suggest that electoral violence in Africa occurs mainly as 'proxy wars' between ethnic-based elite classes. Based on this assumption we propose that electoral violence is a function of the failure of the elite class from competing ethno-religious enclaves to harmonize their interest in an electoral process, and when harmonization of interest do occur there tends to be a peaceful election as was experienced in the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria which was peaceful despite the volatility of the political system at the time. This proposition sustains a new dimension in the debate and therefore provides itself as an analytical framework for future studies to build on. Article DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.20319/pijss.2017.32.206223 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, USA.