I provide a full characterization of the quality choice in duopolies with vertical differentiation, without assuming ex-ante if the market is fully covered or not. This will allow to show that covered or uncovered market configurations are endogenous outcomes of firms' strategic interaction. To this purpose, I assume that firms are characterized by quadratic fixed costs of quality improvements and check whether pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with a corner solution always exist. Finally, my results are compared to the quality choice that maximizes the total surplus of the economy. I show that the welfare-maximizing choice of qualities does not have to be found in the same market configuration of the corresponding market equilibrium.
By raising the question on what made geopolitical equilibrium a tool for understanding international politics, the article discusses differences between classical and modern balance of power, and between balance of power and geopolitical equilibrium. The principal argument is that geopolitical equilibrium is, in scope, global. The second claim about the nature of geopolitical equilibrium concerns modern territoriality. Geopolitical equilibrium bases on occurrence of central powers in global politics, not on modern inter-state relations; therefore, it represents the tendency to stability in a pluralistic world-system. As a result, geopolitics remains a realistic alternative to cosmopolitism for understanding social order in global age. Adapted from the source document.
We work with a newly developed method to empirically assess whether a specified new-Keynesian business cycle monetary model estimated with U.S. quarterly data is consistent with a unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria under rational expectations. We conduct classical tests to verify if the structural model is correctly specified. Conditional on a positive answer, we formally assess if such model is either consistent with a unique equilibrium or with indeterminacy. Importantly, our full-system approach requires neither the use of prior distributions nor that of nonstandard inference. The case of an indeterminate equilibrium in the pre-1984 sample and of a determinate equilibrium in the post-1984 sample is favored by the data. The long-run coefficients on inflation and the output gap in the monetary policy rule are found to be weakly identified. However, our results are further supported by a proposed identification-robust indicator of indeterminacy.
This work extends the analysis of time inconsistency in monetary policy to the case of serial correlation in the level of production. In the one-shot discretionary equilibrium Inflation is higher than in the Barro-Gordon case. Over an infinite horizon, output persistence makes the conditions for a reputational equilibrium more likely to be met.
This work extends the analysis of time inconsistency in monetary policy to the case of serial correlation in the level of production. In the one-shot discretionary equilibrium Inflation is higher than in the Barro-Gordon case. Over an infinite horizon, output persistence makes the conditions for a reputational equilibrium more likely to be met.
After defining deliberation as a form of public discussion central to the functioning of deliberative democracy, E. Noelle-Neumann's (1984) theory of the spiral of silence is outlined & applied in modeling deliberation processes. A formal model of public deliberation is elaborated & tested on two hypothetical groups defending & advancing arguments in support of their political/ideological viewpoint. Statistical formulas for computing the probabilistic distribution of motivations to speak out are developed, & monological & pluralistic equilibriums are described as stable & unstable, respectively; the motivational transformations necessary to produce a stable pluralistic equilibrium are considered & several such outcomes are modeled. The theoretical & applicational aspects of the model proposed are discussed, outlining three strategies, & their underlying procedural rules, leading to a stable equilibrium in a multilateral exchange of views & arguments during deliberation. Figures, References. Z. Dubiel
Negli ultimi anni molte città europee hanno introdotto politiche di tariffazione come strumento di gestione della domanda di trasporto, in particolare per ridurre la congestione e riequilibrare la ripartizione modale tra trasporto individuale e collettivo. Infatti, il comportamento degli utenti conduce il sistema ad una condizione di Equilibrio dell'Utente (User Equilibrium) che non corrisponde alla massimizzazione dell'utilità globale e non prende in considerazione i costi esterni. Pertanto, al fine di raggiungere una configurazione efficiente nell'utilizzo dei sistemi di trasporto (indicata in letteratura come Equilibrio del Sistema – System Equilibrium), è necessario imporre una tariffazione sulle strade urbane in modo da massimizzare il surplus sociale. Per numerose ragioni (teoriche, politiche, sociali) è impossibile applicare "tariffe efficienti" (indicate in letteratura come first-best solutions); perciò sulle reti reali bisogna applicare tariffe sub-ottimali (second-best solutions). Inoltre, una delle problematiche principali dell'applicazione delle politiche di pricing è la loro "accettazione" da parte della comunità e/o di sue componenti (commercianti, residenti, pendolari, ecc.) che conduce a conflitti ed opposizioni.In questa nota, si analizza il problema del progetto delle tariffe ottimali nel caso in cui i ricavi siano investiti totalmente o