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Intro -- Foreword DAPMARC'2015 -- CONTENTS -- 1. Are All We Need Heroes? - The New Role of the IT Project Manager -- 2. Fast or Smart? How the Use of Scrum Can Influence the Temporal Environment in a Project -- 3. Hidden Goals in Projects: A Qualitative Exploratory Study of their Occurrence and Causes -- 4. "Frontload" in Complex Project Program Management to Aim for Lifetime Sustainability of Offshore Windmill Parks -- 5. Metaphors in Projects - An Overlooked X-factor -- 6. Bridging Gaps between IT and Business: An Empirical Investigation of IT Project Portfolio Management using Process Mining and P3M3 Maturity Model -- 7. Governance of Projects and Value Generation in Project-oriented Organizations -- 8. Theory Meets Practice: Practical Implications of Process Theory in Project Management.

This article discusses the recent debate between Jürgen Habermas and Wolfgang Streeck on the relationship between capitalism and democracy in Europe. The article recounts Streeck's analysis of the financial crisis, the transformation of the tax state into the debt state, and the development of the EU towards an international consolidation state, which informs Streeck's call for a retreat from Europe to the nation-state as the last line of defense against neoliberal capitalism. The article proceeds to sketch Habermas's criticism of Streeck's argument, and it illustrates how Habermas' proposal for a reconstitution of the EU as a supranational democracy is motivated by foundational concerns in his critical theory of society. Finally, the article argues that the debate results in an unresolved dilemma: while only a democratized EU can reestablish the supremacy of politics over globalized markets, the EU is more likely to become further entrenched as an international consolidation state.

Andreas Hvidsten (MF vitenskapelig høyskole) anmelder Concepts of International Relations, for Students and Other Smarties, av Iver B. Neumann (University of Michigan Press, 2019).
Abstract in English:Neumann's WorldAndreas Hvidsten (Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society) reviews Concepts of International Relations, for Students and Other Smarties, by Iver B. Neumann (University of Michigan Press, 2019).

I dette fokusnummeret ser vi tilbake på utviklingen på noen utvalgte områder innenfor internasjonal politikk (temaet) og Internasjonal Politikk (faget) i løpet av de 20 årene som har gått siden 11. september, 2001. Dette innledningsessayet presenterer de fire bidragene som belyser hvert sitt konkrete tema: bruken av narrativer i internasjonal politikk, faget Internasjonal Politikk, forholdet mellom USA og Russland, og folkeretten. Essayet tar et skritt tilbake og ser på helheten i arven fra 11. september og krigen mot terror som fulgte, med fokus på internasjonal politikk og internasjonal sikkerhet. I tillegg gir essayet et overblikk over de målbare kostnadene knyttet til krigen mot terror, status for krigen i dag, og status for fienden man har kjempet mot de siste 20 årene. Angrepene og responsen på dem gikk naturlig nok også på bekostning av noe, og visket ut andre, alternative handlingsforløp. Dette essayet beskriver noen av disse tapte mulighetene, og belyser også utfordring med å gjøre opp et «regnskap» 20 år etter 11. september-angrepene.
Abstract in English:International Politics and the Legacy of 9/11This special issue looks back at the developments within international relations since the terrorist attacks on 9/11, 2001, with a particular focus on four specific themes: the use of strategic narratives in international relations, International Relations as academic discipline, US-Russian relations, and international law. This introductory essay present the four contributions to the issue, while also zooming out to present a panoramic view of the many legacies of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent War on Terror that were to make an imprint on both international relations and international security in general. The essay presents the measurable costs associated with the War on Terror, its current status, as well as that for the enemy against which the two-decades long campaign has been fought. The 9/11 attacks and the forceful response resulted in other potential opportunities being passed up or neglected, making it difficult to chart the actual cost of the war. Finally, the essay examines the difficulty in arriving at an agreed-upon metric for assessing whether the war has been a success.

