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Les limites environnementales de l'application de l'égalité des droitsSelon les écrits politiques de Hobbes et de Locke, la paix sociale ne peut être assurée que par l'acceptation, de la part des citoyens, d'une autorité politique coercitive. Or cette acceptation, ils la justifient par l'égalité des droits entre les citoyens, principe dont l'application implique une approbation illimitée de la nature, laquelle y trouve son seul mode de valorisation. Ainsi, l'idée d'égalité, telle que développée d'abord par Hobbes puis appliquée par Locke, constitue beaucoup plus qu'un simple concept politique ou social puisqu'elle repose sur une vision globale de la relation entre l'homme et son environnement naturel, son emploi aux fins de maintenir l'ordre social signifiant que l'acquisition de la nature ne saurait en aucune façon conndître de limite et que tout élément naturel sans propriétaire ne saurait avoir de valeur.L'appropriation de la nature, selon la conception libérale de la propriété, conduit à son terme à une destruction complète de la nature et, par conséquent, de l'homme. Cela étant, on peut se demander si l'application du concept de l'égalité des droits est susceptible de prévenir ou bien d'engendrer le désordre social et la violence. L'ordre politique de Hobbes et de Locke ne ferait-il pas contre la nature ?

Professor Seaman contends that I am mistaken in asserting a logical connection between equality of right and unlimited acquisition. I argued that equality of right as employed by Locke in the Second Treatise logically entails the right of unlimited acquisition, and a consequent danger of environmental destruction, resulting from the necessary commitment of political structures to unlimited acquisition.

In a recent article, "An Environmental Case Against Equality of Right," Professor Lewis argues for no less than the complete rejection of those highly-prized liberal values upon which much of the institutional framework of Western societies has been built, the values of civil peace, unlimited acquisition, and equality of right. This radical recommendation is urged on the basis of the mundane and, until very recently, much-ignored problem of environmental destruction. Lewis' environmental case is (1) that equality of right, which is recommended by Hobbes as the necessary condition of civil peace, "logically entails"—and this is clear, he contends, from Locke's use of the concept in the Second Treatise—the right of unlimited appropriation; (2) that unlimited appropriation destroys nature and ultimately man; and (3) that we must consequently rethink our allegiance to unlimited appropriation, to equality of right (because it logically entails unlimited appropriation), and to civil peace (whose necessary condition is equality of right), and be prepared to accept alternative theoretical foundations upon which to reconstruct our major social institutions. While this attack on unlimited acquisition will undoubtedly strike a responsive chord among many social critics, the concomitant rejection of the Hobbesian hope of civil peace and of equality of right will receive a much less hospitable welcome. But the catch in Lewis' argument is that we cannot get rid of the former without jettisoning the latter two at the same time. If his analysis of this matter is correct, then the costs of preventing the further destruction of nature and the future demise of man are extremely high, much higher than most critics have yet been willing to recognize.

In his chief work Person and act concerning the transcendent virtue of natural ethical norms, the author, Cardinal Karol Wojtyła, stresses the autonomous decision of the single person and thereby his own responsibility. This results in a deepened comprehension of what freedom of the human being really means. Only the conception of a balance between rights and duties of man will protect our own freedom and dignity. In Cardinal Wojtyła´s philosophy we can implicitly find the current answer to the problem of equality, which can´t be solved without the transcendent outlook. The article is limited to three parts: 1. Sources of Karol Wojtyła´s philosophy; 2. The role of conscience as legislator for the person; 3. Equality of rights and duties as moral imperative of human acts. We can describe Karol Wojtyła´s thinking as an emphasizing on the transcendent perspective as well as an equal estimation of responsibility compared to rights and liberties. Karol Wojtyła´s philosophy gives us a current answer to present challenges also concerning the problem of equality, which can´t be solved without transcendent outlook. ; In his chief work Person and act concerning the transcendent virtue of natural ethical norms, the author, Cardinal Karol Wojtyła, stresses the autonomous decision of the single person and thereby his own responsibility. This results in a deepened comprehension of what freedom of the human being really means. Only the conception of a balance between rights and duties of man will protect our own freedom and dignity. In Cardinal Wojtyła´s philosophy we can implicitly find the current answer to the problem of equality, which can´t be solved without the transcendent outlook. The article is limited to three parts: 1. Sources of Karol Wojtyła´s philosophy; 2. The role of conscience as legislator for the person; 3. Equality of rights and duties as moral imperative of human acts. We can describe Karol Wojtyła´s thinking as an emphasizing on the transcendent perspective as well as an equal estimation of responsibility ...

Die Autorin skizziert die von der Europäischen Gemeinschaft gesetzten Rahmenbedingungen für eine Gleichbehandlung von Mann und Frau auf dem Arbeitsmarkt. Inwieweit das kommende Jahrzehnt eine Umsetzung des Gleichbehandlungsprinzips - mit positiven Resultaten auf die Stellung der Frau im Berufsleben - bringt, hängt auch, so eine These der Autorin, von den Entwicklungen der betrieblichen Personalarbeit ab und von dem Druck, den Frauen auf Betriebsebene ausüben können. Sie beschreibt künftige wichtige Entwicklungen des Personalmanagements (flexible Beschäftigungsverhältnisse, dezentrale Vergütungspolitik etc.). Gerade diese Entwicklungen, so ein Fazit, vermindern aber auch die Erfolgschancen betrieblicher Gleichberechtigungsmaßnahmen. Als Gegengewicht könnten sich Frauen in Westeuropa auf die demographische Entwicklung stützen, die zu einer Verminderung und Überalterung der Erwerbsbevölkerung und damit zu einer größeren Nachfrage an weiblicher Erwerbsarbeit führen wird. (rk)

The Southern Rhodesian experiment with the alternative vote (AV) is not well known among electoral specialists. Yet this was the origin of the better known claim that such a preferential voting system might ameliorate ethnic tensions in deeply divided societies. AV was one among several institutional innovations deployed by a reformist white settler government in Southern Rhodesia in response to the emergence of the African nationalist movement. Despite its usage with a highly restrictive franchise, the system delivered a preference transfer-dependent victory for a centrist government that aimed to accommodate African political aspirations in 1958. Yet that outcome was not repeated in 1962 or 1965, when Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front instead obtained office, declared independence from the United Kingdom and – once freed of restraints from London – dismantled electoral devices aimed at encouraging inter-communal vote transfers. This article examines the debates about Southern Rhodesian electoral reform in the late 1950s and early 1960s, explores the working of accommodation-oriented devices at the elections of 1958, 1962 and 1965, and contests whether viable political settlements can be assembled in such contexts simply by institutional reform aimed at encouraging 'moderation'.

The Southern Rhodesian experiment with the alternative vote (AV) is not well known among electoral specialists. Yet this was the origin of the better known claim that such a preferential voting system might ameliorate ethnic tensions in deeply divided societies. AV was one among several institutional innovations deployed by a reformist white settler government in Southern Rhodesia in response to the emergence of the African nationalist movement. Despite its usage with a highly restrictive franchise, the system delivered a preference transfer-dependent victory for a centrist government that aimed to accommodate African political aspirations in 1958. Yet that outcome was not repeated in 1962 or 1965, when Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front instead obtained office, declared independence from the United Kingdom and – once freed of restraints from London – dismantled electoral devices aimed at encouraging inter-communal vote transfers. This article examines the debates about Southern Rhodesian electoral reform in the late 1950s and early 1960s, explores the working of accommodation-oriented devices at the elections of 1958, 1962 and 1965, and contests whether viable political settlements can be assembled in such contexts simply by institutional reform aimed at encouraging 'moderation'.