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The author presents Petitt's reaction to the central dichotomy that ensues from MacIntyre's thinking about politics on the borderline between the liberal thought (as the continuation of the Enlightenment) & the communitarian thought (Aristotelianism-inspired but characteristic of the anti-enlightenment, romantic tradition). Petitt considers that dichotomy mystifying, since it conceals other interesting alternatives, such as pre-liberal, republican political thought. He tries to prove the republican tradition worthy of serious consideration & claims that it can be evolved into a truly appealing political stance. The author concisely describes liberalism & communitarianism as seen by MacIntyre & Petitt. Then he goes on to describe republicanism, as seen by Petitt. And finally, the author lists critical objections to Petitt's description of republicanism due to which that political alternative does not seem as attractive as Petitt claims. Adapted from the source document.

In this paper, the author focuses on the work of Bernard Mandeville as predecessor of Scottish Enlightenment and liberal tradition of thought. Starting from the social, political and economic context of the all-embracing crisis of the society in transition of his time, special attention is devoted to his moral, social and economic views based on methodological individualism. The author argues that Mandeville's controversial thought resists one-sided labeling and unambiguous fitting into mutually opposed camps of mercantilism and market liberalism, i.e. constructivism and evolutionism. This is the reason behind the variety of interpretations, and sometimes even completely opposite readings of his work. He was a satirist, social critic, physician, philosopher and economist, who effectuated a shift and a turn with regard to the habitual perceptions of the age in all those segments of his reflection and activity, and he launched a sort of "revolution in thought", which will be given its definitive formulation and elaboration in the second half of the 18th century by the Scottish moral philosophers. The author concludes that Mandeville was, first and foremost, a man of his time and responded to the acute problems of his age. It would thus be inappropriate and wrong to apply his ideas from the beginning of the 18th century to the present time with a clearer precising of intellectual and political projects, and declare him either a mercantilist or an interventionist, or else an advocate of laissez-faire. Nonetheless, Mandeville came up with answers that would later be incorporated in the liberal tradition. One may therefore say that he greatly influenced the Scottish Enlightenment and contributed to the birth of liberalism, although he was not a consistent economic liberal himself, of the type that was familiar to the late 18th century. Adapted from the source document.

The author's starting point is the assumption that the idea of the Christian Republic, suppressed by the Enlightenment, entered the French 18th-century discourse through its two secularized versions: the "Great Plan" put forward by Duke of Sully in Royal Economies (1638) and the Project for Perpetual Peace in Europe by Charles-Irenee Castel, the abbot of Saint-Pierre (1717). While the "Great Plan" aimed at establishing a secularized European peace alliance under the hegemony of France, Saint-Pierre strove to remove all hegemonic facets of the plan and establish peace according to the principles of equality of sovereign states. In the second half of the 18th century, Gabriel Bonnot de Mably and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in reaction to the Seven-Year War, assumed different standpoints regarding the heritage of Sully and Saint-Pierre: although both deemed useful to build upon Saint-Pierre's pacifist thought, they rejected his way of establishing a Christian Republic in Europe as essentially Utopian. The former saw the only way of pacifying Europe in federalization under the hegemony of a single federal republic. The latter however rejected this solution as too risky and too difficult to carry out, preferring a return to the old theory of balance of forces, which enables small, autarchic and belligerent republics, that must always take into account the certainty that they could be attacked at any time, to establish only temporary and loose connections with other (equally small) republics within the frameworks of defensive alliances. Adapted from the source document.

The author probes into the epistemological roots of Rorty's liberalism & describes the mental evolution by which the unpolitical ideas presented in Philosophy & the Nature's Mirror obtained political meaning in Rorty's philosophical-political writings. Focusing on Rorty's usage of the notion of incommensurability, the author claims that Rorty fails to explain to the liberals of enlightenment why his postmodern liberalism is better than modern liberalism. 18 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the emergence of the modern state in Latin Europe, its spread into other parts of the world, its crisis, & its future prospects. In Europe, the conflict between the church & the state was central for the evolution of the state. The Latin Church inherited the politically significant legacy of antiquity, especially of the Roman Empire. This legacy includes the territorial principle, the idea of service in the interest of the public good, the rule of law & not individuals, & the idea of discipline or voluntary obedience. Also included is the concept of total control of owners over their property. The modern state emerged as a warrior state; however, it soon became clear that it needed emotional mobilization. In many cases religious identity represented a pre-phase of national identity. This meant that the modern state was a system of faith. The Enlightenment fostered the growth of the state, but also contributed to its downfall, since those who know how the state functions cease to have faith in it. The author concludes that the state will remain, but in a decentralized & pluralist form. 20 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author shows how Fichte's concept of the nation, although modern, originates in a long philosophical tradition that postulates the importance of the community above that of the individual. Fichte's original philosophy of humanity, inspired by enlightenment & especially Kant, he later transferred to the abstract ethical unit of nation. In it the concept of humanity (later 'nation') is the most general community toward which the individual aspires to become a member because of his longing for the absolute. The general understanding of nations transforms into Fichte's later philosophical hypostasis of the German nation. According to Fichte, only the German nation, as a community tied by a "living language" has general human importance & a world historical mission to be accomplished in the future. The German nation, however, must become a dynamic unit through elevating its people above political & social divisions. This occurs through the education of individuals for love of the nation, based on "true" philosophy (Fichte's philosophical teachings). The author concludes that the concept of a nation in Fichte's later works (in which the relationship between the individual & the state is an educational dictatorship & the complete destruction & individuality) creates a fertile ground for totalitarian, nationalistic ideology. 27 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the design of Rawls's liberal project via his idea of justice as the primary virtue of social institutions. Rawls thinks that what is just must have primacy over what is good, by which he has revitalized the deontological ethics. Rawls's deontological liberalism is based on the conviction that a plural society is possible if we stick to the principle of the primacy of what is just & by this limit the various concepts of the good. In his critique, Sandet highlights the pro & contra arguments of the deontological ethics, but concludes that it is impossible to save Rawls's deontological liberalism since it cannot be consistently derived. John Gray's criticism of Rawls is threefold: first, Gray claims that Rawls's concept of the individual is taken out of its cultural-historical context & thus represents a vestige of the Enlightenment project fallacy; second, Gray argues that Rawls fell for the misconception of the primacy of the law over the good, because law without substance provided by a concept of the good would be hollow; & third, Gray says that Rawls substituted the sphere of the political by law, which makes his political liberalism essentially antipolitical. The author concludes that it is not essential for the idea of justice to occupy a privileged position as the ultimate valorization of a society, & in that sense it cannot be imperative & obligatory. 14 References. Adapted from the source document.