parzialmente per migliorare il trasporto collettivo. In particolare, si formula un modello che sia multimodale e multiutente, in cui gli aspetti relativi alla scelta modale siano calcolati in maniera esplicita su rete in corrispondenza di ciascuna configurazione tariffaria. Il modello è applicato ad una rete test (costruita con differenti valori di accessibilità relativa tra le differenti zone), analizzando alcune strategie "second-best" con particolare riferimento al reinvestimento dei ricavi. ; In recent years several European cities have introduced pricing policies as a tool for managing transport demand, especially to reduce traffic congestion and rebalance the modal split between private vehicles and mass-transit systems. Indeed, user behaviour brings about a User Equilibrium condition which does not correspond to overall utility maximisation and fails to take account of external costs. Hence, in order to achieve the efficient use of transportation systems (System Equilibrium), tolls can be charged on urban roads so that the social surplus is maximised. For several reasons (theoretical, political, social acceptability) it is impossible to charge "efficient tolls" (first-best solutions) proposed in the literature; therefore in real networks sub-optimal tolls (second-best solutions) are applied. Moreover, one of the main problems related to pricing policy application is their acceptability among community and/or social categories (such as shopkeepers, residents, commuters, etc.) leading to conflicts and oppositions.In this paper we analyse the effects on optimal fare design when pricing revenues are wholly or partly used for improving public transport. In particular, we formulate a model according to economic theory in a multimodal and multiuser context, where multimodal features are calculated explicitly on the network for each fare configuration. The model is applied on a trial network (built with heterogeneous values of relative accessibility among different traffic zones) and several second-best strategies are analysed with particular attention to the use of pricing revenue.
Negli ultimi anni molte città europee hanno introdotto politiche di tariffazione come strumento di gestione della domanda di trasporto, in particolare per ridurre la congestione e riequilibrare la ripartizione modale tra trasporto individuale e collettivo. Infatti, il comportamento degli utenti conduce il sistema ad una condizione di Equilibrio dell'Utente (User Equilibrium) che non corrisponde alla massimizzazione dell'utilità globale e non prende in considerazione i costi esterni. Pertanto, al fine di raggiungere una configurazione efficiente nell'utilizzo dei sistemi di trasporto (indicata in letteratura come Equilibrio del Sistema – System Equilibrium), è necessario imporre una tariffazione sulle strade urbane in modo da massimizzare il surplus sociale. Per numerose ragioni (teoriche, politiche, sociali) è impossibile applicare "tariffe efficienti" (indicate in letteratura come first-best solutions); perciò sulle reti reali bisogna applicare tariffe sub-ottimali (second-best solutions). Inoltre, una delle problematiche principali dell'applicazione delle politiche di pricing è la loro "accettazione" da parte della comunità e/o di sue componenti (commercianti, residenti, pendolari, ecc.) che conduce a conflitti ed opposizioni.In questa nota, si analizza il problema del progetto delle tariffe ottimali nel caso in cui i ricavi siano investiti totalmente o parzialmente per migliorare il trasporto collettivo. In particolare, si formula un modello che sia multimodale e multiutente, in cui gli aspetti relativi alla scelta modale siano calcolati in maniera esplicita su rete in corrispondenza di ciascuna configurazione tariffaria. Il modello è applicato ad una rete test (costruita con differenti valori di accessibilità relativa tra le differenti zone), analizzando alcune strategie "second-best" con particolare riferimento al reinvestimento dei ricavi. ; In recent years several European cities have introduced pricing policies as a tool for managing transport demand, especially to reduce traffic congestion and rebalance the modal split between private vehicles and mass-transit systems. Indeed, user behaviour brings about a User Equilibrium condition which does not correspond to overall utility maximisation and fails to take account of external costs. Hence, in order to achieve the efficient use of transportation systems (System Equilibrium), tolls can be charged on urban roads so that the social surplus is maximised. For several reasons (theoretical, political, social acceptability) it is impossible to charge "efficient tolls" (first-best solutions) proposed in the literature; therefore in real networks sub-optimal tolls (second-best solutions) are applied. Moreover, one of the main problems related to pricing policy application is their acceptability among community and/or social categories (such as shopkeepers, residents, commuters, etc.) leading to conflicts and oppositions.In this paper we analyse the effects on optimal fare design when pricing revenues are wholly or partly used for improving public transport. In particular, we formulate a model according to economic theory in a multimodal and multiuser context, where multimodal features are calculated explicitly on the network for each fare configuration. The model is applied on a trial network (built with heterogeneous values of relative accessibility among different traffic zones) and several second-best strategies are analysed with particular attention to the use of pricing revenue.
