Dobro mentalno zdravlje sastavni je dio općeg zdravlja populacije i dobrobiti te pridonosi kvaliteti funkcioniranja pojedinaca, obitelji i zajednica. U novijim se dokumentima Europske unije na mentalno zdravlje gleda kao na preduvjet socijalnog i ekonomskog razvoja nekog društva. Sukladno tome, uloga je donositelja odluka i odgovornost raznih pomažućih profesija da djeluju na socijalne determinante koje utječu na mentalno zdravlje građana. Cilj je ovoga rada predstaviti suvremeno interdisciplinarno područje promocije mentalnog zdravlja te ponuditi prikaz literature o promociji mentalnog zdravlja, polazeći od povijesnog razvoja područja, temeljnih koncepata pa do preporuka za kreiranje programa. Rad rasvjetljava razlike i preklapanja područja promocije mentalnog zdravlja i prevencije mentalnih poremećaja. Promocija je usmjerena na pozitivno mentalno zdravlje, a njezin je glavni cilj jačanje snaga i kompetencija, dok je prevencija usredotočena na smanjivanje rizičnih čimbenika te specifične poremećaje, a cilj joj je smanjiti učestalost, rasprostranjenost i ozbiljnost određenih problema. S obzirom na recentne međunarodne preporuke koje govore da bi se mentalnim zdravljem trebale baviti svi sektori te razne socijalne politike, a ne samo zdravstveni sustav, rad donosi temeljne modele kako bi se pridonijelo istoznačnom razumijevanju pojmova kod različitih pomažućih profesija. Promocija mentalnog zdravlja, koja je multisektorska, obuhvaća aktivnosti i programe za podršku roditeljstvu, za djecu i mlade u obrazovnom sustavu, za područje socijalne i zdravstvene skrbi, kvalitetu života u zajednici i na radnom mjestu. Kako je riječ o interdisciplinarnom području, radom se želi utjecati na znanstveno-stručnu raspravu srodnih disciplina. ; AbstractGood mental health is an integral part of population's general health and well-being that contributes to the quality of functioning of individuals, families and communities. In newer European Union documents, mental health is perceived as a prerequisite for the social and economic growth of each society. According to that, the role of the decision makers and the responsibility of various helping professions is to act towards social determinants which influence mental health.The aim of this paper is to present modern interdisciplinary area of mental health promotion through the review of the literature, starting from the historical development of the area, basic concepts and guidelines for program development. The paper highlights the differences between mental health promotion and prevention of mental disorders. Promotion is connected with positive mental health, and its main goal is strengthening protective factors and competencies. Prevention, on the other hand, aims to reduce risk factors and specific disorders to diminish incidence, prevalence, and seriousness of problems.Regarding recent international developments, which state that mental health should concern various sectors and social policies, not just health sector, this paper brings basic models to contribute to the mutual understanding of the terminology within different professions. Multi-sectoral mental health promotion involves activities and programs for supporting parenthood, and children and youth in the education system, while the area of social welfare and healthcare concerns with the quality of life in a community and within a work place settings. Regarding the interdisciplinary nature of the area, this paper wants to contribute to the scientific and professional discussion of various disciplines which are included. ; Buena salud mental forma parte de la salud general de una populación y del bienestar. Además, contribuye a la calidad del funcionamiento de individuos, familias y comunidades. En los documentos recientes de la Unión Europea la salud mental se considera un requisito previo del desarrollo social y económico de una sociedad. En consecuencia, el papel del tomador de decisiones y la responsabilidad de diferentes profesiones ayudantes es influir en las determinantes sociales que influyen en la salud mental de los ciudadanos. El objetivo de este artículo de revisión es presentar el área interdisciplinaria contemporánea de la promoción de la salud mental y presentar la bibliografía que abarca dicho tema, partiendo del desarrollo histórico y conceptos básicos, hasta llegar a las recomendaciones para crear un programa. El trabajo aclara las diferencias y puntos comunes de las áreas de la promoción de la salud mental y la prevención de trastornos mentales. La promoción está enfocada en la salud mental positiva, y su objetivo principal es fortalecer el poder y las competencias, mientras que la prevención se enfoca en disminuir los factores de riesgo y trastornos específicos, y su objetivo es disminuir la frecuencia, difusión y severidad de ciertos problemas. Como las recomendaciones internacionales recientes afirman que a la salud mental deberían dedicarse todos los sectores y diferentes políticas sociales, y no sólo el sistema sanitario, el trabajo expone los modeles básicos para contribuir a la comprensión idéntica de los términos usados por diferentes profesiones ayudantes. La promoción de la salud mental es multisectorial y abarca actividades y programas para apoyar a los padres, niños y jóvenes en el sistema educativo, para la asistencia social y sanitaria, calidad de la vida, tanto en la comunidad, como en el puesto de trabajo. Como se trata de un área interdisciplinaria, con este trabajo se quiere influir en el debate científico de disciplinas relacionadas.
Based on the experience of former rightist & communist dictatorships in Europe regarding different forms of opposition -- both open & hidden within these regimes' structures -- the author analyzes the role of the opposition in the process of the sweeping democratic change that has taken the "new democracies" of Central & Eastern Europe in the direction of the state of law & civil society. His conclusion is that in today's Central European countries, political multiparty pluralism, which includes viable parliamentary opposition, was given a smooth start & has since taken root. However, in the countries with only superficial democracy & an obvious "democratic deficit" -- eg, Croatia (& Slovakia) -- parliamentary opposition plays second fiddle. The prime movers of the change -- & of the democratization as well -- are still the ruling parties (not unlike during the communist single-party regimes). Changes occur only when the ruling party or its majority opt for them, considering them the lesser of two evils, either because they are no longer satisfied with the distribution of power & goods in the status quo, or because they are aware that it cannot be maintained in its present form. This happened in the Soviet Union, first under Nikita Khruschev & then again under Mihail Gorbachev. Changes, however, when imposed from above, get out of hand & backfire against those who have set them off (as in the case of Gorbachev); what emerges is usually a compromise between the old & the emerging regime. Adapted from the source document.
Sreća, životno zadovoljstvo i druge subjektivne procjene građana o vlastitom životu i percepciji društvenih pojava danas sve više postaju nezaobilazne komponente pri praćenju društvenog razvoja, ravnopravne različitim ekonomskim pokazateljima. Cilj ovog istraživanja bio je prikazati usporedne analize nekih od parametara koji određuju kvalitetu življenja, sreću i životno zadovoljstvo u različitim zemljama Europske Unije te na temelju hrvatskih istraživanja usporediti Sjeverozapadni dio u odnosu na ostale dijelove Hrvatske. Podaci koji su korišteni za usporedne analize u EU preuzeti su iz istraživanja Eurobarometar iz 2015. godine u kojem su provedena istraživanja u 28 zemalja članica EU i nekoliko zemalja kandidata. Za usporedbe unutar Hrvatske korišteni su podaci istraživanja Pilarov barometar hrvatskog društva, koje je provedeno u proljeće 2015. godine na reprezentativnom uzorku hrvatskih građana (N=1000). Za usporedbe Sjeverozapadne u odnosu na ostale dijelove Hrvatske uzorak je podijeljen na dva dijela: (1) stanovnike Krapinsko-zagorske, Zagrebačke, Varaždinske, Međimurske i Koprivničko-križevačke županije (N=196) i (2) stanovnike ostalih dijelova Hrvatske (N=804). Statistička značajnost razlika u pojedinim parametrima računala se t-testom. Usporedbe kvalitete življenja u Hrvatskoj i zemljama članicama EU (EU28) pokazale su da građani Hrvatske procjenjuju niže od europskog prosjeka svoje životno zadovoljstvo, financijsko stanje kućanstava, općenitu kvalitetu življenja te iskazuju niže razine povjerenje u državne institucije (vlada, parlament, pravosuđe, regionalne/lokalne vlasti). Osobito su niske bile razine povjerenja u regionalne i/ili lokalne vlasti gdje je Hrvatska zauzela zadnje mjesto unutar zemalja EU28. Jedini parametar koji je bio procijenjen iznad europskog prosjeka bila su očekivanja o financijskoj situaciji u idućih godinu dana, gdje su hrvatski građani iskazali iznadprosječni optimizam. Rezultati usporedbe različitih parametara kvalitete življenja između stanovnika sjeverozapadne i ostalih dijelova Hrvatske pokazali su da su stanovnici Sjeverozapadne Hrvatske zadovoljniji svojim životom, zadovoljniji odnosima u obitelji i među prijateljima, osjećajem pripadnosti svojoj okolini i osjećajem sigurnosti u budućnosti. Također, u odnosu na ostale dijelove Hrvatske iskazali su više razine povjerenja u pravosuđe, policiju, školstvo, crkvu, zdravstvo i EU parlament. Ovakvi rezultati upućuju na zaključak da je općenita razina kvalitete življenja u nekim aspektima viša u Sjeverozapadnoj, nego u ostalim dijelovima Hrvatske. ; Together with economic indices, happiness, life satisfaction and other subjective perceptions about quality of life and various societal processes in contemporary world became unavoidable in monitoring nation's social progress. The aim of this study was to compare several parameters that determine quality of life and life satisfaction between citizens of Croatia and other countries in the European Union (EU28). The second aim was to compare within Croatia the same parameters between citizens of North-West region and the rest of Croatia. The data for comparisons between Croatia and EU28 were based on the Eurobarometer survey conducted in 2015 in all countries of EU and several candidate countries. The data for comparisons within Croatia were based on the survey Pilar's barometer of Croatian society, which was conducted in spring of 2015 on the representative sample of Croatian citizens (N=1000). For the purposes of these analyses the sample was devided into: (1) citizens of Krapina-Zagorje, Zagreb, Varaždin, Međimurje and Koprivnica-Križevci counties (N=196) and (2) citizens of the other regions of Croatia (N=804). Statistical differences were determined by t-test analyses. The comparisons of quality of liofe indices between Croatia and EU28 showed that citizens of Croatia rated their life satisfaction, financial situation in households, general quality of life and trust in various institutions (government, parliament, justice, regional/local authorities) lower than EU28 averages. Especially low citizens rated their trust in local/regional authorities, where Croatia was at the last position within EU28. The only parameter which was rated above EU28 average were expectations about financial situation in one year, where Croatian citizens showed higher optimism than EU28 average. Comparisons within Croatia showed that citizens of North-West region of Croatia expressed higher levels of life satisfaction, satisfaction with family and friends, satisfaction with their feelings of acceptance by the community and feelings of safety in the future. Besides that, citizens of North-West region of Croatia showed higher levels of trust in justice, police, education system, church, health care and EU parliament than the citizens in other regions of Croatia. These results indicate that quality of life in North-West region of Croatia is somewhat higher in several components than in other parts of Croatia.
