There's always been two histories to tell about International Relations. One that explains structures and processes and another that understands individual and collective actions. But the first one has always been predominant in our discipline, forgetting what International Relations truly means for the states and for global political actors. ; Siempre habrá dos historias que contar de las relaciones internacionales. Una que explique estructuras y procesos, y otra que comprenda las acciones de los individuos y de los agregados sociales. Pero siempre ha sido la primera de estas historias la que ha dominado la disciplina, olvidando los significados que las relaciones internacionales tienen para los Estados y para otros actores de la política mundial.
Siempre habrá dos historias que contar de las relaciones internacionales. Una que explique estructuras y procesos, y otra que comprenda las acciones de los individuos y de los agregados sociales. Pero siempre ha sido la primera de estas historias la que ha dominado la disciplina, olvidando los significados que las relaciones internacionales tienen para los Estados y para otros actores de la política mundial ; There's always been two histories to tell about International Relations. One that explains structures and processes and another that understands individual and collective actions. But the first one has always been predominant in our discipline, forgetting what International Relations truly means for the states and for global political actors
The basic aspects of the theory of argumentation, the relations of argumentation with the concept of logical inference and a description of argumentation in the analysis of compared international politics are presented in this article. Argumentation will be here understood as part of a deliberative process of pro or against reasoning around certain opinion that might be defended by means of a confrontation of ideas. Therefore, the one who argues proposes, refuses, beats or justifies any understanding of the world. With this in view, a brief description of deductive argumentative systems is undertaken. Some degree of formality, arising from the logics to structure the general argumentative basis, is introduced. Then, an exemplification based on a highly recognized case in international relations is presented: the conditions of public debate that gave birth to the invasion and war in Iraq. ; En este artículo se presentan aspectos básicos de la teoría de la argumentación, las relaciones de la argumentación con el concepto de inferencia lógica y una ilustración sobre argumentación en análisis de política comparada internacional. La argumentación se comprenderá como parte de un proceso deliberativo de razones en favor o en contra de un punto de vista que puede defenderse mediante una confrontación de ideas. Por lo cual quien argumenta: propone, refuta, derrota o justifica una determinada concepción del mundo. Con este propósito, se aborda preliminarmente una breve descripción de sistemas deductivos de argumentación (SDA). Se introduce cierto grado de formalización proveniente de la lógica para estructurar los cimientos de la argumentación en general, y luego se ofrece una ilustración con base en un caso reconocido ampliamente en política internacional: las condiciones del debate público que dieron lugar a la invasión y la guerra en Irak.
This article examines the sources, structures and the possible meaning of Clausewitz's theory. The paper suggests an interpretation of Vom Kriege and provides a comparison with Goethe and Fichte. It points out that Clausewitz set the rationale of an integral politics theory, reintroducing human nature as opposed to culture and creating a classical conceptual order prevailing over Romanticism, as well as forging essential concepts for a critical view of liberalism. ; El presente artículo analiza las fuentes, la estructura y los significados posibles del pensamiento de Clausewitz. Propone una interpretación de Vom Kriege en sintonía con el pensamiento de Goethe y Fichte. Señala que Clausewitz construyó los cimientos de una teoría de la política integral, reintroduciendo la naturaleza humana frente a las convenciones. Configurando un orden conceptual clásico dominante sobre ciertos aspectos románticos, Clausewitz forjó conceptos fundamentales para la crítica de la visión liberal de la política.
The paper examines Raymond Aron's International relations as a process of development along three decades, where politics, war and technology are analyzed and reinterpreted in three different manners. The first depends on Spengler`s thought, while the second and third are based in a deep and original interpretation of Clausewitz. ; En el presente trabajo se examina la obra International relations de Raymond Aron como un proceso de desarrollo a lo largo de tres decenios, en que política, guerra y tecnología se analizan y reinterpretan de tres diferentes maneras. La primera depende del pensamiento de Spengler, mientras que la segunda y la tercera se basan en una interpretación detenida y original de Clausewitz.
