Making Sense of International Relations Theory
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 65, Heft 3, S. 174-179
ISSN: 0020-577X
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In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 65, Heft 3, S. 174-179
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 70, Heft 4, S. 539-560
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 63, Heft 4, S. 455-459
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 66, Heft 2-3, S. 538-542
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 62, Heft 3, S. 471-474
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 59, Heft 3, S. 427-433
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 71, Heft 1, S. 137-142
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 70, Heft 4, S. 539-560
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 66, Heft 2-3, S. 538-542
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 65, Heft 4, S. 151-155
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 68, Heft 2, S. 313-316
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 66, Heft 2-3, S. 509-511
ISSN: 0020-577X
In: Internasjonal politikk, Band 70, Heft 4, S. 539-560
ISSN: 0020-577X
International relations can be considered as a set of interactions between the actors of international system. As a result of these interactions some actors gain a reputation of reliable and stable while the others perform as irrational and unpredictable. The main goal of these masters' theses was to identify when and how should the seemingly "irrational" behavior of the international actor be considered as a rational strategy aiming at some certain objectives. The subject of this research is the interactions between two states in which the structural and comparative power of the one state is lower than the one of the other. Under these circumstances the state which possesses lower power seeks to raise it in relation to the stronger state. The author of this research hypothesizes that the aim of the behavior which seems irrational to the other players of the international system may be the creation of the conditions of uncertainty. The later can be used as a means of rising structural power of the actor who necessitated it. The Author approaches the logic of the theory of rational choice as well as examines the prospects of using the particular models of game theory as a tool of analyzing the abovementioned interactions of two states the structural and comparative power of which is notably unequal. After analyzing the impact of imperfect information as well as the mistrust in the rationality of the partners of the game, the Author comes to conclusion that the abovementioned factors may be intentionally encouraged to bind the rationality of the adversary.
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International relations can be considered as a set of interactions between the actors of international system. As a result of these interactions some actors gain a reputation of reliable and stable while the others perform as irrational and unpredictable. The main goal of these masters' theses was to identify when and how should the seemingly "irrational" behavior of the international actor be considered as a rational strategy aiming at some certain objectives. The subject of this research is the interactions between two states in which the structural and comparative power of the one state is lower than the one of the other. Under these circumstances the state which possesses lower power seeks to raise it in relation to the stronger state. The author of this research hypothesizes that the aim of the behavior which seems irrational to the other players of the international system may be the creation of the conditions of uncertainty. The later can be used as a means of rising structural power of the actor who necessitated it. The Author approaches the logic of the theory of rational choice as well as examines the prospects of using the particular models of game theory as a tool of analyzing the abovementioned interactions of two states the structural and comparative power of which is notably unequal. After analyzing the impact of imperfect information as well as the mistrust in the rationality of the partners of the game, the Author comes to conclusion that the abovementioned factors may be intentionally encouraged to bind the rationality of the adversary.
BASE