Način funkcioniranja i prilagodba nacionalnog sustava upravljanja i provedbe instrumenata kohezijske (u nastavku: regionalne) politike Europske unije (u nastavku: EU) te, posljedično, učinkovitost toga sustava, ima presudan utjecaj na dinamiku i svrsishodnost povlačenja sredstava fondova regionalne politike EU. Uzimajući u obzir aktualnost te teme uslijed završetka proračunskog razdoblja EU, 2014. - 2020. i perspektivu novog proračunskog razdoblja EU (2021. - 2027.), doktorska disertacija izdiže se iznad vremenskih ograničenja proračunskih razdoblja jer analizira problematiku korištenja sredstava regionalne politike EU u kontekstu znanstvenog doprinosa predlaganju modela institucionalnog okruženja sustava upravljanja instrumentima (fondovima) regionalne politike EU u Hrvatskoj. U tom kontekstu, jedan od najvećih problema i izazova je činjenica da je Hrvatska zadnja država koja je postala članica EU te istovremeno i jedina koja koristi fondove regionalne politike EU samo jednu proračunsku perspektivu. Stoga je i dodatni izazov prikupiti dostatne empirijske i ekonometrijske spoznaje o funkcioniranju sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike u odabranim državama EU, a da bi zaključci bili primjenjivi na Hrvatsku. Posebna pozornost posvećena je prikazu sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike EU u državama sličnih usporednih karakteristika kao i Hrvatska, putem empirijskih spoznaja i zakonitosti, suvremenih pristupa i teorija koje pridonose rješavanju aktualnih, kompleksnih, teorijskih i praktičnih problema, a koji do sada nisu dovoljno istraženi niti prisutni u nacionalnom istraživačkom području. Rezultati organizacijske analize te analize učinkovitosti sustava upravljanja fondovima EU u odabranim državama u fokusu je istraživanja provedenog u okviru ove doktorske disertacije. Znanstveno istraživanje temelj je za davanje smjernica pri definiranju optimalnog modela sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike EU u Hrvatskoj koji, do trenutka izrade doktorske disertacije, zbog svoje nedovoljne učinkovitosti, kompleksnosti sustava donošenja odluka i svojevrsne "isprepletenosti" institucija u procesu pripreme i implementacije, negativno utječe na maksimiziranje iskorištavanja sredstava fondova regionalne politike EU. Kako bi se iz postojećih sustava upravljanja odabranih država EU empirijski mogli utvrditi ključni institucionalni čimbenici apsorpcije fondova EU, uzimaju se u obzir postojeći sustavi upravljanja. Znanstvenim istraživanjem i komparativnom analizom sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike EU u devet država središnje i istočne Europe te iskustvima funkcioniranja hrvatskog sustava, nastoji se formulirati optimalni okvir nacionalnog sustava upravljanja fondovima regionalne politike EU koji bi mogao omogućiti donošenje kvalitetnijih strateških odluka izvršnoj vlasti kako bi se isti, u što je moguće većoj mjeri, odrazio na gospodarski rast putem učinkovitosti korištenja sredstava fondova regionalne politike EU. Rezultati provedene ekonometrijske analize doprinose zaključcima koji potvrđuju da su primljene bespovratne pomoći EU dovele do povećanja gospodarskog razvoja država EU. Međutim, sama alokacija sredstava pomoći nije nužno dovela do povećanja kvalitete institucionalnog okvira te konkurentnosti analiziranih zemalja. Stoga se potvrđuje važnost uspostavljanja institucionalnog okvira upravljanja fondovima EU koji, ne samo da će dovesti do povećanja apsorpcije fondova EU, nego će unaprijediti opću djelotvornost javnog sektora te konkurentnost države. Stoga je, temeljem sustavnog i sveobuhvatnog znanstvenog istraživanja u ovoj doktorskoj disertaciji, predložen i argumentiran model institucionalnog sustava za upravljanje i provedbu instrumenata (fondova) regionalne politike EU u Hrvatskoj, a primjenjiv je u kratkom i dugom roku. ; The national system of management and implementation of the European Union (hereinafter: EU) cohesion (hereinafter: regional) policy, its manner of functioning, its adjustment and, consequently, the effectiveness of this system, has a decisive influence on the dynamics and expediency of drawing from EU regional policy funds. Considering the relevance of this topic due to the end of the European budgetary period 2014-2020, and the perspective of the new budgetary period (2021-2027), this doctoral thesis rises above the time limits of budget periods because it analyses the use of EU regional policy funds in the context of scientific contribution to a draft model of the institutional framework for managing EU regional policy instruments (funds) in Croatia. In this context, one of the biggest problems and challenges is the fact that Croatia was the last to become an EU member country and at the same time the only one that uses EU regional policy funds for only one budgetary period. Therefore, it is an additional challenge to gather enough empirical and econometric knowledge about the functioning of the EU regional policy funds management system in selected EU countries, for the conclusions to apply to Croatia. Special attention was paid to the presentation of the EU regional policy funds management systems in countries with similar characteristics comparative to Croatia, through empirical knowledge and laws, modern approaches and theories that contribute to solving current, complex, theoretical and practical problems, which have not been sufficiently researched or present in the national research area. The results of the organizational and efficiency analyses of the EU funds management system in selected countries are the focus of the research conducted within this doctoral thesis. Scientific research served as the basis for providing guidelines for defining the optimal model of the EU regional policy funds management system in Croatia, which, by the time of this analysis, due to its low efficiency, the complexity of the decision-making system and a kind of "intertwining" of institutions in the process of preparation and implementation, has failed to maximize the utilization of EU regional policy funds. To be able to empirically determine the key institutional factors for the EU funds absorption from the existing management systems of selected EU countries, the existing management systems are considered. Through scientific research and comparative analysis of the EU regional funds management system in nine Central and Eastern European countries, along with the experiences of the Croatian system, this paper aims to determine an optimal framework for a national EU regional policy fund management system that would enable the executive power to adopt better strategic decisions. The abovementioned framework should, to the greatest extent possible, stimulate economic growth through the efficient use of EU regional policy funds. The results of the conducted econometric analysis contribute to the conclusions confirming that the received EU grants have led to an increase in the economic development of EU countries. However, the allocation of funds alone did not necessarily lead to an increase in the quality of the institutional environment and the competitiveness of the countries analysed. Furthermore, it is confirmed that an institutional framework for the management of EU funds should be established, which will not only increase the absorption of EU funds but will also improve the overall efficiency of the public sector and the competitiveness of the state. Therefore, this doctoral thesis, based on systematic and comprehensive scientific research, proposes and asserts a model of an institutional system for management and implementation of instruments (funds) of EU regional policy in Croatia that is applicable in the short and long term.
Alimentarna kampilobakterioza najčešće je prijavljivana zoonoza u Europskoj uniji (EU), predstavlja jedan od vodećih javnozdravstvenih problema i uzrokuje ogromne financijske gubitke (EFSA-ECDC, 2015.). Pileće meso jedan je od najvažnijih izvora uzročnika ove bolesti u globalnim okvirima. U radu je opisana kontaminacija brojlerskih jata i pilećeg mesa bakterijama roda Campylobacter u Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH). Cilj rada bio je istražiti učestalost kontaminacije pilećih trupova uzorkovanih na liniji klanja nakon faze evisceracije kampilobakterijama. Pileći trupovi i jetra (n=84) uzorkovani su jednom mjesečno tijekom godine dana u jednoj od najsuvremenijih klaonica brojlera u BiH. S ciljem izolacije bakterija Campylobacter spp. iz svakog trupa u laboratoriju je uzet uzorak grudne musklulature, bris visceralne šupljine, kao i uzorak jetre (n=252). Onečišćenje kampilobakterijama utvrđeno je u 27,4 % (23/84) pilećih trupova, i to najčešće u pilećim prsima (19,0 %), nešto manje u visceralnoj šupljini (15,5 %), a najmanje u uzorcima pileće jetre (9,5 %). Ukupno, bakterije Campylobacter spp. izolirane su iz 37 uzoraka. Izrazita predominacija ustanovljena je za Campylobacter jejuni (91,9 %), dok je Campylobacter coli bila neznatno zastupljena (8,1 %). Rezultati ovog istraživanja podcrtavaju značaj pilećeg mesa kao potencijalnog izvora alimentarne kampilobakterioze i sugeriraju obveznu mikrobiološku kontrolu onečišćenja pilećeg mesa s bakterijama roda Campylobacter u BiH. ; Food-borne campylobacteriosis is the most frequently reported zoonosis in the European Union (EU), which represents one of the leading public health issues and causes enormous financial losses (EFSA-ECDC, 2015.). Chicken meat is one of the most important global sources of the disease. Campylobacter contaminations of broiler flocks and chicken meat in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) have been described. The aim of the study was to research the prevalence of campylobacter contamination of chicken carcasses and liver samples on slaughter line after the evisceration phase. Monthly sampling of chicken carcasses and liver was carried out along a year at one of the most recent broiler slaughterhouses in BiH (n=84). To isolate Campylobacter spp., from each carcass a deep sample of pectoral muscle, visceral cavity swab and liver (n=252) were taken. Campylobacter spp. contamination was detected in 27.4 % (23/84) of chicken carcasses. Out of the 252 analyzed samples, the most prevalent campylobacter contamination was observed in chicken breasts (19.0 %), less in visceral cavity (15.5 %), and the least in chicken liver (9.5 %). In total, Campylobacter spp. were isolated from 37 samples. C. jejuni was predominant (91.9 %), while C. coli was slightly represented (8.1 %). Results of the study underline the importance of chicken meat as a potential source of food-borne campylobacteriosis and suggest compulsory microbiological control of campylobacter contamination of chicken meat in BiH. ; Lebensmittelbedingte Infektionen durch Campylobacter sind die am häufigsten gemeldeten Zoonosen in der Europäischen Union (EU); sie zählen zu den führenden Problemen der öffentlichen Gesundheit und verursachen erhebliche finanzielle Verluste (EFSA-ECDC, 2015). Weltweit zählt Geflügelfleisch zu den wichtigsten Quellen dieser Krankheitserreger. In dieser Arbeit wurde die Kontamination von Masthähnchen und Hähnchenfleisch mit Campylobacter in Bosnien und Herzegowina beschreiben. Ziel der Studie war es, die Prävalenz der Kontamination der Hähnchenrümpfe, die auf dem Schlachtband nach der Ausweidung stichprobenartig untersucht wurden, mit Campylobacter festzustellen. In einem der modernsten Schlachthöfe in Bosnien und Herzegowina wurden ein Jahr monatliche Proben der Hähnchenrümpfe und Leber untersucht (n=84). Um die Campylobacter spp. zu isolieren, wurden aus jedem Rumpf Proben des Brustmuskels, ein Abstrich des viszeralen Hohlraums sowie eine Leberprobe (n=252) für das Labor entnommen. Die Kontamination mit Campylobacter spp. wurde bei 27,4 % (23/84) der Hähnchenrümpfe festgestellt. Unter den insgesamt 252 untersuchten Proben wurde die größte Prävalenz der Kontamination mit Campylobacter in der Hähnchenbrust (19,0 %) festgestellt, gefolgt vom viszeralen Hohlraum (15,5 %); der niedrigste Anteil wurde in der Hähnchenleber (9,5 %) festgestellt. Insgesamt wurden die Campylobacter spp. in 37 Proben isoliert. Eine ausgeprägte Prädominanz wurde bei C. jejuni (91,9 %) festgestellt, währen die C. coli nur geringfügig vertreten war (8,1 %). Die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchung unterstreichen die Relevanz von Hähnchenfleisch als potentielle Quelle der lebensmittelbedingten Infektionen mit Campylobacter und deuten auf eine unerlässliche mikrobiologische Kontrolle der Kontamination von Geflügelfleisch in Bosnien und Herzegowina durch Campylobacter hin. ; La campilobatteriosi alimentare è la zoonosi più frequentemente riscontrata nell'Unione europea (UE). Essa rappresenta uno dei problemi di salute pubblica più importanti e causa enormi perdite finanziarie (EFSA-ECDC, 2015). La carne di pollo è una delle fonti principali di questa infezione a livello globale. Nello studio è descritta la contaminazione da Campylobacter spp. delle batterie di polli da carne (i c.d. brojler) nella Bosnia ed Erzegovina (BiH). Lo studio aveva come scopo quello di accertare la prevalenza della contaminazione da Campylobacter spp. nelle carcasse di pollo campionate sulla linea di macellazione dopo la fase dell'eviscerazione. La campionatura mensile delle carcasse e dei fegati del pollo è stata compiuta durante l'arco di un anno in uno dei più moderni stabilimenti di macellazione di polli da carne della BiH (n=84). Al fine di isolare il Campylobacter spp., in laboratorio s'è provveduto a prelevare un campione della muscolatura del petto per ogni carcassa campionata, oltre a sottoporre le carcasse allo striscio della cavità viscerale ed al prelievo di un campione del fegato (n=252). La contaminazione da Campylobacter spp. è stata accertata nel 27,4 % (23/84) delle carcasse di pollo analizzate. Su un totale di 252 campioni analizzati, la massima contaminazione da Campylobacter spp. è stata riscontrata nel petto del pollo (19,0 %), un po' inferiore nella cavità viscerale (15,5 %) e minima nei campioni di fegato di pollo (9,5 %). In totale, il Campylobacter spp. è stato isolato in 37 campioni. Nei campioni contaminati è stata riscontrata la schiacciante predominanza del C. jejuni (91,9 %), mentre la presenza C. coli è stata ritenuta trascurabile (8,1 %). I risultati di questa ricerca sottolineano l'importanza della carne di pollo quale potenziale fonte della campilobatteriosi alimentare e suggeriscono la necessità di un controllo microbiologico obbligatorio per accertare la contaminazione da Campylobacter spp. della carne di pollo in BiH. ; La campilobacteriosis alimentaria es la zoonosis más común en la Union Europea (UE) y representa uno de los problemas principales de salud que causa grandes pérdidas financiales (EFSA-ECDC, 2015). La carne de pollo es uno de los causantes principales de esta enfermedad a nivel mundial. En este trabajo fue descrita la contaminación de los rebaños de los broiler y del pollo por el Campylobacter en Bosnia y Herzegovina. El objetivo de este estudio fue investigar la prevalencia de la contaminación de los abdómenes de pollo por el Campylobacter en la línea de matanza después de la fase de evisceración. Durante un año, mensualmente fueron tomadas las muestras de los abdómenes de pollo y del hígado en uno de los mataderos más modernos en Bosnia y Herzegovina (n=84). Con el fin de aislar el Campylobacter spp. de cada abdomen fueron tomadas las muestras de la musculatura pectoral, el frotis de la cavidad visceral y la muestra del hígado (n=252) en laboratorio. La contaminación por el Campylobacter spp. fue encontrada en 27,4 % (23/84) de los abdómenes de pollo. Entre 252 muestras analizadas, la prevalencia mayor de la contaminación por el Campylobacter spp. fue encontrada en la pechuga de pollo (19,0 %), menor en la cavidad visceral (15,5 %) y la menor en las muestras de hígado (9,5 %). El Campylobacter spp. fue aislado de 37 muestras en total. Prevaleció el C. jejuni (91,9 %), mientras el C. coli casi no estaba presente (8,1 %). Los resultados de esta investigación muestran la importancia del pollo como una fuente potencial de campilobacteriosis alimentaria y sugieren el control microbiológico obligatorio de la contaminación por el Campylobacter del pollo en Bosnia y Herzegovina.