In the nineteenth century, one of the essential conditions for obtaining recognition of the sovereignty of a state by the international community was the ability to maintain internal order and guarantee the lives and property of foreign nationals. Justice then becomes a major political element and the case of Spanish-Mexican relations is particularly significant. For Mexico, the aim is to preserve national independence, avoid military intervention and integrate into the international system. For Spain, it seeks to assert its status as a major power with the capacity to intervene in defence of its citizens and to obtain the necessary reparations. This work is then structured around three issues: the debt and financial claims of the Spaniards, the punishment of those guilty of the murders of Spaniards and the negotiation of an extradition treaty for offenders and deserters. ; International audience In the nineteenth century one of the key conditions for recognition of sovereignity of a state by the international community was the ability to maintain order and ensure the lives and properties of nationals abroad. Justice, then, becomes a political element of the first order and the case of Spanish-Mexican relations is particularly significant. For Mexico, it is to preserve national independence, to avoid a military intervention and to integrate into the international system. For Spain, it is asserting its status as a great power with the ability to speak in defense of its citizens and to obtain the necessary repairs. This work is structured so on three issues: debt and financial claims of the Spaniards, the punishment of those guilty of the murders of Spaniards and the negotiation of a treaty on extradition of criminals and deserters. ; In the nineteenth century, one of the essential conditions for obtaining recognition of the sovereignty of a state by the international community was the ability to maintain internal order and guarantee the lives and property of foreign nationals. Justice then becomes a major ...
Exploring the international dimension of the thought of French philosopher Jacques Maritain (1896-1973), the author deals with potential cooperation between peoples pertaining to various religions, cultures and political systems, respect of human rights and the need for a democratic system -also at the international level- for the achievement of peace. The possibility of a common practical thought that could orient actions of people who hold different theoretical positions would allow common good, both at the domestic and the international levels. All human rights declarations are determined by the moral conscience of civilization, in each historical era. Its fulfillment allows preventing dispersion as well as maintaining hope. ; El autor profundiza la dimensión internacional del pensamiento del filósofo francés Jacques Maritain (1896-1973) sobre la posible cooperaciónentre pueblos de religiones, culturas y sistemas políticos diversos, el respeto a los derechos humanos y la necesidad de un sistema democrático -también a nivel internacional- para el logro de la paz. La posibilidad de un común pensamiento práctico que dirija la acción de personas de distintas posiciones teóricas, permitiría el bien común, tanto nacional como internacional. Toda declaración de derechos humanos está determinada por la conciencia moral de la civilización, en cada etapa histórica. Su respeto permite evitar la disgregación y salvar la esperanza.
En las últimas décadas las ciencias sociales se han visto deconstruidas por diferentes corrientes de pensamiento crítico que buscan analizar el sistema mundo actual, la política global y las relaciones sociales desde paradigmas y epistemologías otras que sirvan para interpretar las diferentes temporalidades y localidades del poder y del conocimiento. Una de las corrientes más novedosas es el llamado pensamiento decolonial. Esta propuesta surge dentro del debate crítico en las ciencias sociales, originalmente en las áreas de Sociología, Historia y Economía Política, y más recientemente en la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales. El pensamiento decolonial se plantea como crítico de las ya establecidas teorías poscoloniales. Es impulsado desde América Latina por el proyecto conocido como modernidad/colonialidad/decolonialidad, que nos invita a cuestionar la modernidad europea desde la reflexión de su antítesis, la colonialidad en América, y