This paper examines some of the main assumptions on which the IR theory of political realism is based. According to the theory of political realism, national interest and not morality is the main criterion by which the state acts in its foreign affairs. In its first part this article examines three arguments in support of realists' skepticism towards morality in international relations. In the second part the concept of national interest and the possibility of its application as the main criterion in choosing the state action in international relations are examined. The author argues that the only plausible version of morality is universal morality based on respect for fundamental human rights. Realists' view of morality at the international level cannot be defended in a convincing manner. Still, the theory of political realism provides valuable insights about the nature of international morality and the limits of its application. Adapted from the source document.
The debate on this topic began in the 1950s in the texts by Patrick Devlin. Devlin argued that for the sake of its stability the community has the right to impose moral standards by means of law in relation to those actions that breed intolerance, anger & disgust. Devlin's arguments are challenged on several grounds. First, Hart's argument is accepted, that there is no direct connection between such moral attitudes & the stability of a community. Second, Devlin's foundations of morality are rejected. & finally, an alternative model of the stability of community is taken over from Rawls' social contract theory. References. Adapted from the source document.
The author's starting point is Locke's classical thesis that the rulers & the ruled are subject to universal laws & that their abuses are prevented by the institutional means of power sharing. The rule according to which nobody can be a judge in their own affairs unconditionally applies in all court or administrative proceedings. The problem arises when this legal thinking is applied to parliaments. Namely, in parliamentary work the incompatibility of the mandates of the legislative & the executive branch is annulled since the executive power gains the upper hand in the composition & substance of the legislature. Besides, The basic law (Grundgesetz) provides MPs with indemnity in their voting behavior & guarantees to them immunity from punishment for certain acts that other citizens would not be able to get away with. This relative freedom & independence of MPs is corrected by the rule books on the behavior of MPs that envision the necessity of their ethical conduct. The violations of the rules are sanctioned not so much by moderatorial law as by political means. The author's opinion is that deciding on their own affairs cannot be universally granted to parliaments. Constitutions allow, even call for, certain decisions on one's own affairs to be made. However, due to insufficient outside control, self-control must be increased, which implies legal obedience on the part of MPs so that laws become meaningful for all participants. Besides the ethical & political pressures that force the MPs to behave in a law-abiding manner, laws also exert positive pressure on them to see to it that their decisions serve the public good. Adapted from the source document.
A revised translation of an article originally published as "Der ambivalente Liberalismus. Oder: Was halt die liberale Demokratie zusammen?" Zeitschrift fur Politik (42 [1995] 3, 250-267). A few years after the collapse of communist regimes, it is evident that the confidence about the ultimate triumph of liberal democracy was premature. This waking up to reality is not only the consequence of the hardships in the transformation of postcommunist societies, but of the intellectual skepticism regarding the normative potential of liberal democracy in the developed Western societies. The problem might in most general terms be formulated as the incapacity of liberal democracy to generate & reproduce the normative requirements for its own survival. The author thinks that the solution to this paradox can nevertheless be found within the institutional framework of liberal democracy: if the traditional moral concepts on which liberal democracy was founded in the past are worn out indeed, & no civil-religious substitute for that tradition has emerged as yet, then its only possibility is to create its own, modern or postmodern, morality by means of the public discourse mechanisms & the political participation of citizens. The normative dimension of liberalism must not be reduced to the theory of private ownership, market, & competition, but be envisaged as a constitutional theory of human rights & restricted government & the egalitarian distribution of goods & opportunities. Adapted from the source document.
In the wake of the 'Kant revival,' which has spawned a plethora of works on his philosophy by its contemporary interpreters & advocates such as Herbert Schnadelbach, Hans Lenk, Konrad Cramer, Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Volker Gerhardt, Karl-Otto Apel, Otfried Hoffe & others (whose studies were published this year under the title of Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne), the author tries to prove, by means of an analysis of Kant's treatise Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis, that not only did Kant in his later works draft & expound the program of a practical philosophy of morality & right, politics, & history, but also that in the last three chapters of this work, this philosophy evolves into a modern liberal theory of morality, state law, & international or "international civil" law built around the central principle of Kant's practical philosophy: "Was aus Vernunftgrunden fur die Theorie gilt, das gilt auch fur die Praxis.". Adapted from the source document.