Pranje novca, kao jedan od najsofisticiranijih i najtežih oblika organizovanog kriminaliteta, je i međunarodni fenomen jer se odvija i prisutan je, kako u nacionalnim tako i međunarodnim razmjerama. Međunarodni karakter odvijanja pranja novca je jedan od efikasnijih metoda da se prikrije nezakonito porijeklo novca ili bilo kojeg oblika imovine koja je proistekla izvršenjem, uglavnom, teških krivičnih djela.Problematika pranja novca je prisutna u nacionalnim i međunarodnim razmjerama i značajno je izražena u onim društvima gdje perači novca nastoje da legaliziraju kriminalom zarađenu dobit i da tu dobit infiltriraju u privredu i finansijske tokove, s ciljem da kontrolišu određene ekonomske i političke procese. Pranje novca predstavlja međunarodni zločin, zbog čega je međunarodna zajednica odlučila uspostaviti međunarodne standarde, sa zahtjevom da te standarde prihvati što veći broj zemalja svijeta. S obzirom na velike probleme i razne poteškoće na koje nailazi u borbi protiv svih oblika organizovanog kriminaliteta, kroz akcije usmjerene na same izvršioce ovih krivičnih djela, međunarodna zajednica je odlučila da svoju pažnju usmjeri na drugi moment ove borbe: novac, tj. prihod koji nastaje izvršenjem krivičnih djela organizovanog kriminaliteta. Shodno tome, međunarodna zajednica je odlučila da pokuša da udari tamo gdje će kriminalcima nanijeti najveće posljedice, tako što je preduzela velike akcije protiv pranja novca.U borbi protiv pranja novca stvoreni su čitavi institucionalni aparati; zbog njega se pišu nove i nove konvencije, direktive, preporuke; zbog njega se mora često mijenjati krivično zakonodavstvo; zbog pranja novca prestala je postojati tajnost računa I podataka banaka. Ponekad se, u toj borbi žrtvuju i osnovna ljudska prava, jer se praktično vodi rat protiv pranja novca. Obim intervencija, strategija i međunarodnih sporazuma, razrađenih da bi se prekinuli lanci pranja novca, širokog su raspona i veoma usavršeni. Pranje novca je veoma veliki biznis, koji nije lako kontrolisati putem međunarodnih sporazuma. Naravno, sve je to potrebno i neophodno, a drugo je pitanje da li sve te mjere daju uvijek očekivane rezultate tj. da li to ima za rezultat adekvatan broj pravosnažno osuđujućih presuda i adekvatan iznos oduzete imovinske koristi.U tom smislu, u radu sam istražio i dao pregled samo najvažnijih i najrelevantnijih međunarodnih organizacija i institucija u borbi protiv pranja novca kao što su: Organizacija ujedinjenih nacija, Vijeće Evrope, Financial Action Task Force – FATF, Grupa Egmont, Evropska unija, Bazelski komitet za bankarske propise i kontrolu, Međunarodni monetarni fond i Svjetska banka, s napomenom da ću šire obraditi samo neke od njih koje smatram bitnim. --- Money laundering, as one of the most sophisticated and severe forms of organized crime, has a strong international component because it occurs not only within national borders, but goes far beyond. The transnational aspect of money laundering makes it easier to prevent the true source of funds and other property derived from serious criminal activity.Therefore, the problem of money laundering is both, a national as well as an international problem. It is very common in the countries where money launderers attempt to legalize the illegal proceeds and then transfer it into the stream of commerce and finance in order to control certain economic and political processes. Money laundering is an international crime leading the international community to establish common standards that countries around the world should adopt. Having in mind the great difficulties in fighting against organized crime using the traditional methods focused upon the perpetrators, the international community decided to shift its focus towards the other important component of money laundering – the proceeds derived from criminal activity. In that sense, the international community decided to strike where the consequences for money launderers are the most prominent – the money.The prevention of money laundering lead to creation of the whole new set of institutional apparatus; many conventions have been organized, and many articles, directives, recommendations, guidelines were created. The prevention of money laundering has lead to changes in criminal code legislation and dissolution of bank information secrecy. Sometimes, however, this war on money laundering sacrifices some basic human rights. The range of strategies, interventions and international agreements developed to prevent money laundering is broad and very sophisticated. Money laundering is a large business which is not easy to regulate by way of international agreements. Of course, while these agreements and strategies are necessary, the question about their effectiveness, however, still lingers in the background, especially considering the number of final criminal convictions and the amount of illegal proceeds forfeited.In that sense, I provided an overview of the most relevant and the most important international institutions whose job is the prevention of money laundering, namely the UN, Council of Europe, Financial Action Task Force –FATF, Egmont Group, European Union, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, The International Monetary Fund and World Bank. I would like to mention that I will cover in more detail only those organizations I find the most relevant.
Drvena kapela sv. Martina u Starom Brodu rijedak je primjer tradicionalnog narodnog graditeljstva s cjelovito očuvanim oslikanim baroknim interijerom. Njezino je očuvanje iznimno važno za lokalnu zajednicu jer je kapela glavno okupljalište seljana u vrijeme pogreba i proštenja, a zbog svoje starosti snažan je simbol višestoljetnog opstanka sela unatoč ratovima i poplavama. Stoga se njezina obnova temeljila na vrednovanju cjelovite strukture građevine i njezinih povijesnih oblikovnih vrijednosti te je povezala sve aspekte kulturnog dobra u cjelinu, što se podjednako odnosi na građevinu, oslikanu unutrašnjost i oltar, kao i na primjenu tradicionalnih tehnika gradnje i uključivanje lokalne zajednice u projekt. Zbog toga je u svibnju 2017. godine Hrvatskom restauratorskom zavodu uručeno najviše europsko priznanje na području zaštite i očuvanja kulturne baštine – Nagrada Europske unije za kulturnu baštinu / Nagrada Europe Nostre u kategoriji zaštite baštine. ; The wooden chapel of St. Martin in Stari Brod is a rare example of traditional, vernacular architecture with a preserved Baroque interior. Over the centuries it has played an important part in the everyday life of villagers as a gathering place for worship and a powerful symbol of the village's survival. Archival records mention the chapel for the frst time in 1699. Originally, it was laid out as a single-nave chapel with a polygonal sanctuary and a small atrium on top of which stood a bell tower. Its present form originated when the atrium was incorporated to form a vestibule in 1736. It was built using a traditional technology of construction with oak planks laid over stone and brick foundations and interlocked without the use of brackets (socalled dovetail joint). What is particular about the chapel is its interior design: all the walls, the ceiling over the nave and the sanctuary vault are lined with a vividly painted wainscoting made of 88 wooden panels framed with decorative laths. The panels depict motifs of intertwined symmetrical ribbons with hanging acanthus leaves, rose flowers, tulips, carnations, peonies and grape vines, painted in vivid colours in the mid-18th century. The main altar with the altarpiece of St. Martin was installed in 1743. By the end of the 20th century, the chapel was rather neglected and had a dilapidated roof. As the roof covering was damaged, the interior was exposed to rainfall, which caused severe damage to the wooden support and the paintwork. An earlier replacement of the roof covering with beavertail tiles instead of shingles led to static displacements and deformations of the building material and caused further damage to the wainscoting panels. The main altar was removed from the chapel in 1991 during a war-time evacuation. Renovation work on the chapel of St. Martin started with an architectural survey of the existing condition and conservation research of the painted wainscoting. The wainscoting was then dismantled, and construction repair of the chapel ensued, which lasted from 2007 to 2012. During the course of it, the entire chapel was disassembled in order for the foundations to be repaired and the damaged or rotted parts of the building replaced. Damaged parts of the roof construction were also repaired and the beavertail tiles replaced with oak shingles, modelled after the original covering. On the dismantled elements of the wainscoting, necessary restoration treatments were carried out, which involved a mechanical removal of dirt from the back of the panels, gamma-ray disinsection, fxing of blistering portions of the polychromy to the support, consolidation of the support, joining and fxating of the panels, and a reconstruction and retouch of the painted layer. With the conservation work completed, the wainscoting panels were returned to the chapel. The Baroque altar of St. Martin was put on display at the 1994 exhibition Sveti trag [Holy Trail], after which it was stored in the Croatian Conservation Institute's depot in Ludbreg. Because of inappropriate microclimatic conditions, damage occurred in places where the wooden elements were joined, and layers of the polychromy and gilding partially detached from the wooden support. The damage was repaired in 2015, just before the altar was returned to the chapel. Despite having been left without the altar in 1991 and the painted wainscoting in 2002, the chapel continued to be used for funerals and on the Feast Day of St. Martin. Only during the construction repair, when it was dismantled, was it out of function. With the renovation completed, the restored wainscoting mounted and the main altar installed, not only was its physical and visual integrity recovered, but a symbolic and spiritual component important to the local community was reinstated as the chapel was returned to function. Albeit important in art-historical terms, as a rare surviving example of Baroque wooden architecture, its true value lies in the symbolism of survival of a community that gathers around it, in spite of all the wars and floods to which it was exposed over the course of history. On the other hand, the comprehensiveness and complexity of the conservation work carried out, while applying the principle of renovation in accordance with professional guidelines, represent a model of how to approach the renovation and presentation of similar monuments of culture. All the aforementioned components constitute the reason why the renovation of the chapel of St. Martin in Stari Brod earned a Europa Nostra Award, a European Union Prize for Cultural Heritage in the category of conservation, with which it was presented in the May of 2017.