los efectos que la colonialidad del poder, del saber, y del ser, han tenido sobre el sujeto colonial global. En este artículo proponemos evaluar los aportes que el pensamiento decolonial puede hacer a la teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales y cómo, junto con otras conceptualizaciones hechas desde la teoría crítica, se podría contribuir al diálogo pluriversal que sus autores proponen. ; In recent decades the social sciences have been deconstructed by different strands of critical thought that strive to analyze the contemporary world system, global politics and social relations from alternative paradigms and epistemologies allowing us to understand the different temporalities and locations of power and knowledge. One of the most recent movements is what has been called Decolonial thinking. This proposal originates within critical debate in the social sciences, originally in Sociology, History and Political Economy and more recently in International Relations. Decolonial thinking takes a critical approach to established postcolonial studies. Driven by Latin American scholars forming part of the modernity/coloniality/decoloniality project, Decolonial thinking invites us to question European modernity considering its antithesis, colonialism in America, and the effects of Coloniality of power, knowledge and being, on the global colonial subject. In this article we evaluate the contributions Decolonial thinking may offer to International Relations theory, and at the same time, how it may add to other critical theories in order to contribute to the pluriversal dialogue that these authors propose
In recent decades the social sciences have been deconstructed by different strands of critical thought that strive to analyze the contemporary world system, global politics and social relations from alternative paradigms and epistemologies allowing us to understand the different temporalities and locations of power and knowledge. One of the most recent movements is what has been called Decolonial thinking. This proposal originates within critical debate in the social sciences, originally in Sociology, History and Political Economy and more recently in International Relations. Decolonial thinking takes a critical approach to established postcolonial studies. Driven by Latin American scholars forming part of the modernity/coloniality/decoloniality project, Decolonial thinking invites us to question European modernity considering its antithesis, colonialism in America, and the effects of Coloniality of power, knowledge and being, on the global colonial subject. In this article we evaluate the contributions Decolonial thinking may offer to International Relations theory, and at the same time, how it may add to other critical theories in order to contribute to the pluriversal dialogue that these authors propose. ; En las últimas décadas las ciencias sociales se han visto deconstruidas por diferentes corrientes de pensamiento crítico que buscan analizar el sistema mundo actual, la política global y las relaciones sociales desde paradigmas y epistemologías otras que sirvan para interpretar las diferentes temporalidades y localidades del poder y del conocimiento. Una de las corrientes más novedosas es el llamado pensamiento decolonial. Esta propuesta surge dentro del debate crítico en las ciencias sociales, originalmente en las áreas de Sociología, Historia y Economía Política, y más recientemente en la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales. El pensamiento decolonial se plantea como crítico de las ya establecidas teorías poscoloniales. Es impulsado desde América Latina por el proyecto conocido como modernidad/colonialidad/decolonialidad, que nos invita a cuestionar la modernidad europea desde la reflexión de su antítesis, la colonialidad en América, y los efectos que la colonialidad del poder, del saber, y del ser, han tenido sobre el sujeto colonial global. En este artículo proponemos evaluar los aportes que el pensamiento decolonial puede hacer a la teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales y cómo, junto con otras conceptualizaciones hechas desde la teoría crítica, se podría contribuir al diálogo pluriversal que sus autores proponen.
Review of: Steven C. Roach, (2020). Handbook of Critical International Relations. Edward Elgar, 384 pp. ; Reseña de: Steven C. Roach, (2020). Handbook of Critical International Relations. Edward Elgar, 384 pp.
