Suchergebnisse

Artykuł zawiera analizę postaw i zachowań politycznych obywateli, opis ich treści i dynamiki zmian zachodzących pod wpływem ewolucji polskiego systemu politycznego. Analizę partycypacji politycznej Polaków przedstawiono w odniesieniu do teoretycznego konstruktu postaw społecznych leżących u podstaw demokracji, zaproponowanego przez R. Dahla. W kontekście stosunku społeczeństwa do demokracji i zaufania do instytucji przedstawiono analizę porównawczą partycypacji wyborczej w kolejnych wyborach parlamentarnych i samorządowych. Proces kreowania społeczeństwa obywatelskiego – różne formy uczestnictwa w organizacjach pozarządowych przedstawiono w odniesieniu do postaw współdziałania, zaufania społecznego i dbałości o wspólne dobro. Dla ilustracji postaw egocentrycznych i partykularnych grupowych dokonano analizy działań obywateli uczestniczących w polityce protestu. Liczne demonstracje, jakie miały miejsce w ostatnich latach o znaczeniu symbolicznym, stanowiące wyraz dawania świadectwa wartościom posłużyły jako materiał do analizy ideologicznego stosunku do problemów politycznych. Podsumowując problem partycypacji politycznej Polaków można stwierdzić, iż dynamika form i treści partycypacji politycznej świadczą o pogłębiającym się uczestnictwie obywateli w procesie rządzenia państwem, co niewątpliwie stanowi pozytywny aspekt rozwoju demokracji. Zauważyć jednakże należy, że u podstaw aktywności politycznej znacznej części społeczeństwa nie leżą postawy sprzyjające demokracji. Silne zróżnicowanie, niespójność i chwiejność postaw przekłada się na formy i treść partycypacji politycznej. ; The article analyses the political attitudes and behaviours of the citizens, and describes the content and dynamics of the changes occurring due to the evolution of the Polish political system. The analysis of political participation by Polish citizens is presented in relation to the theoretical construct of social attitudes as a foundation of democracy, as proposed by Dahl. In the context of society's approach to democracy and trust in institutions, a comparative analysis has been presented of voter participation in subsequent parliamentary and local elections. The process of creating a civil society, including the various forms of participation in non-governmental organisations, has been presented in relation to attitudes such as cooperation, social trust and care for the common good. In order to illustrate the egocentric and particularistic attitudes, the activities of citizens involved in the politics of protest have been analysed. Recent years have seen a number of demonstrations; symbolic in nature and testimony to certain principles, which have been used here as material for the analysis of the ideological approach to political problems. To sum up the problem of political participation of Polish citizens, it can be said that the dynamics of the forms and content of political participation indicates a growing involvement of citizens in the governance process, which definitely makes a positive contribution to the development of democracy. It must be noted, however, that the political activity of a large part of society has not been motivated by pro-democratic attitudes. The high diversification, disparity and instability of attitudes translate into the forms and content of political participation.

This article (part I) presents the activities of artistic circles - architects - and their impact on the ways of using and arrangement of the living area. The way of using apartment is understood as:1) The way of arranging basic living functions by inhabitants (sleeping, resting, preparing and eating meals, receiving guests, studying, personal hygiene);2) The relationships between inhabitants and an apartment dependent on education, occupational structure, origin, life style, inherited cultural patterns, fashion as well as a group of physical characteristics and apartment attributes);3) The rights of family members to use the apartment space, including the right to intimacy and having own private space, as well as the representative needs.The aim of this article is to show the evolution of design thinking in the field of functional and spatial layouts of apartments and indicating the main trends of these changes. The selected functional layouts of apartments (including the remarks of the author of the design), representative of the given period of time, have been analyzed with respect to social and political conditions. In summary, the most important tendencies, which may be observed in respect of discussed changes, have been indicated. These include: expanding the living-room area of the apartment by designing a kitchen closer to the living-room or even combining a kitchen with a living -room; the differentiated approach to the issues of creating sleeping areas due to the understanding of children's individual needs to have their own living space; the concern to upgrade the quality of hygiene in an apartment - by creating separate restrooms and designing bathrooms with a space for a washing machine. ; Niniejszy artykuł (część I) przedstawia działalność środowisk twórczych – architektów – i jej wpływ na sposoby użytkowania i aranżacji przestrzeni mieszkalnej. Sposób użytkowania mieszkania rozumiany jest jako:1) Sposób organizacji przez użytkowników podstawowych funkcji życiowych (snu, wypoczynku, przygotowania i spożywania posiłków, przyjmowania gości, nauki, zabawy, czynności higienicznych);2) Relacje między użytkownikami a mieszkaniem zależne od wykształcenia, struktury zawodowej, pochodzenia, stylu życia, dziedziczonych wzorców kulturowych, mody oraz od zespołu fizycznych cech i atrybutów mieszkania;3) Uprawnienia członków rodziny do korzystania z przestrzeni mieszkania, w tym do realizacji potrzeby intymności i posiadania własnej, prywatnej przestrzeni oraz potrzeb reprezentacyjnych.Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie ewolucji myśli projektowej w obszarze kształtowania się układów funkcjonalno-przestrzennych mieszkań i wskazanie głównych tendencji tych zmian. Jako metodę przyjęto analizę wybranych – charakterystycznych dla danego okresu – układów funkcjonalnych mieszkań (z uwzględnieniem uwag autorów tych projektów) na tle uwarunkowań społeczno-politycznych. W podsumowaniu wskazano najważniejsze tendencje, jakie można zaobserwować w zakresie omawianych zmian. Należą do nich: powiększanie przestrzeni strefy dziennej mieszkania poprzez zbliżanie kuchni do pokoju dziennego lub nawet łączenie jej z salonem; zróżnicowane podejście do zagadnienia lokowania miejsc snu wskutek zrozumienia indywidualnych potrzeb dzieci do posiadania własnej przestrzeni mieszkalnej; troska o podniesienie jakości higieny w mieszkaniu – wydzielanie osobnych WC i projektowanie łazienek z uwzględnieniem miejsca na pralkę.