The present work attempts to provide a more realistic description of international labour migration within a simple core-periphery model à-la Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). The choice of this benchmark model is motivated by the key role it plays in the most recent and sophisticated dynamic spatial general equilibrium model, such as the Regional Holistic model (RHOMOLO) model developed by the European Commission (EC) for simulating policy scenario related to the European Union (EU) cohesion policies and for evaluating its implications on the economies of the Member States of the Union. The first part of the work consists in a concise review of the relevant international trade theories and the main international migration theories. In the second part, after a concise description of the simple 2-region core-periphery model developed by Fujita et al. (1999), the migration law à-la Krugman (1991a) is modified to include other drivers, such as political instability and climate change in the less developed country. In the last part, the evolution of the key endogenous variables of the model will be simulated and some policy implications of the model will be discussed. This work shows that, although it has been used the simplest (and less complete) baseline model, the introduction of the sociopolitical and the environmental driver for international migration plays a key role in the dynamic spatial general equilibrium approach.
Illusory Ambitions of Mediterranean Domination of Fascist Italy Abstract: In 1918, Italy acquired real influence in the Danube region and Balkans. The news of an aggressive rearmament by Nazi Germany from 1934 onwards forced Mussolini to seek military agreements in France, Britain, Czechoslovakia, and Poland in order to thwart Hitler's expansionist ambitions while also maintaining an anti-Soviet equilibrium on the European continent. However, when France and Britain imposed sanctions in response to Fascist Italy's policy of expansion into Ethiopia, Mussolini was forced to turn to Hitler, embarking upon an alliance with the superior industrial and organisational power of the Third Reich.
In France, in the 18th century, forward contracts prevailed as the preferred instrument for deferred buying or selling of Government bonds. These business transactions, however, were viewed by legislators and certain parts of society with hostility. When the Napoleonic codification was subsequently introduced, this only partially modified the existing equilibrium. It was, therefore, more 'thanks' to jurisprudence in the 1830s, supported by the juridical science of the time, that contracts for differences – "marchés à terme fictif" – gradually achieved legal status. A review and analysis of the genesis of speculation in stock markets will be presented in this paper.