1-. International relations (IR) theory has suffered a restructuring among several lines over the past two decades. The gradual but uninterrupted decline of systemic theories - primus inter pares in the discipline since the 1970s- is one of those. (1) This decline was accompanied by a rise of those approaches that privilege domestic politics as the place to look for answers. For reasons I will develop below, such an intellectual step was logical, expected, and partially appropriate. (2) While the current state of affairs should not be seen as immutable and a systemic comeback is plausible, the truth is that domestic politics, and non-systemic approaches in general, are well entrenched in a semi-hegemonic position. In this essay I will explain the reasons behind the aforementioned shift, assess its consequences, and advance some hypotheses on the future of systemic theories of IR.2-. Born between the interwar period and the dawn the Cold War world, IR was created with the explicit objective of explaining the causes of war –particularly great wars, understood under the lenses of the two devastating conflicts of the first half of the 20th century. Since then, IR scholars have struggled to respond to the main challenges –or what they perceive as the main challenges- in world politics. (3) This "duty" to explain the world drives theory to follow the patterns of change in international politics, which, as they develop, suggest new problématiques and novel ways to approach them. In important ways then –although, as discussed later, this is not the whole picture- (4) a sociology of inquiry is needed to better understand some of the key transformations in IR theory -e.g. the shift from systemic to domestic theories. Systemic approaches (5) made their meteoric rise under the shelter of K. Waltz's Neorealism. (6) They were created as a tool for a particular time with particular problems. (7) This was a world in which the primary preoccupation was how to manage the bilateral relationship between the United States and the USSR so that it would not en up in World War III. There were certainly other interests in the discipline, but this one outweighed all the rest. A Cold War context made systemic theories very appropriate. Needless to say, the bipolar conflict had been in place a long time before Waltz's path-breaking Theory of International Politics. (8) The essential point is, however, that Neorealism proved to be very successful in explaining the basic patterns of interest in this particular period of the history of IR –i.e. dynamics of polarity, relevance of nuclear weapons, consequences of anarchy and its relationship with war and cooperation, inter alia- in a more parsimonious and convincing way than the discipline had ever been able to do.The IR community recognized this "Copernican turn", as Waltz defined it, as progress and systemic approaches were established as mainstream, maybe even as "normal science." Anyone trying to explain something in international politics had to reckon with the system. This was true for realists (see the work of Gilpin, Walt, and Grieco) but also for scholars with a line of inquiry that differed substantially from Waltz's (see Keohane's Cooperation after Hegemony for a good example). 3-. A dramatic event that shakes the bases of an academic discipline is sometimes needed to motivate scholars to devise new lines of inquiry and surpass research programs that appear to be losing heuristic power. This is what the fall of the Soviet Union did with Neorealism, and systemic approaches in general. (9) Structural realism was in many ways, and problematically so, a theory for the Cold War. Its discussion on nuclear weapons, bipolarity, uncertainty, and superpower dynamics seemed to be too tied to a specific historical context. (10) The inability of neorealism, or any other systemic theory for that matter, to foresee –or even explain- the disappearance of the bipolar world –a systemic change par excellence-supposed a hard blow to its appeal. (11) Both the fall of the USSR and the subsequent appearance (or uncovering, once the Cold War veil was lifted) of new "themes" in international politics -IPE, civil wars, the role of leaders, the democratic peace, inter alia- opened a fertile camp over which to argue for the need to "go beyond systemic theory." (12) I argued supra that this was an appropriate move (or partially appropriate). But the reasons implicitly inferred up to know -failure in predicting events and a crisis in the IR community (in a Kuhnian sense)- cannot support this claim. The other face of the coin is that the thorough self-examination of the 1990s also responded to internal problems of systemic theories as research programs. For example, in the 1980s the discipline was stuck in the mud of absolute vs. relative gains debate, a degenerative discussion from a Lakatosian perspective. (13) Visible problems of heuristic power were calling for a partial move beyond the system. This was the real cause for the shift, and the best argument to characterize it as "appropriate". The exogenous shock (fall of the USSR) had the role, not at all minor, of opening a window of opportunity for dissenting scholars. Helen Milner was one of the most eloquent advocates for