De nære relationer mellem USA og Europa har i årtier været et centralt element i international politik. Men hvor kommer det transatlantiske forholds holdbarhed og modstandskraft fra? Dette spørgsmål optager mange forskere og aktualiseres nu af de igangværende forskydninger i verdenspolitikken. Bogessayet diskuterer derfor, hvordan de to bøger Special Relationships in World Politics (Haugevik, 2018) og Enduring Alliance (Sayle, 2019) fremmer vores viden om de bånd, der knytter staterne i det nordatlantiske område. Haugevik undersøger bilaterale amerikansk-britiske og britisk-norske 'specielle forhold', mens Sayle ser nærmere på det multilaterale samarbejde i NATO. De tilbyder begge interessante teoretiske argumenter om samspillet mellem diplomatisk praksis og nationale politiske dynamikker samt imponerende empiriske analyser, som underbygger deres pointer. De to bøger rejser samtidig også nye vigtige spørgsmål, herunder om de indbyggede spændinger i liberale normer og værdier samt om betydningen af tillid for det transatlantiske forholds holdbarhed.
Abstract in English: Something Special? The Transatlantic Ties and Their EnduranceFor several decades, the close relationship between the United States and Europe has been a key aspect of international politics. But what are the sources of the endurance and resilience of transatlantic ties? This question preoccupies researchers, and its salience is growing in light of current shifts in world politics. Accordingly, the book essay discusses how the two books Special Relationships in World Politics (Haugevik, 2018) and Enduring Alliance (Sayle, 2019) contribute to our knowledge about the international ties of the North Atlantic area. Haugevik examines bilateral American-British and British-Norwegian 'special relationships', while Sayles studies multilateral cooperation in NATO. They both offer interesting theoretical arguments about the interplay between diplomatic practice and national political dynamics. Moreover, they provide impressive empirical analyses to support their claims. At the same time, the two books raise new important questions, e.g. about the built-in tensions in liberal norms and values as well as about the significance of trust for enduring transatlantic ties.

Tora Sagård, of the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), reviews Hva er Internasjonal Politikk (What Is International Relations), by Benjamin de Carvalho and Halvard Leira.

Grønlands udenrigspolitiske repræsentanter benytter den store internationale interesse for Arktis til at positionere Grønland som en mere selvstændig udenrigspolitisk aktør. Det er muligt, da Danmark er afhængig af Grønland for at opretholde sin status som "arktisk stat", og fordi Grønlands udenrigspolitiske kompetence er åben for fortolkning. Denne artikel analyserer, hvordan repræsentanter for skiftende grønlandske regeringer har udvidet det udenrigspolitiske handlerum ved i diskurs og praksis at styrke Grønlands position i en arktisk kontekst. Det er blandt andet opnået ved 1) højlydt at italesætte utilfredshed i Arktisk Råd, 2) stiltiende symbolske handlinger ved Ilulissat-erklæringens tiårs jubilæum, og 3) ved at mime suverænitet ved Arctic Circle konferencen, der pga. sin mere uformelle struktur er særligt nyttig til at styrke bilaterale internationale relationer. ; Greenland's foreign policy representatives use the great international attention to the Arctic to appear and act as a more sovereign foreign policy actor. This is possible due to Denmark's dependence on Greenland to maintain its "Arctic state" status and because Greenland's foreign policy competence is open to interpretation. The article analyzes how representatives of shifting Greenlandic governments have expanded the foreign policy room for manoeuvre in discourse and praxis to strengthen Greenland's position at Arctic-related events. This has been achieved by, among other things, 1) outspoken discontent in the Arctic Council, 2) tacit gestures at the Ilulissat Declaration's 10-year anniversary, and 3) by mimicking full sovereignty at the Arctic Circle conference serving as a particularly useful platform for enhancing bilateral international relations due to its more informal setup.

Iver Neumann has been an inter-disciplinary entrepreneur for political science in Norway. For Neumann, interdisciplinarity has been coupled with an understanding of politics as the search for meaning and identity. These features are well-developed in European political science, particularly within the field of international relations, but they are more rarely encountered in Norway. This brief article provides a sketch of political science as it evolved and matured in its Norwegian incarnation. In situating Iver Neumann within the discipline, I emphasise his international and eclectic orientation. The personal, national and international meet in Neumann's works, as do popular culture and politics.