Tendencije u govedarstvu su jedan od pokazatelja poljoprivrednog razvitka, a meso predstavlja važan dio prehrane značajnog dijela stanovnika zemalja EU. Na razinu potrošnje najveći utjecaj ima dohodak stanovništva, a znatno manje drugi čimbenici kao što su prehrambene navike, religijski, zdravstveni i drugi razlozi. Iako se broj goveda u EU stalno smanjuje, Unija je i dalje jedno od najvećih svjetskih tržišta mesa. I u Hrvatskoj se bilježi smanjenje broja goveda (za oko 3% za razdoblje 2008/2013) ali i potrošnje mesa per capita koja je oko 13 kg. Udjel goveđeg u ukupnoj potrošnji mesa se također smanjuje i danas je na razini od oko 15% ukupne potrošnje. Republika Hrvatska nije samodostatna kod goveđeg mesa i stupanj samodostatnosti je oko 82%, a meso se najvećim dijelom uvozi iz drugih zemalja Unije. Ipak, velika prilika za domaće poljoprivredne proizvođače su neiskorišteni pašnjaci gorskog dijela Hrvatske pri čemu za tako proizvedeno meso postoji značajna potražnja na izbirljivom europskom tržištu. ; Tendencies in cattle rearing are one of the indicators of agricultural development, and beef represents an important part of the diet of a significant share of inhabitants of the EU countries. The level of consumption is most influenced by the population's income, and much less by other factors such as dietary habits and traditions, religious, health and other reasons. Although the number of cattle in the EU is constantly decreasing, the Union is still one of the world's largest meat markets. In Croatia there is also a reduction in the number of cattle (by about 3% in the period from 2008 to 2013) as well as in meat consumption per capita, which is about 13 kg. The share of beef in total meat consumption has also been declining and is now at around 15% of total consumption. The Republic of Croatia is not self-sufficient in beef: the degree of self-sufficiency is about 82%, and beef is mostly imported from other countries of the Union. However, local farmers can seize the opportunity that is offered in the unused pastures in the mountainous part of Croatia since there is significant demand for beef produced in this manner in the highly demanding European market. ; Die Tendenzen bei der Viehzucht sind eine der Kennzahlen der landwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, und Fleisch stellt einen wichtigen Teil der Nahrung bei einem wesentlichen Anteil von Einwohnern der EU-Länder dar. Das Einkommen der Einwohner übt den größten Einfluss auf die Ebene des Verbrauchs aus, während die anderen Faktoren wie Ernährungsgewohnheiten, religiöse, gesundheitliche und sonstige Gründe wesentlich niedrigere Auswirkungen haben. Obwohl die Anzahl der Rinder in der EU ständig sinkt, ist die Europäische Union auch weiterhin einer der weltweit größten Märkte für Fleisch. Auch in Kroatien wird der Rückgang der Anzahl der Rinder (um etwa 3% für den Zeitraum 2008/2013) aber auch des Fleischverbrauchs pro Kopf verzeichnet, der bei 13 kg liegt. Der Anteil vom Rindfleisch am gesamten Fleischverbrauch sinkt auch und liegt heute auf der Ebene von etwa 15% des Gesamtverbrauchs. Die Republik Kroatien ist in punkto Rindfleisch nicht selbstgenügsam. Der Grad der Selbstgenügsamkeit liegt bei 82%, und Fleisch wird größtenteils aus anderen EU-Ländern eingeführt. Dennoch stellen die nicht ausgenützten Weiden in Gebirgsgebieten Kroatiens eine große Gelegenheit für einheimische landwirtschaftliche Hersteller dar, denn an dem derart hergestellten Fleisch besteht eine erhebliche Nachfrage am wählerischen europäischen Markt. ; Le tendenze nell'allevamento bovino sono uno degli indicatori dello sviluppo dell'agricoltura, e la carne rappresenta una parte importante di una parte significante di abitanti dei paesi dell'UE. A livello di consumo, l'influenza più importante è data dai redditi degli abitanti, e meno da altri fattori come le abitudini alimentari, religiose, della salute e altri motivi. Anche se il numero di bovini nell'UE è in continua diminuzione, l'Unione ha tutt'ora uno dei più grandi mercati di carne. Anche in Croazia si nota una diminuzione del numero dei bovini (per il 3% circa per il periodo dal 2008 al 2013) ma anche del consumo di carne pro capite che è circa di 13 kg. La parte di carne bovina nel consumo complessivo di carne è altrettanto in diminuzione, e oggi è al livello del 15% circa del consumo complessivo. La Repubblica di Croazia non è autosufficiente riguardo alla carne bovina e il livello di autosufficienza è dell'82% circa, e la carne viene per la maggior parte importata da altri paesi dell'Unione. Ciononostante, una grande opportunità per i produttori agricoli locali sono i pascoli liberi della zona montana della Croazia, e per il tipo di carne prodotta in questo modo esiste una richiesta significativa sull'esigente mercato europeo. ; Las tendencias en la ganadería son un indicador del progreso agricultural, y la carne representa una parte importante en la alimentación de los habitantes de la UE. La mayor influencia sobre el consumo tiene el ingreso de los habitantes, y significativamente menor influencia tienen otros factores como hábitos alimentarios, motivos religiosos, motivos de salud y otros. Aunque el número del ganado vacuno está disminuyendo constantemente, la UE continúa siendo uno de los mayores mercados de carne del mundo. También en Croacia se nota que el número del ganado bovino disminuye (3% entre 2008 y 2013) tanto como la consumación de carne per cápita (alrededor de 13 kg). La proporción de la carne bovina en el consumo total de carne también disminuyó y hoy forma 15% del consumo total. La República de Croacia no puede autoabastecerse con la carne bovina, su grado de autoabastecimiento está alrededor de 82%. La mayoría de las importaciones de la carne son de los países de la UE. Sin embargo, los prados no usados de la parte montañosa de Croacia son una gran oportunidad para los productores agrícolas nacionales y existe una demanda significante en el exigente mercado de la UE por la carne producida de esta manera.
RIJEČ UREDNIŠTVAPrijedlog zakona o šumama prošao je prvo čitanje u Saboru Republike Hrvatske. Njegova priprema trajala je skoro dvije godine. U povjerenstvu za izradu sudjelovali su predstavnici svih relevantnih sektorskih institucija, a prijedlog zakona prošao je i e-savjetovanje, nakon kojega je dio primjedbi usvojen. Na saborskom Odboru za poljoprivredu bilo je dosta rasprave o iznosu naknade za općekorisne funkcije šuma, čija bi se stopa trebala zadržati na postojećoj razini od 0,0265 %, ali s oslobađanjem plaćanja naknade svim pravnim i fizičkim osobama koje ostvaruju godišnji prihod do tri milijuna kuna. Vezano za raspodjelu sredstava iz naknade OKFŠ-a buru među šumarskim znanstvenicima i stručnjacima izazvao je prijedlog pravilnika sa smanjenjem financiranja znanstveno-istraživačkih radova sa sadašnjih 5 % na samo 1 %, što bi u praksi značilo da se samo oko milijun i pol kuna raspodjeljuje za šumarsku znanost. Svjesni svih ugroza koje trenutno vladaju u hrvatskim šumama, ovakav prijedlog je stvarno nerazuman i podcjenjivački. Valja se nadati da će kritički komentari i prijedlozi uroditi plodom te da će se znanstveno-istraživačkim radovima propisati traženih 10 % od ukupnih sredstava iz fonda OKFŠ-a. Novi pak Pravilnik o nedrvnim šumskim proizvodima unosi nepotrebno i golemo administriranje zbog izdavanja dozvola za besplatno sakupljanje šumskih plodova za vlastite potrebe, bez mogućnosti kvalitetne kontrole ulaska u šumu na temelju kojega mogu nastupiti i značajne štete za dio šumskog ekosustava, a povećana je i opasnost od šumskih požara.Nedavno najavljeno osnivanje sedamnaeste podružnice Hrvatskih šuma u Slatini, za područje Virovitičko-podravske županije, možda je prošlo nekako nezapaženo i ne previše glasno komentirano u šumarskoj javnosti. Međutim, sama realizacija te ideje otvorila bi Pandorinu kutiju iz koje ne znamo što bi sve izašlo, a po mitologiji iz te kutije je izašlo zlo. Raspodjela državnih šuma i šumskih zemljišta u Republici Hrvatskoj ne prati političke granice županija i općina. To je davno napušteno. Trgovačko društvo Hrvatske šume d.o.o. u stopostotnom je vlasništvu Republike Hrvatske i brine se o gospodarenju državnim šumama, ne gledajući na lokalne granice, jer je interes šume u prvom planu. Naravno da lokalno stanovništvo treba imati koristi od resursa kojima raspolaže, ali to se rješava kroz zapošljavanje u Hrvatskim šumama d.o.o., prodaju ogrjeva, sakupljanje nedrvnih proizvoda i slično. Najavljena korist za Virovitičko-podravsku županiju osnivanjem nove podružnice kosi se s današnjim ustrojem i upravljanjem Hrvatskim šumama. Nijedna županija ne radi razvojne planove za Hrvatske šume d.o.o., no suradnja s jedinicama lokalne uprave posvuda postoji, jer su šumari oduvijek bili dio zajednice u kojoj su djelovali. Ne samo da je najava upravljanja eventualnom novom podružnicom iz županije nemoguća, nego bi se time otvorila mogućnost prekrajanja granica i ostalih podružnica po županijskim granicama. Neke podružnice mogle bi biti ukinute, a neke bi se proširile izvan povijesnih i tradicijskih granica. Svaki ustroj ima svojih nedostataka i ne može se reći da je sadašnji idealan, ali sa svakom najavom promjena, posebice ako nisu cjelovite nego parcijalne, provedbom istih dolazi do sukoba u kojima glavnu ulogu ne igraju racionalni gospodarski razlozi, nego trenutna politička moć. Trenutno postoji 21 županija s gradom Zagrebom, ali već godinama se vode rasprave treba li smanjiti broj tih administrativnih jedinica. Za koju godinu će možda postojati samo nekoliko regija. Da li bi onda ponovno trebalo prekrajati granice podružnica unutar Hrvatskih šuma d.o.o.? Današnje poslovanje trgovačkog društva u državnom vlasništvu, iako ima monopolistički položaj, nikako ne određuje tržišno poslovanje, nego državom uvjetovana raspodjela sirovine po dugo vremena najnižim cijenama u regiji, ali i u čitavoj Europskoj uniji. Najveću cijenu "darivanja" državnog resursa plaća šuma kojoj se ne vraća ono osnovno kroz dostatne šumsko-gospodarske zahvate, a kamoli da joj se poboljšava stanje sanacijom uslijed elementarnih nepogoda, promjene klime, pojave novih štetnika i drugih ugroza. U takvoj situaciji razmišljati o stvaranju nove podružnice zbog zadovoljavanja lokalnih apetita nikako nije mudro ni racionalno. Uredništvo ; EDITORIALThe forest law proposal has gone through the first reading in the Sabor of the Republic of Croatia. It has been prepared for almost two years. The conflict of interest committee was participated by the representatives of all relevant sector institutions; the Law proposal also underwent an e-consultation after which a part of the comments were accepted. At the Board of Agriculture there was considerable discussion on the amount of reimbursement for the nonprofit forest functions, the rate of which should be retained at the present level of 0.0265%, though with the exemption from payment granted to all legal and physical persons with a yearly income up to three million Kunas. In connection with the distribution of the means from the OKFŠ (nonprofit forest functions) fund, the proposed regulations that would reduce the finances for the scientific research from the present 5% to only 1% have caused a turmoil among the scientists; this would practically mean that only about 1.5 million Kunas would be alloted to forestry science. Considering the many current threatening issues related to the Croatian forests, a proposal of this kind is irrational and degrading. We hope that the critical comments and suggestions will supports the efforts toward achieving the required 10% of the OKFŠ fund for scientific research. On the other hand, the new Regulations on the non-wood forest products are causing the unnecessary huge administration due to the issuing licences for free uncontrolled collection of forest fruits for personal use, which could lead to considerable damage to one part of the ecosystem; besides, this would increase the already high danger of forest fires. The recently announced foundation of the 17th branch office of the Croatian Forests in Slatina for the region of the Virovitica/Podravina county has been almost unnoticed and only marginally commented in the forestry environment. However, the realisation of the idea would open the Pandora's box, out of which who knows what would emerge; the myth says, all the evels of the world. The distribution of state forests and forest areas in the Republic of Croatia does not coincide with the political borders of the counties and municipal areas, as it used to be for a long time. The trading company Croatian Forests Ltd. is entirely owned by the Republic of Croatia, so that the state takes care of the management of its forests without considering the local border lines. The care for the forest comes first. The local population should benefit from the forest resources, which is achieved through employment in Croatian Forests Ltd., sale of fuelwood, collecting the non-wood products, etc. The announced benefit for the Virovitica/Podravina county through the foundation of the new branch is in conflict with the present constitution and management of the Croatian Forests. No county makes development plans in the name of the Croatian Forests Ltd.; however, there is a collaboration among the units of the local management because foresters have always been a part of the community in which they have been active. Not only that the announcement of the management of a new branch office in a county is unacceptable, but it would also open a possibility of changing the borders of other branch offices, some of which could then be cancelled, others would cross outside of the historical traditional borders. With all the disadvantages of the present constellation, we cannot claim that the present one is ideal; with every proposed change, particularly such that is not global but particular, its implementation usually results in conflicts, not caused by rational economic reasons, but by current political power. There are now twenty-one counties, including the City of Zagreb. Disputes have been going on for years on whether the number of these administrative units should be reduced. In a few years, there may be only several regions. Should the borders of the branch offices be then again changed within the borderlines of the Croatian Forests Ltd? Though monopolistic, the present business management of the trading company owned by the state is not defined by the market but by the distribution of raw materials at the lowest prices in the region and all European Union over a long time. The highest price of "giving away" the state resources has been paid by the forest without reimbursing it with what is fundamental - satisfactory forest management operations, not to speak of improvements by recovery after damages, climate change, new pests and other threats. At this time the opening of new branch offices in order to satisfy local appetites is neither wise nor rational. Editorial Board