this turn. Her argument, in short, was that "systemic theory simply cannot take us far enough" (Milner, 1992). The assumption that anarchy was the principal variable defining states preferences and the primacy of a straight causal line from the system to the state and then to policy-making was excessively simplistic, Milner argued. How could the discipline solve this quagmire? By studying domestic politics to understand states' preferences and, consequently, the differing patterns of conflict and cooperation in international politics. (14) As Milner contended: "…cooperation may be unattainable because of domestic intransigence, and not because of the international system." (15) A reaction against systemic theories was not exclusive to the liberal trenches. Following this turn toward domestic politics, some realist scholars directed their efforts at the incorporation of domestic variables as a way to add complexity to systemic models that they saw as too crude. In his From Wealth to Power, F. Zakaria argued that anarchy and the distribution of power were not enough to explain the behavior of rising powers. After observing that at the end of the 19th century the US was not as assertive as a structural approach would have predicted, he hypothesized that this was because it did not have the governmental capacity to do so. To solve this puzzle he argued for the incorporation of models of resource extraction and governmental capability to try to get through the Neorealist corset. This was an important intra-realist challenge to a somewhat ossified systemic realism. (16)The rise of domestic approaches represented a generalized discontentment with the excessive importance given to parsimony and the inflexibility that came with it. Parsimony, which should be no more than a tool in theory building, was placed as a goal in itself, restricting research in a way that went against the discipline's own progress. Those boundaries had to be overcome if we wanted to say something about some of the important issues left unstudied by a focus on the system. Once again, the Cold War world with its apparently clear strategic problems may have seemed more propitious to a highly parsimonious approach to theory building. In a post Cold War world, the costs of parsimony were too heavy. Domestic theories certainly lost in parsimony, but they gained in a more real approach to IR problématiques. This was the primary rationale behind the turn here discussed, and in this limited sense, the shift was appropriate. (17)4-. It would be nice to unambiguously assert that the fall of systemic theories made IR a coherent and progressive discipline. This, unfortunately, is not the case. The past two decades have seen the formation of a different ethos of theory building and discipline development that may end up doing more harm than good to our broader understanding of international politics. Something not mentioned up to now is the ascent of quantitative and strategic-choice approaches in the discipline. Quantitative approaches gained prominence by the same time that, and related to, domestic theories were supplanting systemic theories. (18) Strategic choice and game theory, following developments in other academic areas -especially economics-, also gained importance in the 1990s under the idea of formalizing theories and going beyond the "isms." There is nothing wrong with these approaches per se. Quantitative work has been very important in the empirical development of IR -maybe too neglected in the past. Formal theory, on the other hand, is a powerful and clear tool to build and evaluate theories while avoiding problems of underspecification all too common in the discipline –though, this is only true if one can get through its assumptions. (19)The problems of this new "methodological bets" are to be found in the costs for the general development of the discipline. The most pressing are the ones related to the idea that theory construction should be a bottom to top affair, and the implicit notion that by building the parts individually we will eventually end up in a progressive accumulation of theoretical knowledge. However, this epistemological decision may well result in the proliferation of particularistic theories of problems ever more sophisticatedly studied, increasingly particular and micro, and in crescendo uninteresting. (20) By depending on a kind of magical automatic accumulation of theoretical knowledge we are risking to end up with an even more chaotic and incoherent discipline (more on this in the conclusion). 