Genstande. Rum. Kroppe. I årtier har kulturforskningen fokuseret på sproglige konstruktioner og tegnenes spil. Men nu er tingene og det materielle for alvor vendt tilbage. Det kræver analyser af det materielle som dynamiske og betydningsproducerende processer, relationer og praksisser: som materialiseringer.I denne antologi stiller otte forfattere fra forskellige forskningsområder skarpt på genstandenes, rummenes og kroppenes materialiseringer ved at analysere, hvad og hvordan materialitet 'gør' og 'gøres'. Inspireret af nye materialitetsteorier og især af Actor Network Theory indkredser forfa

Iver B. Neumann begynte på NUPI i 1988. Etter tre tiår som NUPI-forsker (riktignok med en periode som Montague Burton-Professor i International Relations på LSE i London) meldte han i 2018 overgang til OsloMet. Med NUPI som plattform har Neumann satt et solid fotavtrykk i norsk offentlighet, og han er i dag en av Norges mest profilerte og internasjonalt anerkjente forskere på utenriks- og internasjonal politikk. Han er hyppig sitert, og er blant de 20 norske forskerne som publiserer mest ifølge CRISTIN-registeret.1 Han er særlig opptatt av norsk utenrikspolitisk historie, identitet, diplomati og Russland.

Mesteparten av norske havområder ligger nord for polarsirkelen og er åsted for noen av verdens rikeste fiskerier. De største fiskebestandene er delt med andre land, og internasjonalt samarbeid om ressursforvaltningen er derfor en viktig dimensjon ved nordområdepolitikken. Slikt samarbeid er basert på globale normer om hvordan levende marine ressurser skal forvaltes og deles og foregår på en rekke arenaer både bilateralt og regionalt. Samtidig er det også utfordringer knyttet til blant annet fordeling av ressurser i Norskehavet og klimaendringer som medfører at fiskebestandenes utbredelse er omskiftelig. Et føre-var tiltak i forhold til det siste er etableringen av en avtale om å forhindre uregulert fiske i Polhavet.
Abstract in English:Oceans, Fish and Resource Management in the Northern AreasMost of Norway's oceans are situated to the north of the Arctic Circle and some of the world's richest fishing grounds are there. The largest fish stocks are shared with other countries, and international cooperation on the management of the resources is therefore an important aspect of Norway's northern policy. Such cooperation is based on the international norms for how living marine resources are to be managed and shared, and it takes place in a number of bilateral and regional fora. There are challenges related to the allocation of pelagic resources in the Norwegian Sea and climate change driving change in the geographical distribution of fish stocks in the ocean. A recent precautionary measure in relation to climate change and its effects on marine ecosystems is the establishment of an international agreement to prevent unregulated fishing in international waters in the central Arctic Ocean.

Som svar på Karsten Friis' kritik af Fokkusspalten, "Når krig blir hverdag", formulerer denne replik en kort begrebslig, empirisk og normativ afklaring af spaltens anvendelse af begrebet militæraktivisme. Begrebsligt påpeger replikken, at militæraktivisme allerede er hyppigt anvendt i litteraturen om skandinaviske landes øgede engagement i internationale militære operationer efter Den Kolde Krig. Empirisk set, er det korrekt, at udviklingen ikke har været lineær, og man kan argumentere for, at Danmark og Norges militæraktivisme var (endnu) større, da Afghanistankrigen var på sit højeste. Dog er begge lande fortsat engageret særligt i NATO-regi, og det er væsentligt at bemærke, at de direkte kampe på landjorden i internationale militære operationer i stigende grad udliciteres til mindre privilegerede lokale og internationale kombattanter. Replikken påpeger, at Friis' påstand om, at militæraktivisme som begreb udgør en slet skjult kritik af Danmark og Norges militære engagement, beror på en misforståelse. Tværtimod stammer aktivisme fra den danske udenrigspolitiske debat, hvor begrebet anvendes politisk med en række positive konnotationer forbundet med at være aktiv (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017). I lyset af afpolitiseringen af Danmarks og Norges krigsdeltagelse velkommer vi fremadrettet yderligere forskningsmæssig og politisk diskussion af militæraktivismen.
Abstract in EnglishReply: Military Activism RevisitedIn response to Karsten Friis' critique of the special issue When War Becomes Daily Life, this reply outlines a brief conceptual, empirical and normative clarification of the special issue's use of the concept, military activism. Conceptually, the reply points out that military activism is already a frequently used concept in the academic literature on Scandinavian countries increased engagement in international military operations after the Cold War. Empirically, it is correct that this development has not been linear, and arguably, Denmark and Norway's military activism was (even more) pronounced, when the war in Afghanistan was at its zenith. However, both countries continue to be engaged particularly in NATO, and significantly, direct battles on the ground are increasingly outsourced to local actors to less privileged local and international combatants. The reply points out, that Friis's claim that military activism is a concealed critique of Denmark and Norway's military engagement, is based on a misunderstanding. On the contrary, activism as a concept derives from the Danish foreign policy debate, where the term is used to connote a series of positive attributes associated with being active (Pedersen & Ringsmose, 2017). Considering the depoliticisation of Denmark and Norway's military activism we welcome further academic and policy discussions about this important issue.