The article is a brief introduction to the use of game theory models in studies of national security. It is divided into four parts. The first part discusses basic theoretical issues, i.e. the division of game theory into analytical and behavioural, the concept of the rationality of players, the assumption that the rationality of players is common knowledge, the Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficiency and the classification of games. The second part briefly describes the evolution of game theory analyses in national security. Attention is drawn to the relationship between the development of game theory and military requirements. The third part provides an example of how game theory models can be used in national security studies. Trade relations, which adopt the schema of interactions of the prisoner's dilemma, are discussed in detail. During the analysis, the general model of the prisoner's dilemma, the initial game defining the problem under consideration, and its solutions in the form of an iterated game and metagame are presented. The entire discussion concludes with a summary.The analyses indicate the following advantages of the application of game theory models to the study of national security: 1) game theory models significantly simplify the analysed interactions, thus, allowing to penetrate the processes, bringing out features and relations which have hitherto escaped researchers; 2) the application of game theory models does not require researchers to be familiar with complex mathematical formalisms; 3) game theory models enable the identification of social dilemmas, i.e. situations where the short-term interests of an individual are at odds with the long-term interests of society. ; Artykuł jest zwięzłym wprowadzeniem w problematykę wykorzystania modeli teoriogrowych w badaniach bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Podzielono go na cztery części. W części pierwszej omówiono podstawowe zagadnienia teoretyczne, tj.: podział na analityczną i behawioralną teorię gier, pojęcie racjonalności graczy, założenie o wspólnej wiedzy graczy o ich racjonalności, pojęcie równowagi Nasha, pojęcie efektywności w sensie Pareto oraz klasyfikacje gier. W części drugiej opisano pokrótce ewolucję teoriogrowych analiz bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Zwrócono uwagę na związki między rozwojem teorii gier a potrzebami militarnymi. W części trzeciej wskazano przykładowy sposób użycia modeli teorii gier w badaniach bezpieczeństwa narodowego. Szczegółowo omówiono stosunki handlowe przyjmujące schemat interakcji dylematu więźnia. W toku analiz przybliżono ogólny model dylematu więźnia, grę wyjściową definiującą rozpatrywany problem oraz jego rozwiązania w postaci gry iterowanej oraz metagry. Całość rozważań zwieńczyło podsumowanie.Analizy wskazują następujące zalety stosowania modeli teoriogrowych w badaniach bezpieczeństwa narodowego: 1) modele teoriogrowe znacznie upraszczają analizowane interakcje, przez co pozwalają wniknąć w głąb procesów, wydobywając te cechy i związki, które do tej pory umykały badaczom; 2) stosowanie modeli teorii gier nie wymaga od badaczy znajomości skomplikowanych formalizmów matematycznych; 3) modele teorii gier umożliwiają identyfikację dylematów społecznych, czyli sytuacji, w których zachodzi sprzeczność krótkoterminowego interesu jednostki z długoterminowym interesem społecznym.