U legitimiranju komunističke vlasti u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji nakon Drugog svjetskog rata važnu ulogu imale su i tradicionalne institucije zakonodavne, izvršne i sudbene vlasti. Njihovo oblikovanje u Federalnoj Državi/Narodnoj Republici Hrvatskoj započelo je 1943. te je nastavljeno do donošenja Ustava NRH 18. siječnja 1947., kojim dobivaju ustavnu potvrdu. U odnosu na njihove ustavne pozicije, u dosadašnjim istraživanjima poslijeratnog političkog sustava u Hrvatskoj zaključeno je da su stvarnu vlast i monopol odlučivanja imala najviša tijela KPJ, tj. KPH. Pri tome stvarni položaj i uloga središnjih državnih tijela u funkcioniranju političkog sustava vlasti u Hrvatskoj nakon 1945. do sada nisu sustavno istraženi te se ovim radom daje doprinos na tom području. Prezentiraju se rezultati istraživanja organizacije i djelovanja Sabora NRH u sustavu vlasti u Hrvatskoj u razdoblju formalnog federalizma i stvarnog centralizma (1945. – 1953.). Postavljeno je više istraživačkih ciljeva: odnos između njegova formalnog ustavnog (de iure) i stvarnog (de facto) položaja u sustavu vlasti, ustroj, sastav, zakonodavna djelatnost i druge funkcije, odnosi s KPH/SKH i republičkim institucijama vlasti, te utjecaj njegova djelovanja na svakodnevni život stanovništva. Njegova organizacija i djelovanje uspoređeni su s organizacijom i djelovanjem Narodne skupštine FNRJ, institucija zakonodavne vlasti drugih jugoslavenskih republika, te drugih država u kojima je bila uspostavljena komunistička vlast, ponajprije Ruske Sovjetske Federativne Socijalističke Republike (RSFSR) i Saveza Sovjetskih Socijalističkih Republika (SSSR). Postavljeno je nekoliko hipoteza koje su istraživanjem i potvrđene: ustavni položaj vrhovnog tijela državne vlasti u Hrvatskoj Sabor NRH nije ostvarivao u praksi; bio je organiziran po uzoru na Narodnu skupštinu FNRJ; njegova zakonodavna djelatnost nije uključivala stvarnu raspravu, već samo formalno normiranje prethodno definiranih političkih ciljeva i ideja KPH/SKH; u Saboru NRH nije bilo pluralizma političkoga mišljenja; građani su se obraćali Saboru NRH prvenstveno s ciljem ostvarivanja osobnih prava, ponajprije socijalnih. Osnovne metode korištene u istraživanju su kritička analiza izvora i komparativna metoda. Rezultati su prezentirani kombinacijom tematskog i kronološkog pristupa, a u pojedinim poglavljima sistematizirani su u obliku grafičkih i tabličnih prikaza. Doktorskim radom daje se doprinos boljem poznavanju institucija i političkog sustava vlasti FD/NRH u razdoblju 1945. – 1953. Istraživanje može biti poticaj sličnim istraživanjima i u drugim bivšim jugoslavenskim republikama. Omogućuje se usporedba s političkim sustavima vlasti u drugim europskim državama u kojima je bila uspostavljena komunistička vlast. ; The important role in legitimising the communist system of government in Croatia/Yugoslavia after the Second World War was played by the traditional institutions of legislative, executive and judicial government. Their organization in Federal State / People's Republic of Croatia began in 1943, and continued until the Constitution of the People's Republic of Croatia adoption on 18th January 1947, which gave them constitutional confirmation. As the supreme state governing institutions were declared People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament and its Presidium; Government of the People's Republic of Croatia was declared as the supreme executive and administrative governing institution, and Supreme Court of the People's Republic of Croatia was declared as the supreme judicial institution. In relation to their constitutional position, in previous researches of post-war political system in Croatia, was concluded that the real authority and decision-making monopoly had the highest body of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, ie. Communist Party of Croatia. In doing so, the actual position and the role of republic governmental institutions in the communist system of government in Croatia after 1945 haven't been systematically researched, and this doctoral thesis makes a contribution in this scope. The doctoral thesis presents the results of researching the organisation and activity of People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament during the period of formal federalism and actual centralism (1945 – 1953). The aim is to explain the realation between the constitutional and actual position of the Parliament in the communist system of government, its structure, composition, legislative activity, relations with the Communist Party of Croatia/League of Communists of Croatia and republic governmental institutions, as well as the influence of its activities on everyday lives of the population. Parliament's organisation and activity is also compared to the organisation and activity of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia, as well as with legislative institutions of the former Yugoslavian republics and other European states with established communist rule, primarily Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A number of hypotheses are confirmed by research: the constitutional position of the supreme state governing institution, Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia didn't achieve in practice; it was organized on the model of the National Assembly of Yugoslavia; its legislative activity didn't include the actual debate, but only a formal adoption and promulgation of pre-defined political goals and ideas of the Communist Party of Croatia/League of Communist of Croatia; in People's Republic of Croatia'a Parliament, there wasn't pluralism of political opinion; citizens addressed the Parliament, primarily with the aim of solving personal problems, especially social. Main methods used in research were critical analysis of resources (notably original, unpublished archival documents) and comparative method. The research results are presented by a combination of thematic and chronological approach. In certain chapters, they are systematized in the form of graphical and tabular overviews. Doctoral thesis is structured as follows. In the first, introductory chapter are explained the research topic, main goals, hypotheses and scientific contribution, methodology, as well as literature and resources used in the research. The chapter gives an overview of the previous researches relevant to the topic, and the classification of legislatures in such researches. The second chapter gives an overview of the Yugoslav/Croatian communist system of government and the position of legislatures in this system in theory. There are explained the main characteristics of the then revolutionary ideology of the ruling Communist Party, as well as formal constitutional provision. They are compared with the main characteristics of the Soviet communist system of government. It also gives an overview of the classical Marxist theory about the state, government and legislatures, and demonstrates how it was used in the writings and speeches of Yugoslav theoreticians and politicians. The third and fourth chapter give an overview of the People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament organization and activity in practice, divided into two chronological periods: until the adoption of the People's Republic of Croatia's Constitution in January 1947, and thereafter up in 1953. The fifth, concluding chapter, summarizes the main research results. Chapter six contains several appendixes: the results of parliamentary elections in Croatia 1946, 1947 and 1950; a list of councilors, ie. representatives in State Anti-fascist Council for the National Liberation of Croatia and in People's Republic of Croatia's Parliament 1943 – 1953; a list of members of the Presidium of the Parliament of the People's Republic of Croatia 1945 – 1953; a list of representatives from Croatia in Constituent Assembly of the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia / National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1945 – 1953; a list of laws adopted by the National Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia 1946 – 1953; a list of tables and figures used in doctoral thesis). Seventh chapter contains a list of sources and literature used in the research. Doctoral thesis contributes to better understanding of institutions and the political system of government in Croatia in the period 1945 – 1953. Comparative approach in the presentation of research results, gives a contribution to knowledge of the political system of government and central governing institutions in the former Yugoslavia, as well in the other former Yugoslavian republics. At the same time, it can be a impulse for similar researces in those states. It also enables comparation with the political systems of government and legislatures in other European states with established communist rule. Through the analysis of the influence of its activities on everyday lives of the population, it gives contribution to the history of everyday life in communist Croatia and Yugoslavia.
Raspravljajući o porijeklu hrvatske nacije, autor u prvom dijelu odbacuje tvrdnju da se ona razvijala kao tzv. "jezična nacija". Također osporava gledište da je u tome bitnu ulogu imalo jugoslavenstvo. Zatim pokazuje da je hrvatska nacija nastala u procesu međusobnih interakcija socijalnih i povijesnih vrijednosti, koje su napokon odredile njezinu individualnost spram svake druge zajednice na cjelokupnom prostoru Srednje i Jugoistočne Europe. Sve je to autor dokazao u drugom dijelu rasprave, gdje analizira hrvatski nacionalno-politički program, koji je nastao za revolucije 1848/49. godine. U njemu su hrvatski liberali i demokrati jasno odredili individualnost hrvatske nacije i hrvatske države (ujedinjene Trojedne Kraljevine Hrvatske), i to kao jedinstvene, samostalne i autonomne moderne države u sklopu konfederalnog političkoga i društvenog sustava Srednje Europe (austrijske konfederacije). ; In the present paper the author deals with the origin and development of Croatian nation, and creation of the modern Croatian state (Tripartite Kingdom of Croatia) in the first half of the 19th century, especially during the 1848/49 revolution, at several levels: idea about nation, ideology, political and social programmes, political actions, institutions, and political community. If considered from the point of view of new socio-political processes, when transformation of a people into a modern national-political community takes place, we can see that Slavic peoples in the middle and south-eastern Europe formed multinational states, but followed some quite clear courses: formation of individual ethnic and national communities within a plural social system. Being aware of these historical processes, at the time of formation of their own national communities, these Slavic peoples (according to the level of their social and political organizations), especially in 1848, asked for a change of traditional societies and reorganization of the existing empires, not only by the language national principle, but also by the principle of sovereignty, policy of federalism and confederalism and the principles of international law and international agreement. All this should have made possible formation of essentially new political communities: individual national states within equal and democratic multinational communities, but within a new middle-class society. However, considered from the point of view of formation of the identity and individuality of Croatian nation, which is the subject of this paper, it is indisputable that Croatian national political programme and programme of confederalism as well as legal principles compatible with them (like natural and national laws, Croatian historical and constitutional laws, international law and international agreements), which were the values Croatian politicians based their national policy on since 1848, had the essential influence on the explicit quality of Croatian national-political individuality, and thus, looking historically, on the integration of Croatian nation and creation of Croatian political and state community (the united State of Croatia). The subject and vey complex structure of that political programme had an impact onto clear definition of Croatian national-political community (the united Tripartite Kingdom of Croatia) in relation to other political communities in such a multinational state as it was the Habsburg Monarchy. And that state, in their eyes should have been formed (within the new middle-class society, and a democratic and parliamentary system) on confederal basis, by means of international agreements between quite equal ethnic/national states: within the middle European Austrian confederation. In any case, Croatian nation (if we consider its national integrative processes in terms of events, in terms of idea and ideology and/or in terms of ethnic identity) was not formed nor developed as solely the so-called "language nation", as historiography would like it. For, neither is ethnos (not even ethnic community, or people, or nation, or ethnic identity) only a language-cultural category, nor the Croatian politicians and reformers took only language and culture to determine Croatian people and nation. On the contrary, Croatian nation was formed in the process of interactions of social and historical values which defined its individuality in relation to any other community on the whole area of middle and south-eastern Europe. Also, Croatian nation was not formed only as a natural community (determined by natural conditions of work and society and genealogic structure, i. e. determined by undefined Slavic union and/or undefined Slavic ethnic identity), but, in the course of processes of modernization, it was formed first of all as a historical community, based on group institutions of its own historical community. In other words, Croatian nation was formed on its own cultural, political, state and public-law traditions. It is quite clear that in this process neither Slavism, nor Illyrism, nor Yugoslavism had any role more important that the secondary one, not even for the definition of any particular ethnic identity. Illyrism and Yugoslavism had declarative ideological meaning, expressed through the idea of still non-existing community. On the contrary, Croatianism (as a national principle, as a community and as a legal, state and political system) was an expression of existence of Croatian community as reality. Thus, if we want to discuss the integration of Croatian nation and formation of Croatian political community, i. e. the united State of Croatia, we should realize that these processes were influenced by numerous values and structures, especially spiritual-cultural, political, economic, legal and social. However, the importance of political system and all its substructures – political action, political organization of the community, political programme and formation of a modern national state — should also be noted. Formation of Croatian political and state community, which was clearly stated in the Croatian national and political programme of 1848/49, assumed: 1) associating the segments of Croatian people into one political people, within one integral Croatian political community; 2) uniting of all Croatian provinces into one united Croatian state (Tripartite Kingdom of Croatia, Dreieiniges Koenigreich Kroatien). And these were the most important determinants which led to the political homogeneity and formation of Croatian nation and Croatian modern state.
Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastala je u početcima otvorene velikosrpske agresije na Hrvatsku, ali i usred krize strateško-obrambene koncepcije. Tuđmanova politika čekanja i kupovanja vremena te izbjegavanja frontalnog i općeg sukoba s JNA, doveli su do javnog kritiziranja njegove obrambene politike od strane oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. U okolnostima sveobuhvatne agresije i, prema nekim navodima, očekivanja raskola u hrvatskoj politici, sredinom srpnja počela je rekonstrukcija postojeće Vlade. Novi mandatar Franjo Gregurić okupljao je kadrove za sastavljanje Vlade, a u tom razdoblju javila se ideja o potrebi proširenja Vlade i nekim nestranačkim kandidatima pa i predstavnicima oporbe. U samo dva-tri dana pregovora postignut je nacionalni konsenzus i potpisan Sporazum saborskih stranaka, čime je stvorena Vlada demokratskog jedinstva. Vlada se sastojala od devet parlamentarnih stranaka, od kojih je osam imalo svoje predstavnike u Vladi. Unatoč činjenici da je 1990-ih godina u Hrvatskoj na snazi bio polupredsjednički sustav koji je predsjedniku Republike davao prilično široke ovlasti, Vlada je na području obrambene i vanjske politike pokazivala određeni stupanj samostalnosti. Prema nekim tvrdnjama Vrhovno državno vijeće je ograničavalo slobodu djelovanja Vlade tako da se za svog jednogodišnjeg mandata Vlada trebala često boriti za veću samostalnost i slobodu djelovanja. S druge strane, Vlada je imala potpunu slobodu u unutarnjim poslovima, primjerice u njezinoj politici prema prognanicima i izbjeglicama, kao i u gospodarskoj politici. Unatoč tvrdnjama o "nestanku" oporbe u vrijeme te višestranačke vlade, s obzirom na to da su potpisivanjem Sporazuma o Vladi demokratskog jedinstva saborske stranke od oporbenih formalno postale koalicijske, dostupni izvori navode na drukčiji zaključak. Naime, predstavnici pojedinih oporbenih i ujedno koalicijskih stranaka od listopada 1991. godine često su kritizirali neke odluke vlasti, koje su se posebno odnosile na vanjsku politiku. Predmet njihovih kritika bile su ujedno Vladine i Tuđmanove uredbe sa zakonskom snagom. Vlada je posljednjih šest mjeseci svog mandata bila izložena pritiscima oporbe i dijela HDZ-a. Međunarodno priznanje Hrvatske i priprema za nove parlamentarne i predsjedničke izbore uzrokovali su pritiske na Vladu demokratskog jedinstva, što se prije svega očitovalo u odlascima određenih nestranačkih i oporbenih ministara, a kasnije dovelo i do velike travanjske rekonstrukcije Vlade u kojoj je u znatnoj mjeri promijenjen njezin sastav u korist HDZ-a. Vlada demokratskog jedinstva nastavila je djelovati do kolovoza, kad je nakon novih parlamentarnih izbora formirana nova, jednostranačka HDZ-ova vlada. ; After the democratic elections in Croatia in the spring of 1990 and the victory of Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the new Croatian Government faced the Serbian insurgency which expressed approval for the Milošević's Greater-Serbian policy. The insurgency was supported by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) that had disarmed Croatia just after the elections in May 1990. In the summer of 1991, the Yugoslav crisis aggravated. Previous occasional and sporadic conflicts between Croatian police forces and the Serbian insurgents escalated into the open aggression of Serbia, Montenegro and JNA against Croatia. In such conditions, Croatian leadership was conflicted about the defense policy. The disagreement caused the appearance of some fractions in the parliament parties, especially in HDZ. Some participants of Croatian politics in the early 1990s today assert that there were at least two main fractions in HDZ – the "moderate" one that supported Tuđman's policy based on avoiding head-on conflict with JNA, and the "radical" one that wanted to declare JNA and Serbia the aggressors on Croatia and to fight back. Some claim that the "radical" fraction even wanted to bring down Tuđman and replace him with someone else. There isn't enough evidence to verify such statements. It probably was the case of dissatisfaction with the situation on the battlefield. Some write about wide discontent and criticism of Tuđman regarding his defense policy, which was evident at the meetings of the main Board of HDZ in the middle of July, Supreme State Council in the end of July and parliamentary session in the beginning of August 1991. Regarding the attitude towards Tuđman, there is a widespread and simplified opinion that his party turned its back on him and that the opposition expressed him support. Exactly the opposite, the opposition, especially heads of the parties Croatian Social-Liberal Party (HSLS), Croatian democratic party (HDS), and Croatian People's party (HNS) expressed equal, or even more severe, criticism of Tuđman's defense policy. In that kind of atmosphere, the reconstruction of the Government resulted in the national consensus – Democratic Unity Government was formed. It was the third democratic Government and the first multiparty Government after the democratic elections. It is an example of a Grand coalition formed during the war in many countries. The main goal of the new Government was to create more effective defense policy that would gather all the necessary political and military structures and establish the unified command structure. That resulted in entering of the Crisis Staff into the Government and forming of the General Staff of the Croatian Army. In the first two months of its mandate, the Government proposed and adopted measures for emergency readiness in order to organize life in the crisis areas. One of those measures included the blockade of the JNA barracks which Tuđman approved September 13 1991. With the blockade, the previous measured and careful attitude of the Croatian leadership towards JNA shifted from passive to active. One part of the research discussed the role of the Government in defense of the cities of Vukovar and Dubrovnik. Regarding Vukovar, there are some controversies embodied in widespread claims that Croatian leadership "betrayed" and "sacrificed" Vukovar by not sending enough weaponry and ammunition. However, available sources, primarily transcripts and records of the Government sessions, suggest that Vukovar was the priority in the supply of weaponry and ammunition. Furthermore, some members of the Government and other representatives of the Croatian leadership visited Vukovar and Eastern-Slavonian battlefield. In the context of all the crisis areas on the Croatian battlefield, Vukovar was the most dominant topic at the Government sessions. At the session held November 17, the Government adopted a series of decisions pertaining to the protection of Vukovar civilians. In the appeals to the international organizations, Vukovar and Dubrovnik were the two most mentioned cities. As was the case with Vukovar, the Government sent weaponry and other military equipment, transported humanitarian aid to Dubrovnik and appealed for help. It is worth mentioning convoy "Libertas" which supplied humanitarian aid to the surrounded Dubrovnik and broke the naval blockade. Also, some Government members came by the convoy to Dubrovnik to show their support. At the end of November 1991, Government sent three of its ministers to Dubrovnik where they had to represent the Government and facilitate its operation in Southern Dalmatia, maintain contacts with the international organizations, negotiate with the JNA representatives and maintain communication with the Croatian Army. The three ministers Davorin Rudolf, Petar Kriste and Ivan Cifrić were situated in Dubrovnik during its heaviest attack and the day after they agreed to a truce with the JNA representatives. The Government supported the negotiations between the city military and civil representatives and JNA because it wanted to procrastinate with the attacks and buy some time to strengthen the military and international position of Croatia. On the other hand, the Government and Tuđman strongly opposed to intentions of "demilitarization" of Dubrovnik which would surrender its arms to the JNA under the supervision of representatives of the international community, i.e. surrender of the city to the aggressor. Second most important task of the Government was the struggle for international recognition. The establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed all the problems of the political structures that young democratic state had to face. Such problems refer to lack of experience as well as technical and financial resources. The Government cooperated with the European Community and the United Nations. Although, Tuđman was the designer of the Forreign Affairs and the Government often had to put into action his decisions, during the Conference of peace in Hague it showed some differentiation, such as declaring it would abort the attending of the Conference unless JNA left Croatia. After the arms embargo in September 1991, the Croatian Government deprived of the right of representation of Croatia in the UN Budimir Lončar and Darko Šilović, due to their role in instigating the decision of the UN regarding embargo. The Government Memorandum, addressed to ministerial Council of the EC in November 22, stated that economic sanctions of the Roman declaration of November 8 would affect mostly Croatia. Such view showed a certain degree of independence of the Democratic Unity Government. The Government accepted the Vance plan but argued the methods of its implementation. The activity of the Government in Forreign Affairs reflects in numerous official and unofficial meetings and encounters with various politicians and statesmen. The main task of the Government members was to appeal to stop the war and recognize Croatia, but they also had to struggle against Serbian propaganda which spread lies about rehabilitation of Ustasha and Independent State of Croatia (NDH) and portrayed president Tuđman and the Croatian Government as anti-Semitic. In that context, some think that the Croatian Government and leadership in general, provided insufficient to the international public. In this research, I also analyzed social politics of the Democratic Unity Government, that is, politics towards Croatian displaced persons and refugees as well as Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees during 1991 and 1992. At the very beginning of the aggression against Croatia, new Croatian Government had to face refugee crisis. Forcible relocations of the Croatian civilians, among which some moved into safe areas in Croatia, while others left the country, induced Government to, with the term "refugee", which refers to those persons who had to emigrate their own country, introduce another one – "displaced persons", which referred to those civilians who hadn't left Croatia, only were displaced to some other territory within the country. Government also adopted some measures to secure accommodation for the displaced persons and refugees by emptying hotels and resorts and founding of the Office for the displaced persons and refugees in November 1991. Funds for the displaced persons and refugees Government secured mostly from the state budget, while all requests for financial help from the international community were unsuccessful. Consequently, in that period Croatia funded also Bosnian-Herzegovinian refugees from its budget, while the international community helped only with humanitarian help. In this chapter the Government activity in prevention of persecution of the civilian population was discussed through several examples. In that aspect, its activities were mostly limited to addressing the international community. In the case of Ilok, from where in October 1991 approximately 10.000 people were banished, Government founded the Commission of the Parliament and Government to try to stop the persecution, but it failed to achieve its goal, since the persecution had already begun. After the fall and occupation of Vukovar in November 1991, the Government organized evacuation of approximately 15.000 people, but it was carried out only partially. The Government didn't have control over the war zone, which means that its opportunities for safe and efficient evacuation were highly limited. One of the main plans for the displaced persons and refugees was Government's Return Program, which began its realization only after the end of the war and peaceful reintegration of Podunavlje in 1998. Economic politics of the Democratic Unity Government was reflected in its independence from Serbia. Following measures and decisions of the previous Croatian Government, on the day of its establishment, Democratic Unity Government broke off economic relations with Serbia, however only partially. Those companies with strong business ties with some companies in Serbia, had liberty to continue their cooperation. The export to Serbia and Montenegro was limited only to some "strategic" raw materials and products, such as petroleum. The Government also introduced its own currency, hrvatski dinar (HRD). One of the main achievements of the Government was that it avoided the transit to "war economy", in spite of the increased military spending. Since priority of the Croatian Government was determined by war, its activities gravitated towards repair of the enormous war damage in transport, utility and residential infrastructure. In the end of 1991 the Government established the Ministry of Reconstruction, while in the first half of 1992 the Government composed the Reconstruction Program and its Financial Plan that was adopted by the Croatian Parliament in June 1992. Nevertheless, because of the status quo imposed by the UNPROFOR, located on the occupied territories in Croatia, the reconstruction of the country began after the war had ended in 1995. Analyzed activities of the Government in the Defense policy, Foreign Affairs, as well as its Social and Economic policy raise the question of the Government's independence regarding Tuđman and Croatian Parliament. Considering the semi-presidential