Suchergebnisse

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) developed strategies in the 1990s to control illegal immigration across U.S. borders and to address enforcement priorities within the country. In 1994, INS's Border Patrol issued a strategy to deter illegal entry through "prevention through deterrence;" that is, to raise the risk of being apprehended for illegal aliens to where they would consider it futile to try to enter. The plan called for targeting resources in a phased approach, starting in areas with the greatest illegal activity. In 1999, INS issued its Interior Enforcement Strategy to focus resources on areas that would have the greatest impact on reducing the size and annual growth of the illegal resident population. The strategy established the following five areas: (1) identify and remove criminal aliens and minimize recidivism; (2) deter, dismantle, and diminish smuggling or trafficking of aliens; (3) respond to community reports and complaints about illegal immigration; (4) minimize immigration benefit fraud and other document abuse; and (5) block and remove employers' access to undocumented workers. For these to be effective, INS needs better data to determine staff needs, reliable information technology, clear and consistent guidelines and procedures for working level staff, effective collaboration and coordination within INS and with other agencies, and performance measures that help INS assess program results. Having an effective interior strategy is an essential complement to having an effective border strategy."

The Reagan administration has been accused of setting back civil rights enforcement. This article reviews available data on the administration's enforcement efforts and discusses changes in emphasis, tone, and types of cases pursued. An emphasis on identifiable victims and a movement away from more punitive measures is apparent. Moreover, the large budget cuts and the administration's antipathy to goals and timetables raise questions concerning the "quality" of enforcement.

Abstract: Four approaches to drug enforcement are appraised. Three of these are characterised as the conventional approaches which have been dominant through most of the past decade. The arguments for and the limitations of each are considered. It is argued that the shortcomings of these conventional approaches has led to renewed interest in enforcement aimed at the street or retail level of the market. Drawing on economic models of the drug market and the behaviour of drug buyers, the arguments for low level drug enforcement are described, and some problems with this approach indicated.

The enforcement styles of inspectors are particularly important when a regulatory agency deals with issues that are low in salience and low in complexity In this article, based on interviews with 104 child care in spectors in four states, I distinguish between individual-level and state- level variations in regulatory stringency, regulatory flexibility, and technical support. The evidence suggests a breakdown of democratic accountabil ity but also techniques for restoring it.

The mix of formal and informal mechanisms for contract enforcement is examined using survey data from Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Poland, and Slovakia. Using the size of trade credit to quantify the success of contracting, we ask: Do the courts have a perceptible effect on contracting? When can a firm rely on its customer to repay trade credit voluntarily? Which is more effective, the courts or relational contracting? Do trade associations play a role in contract enforcement? Does relational contracting entail inefficiencies? Is the reliance on relation contracting merely a transitory phenomenon, reflecting the inadequacy of these countries ̕legal systems?

We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection. ; Publicado

The dissertation 'Enforcement Matters' is a comparative analysis of the transposition and enforcement of, and compliance with, two directives regulating dangerous chemical substances (the Seveso II and Safety Data Sheets directives) in four member states (the Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom and Spain) of the European Union. Ideally, European legislation stimulates uniform rule application within the member states and equal circumstances for 'the regulated'. The European Union, however, is not involved in enforcing these rules and thus does not control the process in which the 'law in the books' becomes the 'law in action'. Enforcement remains the responsibility of individual Member States. This book sheds light on the 'black box' of the practical implementation of European legislation from two perspectives; on the one hand from the perspective of the 'regulators' (environmental and labor inspectors) and on the other hand from the perspective of the 'regulated' (chemical companies). It shows that enforcement and compliance practices (or 'styles') differ considerably between member states as well as between directives. The study explores the explanatory mechanisms at work; in particular issue salience, legal design, organizational structure of the enforcement agencies and characteristics of the street-level actors (inspectors and chemical companies). The 'Dutch Association for Public Administration' awarded this dissertation with the 'Van Poelje price 2003' for the best dissertation in the field of public administration, and concluded that the dissertation 'Enforcement Matters' will function as a standard work and point of reference for future studies on the practical implementation of European legislation.