5-. As said in the introduction, the fall of grace of systemic theories cannot be taken as an irreversible given; it is possible to devise some scenarios in which systemic approaches could make a comeback.The first one is linked to the relationship between theory and History discussed earlier. The post Cold War world, particularly the 1990s, was a strange period for the discipline. The study of IR has historically dealt with great power politics as its core. The "curious" 1990s came with a certain absence of great power politics, especially due to the overwhelming power position of the US. This goes a long way in explaining the growing emphasis on domestic politics, civil wars, international organizations, inter alia, during those years. A partial return of classical great power politics (or the perception of it) -for example under the banner of the rise of China and some other middle powers- might motivate a recasting of systemic theories -particularly for those wanting to study polarity (a passé topic in the unipolar 1990s), (21) systemic change and its consequences, etc. (22)Another plausible scenario would be the success of some of the ongoing projects to make systemic theories more sophisticated and comprehensive by, for example, incorporating domestic variables. A good example is "Neo-classical Realism" (see fn. 16). This research project proceeds from a systemic assumption of the influences of the system (that is, a neorealist basis) but incorporates domestic politics as an intervening variable between systemic pressures and decision-making. Though a rather interesting proto-school, Neoclassical Realism is still in its infant stages and has yet to produce work of remarkable characteristics. Lastly, domestic politics, as should have been expected, were not the panacea for the development of IR theory. There might well be a social exhaustion with the results of domestic and micro-theory –a Kuhnian crisis analogous to the one that discredited systemic theories. This may eventually take IR on unexpected paths. Nevertheless, if measured by academic output and Geist, predicting a comeback of systemic approaches seems a risky bet. The discipline appears to be quite comfortable with increasing its empirical production, formalizing theories towards an Icarian "scientism", and avoiding, at its own peril, a "wholist" view of international politics. 6-. Going beyond systemic theories –not in the sense of vanishing them, but of relaxing some of their strictures, increasing their sophistication, and trying new approaches- was the necessary thing to do for a methodology that was unable to cope with many of the relevant problems in IR. The turn to domestic and particularistic perspectives brought much needed renovation, indeed. However, the excesses incurred by systemic theorists as a result of an obsession with parsimony and structural effects may now seem analogous (although for the opposite reasons) to a fixation with the particular and micro-level studies in contemporary IR theory. A blind push to obtain ever more data of increasingly micro phenomena puts at risk what we can say about international relations in general. We may, for example, be more much prepared to sophisticatedly answer why a specific insurgent group responded in a specific way to the level of aggression of a specific state, (23) but we may also be losing our interest and capacity to think about the nature of conflict in its most elemental condition. The stakes are too high for the IR community to avoid an honest discussion on how far we are willing to continue on this path. (1) This essay works with the assumption of a relative decline of systemic apporaches. To argue that they have vanished would be utterly incorrect. For a convincing argument on the inevitability of structural constraints see Jervis'sSystem Effects.(2) Although a change may be welcomed, the results are not always as encouraging as expected (more on this qualification of "appropriate" later).(3) This does not mean, of course, that there is an exclusive focus on policy or immediacy, It means that in its most basic essence, the idea of the discipline is to be able to provide some answers to the pressing problems in the international system. To give an example, few people would be interested in studying the prospects of war between France and Germany in the 21st century per se –though it surely is studied as a historical case that can shed light on other issues-, while this was one of the main topics in the nascent IR discipline.(4) Social science does not progress only by exogenous shocks, but also for endogenous reasons that cannot be explained by what happens outside theoretical disscusions.(5) Understood simply as those that privilege the influence of the structure over the behavior of the units.(6) This type of theories certainly were not born with Waltz; systemic is a much broader category than Neorealism. The important point is that Waltz devised the more convincing type of systemic theory. For simplicity, Waltz' Neorelism will be used here as the epitome and a kind of proxy for systemic theory. (7) It must be said that the rise of systemic theories also responded to changes in the social sciences in general; for example, the influence of structuralist anthorpoligist Levi-Strauss' work, which Waltz knew well.(8) Theories of IR before Waltz hosted a diverse group of analysts: Classical realism from the hand of a Hans Morgenthau, Geroge Kennan and Raymond Aron; liberal approaches from a Stanley Hoffman, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye; Bureacratic Organization and foreign policy from a Graham Allison; and a long et cetera.(9) See R. N. Lebow, "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War and the Failure of Realism."(10) See I. Oren's Our Enemies and US: America´s Rivalries and the Making of Political Science.