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THOMAS NAGEL has argued that 'true liberalism' excludes appeals to conceptions of the good in political argument. According to Nagel, liberalism's impartiality is grounded not in skepticism but, rather, in its commitment to 'epistemological restraint.' As he puts it, 'We accept a kind of epistemological division between the private and the public domains: in certain contexts I am constrained to consider my beliefs merely as beliefs rather than as truths, however convinced I may be that they are true, and that I know it.' Nagel's notion of epistemological restraint has been roundly criticized by perfectionist liberals and advocates of liberal neutrality alike. In fact, even Nagel has come to reject the epistemological argument—in part, because of the epistemological asymmetry that it presupposes. In this paper, I offer an answer to Nagel's critics, one that makes the notion of epistemological asymmetry coherent. In so doing, I show how to defend liberal neutrality without embracing skepticism. I structure the paper in the following way: Section II lays out the critique of epistemological restraint; Section III defends the coherence of this notion; and Section IV considers an objection to the analysis developed in Section III.

Thomas Nagel's (1987) assertion that liberalism's neutrality is contingent on the notion of "epistemological restraint" is defended. Joseph Raz's (1994) & Brian Barry's (1995) respective critiques of Nagel's notion of epistemological restraint are reviewed & subsequently challenged. A nonskeptical strategy that renders epistemological restrain viable is then presented. Although it is claimed that the problem of transferring positions should be attributed to the presence of background beliefs, it is contended that individuals draw on these background beliefs to maintain their positions when attempting to account for nonbelievers' rejections of these positions. A potential objection to the defense of epistemological asymmetry is addressed; specifically, it is argued that religious arguments against epistemological asymmetry can be handled by appealing to differences in background beliefs. J. W. Parker

'Hume's Epistemological Evolution' argues that 'Hume's Enquiry' represents a significant departure from the Treatise in respect of its epistemological framework. The treatise's treatment of skepticism is an unsatisfactory one, as Hume seems to realize, and he therefore forms a new epistemological framework in the Enquiry. Qu's central argument is that Hume's epistemology evolves between these two works.