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In the Netherlands, an elaborate legal system of legislative protection against discrimination has been in place since 1994. Partly with the aim of implementing the Article 13 Directives, two new statutes were added to the system in 2003 (disability discrimination) and 2004 (age discrimination) and a number of amendments have been made to the existing legal framework. This has resulted in a highly complex system of legislation. The complicated differences between the scope and exceptions of the various legislative acts will be difficult for most people to comprehend. As far as content is concerned, however, the Dutch legislation generally seems to comply with the requirements of the Directives and often even provides a higher level of protection. Most issues of debate in the Dutch implementation process concern relatively minor points, such as terminology (discrimination or "distinction"?). It is clear, however, that some elements of the Dutch legislation can be considered to be incompatible with the Directives, in particular the complete exclusion of religious institutions and the clergy from the scope of application of the ETA and the decision to define the elements of harassment cumulatively instead of alternatively.

Free movement of persons is a fundamental freedom and equal treatment its necessary corollary. Yet, both principles have come under pressure in the past decades. This article investigates three forms of mobility within the European Union (EU): workers, economically inactive persons and posted workers. In respect of all three categories, there is a tension between social and market interests, which appears most clearly when comparing their right of equal treatment. The balancing between market and social values is at the core of this research. We expect that the social market economy will, on the one hand, explain the 'why' in discussing the right of equal treatment of free movers and its limitations. On the other hand, the social market economy also has a normative dimension, which enables us to discuss perspectives on how equal treatment can develop, and make some propositions. We argue that the social component in the market economy requires a revision of what is seen as fair competition in the direction of outlawing social dumping. We also find that the persistence of the market elements pleads for the right to free movement of persons, which does not substantially disturb the economy of the host Member State.

Free movement of persons is a fundamental freedom and equal treatment its necessary corollary. Yet, both principles have come under pressure in the past decades. This article investigates three forms of mobility within the European Union (EU): workers, economically inactive persons and posted workers. In respect of all three categories, there is a tension between social and market interests, which appears most clearly when comparing their right of equal treatment. The balancing between market and social values is at the core of this research. We expect that the social market economy will, on the one hand, explain the 'why' in discussing the right of equal treatment of free movers and its limitations. On the other hand, the social market economy also has a normative dimension, which enables us to discuss perspectives on how equal treatment can develop, and make some propositions. We argue that the social component in the market economy requires a revision of what is seen as fair competition in the direction of outlawing social dumping. We also find that the persistence of the market elements pleads for the right to free movement of persons, which does not substantially disturb the economy of the host Member State.

We argue that tax policy typically does not respond to inequality because many voters hold equal treatment fairness beliefs for which the expectation is that, just as all have one vote, the state should treat citizens equally on other dimensions of policy. In the tax domain, this means all should pay the same rate. We propose a new survey instrument to measure equal treatment beliefs and implement it in surveys in Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We document in all three countries a robust negative partial correlation between the strength of individual equal treatment beliefs and preferences for higher taxes on the rich. We also present results from a survey experiment in the United States that exposes respondents to a violation of equal treatment beliefs—voting weighted by educational attainment. Exposure to this treatment both increases the strength of equal treatment beliefs and decreases support for progressive taxation.

AbstractLines at the polls raise the cost of voting and can precipitate unequal treatment of voters. Research on voting lines is nonetheless hampered by a fundamental measurement problem: little is known about the distribution of time voters spend in line prior to casting ballots. We argue that early, in-person voter check-in times allow us identify individuals who waited in line to vote. Drawing on election administrative records from two General Elections in Florida—1,031,179 check-ins from 2012 and 1,846,845 from 2016—we find that minority voters incurred disproportionately long wait times in 2012 and that in-person voters who waited excessively in 2012 had a slightly lower probability—approximately one percent—of turning out to vote in 2016, ceteris paribus. These individuals also had slightly lower turnout probabilities in the 2014 Midterm Election, ceteris paribus. Our results draw attention to the ongoing importance of the administrative features of elections that influence the cost of voting and ultimately the extent to which voters are treated equally.

The article examines whether ethnic minority employees report poorer treatment at work than white employees, and evaluates the impact of three key features — gender differences, formal equal opportunities policies and trade union recognition. The analysis reveals that ethnic minority men and women receive poorer treatment than their white counterparts. In addition, there is evidence to suggest that ethnic minority women receive poorer treatment than ethnic minority men. Equal opportunities policies are effective in ensuring equal treatment, but the presence of a recognised trade union is not. White men and women in unionised workplaces enjoy better treatment than their white counterparts in non-union workplaces, but the same is not true for ethnic minorities. By contrast, there is very little evidence of unequal treatment in non-union workplaces.