(11) As with its rise the decline of systemic theories was also linked to broader transformations in the world of ideas, to which IR seems to always be a latecomer. From a broad perspective, this phenomenon had started in the 1960s with the work of Foucault, Derrida, Geertz and others.(12) The end of the immediate preoccupation with bipolarity also gave the opportunity to rethink some long-term historical problems of Neorealism (see Schroeder 1994).(13) Some of the scholars engaged in this deabate were: Keohane, Grieco, Axelrod, and Mastanduno; cf. Milner (1992).(14) In another article in International Organization (1987) she argues that to understand the way in which states make decisions in the international economy it is not enough to look at anarchy. Her model studies the type of economic links between countries (high or low interdependence) and the influence of interests groups that may pressure the state to make particular decisions; these policy outcomes would have been incomprehensible from a systemic/anarchic stance. According to Milner, there is an important dynamic of preference construction and strategies adopted that are to be found in domestic politics.(15) See also Putnam (1988) for an interesting effort to move beyond lists of domestic factors and towards a coherent two level theory.(16) This line of research has been given the title of Neoclassical Realism (see G. Rose 1998). See the work of R. Schweller, J. Taliaferro, A. Friedberg, and T. Christensen.(17) Systemic theories were also attached to what has been discussed as the "paradigm wars" between realism, liberalism, constructivism, etc. The turn away from them can also be given credit for helping to discredit this unproductive way of theorizing.(18) This trend was tied to the notoriety of the "democratic peace" project that was, and still is, an empirical enterprise at its core. See Russett and Oneal (1999); cf. Gartzke (2007).(19) See Wagner, War and the State, and Lake and Powell Strategic Choice and International Relations.(20) This is not the nature of all the work in this approach, of course, but just a possible trend of the school as a whole. See Walt's "Rigor or Rigor Mortis" for a sharp, but not always convincing, critique.(21) For an exception see the work by N. Monteiro on unipolarity. This does not mean that polarity disappeared from the IR map, but it was certainly shrinked as a research question.(22) Some young scholars on this line of research are: P. MacDonald, J. Parent, D. Kliman and M. Beckley.(23) See Jason Lyall's "Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya" To be fair, Lyall's work attempts to generalize from this specific case –how convincing he is not very clear, however. *Ph.D. StudentDepartment of Political ScienceUniversity of Pennsylvania.E-mail: gcastro@sas.upenn.edu
According to the nature of the Westphalian system, the independent state is the central actor in international relations. However, the discipline has not developed theoretical approaches regarding the independence process, which is considered more a concern of the international law and the political interests of state actors. Then, in this article, the issue of independence is analyzed as a basic step for political entities to access statehood, becoming a basisfor understanding the role of the independent state in the Westphalian order. It is necessary to observe the variations in the conception of independence, especially regarding self-determination and recognition principle, acknowledging the existence of deep changes in the international system. This principle has had greater relevance since the 1990s due to the disintegration processes of some countries, particularly the case of Kosovo. Taiwan is also a relevant experience. Another key point is the weakening process of the state, with the appearance of variants that question the status and existence of the state actor. At the end of this paper, a brief reference is made to the Latin and Central Americanexperience, which shows particularities since the 19th century. ; El actor central en las relaciones internacionales es el Estado soberano independiente, según la naturaleza del sistema westfaliano; sin embargo, en la disciplina no se han desarrollado enfoques teóricos sobre el proceso de independencia. Se considera más un asunto del derecho internacional y de los intereses políticos de los actores estatales. Por ello, se analiza en este trabajo, la cuestión de la independencia como un paso básico para que las entidades políticas accedan a la categoría de Estado, lo que sirve de fundamento para entender el papel del Estado independiente en el orden westfaliano. Al reconocer que hay cambios profundos en el sistema internacional, es necesario observar las variaciones en la concepción de independencia, sobre todo en relación con el principio de autodeterminación y el reconocimiento.Esto tiene mayor relevancia a partir de la década de 1990, por los procesos de desintegración de algunos países, en particular, el caso de Kosovo; otra experiencia relevante es Taiwán. A lo anterior, se suma el debilitamiento del Estado, con la aparición de variantes que cuestionan la estatidad y la existencia del actor estatal. Al final,se hace una breve referencia a la experiencia latinoamericana y centroamericana, que muestran particularidades desde el siglo XIX.