system, the Government was the executive authority of the president of the Republic and Croatian Parliament. Government also had legislative powers authorized by the Parliament, because in the wartime a great number of important decisions had to be made in a very short amount of time. The Government was not only the executive body of the President, but it also functioned as his close associate. That manifests mostly through the measures for emergency readiness in August and September 1991. Sometimes, the Government had to step out of its Constitutional powers if developments on the battlefield required it to, for example regarding the decisions about Vukovar, November 17 1991. Regarding activities of the Government in the researched areas, it can be concluded that Democratic Unity Government had a high level of autonomy, taking into account the existing semi-presidential system. Nevertheless, the powers of the Government were limited in the Defense policy and Forregin Affairs, while on the other hand, it had complete autonomy in Internal Affairs, in this case, in its Social and Economic politics. An issue that requires special consideration in this research regards the opposition in Croatia during the mandate of the Democratic Unity Government. Some claim that with forming of the multiparty Government, the opposition in Croatia "disappeared". The remark is understandable considering that all the parliament parties signed the Agreement of Democratic Unity Government, which marked their transition from the opposition to coalition partners. But, did the opposition really "disappeared" form Croatian political life? Numerous public appearances of various representatives of opposition parties and parties in general, indicate otherwise. Activity of the opposition at the Parliament sessions from October 1991 to May and June 1992 shows agility of the opposition life in Croatia. From the beginning of the Democratic Unity Government in August till October, the opposition parties didn't raise any questions in public about some decisions of the Croatian leadership, but from October began severe criticism towards Tuđman and the Government. Discontent was expressed primarily to the acceptance of the Carrington's arrangement in Hague. Criticism of Foreign Affairs arose also after the acceptance of the Vance plan. In the last six months of its mandate, the Government was exposed to various pressures from the opposition and from one part of the HDZ, which reinforced especially after the international recognition at the beginning of 1992. Some opposition and nonpartisan ministers left the Government, whereas in April 1992 there was the reconstruction of the Government which changed significantly the personnel composition of the Government, resulting in the increase of the HDZ members. It was obvious that it was not the exact same Government from the beginning of August 1991 and that its end was near. In the new elections held August 2 1992, the HDZ defeated its opponents and ten days later, new, One-party Government was formed. Establishment and presented activities of the Democratic Unity Government is the proof of the democratic system in Republic of Croatia at the beginning of 1990s and counter-argument for theses about Tuđman's authoritarian style of rule. A multiparty Government, whose prominent members were opposition representatives, couldn't have been formed in an undemocratic or authoritarian system. Forming of the Grand Coalition merely one year after HDZ had won the elections, provides a valuable contribution to the study of Tuđman's policy, shows larger picture of the Croatian leadership and opens the door for further research of Croatian political life in the early 1990s.
Baski, manjinski narod sa svojim zasebnim jezikom i kulturom, stoljećima je podijeljen između Španjolske i Francuske. U Francuskoj Baski nemaju status manjine ni institucionalnu autonomiju. U Španjolskoj, međutim, nakon teškog razdoblja Francove diktature i preustrojstva Španjolske 1978. na kvazifederalnom načelu, španjolski Baski dobivaju priznanje nacionalne posebnosti te znatnu institucionalnu autonomiju kroz tzv. Autonomnu zajednicu (AZ) Baskiju. Unatoč zadovoljavanju većine aspiracija Baska u Španjolskoj, u španjolskoj Baskiji i dalje je prisutan secesionizam, dok taj fenomen u francuskom dijelu Baskije gotovo da i ne postoji. Cilj disertacije bio je, binarnom studijom i dizajnom najsličnijih slučajeva, koristeći se kvalitativno-kvantitativnom metodom, istražiti je li autonomija, umjesto zadovoljavanja španjolskih Baska statusom u okviru Španjolske, pridonijela jačanju njihova nacionalizma i secesionizma. Ovi fenomeni obrađeni su kroz tri prizme: izgradnju subdržavnih institucija, izgradnju subdržavnih identiteta i izgradnju lokalnih elita. Uočeno je da je autonomija u španjolskoj Baskiji pridonijela izgradnji protodržave, od demokratski izabranog Parlamenta, preko izvršne vlasti, do djelomično izgrađenog sigurnosnog aparata. Iako usporen rascjepima u baskijskom društvu uslijed demografske heterogenosti, na djelu je proces izgradnje subdržavne baskijske nacije. Autonomija je omogućila i izgradnju lokalnih elita, dolazak baskijskih nacionalista na vlast, kao i stranačko nadmetanje u baskijskom nacionalizmu. Sve to omogućilo je i da AZ Baskija krene izrazito "baskijskim" smjerom. Ona je potencijalno samo korak do pune neovisnosti, kojoj nedostaje još "prozor mogućnosti", koji se dogodio npr. raspadom bivših komunističkih federacija. U francuskoj Baskiji ne postoji teritorijalna, odnosno institucionalna autonomija. Ne dajući im "prozor mogućnosti" za razvoj i jačanje, građanska i unitarna država u Francuskoj odigrale su značajnu ulogu u ublažavanju baskijskog nacionalizma i secesionizma. Slučajevi španjolske i francuske Baskije pokazali su kako (ne)postojanje autonomije znatno utječe na periferni nacionalizam i secesionizam, kao i na potencijal za secesiju. ; In the last couple of years, the rise of secessionism in several democratic, Western European countries - from the United Kingdom (Scotland) and Belgium (Flanders) to Spain (Catalonia and the Basque Country) has been noted. All of them have something in common. In addition to having a heterogeneous ethnic structure, that is, the existence of distinct historical ethnic communities, all of these states have also, in the last couple of decades, gone through dramatic administrative and structural changes. From unitary states they had once been, they have transformed in a way which resulted in the introduction of either a certain degree of devolution or even in federalization. Consequently, historical ethnic communities have achieved a certain degree of autonomy, ranging from a partial and asymmetric decentralization ("devolution") as in the case of Scotland, to an extensive autonomy of the so-called autonomous communities of Spain. The intention of the central state and the legislator has been, inter alia, to safeguard the state unity and strengthen the state by accommodating the grievances of ethnic communities and their elites. The final outcome, however, has often been adverse to initial intentions. In the newly formed administrative units, "proto-states" of the ethnic minorities, there has been a rise in nationalism and secessionism. The purpose of this dissertation is to tackle this phenomenon and explore the causal relationship of autonomy and nationalism/secessionism. That is, the idea whether the autonomy itself strengthened nationalism and secessionism in the autonomous territories, thus acting as "subversive institutions" towards the central State, has been examined. In order to test the hypothesis and the arguments of the theory of subversive institutions, a dual comparison of two cases, Spanish and French Basque Country, and the most similar systems design have been used. The most similar systems design holds that the two cases share many common features and differ in only one. For instance, French and Spanish Basque Country are situated in the same region, share common language and ethnic origins; they are both parts of wider nation-states, face situation of diglossia etc. A differing feature, in this case, autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country – Autonomous Community of the Basque Country –Euskadi, is held responsible for the different outcome (stronger peripheral nationalism and secessionism). The choice of these two cases has been prompted by the fact that they may be considered the most similar cases in extremis, given that it is the same people on the two sides of the state border.The Basques, minority group with their own language and culture, for centuries have been divided among Spain and France. In France of today the Basques enjoy neither status of a national minority nor an institutional autonomy. In Spain, however, after a difficult period of Franco's dictatorship and the country's restructuring in 1978 on a quasi-federal principle, the Spanish Basques got acknowledgement of their national uniqueness (through a status of a nationality), and the Basque Country gained a significant institutional autonomy through so-called Autonomous Community of the Basque Country. In spite of the accommodation of most of the Spanish Basques' grievances, both on a tangible level (economic, political and cultural) and on a symbolic level (national and state symbols), the Spanish Basque Country still faces secessionism, while that phenomenon is hardly visible in its French counterpart. The dissertation explores whether the autonomy, instead of accommodating the Spanish Basques in the framework of the Spanish State, has contributed to the growth of their nationalism and secessionism. Conversely, the dissertation explores also whether the French civic state has contributed to attenuation of the peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. In France there are no "autonomic" institutions, but as a result of political and societal changes in France and external pressure from the South, i.e. from the Spanish Basque Country (spill over effect or Galton's problem), a "new governance" with specially designed institutions has been developed to partially accommodate the Basque grievances. Deprived of any substantial competences, executive or financial, they are a pale shadow of their Spanish counterparts. However, precisely for that, they serve as a good example to make comparative research in order to show the immense difference the autonomy per se can make. The research relies on the Valerie Bunce' s theory of "subversive institutions", which she tested on the cases of the former communist federations Soviet Union (USSR), Czechoslovakia (CSFR) and Yugoslavia (SFRY). Valerie Bunce (1999), explaining the collapse of former communist federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY, put forward a thesis that their design created preconditions for creating states within state. Consequently, the structure itself brought about the collapse of the communist bloc, and within it, of the federations USSR, CSFR and SFRY. Therefore, Bunce holds that the federalism created nations at the republican level or, if they had already been "defined", the federalism strengthened them. In other words, federal structure where the autonomous/federal units enjoyed relatively wide autonomy, in the long term acted centrifugally and finally led to the collapse of states (federations). With the advent of Gorbatchev and perestroika, consequent abandoning of the Brezhnev doctrine, and array of events that brought upon the collapse of communism and of federations, federal units – new "nations-in-the-making", took advantage of the situation ("window of opportunity") and proclaimed their independence.Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) Bunce's theory and arguments have been applied on the situation in Spain. In the second case of the French Basque Country, and especially in the following comparative analysis, the situation in Spain can be/ is compared with the situation in France. It is thus possible to test the hypothesis on subversive institutions and to note the differences produced by the existence of autonomy in Spain. Bunce's theory has been tested on Spain (Spanish Basque Country) particularly for its quasi-federal structure of so-called autonomous communities (comunidades autónomas), or in Spanish jargon, Autonomías. Spanish autonomías provide a certain framework of a proto-state, nation-state, "state-in-waiting", and strengthen the centrifugal forces and local nationalism in a way, maybe to a lesser extent, but similarly as former republics of the ex-socialist federations. There comes the idea to test the theory of subversive institutions on Spain, i.e. Spanish Basque Country. In the introductory chapters of the dissertation, the phenomena of identity and nationalism have been tackled, followed by the theory of subversive institutions, as well as other supportive theories of the official nationalism (Anderson, 1990), path dependency (Krasner, 1984) and logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 2009). Finally, the three main arguments of the theory of subversive institutions have been elaborated, as well as the fourth, "counter argument". The two case studies follow, of the Spanish and the French Basque Country, structured in the same or very similar way. Firstly, the phenomenon of the Basque identity, its formation and its specifics for each of the two cases, has been elaborated. Secondly, the relation of the State towards the Basques and their identity has been examined in more depth. Within that framework, process of state building and other "counter-subversive action" of the state, with the aim of diminishing the peripheral nationalism and secessionism, has been tackled. Separate chapters have been dedicated to the transition to autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (and to the Spanish Estado de las Autonomías /State of Autonomies) after the 1978 Constitution, possess almost the entire state administration. One of the 17 autonomous