Kant's philosophy in its entirety outgrew its Humeist heritage of rational empiricism, ie, relativism. This relativism is particularly unwelcome in the realm of morality -- hence his philosophy of a priori concepts. Since law, as the minimum of morality, would be invalidated by the political (value) relativism, Kant has no politics apart from law -- specifically civil, Roman law -- which he declares natural (& absolutely rational). Roman private legal principles are the axiomatic foundations on which a structure of deductional theorems of political reasoning is erected. Ubi ius ibi remedium is the central principle, which serves to deny & circumvent rights -- including the right to revolt -- that would make up a set of political supra "rights." In the age of enlightened absolutism -- a schematic derivative of the philosophy of rationalism -- government ceased to be diffuse. Its bearers became too unequivocal, & the whole system turned into a highly visible & assailable target. For Kant (as well as for Hobbes), anarchy is the worst form of tyranny. While Montesquieu & Rousseau sought refuge from tyranny in the diffusion of power, & Raynal & Mably claimed that the right to resist oppression is not only the ultimate remedium but a civil duty, Kant (long before the French revolution & Burke) considers as nonpermissible not only the right to resist oppression but also that against revolutions instigated by legitimate sovereigns. Adapted from the source document.
In this paper, the author focuses on the work of Bernard Mandeville as predecessor of Scottish Enlightenment and liberal tradition of thought. Starting from the social, political and economic context of the all-embracing crisis of the society in transition of his time, special attention is devoted to his moral, social and economic views based on methodological individualism. The author argues that Mandeville's controversial thought resists one-sided labeling and unambiguous fitting into mutually opposed camps of mercantilism and market liberalism, i.e. constructivism and evolutionism. This is the reason behind the variety of interpretations, and sometimes even completely opposite readings of his work. He was a satirist, social critic, physician, philosopher and economist, who effectuated a shift and a turn with regard to the habitual perceptions of the age in all those segments of his reflection and activity, and he launched a sort of "revolution in thought", which will be given its definitive formulation and elaboration in the second half of the 18th century by the Scottish moral philosophers. The author concludes that Mandeville was, first and foremost, a man of his time and responded to the acute problems of his age. It would thus be inappropriate and wrong to apply his ideas from the beginning of the 18th century to the present time with a clearer precising of intellectual and political projects, and declare him either a mercantilist or an interventionist, or else an advocate of laissez-faire. Nonetheless, Mandeville came up with answers that would later be incorporated in the liberal tradition. One may therefore say that he greatly influenced the Scottish Enlightenment and contributed to the birth of liberalism, although he was not a consistent economic liberal himself, of the type that was familiar to the late 18th century. Adapted from the source document.
As opposed to philosophy, theology and natural sciences, for which only the singular Man exists, for political theory the decisive fact is the plurality of men. Politics is preoccupied with common and mutual being of different men. It is created among men and established as their connectedness. Freedom exists only in the authentic interspace of politics. We are saved from that freedom in the "necessity of history", which is a revolting absurdity. When one wishes in our time to speak about politics, one must start with the prejudice towards it. The prejudice accurately reflect the truly existing contemporary situation precisely in its political aspects, and suggest that we have ended up in a situation in which we do not quite or do not yet know how to move politically. The prejudice towards politics are manifest in the notion that national politics is made up of lies and deception by corrupt interests and corrupt ideology, while foreign politics hovers between hollow propaganda and brute force. This causes a flight into powerlessness, a desperate desire for men in general to be deprived of the freedom to act. Politics is, always and everywhere, preoccupied with illuminating and dissolving prejudice. If one wishes to dissolve prejudice, one must first discover the past judgment contained therein, i.e. actually show their contents of truth. This is the task of the faculty of judgment, but not as mere capability to subject the individual regularly and adequately to the general that corresponds to it and regarding which there is agreement, but as judgment directly and with no standard. The loss of standard, which truly determines the modern world in its facticity and cannot be annulled by any return to the good, old tradition or any arbitrary setting up of new values and standards, is therefore a catastrophe of the moral world only if one presupposes that men would in fact be completely unable to judge things in and of themselves, and that their faculty of judgment is insufficient for original judgment. Politics is always centered on care for the world organized in this or some different way, without which those who care and who are political, think that life is not worth living. Where men come together, the world always breaks through between them, and all human actions take place in this interspace. Adapted from the source document.