I examine three different ways in which the ideals of deliberative democracy have changed in the light of practical concerns about its viability. have changed in the light of practical concerns about its viability, i.e., making increasingly important the problem of how this ideal can approach societies characterized by deep disagreements, social problems of enormous complexity and inoperative instruments in their existing institutions. (1) Theories of deliberative democracy emphasize the process of deliberation rather than its ideal conditions and procedures. (2) Deliberative democrats are increasingly interested in the problems of institutionalization, in making voting, majority rule and representation more deliberative institutions. (3) Deliberativists examine the different scenarios and procedures of deliberation, pointing out obstacles that cannot always be anticipated by resorting only to conceptual arguments ; Examino tres maneras diferentes como los ideales de la democracia deliberativa han cambiado a la luz de las preocupaciones prácticas sobre su viabilidad, es decir, haciendo cada vez más importante el problema de cómo este ideal puede acercarse a sociedades caracterizadas por profundos desacuerdos, problemas sociales de enorme complejidad e instrumentos inoperantes en sus instituciones existentes. (1) Las teorías de la democracia deliberativa enfatizan el proceso de la deliberación y no sus condiciones y procedimientos ideales. (2) Los demócratas deliberativos se interesan cada vez más en los problemas de la institucionalización, en hacer del voto, la regla de mayorías y la representación, instituciones más deliberativas. (3) Los deliberativistas examinan los diferentes escenarios y procedimientos de la deliberación, señalando obstáculos que no siempre pueden anticiparse al recurrir únicamente a argumentos conceptuales
El artículo tiene por objetivo dar cuenta de los diferentes enfoques que desde la disciplina de las Relaciones Internacionales permiten estudiar el fenómeno de las organizaciones internacionales. En este sentido, en primer lugar se realiza un abordaje conceptual y una caracterización de las organizaciones internacionales, así como una diferenciación del término Instituciones Internacionales. En segundo lugar, se señalan aquellos trabajos a los que se tuvo acceso que han estudiado el tema en los últimos años, evidenciándose que han existido esfuerzos desde diferentes puntos del planeta en indagar sobre este tema. En tercer lugar, se analiza el papel que juegan las organizaciones internacionales en la disciplina, específicamente desde los enfoques teóricos del realismo y neorrealismo, liberalismo, institucionalismo neoliberal e interdependencia compleja, constructivismo y otras contribuciones teóricas (entre ellas, la visión crítica, el funcionalismo, neo-funcionalismo, la teoría del agente-principal y la perspectiva feminista). Por último, se presentan reflexiones finales. Así, el artículo estudia un actor internacional considerado por los autores de carácter más estatocéntrico no tradicional en las Relaciones Internacionales, tal como son las organizaciones internacionales, que desde mediados del siglo XX han incrementado su presencia en el sistema internacional, vinculándose en la actualidad tanto con gobiernos nacionales como subnacionales y abarcando una amplia variedad de temas y problemáticas. ; The article has as main objective to evidence the different approaches from the International Relations discipline that permit to study the international organizations. In this sense, first the article defines and characterizes the international organizations, as well as a differentiation from the term international institutions. Second, those researches published in the last years related to the issue of this paper are being exposed in the discussion section given account of the efforts made around the globe to inquire into this subject. Third, the article analyses the role played by the international organizations in the IR discipline, specifically from theories such as, realism and neo-realism, liberalism, neoliberal institutionalism and complex interdependence, constructivism, and others theoretical contributions (like the critical theory, the functionalism and neo-functionalism, the principal and agent, and the feminist theory). Finally yet importantly, final reflections are being presented. Thus, the paper studies an international actor considered by the most state-centric authors as non-traditional in the IR, such as the international organizations, which from mid-20th century have increased its presence in the international system, with currently relations with national and sub-national governments and reaching a huge variety of issues.
Although empirical studies of deliberative democracy have proliferated in the past decade [90's], too few have addressed the questions that are most significant in the normative theories. At the same time, many theorists have tended too easily to dismiss the empirical findings. More recently, some theorists and empiricists have been paying more attention to each other's work. Nevertheless, neither is likely to produce the more comprehensive understanding of deliberative democracy we need unless both develop a clearer conception of the elements of deliberation, the conflicts among those elements, and the structural relationships in deliberative systems. ; Si bien en la década pasada [década de 1990] proliferaron los estudios empíricos sobre democracia deliberativa, pocos de ellos se ocuparon de las cuestiones más importantes de las teorías normativas. Al mismo tiempo, muchos teóricos de la democracia deliberativa desecharon rápidamente los hallazgos empíricos. Solo recientemente, algunos teóricos y empíricos han comenzado a prestar más atención al trabajo realizado por unos y otros. Sin embargo, no parece que esta atención baste para producir la comprensión que necesitamos de la democracia deliberativa; para ello hace falta que los teóricos y los investigadores empíricos desarrollen una mejor concepción de los elementos de la deliberación, los conflictos entre estos elementos y las relaciones estructurales de los sistemas deliberativos.
