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The potential for sizable crowd-out of private expenditures by public insurance and delivery programs has been demonstrated. However, there is limited evidence about whether this stems from decisions of employers about their health benefit package or by decisions of workers. This study focuses on the role of public programs on employer decisions to offer insurance and the amount the employer contributes to the premium, using data from a large survey of employers and a database describing community characteristics. The study finds that both public insurance and public delivery programs have a significant effect on employer decisions, but the magnitude of the effect is small. Policies to limit crowd-out should focus on incentives to make continued private insurance purchase attractive to workers rather than incentives to employers.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "In 1999, nearly 10 million retired people aged 55 or older relied on employer-sponsored health insurance as either their primary source of coverage or as a supplement to their Medicare coverage. Some of these persons are concerned about the continued availability of employer-sponsored coverage. Premium increases and forecasts for a potential economic slowdown could further erode employer-sponsored benefits. In the long term, these factors, coupled with the potential for Medicare reforms and the rising number of aging baby boomers, may produce even more uncertainty and cost pressures for employers. Consequently, as an increasing number of retirees lack employer-based coverage, those in poorer health may have difficulty finding affordable alternative health coverage."

Many large employers prefer to self-insure health plans offered to employees rather than purchase them from insurance companies to save costs and to avoid the burden of complying with varying state mandates. This concerns state governments because they cannot directly regulate self-insured plans. This article describes the prevalence of employer self-insurance for the nation and by state in 1993 and examines what factors, especially state policies, contribute to the national and state variation in the prevalence of self-insurance. Data from the National Employer Health Insurance Survey on 34,604 private sector establishments are analyzed. Variation in the prevalence of self-insurance was largely explained by the firm size of the establishments. After all other factors were examined, very little was added to predict the rate of self-insurance for each state. While state premium taxation and benefits mandates were not associated with self-insurance, small-group reforms were significantly and positively associated with the probability of self-insurance.

In an era of rising health care costs, employers seek cost reduction strategies, with many relying on consumer-driven health plans (CDHP). Utilizing data from a nationally representative survey of firms, this article explores employer experiences with CDHP in two areas. First, it describes those firms most likely to offer CDHP. Second, it estimates potential cost reductions from an emphasis on CDHP. Results indicate that large, nonunion employers offer CDHP most often. Furthermore, an emphasis on CDHP plans is not associated with a reduction in average contributions to insurance policies.

Argues that white men are more likely to be covered by fringe benefits than are women & black men & considers the effect of differences in benefit status on the gap in total compensation by gender & race using individual data (N = 14,500) from the 1988 Current Population Survey. The gap explained by differences in observable worker characteristics is greater for benefit-sector workers when measured by total compensation than when measured by wages only. However, less than 50% of the gap in compensation between white males & other workers is due to differences in observable characteristics. 7 Tables, 10 References. Adapted from the source document.

In the past two decades the OECD has regularly voiced concern about the labor market exclusion of people with disabilities and about the cost of disability insurance programs. This paper examines whether the fundamental disability insurance reforms that were implemented in the Netherlands have helped or hindered employment opportunities of workers with health problems or disability. An important component of the Dutch reforms was to enhance employer incentives, which was done by making them responsible for paying sickness benefits and by strengthening their sickness monitoring obligations. These employer incentives may stimulate preventive and reintegration activities by firms, thereby improving the employment opportunities of disabled workers. However, the reforms also impose substantial costs on employers when an employee gets sick and may therefore reduce employme nt opportunities of disabled workers. We use data from the Dutch Labor Force Survey and rich administrative data from hospital admission records, social security records, and the municipality registers containing demographic information to examine whether the disability reforms have in fact improved the economic situation for the disabled. On balance, we conclude that the DI reforms implemented by the Dutch government have mainly protected those who already have a job, and may have inadvertently reduced the hiring opportunities of people with a disability.

In the past two decades the OECD has regularly voiced concern about the labor market exclusion of people with disabilities and about the cost of disability insurance programs. This paper examines whether the fundamental disability insurance reforms that were implemented in the Netherlands have helped or hindered employment opportunities of workers with health problems or disability. An important component of the Dutch reforms was to enhance employer incentives, which was done by making them responsible for paying sickness benefits and by strengthening their sickness monitoring obligations. These employer incentives may stimulate preventive and reintegration activities by firms, thereby improving the employment opportunities of disabled workers. However, the reforms also impose substantial costs on employers when an employee gets sick and may therefore reduce employment opportunities of disabled workers. We use data from the Dutch Labor Force Survey and rich administrative data from hospital admission records, social security records, and the municipality registers containing demographic information to examine whether the disability reforms have in fact improved the economic situation for the disabled. On balance, we conclude that the DI reforms implemented by the Dutch government have mainly protected those who already have a job, and may have inadvertently reduced the hiring opportunities of people with a disability.

With 70% of recent hires being encumbered with student-loan debt, employers and employees have recently become interested in repayment assistance benefits. Since about 2015, 4% of employers and 8% of large employers have adopted such plans. An estimated 20% will have them by 2018. This article examines the background, growth and magnitude of federal and private student loans. It also examines those programs that have been adopted and gleans from them a number of questions that will help in the design and implementation of new programs by employers.