The region of Southeast Asia is faced with a complex set of challenges stemming from political, economic and religious developments at the national, regional and global level. This paper sets out to examine trade-, foreign- and security policy implications of the issues confronting the region. In ASEAN, the Southeast Asian countries are continuing their ambitious attempts at further integration. Plans outlining deeper security and economic communities have been adopted. However, huge differences in political systems, economic development and ethnic/religious structures are hampering prospects of closer cooperation. The highly controversial conflict case of Burma/Myanmar is testing the much adhered-to principle of non-interference and at the same time complicating relations with external powers. Among these, the United States and China are dramatically strengthening their interests in the region. American influence is not least manifesting itself in light of the war against terrorism, which the region is adapting to in different ways and at different speeds. By contrast, the European Union does not seem to answer Southeast Asian calls for further engagement. A flurry of bilateral and regional trade agreements is another prominent feature of the economic landscape of the region. This is to a certain degree a reflex ion of impatience with trade liberalization in the WTO and within ASEAN itself. Structures of economic cooperation are under rapid alteration in Southeast Asia. The paper analyses the above-mentioned developments with a view to assessing the prospects of future stability, economic development and integration in and among ASEAN countries. It is concluded that although the scope for increased economic benefit and political harmonization through ASEAN integration alone is limited, the organization could still prove useful as a common regional point of reference in tackling more important policy determinants at national and global level.

Artikkelen ser på den teknologiske og strategiske rivaliseringen mellom USA og Kina hva gjelder implementeringen av 5G-nettverk, og spør hva som er med å påvirke hvordan andre stater posisjonerer seg mellom de to supermaktene. Ved å bygge på tre grener av politisk realisme – balance-of-threat-teoriens tanke om at trusseloppfatning driver staters valg av allianser, patron–klient-teoriens tro på at USA kan forvente at deres klientstater innretter seg etter amerikansk utenrikspolitikk, og teorien om at handelsrelasjoner kan brukes som maktverktøy – utleder jeg et sett med hypoteser og potensielt relevante forklaringsvariabler. Som avhengig variabel samler jeg 70 staters holdninger til Kinas omstridte telekommunikasjonsgigant Huaweis rolle i 5G. Bivariat analyse avslører tre hovedmønstre: (1) Stater som er små og maktesløse i forhold til Kina, samt statene i Kinas geografiske region, ser ut til å være mer aksepterende til Huaweis 5G. (2) Stater som ser på USA som sin patron og som er avhengige av Washingtons sikkerhetsgaranti ser ut til å være betydelig mer avvisende til selskapets 5G. (3) Handelsrelasjoner til både USA og Kina ser ut til å ha liten eller ingen effekt på staters holdninger. Av de tre realisme-grenene er det altså patron–klient-teorien som veier tyngst når det gjelder å forklare staters holdninger til Huaweis 5G.
Abstract in English:The US way or the Huawei: An analysis of how small and medium states stand on the Chinese giant's role in 5GThis article examines the technological and strategic rivalry between the US and China on the implementation of 5G networks, asking what influences how other states position themselves between the two superpowers. By building on three branches of political realism – balance-of-threat theory's notion that perception of threat drives states' alliance choices, patron-client theory's belief that the US can expect its client states to adhere to American foreign policy, and the theory that trade relations can be used as power tools – I derive a set of hypotheses and potentially relevant explanatory variables. As dependent variable, I measure 70 states' stances on China's controversial telecom giant Huawei's role in 5G. Bivariate analysis reveals three primary patterns: (1) States who are dwarfed by China's power, as well as states in China's immediate geographic region, appear to be more acceptive of Huawei's 5G. (2) States who see the US as their patron and who rely on Washington's security guarantee appear to be much more rejective of the company's 5G. (3) Trade relations to both the US and China appear to have little or no effect on states' stances. Of the three branches of realism, it is the patron-client theory that offers the most weight in explaining states' stances on Huawei's 5G.

Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "capturing", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization-focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they collaborate in peace and friendliness. So far, the IR liberalism discourse has set the trend of the Russian policy carried out in relation to the Arctic. Thus, it has primarily been the Russian Foreign Ministry and, above all, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov that have drawn the overall lines of the Arctic policy, well aided by the Transport Ministry and the Energy Ministry. On the other side are the Russian national Security Council led by Nikolai Patrushev and the Russian Defence Ministry headed by Sergey Shoygu, which both have embedded their visions of Russia and the Arctic in the IR realism/geopolitical discourse. Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, does the same. Nevertheless, he has primarily chosen to let the Foreign Ministry set the line for the Arctic policy carried out, presumably out of a pragmatic acknowledgement of the means that have, so far, served the Russian interests best. Moreover, it is worth noting that both wings, even though they can disagree about the means, in fact are more or less in agreement about the goal of Russia's Arctic policy: namely, to utilize the expected wealth of oil and natural gas resources in the underground to ensure the continuation of the restoration of Russia's position as a Great Power when the capacity of the energy fields in Siberia slowly diminishes – which the Russian Energy Ministry expects to happen sometime between 2015 and 2030. In addition to that, Russia sees – as the polar ice slowly melts – great potential for opening an ice-free northern sea route between Europe and Asia across the Russian Arctic, with the hope that the international shipping industry can see the common sense of saving up to nearly 4,000 nautical miles on a voyage from Ulsan, Korea, to Rotterdam, Holland, so Russia can earn money by servicing the ships and issuing permissions for passage through what Russia regards as Russian territorial water. The question is whether Russia will be able to realize its ambitious goals. First, the Russian state energy companies Gazprom and Rosneft lack the technology, know-how and experience to extract oil and gas under the exceedingly difficult environment in the Arctic, where the most significant deposits are believed to be in very deep water in areas that are very difficult to access due to bad weather conditions. The Western sanctions mean that the Russian energy companies cannot, as planned, obtain this technology and know-how via the already entered-into partnerships with Western energy companies. The sanctions limit loan opportunities in Western banks, which hit the profitability of the most cost-heavy projects in the Arctic. However, what hits hardest are the low oil prices – at present 50 dollars per barrel (Brent). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the fields in the Arctic are not profitable as long as the oil price is under 120 dollars per barrel. Whether Russia chooses to suspend the projects until the energy prices rise again – and until it has again entered into partnerships that can deliver the desired technology and know-how – or whether the Russian state will continuously pump money into the projects is uncertain. The hard-pressed Russian economy, with the prospects of recession, increasing inflation, increasing flight of capital, rising interest rates and a continuously low oil price, provides a market economic incentive for suspending the projects until further notice. Whether the Kremlin will think in a market economic way or a long-term strategic way is uncertain – but, historically, there has been a penchant for the latter. One of the Kremlin's hopes is that Chinese-Russian cooperation can take over where the Western-Russian cooperation has shut down. Russia has long wanted to diversify its energy markets to reduce its dependence on sales to Europe. At the same time, those in the Kremlin have had a deeply-rooted fear of ending up as a "resource appendix" to the onrushing Chinese economy, which so far has been a strong contributing reason for keeping the Russian-Chinese overtures in check. The question now is whether the Western sanctions can be the catalyst that can make Russia overcome this fear and thus, in the long term, support the efforts to enter into a real, strategic partnership with China. ; Russia's strategy in the Arctic is dominated by two overriding discourses – and foreign policy directions – which at first glance may look like opposites. On the one hand, Russia have an IR realism/geopolitical discourse that often has a clear patriotic character, dealing with "exploring", "winning" or "conquering" the Arctic and putting power, including military power, behind the national interests in the area – which is why we, in recent years, have seen an increasing military build-up, also in the Russian Arctic. Opposed to this is an IR liberalism, international law-inspired and modernization- focused discourse, which is characterized by words such as "negotiation", "cooperation" and "joint ventures" and which has as an axiom that the companies and countries operating in the Arctic all benefit the most if they cooperate peacefully.