In recent years several European cities (such as London, Stockholm and Milan) have introduced pricing policies as a tool for managing transport demand, especially to yield a temporal, spatial and modal redistribution of travel, and particularly rebalance the modal split between private vehicles and mass-transit systems. Indeed, the interaction between user behaviours (whose choices are affected by transportation network performances) and transportation networks (whose performances are depending on the number of travelling users/vehicles) brings the system about a condition, defined in the literature as User Equilibrium, which does not correspond to overall utility maximisation and fails to take account of external costs. The discrepancy between the User Equilibrium condition and the efficient use of transportation systems (condition indicated in the literature as System Equilibrium) comes from user behaviour in making mobility choices: an additional user, entering a traffic flow, considers a travel cost that does not include the cost increase imposed on the other travellers in the network. In other words, travellers try to maximise their own utility or private benefits instead of considering social welfare. It is shown that efficient transportation system use can be achieved by charging 'efficient tolls' on network links. The optimal situation can be reached by the imposition of a tax (or toll) that will reconcile the private cost and the social cost. These tolls, called Marginal Social Cost Pricing (MSCP) tolls, are equal to negative externalities (such as congestion cost, travel delays, air pollution, accidents) imposed on other travellers by an additional user and are one of the most popular tools for pricing applications. For several reasons (theoretical, political, social acceptability) it is impossible to charge "efficient tolls" (first-best solutions) proposed in the literature; therefore in real networks sub-optimal tolls (second-best solutions) are applied. Moreover, one of the main problems related to pricing policy application is their acceptability among community and/or social categories (such as shopkeepers, residents, commuters, etc.) leading to conflicts and oppositions. In this paper we analyse the effects on optimal fare design when pricing revenues are wholly or partly used for improving public transport. In particular, we formulate a toll computation model through a multidimensional constrained optimisation problem according to economic theory in a multimodal and multiuser context, where multimodal features are calculated explicitly on the network for each fare configuration. The model is then applied on a trial network (built with heterogeneous values of relative accessibility among different traffic zones) and several secondbest strategies are analysed with particular attention to possible effects of road pricing revenue use on social welfare and fare levels.
Constitutions "born of sufferings," like that of the Italian Republic, represent a unique case among the array of present day liberal democratic constitutions. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Italian Constituent Assembly (elected on 2 June 1946), the author recalls the most significant phases in the discussion leading to the drawing up of the Constitution by means of which a virtuous compromise was reached between the various parties, despite the great political & ideological divisions of the time. This "constitutional patriotism" (which similarly emerged in the constitutive process in the United States in 1787) produced a Charter which the members (including those declaring themselves to be of a "secular" orientation) called "sacred." From the methodological point of view, this sacredness is expressed in a wise equilibrium between the principle of sovereignty and the principle of cohesion. It is wise to respect such an equilibrium, because it safeguards future generations against the terrible sufferings that gave rise in the first place to the republican form of the state & to the unifying values of the Constitution. The Constitution is certainly not immutable. It can & should be updated in accordance with new requirements of communal life. But -- as the American experience teaches us -- the best course is the prudent one of precise amendments (on which it is easiest to achieve a wide consensus reaching beyond the confines of a momentary majority). Grand constitutional reforms, n the other hand, run the risk of irreversibly altering the DNA of the Constitution & abandoning its function of guaranteeing the continuity & unity of the nation. Constitutional norms are updated by the Constitutional Court, whose jurisprudence gives daily voice to the Constitution. Adapted from the source document.
Venice's reconquest of Marano in 1542 was a key moment in the history of the Republic. The fortress of Marano was in fact at the top of its glory between the XV and XVI century, when it was contested between Austria and Venice. When it fell in the hands of Austria in 1513, Venice tried to reconquest it with every possible means. After years of unsuccessful attempts, the feat was carried out by Beltrame Sacchia, an ambitious and adventurous merchant from Udine, who occupied the fortress in 1542 in name of the King of France. This article analyses the repercussions of Marano's reconquest on European political equilibrium. What happened on the morning of January 2, 1542, as well as making a turning point in the boundary dynamics between Venice and the Austrian, deeply damaged the diplomatic relations between the main powers of Europe: the Venetian Republic, France, the Empire and the Ottomans. ; Venice's reconquest of Marano in 1542 was a key moment in the history of the Republic. The fortress of Marano was in fact at the top of its glory between the XV and XVI century, when it was contested between Austria and Venice. When it fell in the hands of Austria in 1513, Venice tried to reconquest it with every possible means. After years of unsuccessful attempts, the feat was carried out by Beltrame Sacchia, an ambitious and adventurous merchant from Udine, who occupied the fortress in 1542 in name of the King of France. This article analyses the repercussions of Marano's reconquest on European political equilibrium. What happened on the morning of January 2, 1542, as well as making a turning point in the boundary dynamics between Venice and the Austrian, deeply damaged the diplomatic relations between the main powers of Europe: the Venetian Republic, France, the Empire and the Ottomans.