The author looks into Scheler's philosophy of war as stated in his work The Genius of War. In the context of Germany during World War One, Scheler polemicized with various interpretations of the essence & the nature of war, particularly with those that reduce wars to economic or sociological roots, & claimed that the spiritual drive behind the "real" war was only to increase power. The war for him is part of the human nature, but not as a mere struggle for survival but as the struggle for power that maximally exalts, expands & deepens the common & indivisible values of our moral consciousness. The author argues that Scheler's intention is to glorify war, counter to Kant's universalism & rationalism. He is particularly dismissive of Kant's idea of "eternal peace" & all that is linked with cosmopolitanism & pacifism. The author concludes that Scheler's philosophy is self-delusional. References. Adapted from the source document.
A number of interpreters & critics have often complained that Rawls's concept of the individual contains an element of schizophrenia. How is it possible that privately a person is a staunch believer in a moral doctrine, while publicly adopting the principles of political liberalism? The author tries to show how Rawls's concept of the overlapping consensus might avoid this objection. The paper brings two major critiques of Rawls's overlapping consensus: Gray's & Barry's. John Gray claims that the very pursuit of such a consensus is illusory; instead, he advocates a modus vivendi. According to him, the consensus promoted by Rawls is unfeasible even in the US due to the emergence of the so-called "moral majority," & the fact that a huge portion of the population practices rather bigoted variants of Christianity. Brian Barry criticizes Rawls because of his renunciation of his original position, which is apparent in his problematic search for the support from comprehensive doctrines. This maneuver is ill-advised, as it is hard to believe that those citizens who are ardent partisans of a comprehensive doctrine might simply "graft" political liberalism upon it & then, in case of a conflict between their concepts of the good & the justice that political liberalism requires, accept the primacy of justice. The author claims that these criticisms could not be refuted had Rawls believed that the overlapping consensus might be realized in the near future. Rawls, however, is not unrealistic; he only provides arguments why such a consensus might be possible. Rawls finds the grounds for his optimism in the belief that just institutions drastically advance the sense of justice. This means that those who would in the future embrace the overlapping consensus would not have to be schizophrenic after all. 6 References. Adapted from the source document.
The author analyzes the reinterpretation of the 17th-century English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) offered by contemporary American philosopher Gregory S. Kavka. The state of nature, the social contract (pact), the forming of the very first state, & the problem of compliance to its newly formed government are discussed. The question arises of how it is possible to make a social contract because it is still a "state of nature contract," & in these conditions, contracts do not oblige adherence while there is yet no one to punish rebellion or disobedience. (Rather, the state should be a result of that contract.) Another question concerns the possibility of establishing morality in the state of nature, because no authority is formed there, & therefore a moral code & positive law system are nonexistent. The author claims (together with Kavka) that, in spite of the fact that there exists no entire moral code, the possibility of elemental traces of morality exists, because morality & nature (from humanistic outlook) are timeless, as is the state of nature as well. 4 References. Adapted from the source document.
Democracy, as the government of the people by the people, is an inadequately defined notion, giving room for rival concepts of democracy: liberal, socialist, & Christian. The distinguishing features of the Christian outlook are respect for other human beings, the demand for individual involvement in politics, & the government's duty to look after everyone's well-being. The author points to the fact that Christian democracy, with its highlighted moral component of politics, was particularly attractive for the countries that went through fascist totalitarianism. Although the standards of the grand Christian precept of altruism have not been met in social & political life, the author concludes that today's global challenges reemphasize the relevance of the gospel message. Adapted from the source document.
Democracy, as the government of the people by the people, is an inadequately defined notion, giving room for rival concepts of democracy: liberal, socialist, & Christian. The distinguishing features of the Christian outlook are respect for other human beings, the demand for individual involvement in politics, & the government's duty to look after everyone's well-being. The author points to the fact that Christian democracy, with its highlighted moral component of politics, was particularly attractive for the countries that went through fascist totalitarianism. Although the standards of the grand Christian precept of altruism have not been met in social & political life, the author concludes that today's global challenges reemphasize the relevance of the gospel message. Adapted from the source document.
