Suchergebnisse

'Conventional' models of how the field of international political economy should engage with ethics have proposed or assumed the normative primacy of ethical principles and often sought to add reliable empirical economic analysis so that political perspectives on economic systems, institutions and practices can result. James Brassett and Christopher Holmes (2010) have criticized such approaches for overlooking the potentially violent character of ethics as a constitu- tive discourse like any other. The present article defends the conventional method against Brassett and Holmes's critique. Focusing especially on Thomas Pogge's ethics of world poverty as Brassett and Holmes's main conventionalist target, the article argues that: (i) Brassett and Holme s's understanding of 'ethics' is seriously inadequate; (ii) Pogge's 'negative duty not to harm' principle should be maintained against Brassett and Holmes's troublingly 'political' account and facile relativist critique of Pogge's ethics; (iii) Brassett and Holmes, while conceivably critical of Pogge's global level reformist solution as superficially 'neo liberal', cannot see that their own arguably valuable proposal of radical local forms of 'resistance' can coherently complete Pogge's poverty ethics and thus confirms, rather than undermines, the conventional method. Ultimately, Brassett and Holmes's post structural attempt risks being 'violent' itself for implying a renewed international moral skepticism.

""Preface ""; ""References ""; ""List Of Contributors ""; ""1. An Introduction To Aspasius ""; ""2. Aspasian Lemmatology ""; ""3. Aspasius On Eudaimonia ""; ""4. Aspasius On Emotion ""; ""5. Il Volontario E La Scelta In Aspasio ""; ""6. Aspasius On Perfect And Imperfect Virtues ""; ""7. Aspasius On Akrasia ""; ""8. Amicizia E Â"Focal MeaningÂ" ""; ""Bibliography On Aspasius ""; ""Index Of Passages Cited ""; ""General Index ""

Affectivity – especially the emotions – are proved to be a key-point of ethical formation. This book aims at clarifying which thesis the neo-aristotelian Virtue Ethics hold about emotion education, by integrating philosophy of education, philosophy of emotions and moral epistemology. Virtue Ethics, compared to deontology and utilitarianism-consequentialism, offers the more appropriate framework to conceive the relations between education, emotions and ethics. The volume discusses cognitive-evaluative theories of emotions and address the anti-rationalist challenge, based on empirical evidence about how emotions impact on moral judgments. Anti-rationalism, it is argued, is incompatible with the purpose of shaping the emotions looking at our best moral reasons. Then, two Aristotelian educational theses are put forward: all the emotional dispositions – both 'positive' and 'negative' – should be cultivated, and all the emotional dispositions admit an appropriate moral form.

The convergences of Giacomo Leopardi, Simone Weil and Rachel Bespaloff in reading the Iliad are impressive. This holds not only as regards the meaning and value of the poem but also concerning the almost equal interpretation of fundamental passages and the use of expressions that sometimes coincide literally. These convergences open up to a both original and originary ethical dimension, a dimension that allows us to think about ourselves in a condition of radical equality. We are thus dealing with an ethics that precedes morality, law, politics and cultures, an ethics originating from the recognition of the condition of dependence: yesterday from the fatum, today from our biological constitution and the complex of social relations. Such an ethics reaches its goal in the compassion as well as in the awareness that the liberation process must take on this ethical perspective. Keywords: Homer, Ethics, Cosmos, Fatum, Violence