communities, Autonomous Community of the Basque Country - Euskadi has a clearly defined territory, a democratically elected Parliament (officially called the Basque Parliament), a Government, officially called the Basque Government, ministries (called departamentos, departments, headed by consejeros, counselors), a Prime Minister, Lehendakari, with some prerogatives of a President, including state honours and palace. His office includes a mini Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Acción Exterior – External Action), with its delegations abroad. Thus, the Basque Government can project its image abroad. The autonomous administration has some 60 000 employees, to which one has to add the 30 000 employees of the provincial and communal administration, and disposes of a 10.6 billion € budget. At the same time, the central state administration in the Basque Country counts only 15 000 employees. Euskadi disposes of its own police forces Ertzaintza. As mentioned before, several authors argue that with such a developed administrative apparatus, a "segment-state", in our case the Spanish Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi, has been in power for most of the post-1978 Constitution period. Its institutions are consequently able to act as centrifugal ("subversive") institutions, transmitting nationalist messages through media, education system, and regional institutions. But their nationalist message is not of Spanish, but of peripheral, in this case, Basque nationalism. Given the specific, unfavourable linguistic situation of diglossia, and the importance of language for national (and Basque) identity, the Basque Governments took it as a mission to restore to the Basque language a status of a full-fledged official and education language, in a sense of Gellner's "language of high culture" (1998). (Re)Introducing the Basque language, not only in schools and universities, but literary everywhere, rebasquisating Euskadi, a Basque identity has been (re)enforced. Nowadays almost all institutions under the competence of local, autonomous institutions in the Spanish Basque Country are obliged to adopt Action plans or Five-year plans on the language normalization, that is, reinforced use of the Basque language. The Basque Government, in that way projects certain ideology and builds up and strengthens the Basque national identity. A new, Basque nation is being built.The statistics speak for themselves. Before the autonomy, that is, before 1978/1980, education language was 100% Spanish. Nowadays, only a tiny 0.5% of students study exclusively in Spanish (so called Model X), and 15.3% in Model A, with education in Spanish, and Basque language as one of the subjects. 18.9% study in bilingual schools (Model B) and the high 65.3% study in Basque schools (Model D), with Spanish language as one of the subjects. The presence of the Basque language is enforced in other areas as well. For instance, in public administration the targeted percentage of Basque speakers should be 48.46% and it should increase with the rise of knowledge of the Basque language in general population. Moreover, the presence of the Basque language is checked regularly in yearly evaluation reports. In the Parliament, in 2005-2009 legislature, 56% of deputies spoke Basque, while in 2013 the percentage rose to 68,5%. At the University of the Basque Country, in Academic year 1995/1996, 27.2% of the students studied in Basque, while in 2013/2014 the percentage rose to 64.3%. The number of bilingual professors (Basque and Spanish) rose from 35.1% in 2006 to 47.8% in 2013. Similar processes can be followed everywhere.As far as identity is concerned, the 35% of the interviewees in the opinion polls conducted by the University of the Basque Country declare themselves as "only Basques", 21% as "more Basque than Spanish", 35% "equally Basque and Spanish", 3% "more Spanish" and 3% "only Spanish". As it can be noted, Basque identity prevails, with a significant percentage of dual identity. Spanish identity (more or exclusively Spanish) is quite low. Opinion polls also testify of the presence of a strong local (Basque) patriotism, and at the same time, mistrust in Spanish State institutions. For example, 62% of the interviewees show trust in the Basque Government, 61% in the Basque Parliament and Basque police Ertzaintza, while only 39% in the King, 15% in the Spanish Cortes and 11% in the Spanish Government. Trust in the Basque Prime Minister is 56%, while in the Spanish Prime Minister it is only 7%. Regarding the attitude towards secessionism, 35% of interviewees support the present autonomous status, 29% favour federation (which understands a more autonomy), 7% favour more centralization and 25% favour secession. Although the latter percentage alone seems low as to provide proof of secessionism in stricto senso, the sum of the all percentages, except for 7% for centralization, should be taken into consideration if secessionism were to be regarded in a wider sense (as peripheral nationalism; autonomism and secessionism; Horowitz, 1985). From the data above, the conclusion can be drawn that the process of Basque nation-building maybe has not finished yet, but is well under way and that there is a "Basque direction" of the Euskadi. As for the Basque language in the French Basque Country, though it is increasingly present in its schools, public institutions and society, it still does not enjoy an official status. The improvement of linguistic situation is only partially due to the incitement on the part of the authorities. There is an immense difference from Spain. The French state after 1980-s allowed more freedom and space for "regional languages" to be taught, but did not impose it, force it by "dictate", as has been in the case of Euskadi. The main credit for the improvement of status of the Basque language is due to the efforts of the civil society, associations and citizens themselves. The results, comparing the Spanish and the French Basque Country, vary accordingly. Only 36,6% of school children attend some Basque language classes, while in Spanish Basque Country it is 99,5%. There is the Public Office of the Basque Language (OPLB), that helps and promotes teaching Basque language in the French Basque Country, but it has no authority to impose the Basque language in education as the Viceconsejería de Política Lingüística of the Gobierno Vasco and the Gobierno Vasco in the Spanish Basque Country. Only 11% of the interviewees feel "only Basques", 5% "more Basques", 24% "equally Basques and French", 16% "more French and 36% "only French". In the French Basque Country, the French identity and the French language in both education and society prevail. There is no "Basque direction" or Basque nation-building process. The third argument of the theory of subversive institutions is about elites' building. In Euskadi, there is the local (Basque) Parliament, where the Basque nationalists have dominated since the first elections after the establishment of autonomy (1980), with an average of 60% of votes/seats, except for the period 2009-2012 (due to a ban of the Basque radicals before the elections). In the current legislature, 2012-2016, the nationalists (moderate PNV-EAJ and radical EH Bildu) have 48 out of 75 seats. That means that they have been able to impose a "Basque direction", e.g. policies of rebasquization (termed language normalization), or vote the Ibarretxe Plan. There are also numerous examples of party competition in nationalism and local patriotism, e.g. the issue of Basque language use, flag, coat of arms or anthem. In the French Basque Country, due to non-existence of a local Parliament or self-rule, there are no such phenomena. There have been since decades Basque nationalist parties, and they score up to 10% of the votes. Nowadays, there is also a Basque nationalist party, AB (Abertzaleen Batasuna), which is relatively successful at the lower, communal level, having around 100 councillors. However, the non-existence of a Basque administrative unit,département, and centralist French electoral and administrative system, result in a situation where only two Basque nationalist councillors managed to enter the General Council of the Département Pyrénées-Atlantiques, of which French Basque Country is a part. And there they are only two of the 54 councillors. Therefore, even if at the lower, communal level, Basques nationalists can enter the local communes and be part of ruling coalitions, or form associations of local councillors and mayors, they cannot impose a more "Basque direction" of the whole French Basque Country, like their Spanish Basque counterparts. The autonomy, embodied in the Euskadi's Basque parliament, enabled Basque nationalists in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country – Euskadi) to come to power at the local level and to direct the (Spanish) Basque Country towards a "Basque direction". In addition, it helped also to build up their own elites – party elites and leaders, Government and Parliament dignitaries, above all the Prime Minister- Lehendakari, local public company managers, University, Academy, institutes' directors etc. If a potential future new country needs the infrastructure (i.e. state administration, the framework), it also needs identity/ideology and leaders (the contents and experts). And here they are! Not only are they in place, but they are in power! Finally, having their own Basque University will help to reproduce new Basque elites. In contrast, the French Basque Country does not possess almost any of the above. Indeed, the difference produced by autonomy is immense. A special attention has been given to the Ibarretxe Plan which represents at the same time a peak of the autonomy, but also shows its limits. Juan Jose Ibarretxe, Euskadi's Prime Minister (Lehendakari) from 1999 to 2009, put forward in 2003 his Proposal for Reform of the Political Statute of Community of Euskadi, popularly known as Ibarretxe Plan. It was actually a proposal for a confederation between the Basque Country and Spain. The relations between them would be based on a "free association"(Art.1). Without going into details of the Proposal, suffice it to say that, had it been enacted, even without a completely independent Basque Country, it would mean the end of Spain as we know it today. The Plan was approved by the Basque Government in 2003, and a year later, by the Basque Parliament, although with a narrow majority of 39 out of 75 votes. However, in order to be enacted, the Proposal should have passed in the Spanish Parliament. It was not surprising that the Spanish Parliament had rejected any discussion about it. Today a Spanish "carte blanche" for an independent Basque Country seems completely unimaginable. Nevertheless, remembering the "velvet divorce" of Czech and Slovak Republics and bearing in mind as well the development of situation in Catalonia, one cannot exclude, under different circumstances and leadership in Madrid and Euskadi, a possibility of a "new Ibarretxe Plan" leading to a "velvet divorce" and eventually to an independent Basque Country. To conclude, the autonomy enabled institutions (Parliament/Argument 1), nurtured Basque identity (Argument 2), enabled Basque nationalists to come to power, created a space for Basque elites and leaders and created space or even incentives for party competition in Basque nationalism (Argument 3). The thing the autonomy has not produced, and that lacks for secessionists, is a "window of opportunity" (Bunce, 1999). But if the "window" opens, as in the case of e.g. Czechoslovak "velvet divorce", an opportunity for a potential sovereign Basque state could be created. The comparative analysis has showed more sharply the differences between the two cases resulting from the existence of the autonomy in the Spanish Basque Country (Autonomous Community of the Basque Country- Euskadi) and its absence in the French Basque Country. While in Euskadi the nationalists have since 1980 scored around 60% of the votes in the Basque Parliament and dominated local politics for most of the time, in the French Pays Basque they never score more than 10% and have always been quite irrelevant at the regional local level (except for the lower local level of municipalities). The Basque identity prevailed in Euskadi and French in the Pays Basque. The Basque nationalists have been able to impose a "Basque direction" and an intensive "basquization" within the language normalization policy in Euskadi, which has not been the case in Pays Basque. Finally, a serious sovereignist/secessionist attemps – Ibarretxe Plan occurred, materialized, and was voted in the Basque Parliament of Euskadi, while in the Pays Basque anything of a kind is beyond imagination. There is no French Basque Government to conceive such a plan, no French Basque Parliament as a forum where such a Plan could be voted and no prevalence of Basque nationalists to vote such a plan…All of these phenomena are direct or indirect results of the autonomy or were allowed and fostered by the autonomic institutions in the Spanish Basque Country. Conversely, they are missing in the French Basque Country due to lack of autonomy. The two cases confirmed the hypothesis that the autonomy in ethno-federal arrangements fosters peripheral nationalism and secessionism and a potential for secession, while civic State attenuates them. Interestingly enough, even the consultative institutions of the French "new governance", initially quite powerless, managed to acquire some of the features of the "subversive institutions". They have become increasingly "Basque" and have taken a "Basque direction". However, the civic, centralised and unitary State prevented these institutions stripped of a real power from taking a lead in the Basque nationalism, to gain any significant power, or to direct the French Basque Country in any "Basque direction". The civic State in France indeed acted in attenuating peripheral, Basque nationalism by not providing it a "window of opportunity" to grow.