Research Objective: The article is to present select aspects of changes in American party system and institutional environment that influenced 2016 election results and to analyze probable consequences of those results for further evolution of the said systems.Research Problem and Methods: The article focuses on causes of the party establishment's loss of control over the nominating process, long-term determinants of Donald Trump's general election victory and perspectives for reorientation of Republican Party line towards the "Jacksonian tradition."Process of Argumentation: Primary campaigns and their outcomes are analyzed in the light of scholarship findings on internal operating mechanisms of American political institutions (primarily legislatures and political parties). Causes of interparty shifts in electoral support are considered qualitatively on the basis of historical trends and examples. Potential consequences of Donald Trump's victory are analyzed against institutional rules (primarily legal norms) determining feasibility of his electoral platform.Research Results: A claim of causal relationship between institutional reforms directly or indirectly weakening traditional hierarchical relationships in American politics and loss of establishment control over primaries, which facilitated Donald Trump's nomination and led to weakening of Hillary Clinton's campaign, has been preliminarily substantiated. Stable patterns of electoral behaviors that partially explain Republican candidate's victory in general elections have been indicated.Conclusions and Recommendations: 2016 American presidential election results are a product of multiple factors and but-for causes. Not insubstantial among them, although receiving little recognition in the campaign commentary, were institutional conditions (such as weakening of party leadership) and stable patterns of electoral behavior (favorable view of political outsiders and inclination towards alternation in power). ; Cel naukowy: Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wybranych aspektów zmian amerykańskiego systemu partyjnego i instytucjonalnego, jakie wpłynęły na wynik wyborów 2016 r., oraz przeanalizowanie, jakich konsekwencji tego wyniku należy oczekiwać dla dalszej ewolucji wspomnianych systemów.Problem i metody badawcze: Artykuł koncentruje się na przyczynach utraty kontroli establishmentu partyjnego nad procesem prawyborów, długoterminowych uwarunkowaniach zwycięstwa Donalda Trumpa w wyborach powszechnych oraz perspektywach reorientacji programowej Partii Republikańskiej w kierunku tzw. tradycji jacksonowskiej.Proces wywodu: Przebieg i wyniki prawyborów w obydwu partiach analizowane są w świetle ustaleń literatury dotyczących mechanizmu funkcjonowania amerykańskich instytucji politycznych (w szczególności legislatur i partii politycznych). Z kolei przyczyny przesunięć poparcia wyborczego między partiami rozpatrywane są w ujęciu jakościowym na podstawie przykładów i trendów historycznych. Wreszcie potencjalne konsekwencje zwycięstwa D. Trumpa analizowane są w odniesieniu do reguł instytucjonalnych (przede wszystkich prawnych) determinujących możliwości realizacji programu prezydenckiego.Wyniki analizy naukowej: Uprawdopodobniono tezę o istnieniu związku przyczynowego między reformami instytucjonalnymi bezpośrednio lub pośrednio osłabiającymi tradycyjne mechanizmy hierarchiczne w polityce amerykańskiej a utratą kontroli nad procesem nominacyjnym przez establishmenty partyjne, która umożliwiła zwycięstwo D. Trumpa i osłabiła H. Clinton. Wskazano na stabilne historyczne wzorce zachowań wyborczych, częściowo wyjaśniające zwycięstwo kandydata republikanów w wyborach powszechnych.Wnioski, innowacje, rekomendacje: Wynik wyborów prezydenckich w USA w 2016 r. był rezultatem splotu wielu czynników. Nie bez znaczenia były również niedostrzegane w bieżących komentarzach uwarunkowania instytucjonalne (jak osłabienie kierownictwa partyjnego) oraz stabilne wzorce zachowań amerykańskiego elektoratu (przewaga "outsiderów" – kandydatów spoza polityki federalnej czy inklinacja ku alternacji władzy).

Przez dwadzieścia pięć lat międzynarodowe środowisko Polski uważane było za stabilne i wolne od bezpośrednich zagrożeń militarnych. Kryzys na Ukrainie i interwencja zbrojna Rosji na Krymie podważyły to przekonanie. Naruszenie integralności Ukrainy przez Rosję winno spotkać się ze zdecydowaną reakcją społeczności międzynarodowej. Szczególnie zobligowane do działania wydają się być jednak Stany Zjednoczone i Wielka Brytania, które - wraz z Rosją - są od 1994 r. gwarantami bezpieczeństwa, integralności terytorialnej i niezależności Ukrainy. Do¬trzymanie przez nie złożonych obietnic można traktować jako probierz dotrzymania innych zobowiązań, w tym także tych, które wynikają z układów sojuszniczych. Międzynarodowe reperkusje zbrojnego konfliktu na Ukrainie mogą więc dotyczyć nie tylko przyszłego statusu Krymu i Ukrainy, ale także wiarygodności NATO, Unii Europejskiej (w tym Wielkiej Brytanii) oraz Stanów Zjednoczonych. W tym kontekście konflikt na Ukrainie może stać się powodem wymuszającym przegląd oraz - być może - redefinicję założeń polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa. Bezpieczeństwo Polski zostało bowiem oparte na trzech filarach: członkostwie w NATO oraz Unii Europejskiej i partnerstwie ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Spoiwem tych filarów jest przekonanie o dotrzymaniu zobowiązań sojuszniczych przez USA oraz partnerów z UE i NATO. Artykuł traktuje o ewolucji polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa. Autorka skupia się na ocenie wagi przykładanej przez Polskę do związków sojuszniczych z NATO, Unią Europejską i Stanami Zjednoczonymi i zastanawia się nad wpływem, jaki mogą na nie wywrzeć naruszenie integralności terytorialnej Ukrainy przez Rosję oraz reakcja głównych aktorów stosunków międzynarodowych regionu euroatlantyckiego na ten fakt. ; For twenty-five years Poland's international environment had been considered stable and free from direct military threats. The crisis in Ukraine and Russia's military intervention in the Crimea undermined this belief. Russia's violation of the Ukrainian integrity should meet with an overwhelming response of the international community, especially United States and United Kingdom, who are - together with Russia - the guarantors of Ukraine's security, territorial integ¬rity and independence. The fulfillment of promises US and UK were given to Ukraine could be nowadays regarded as a test, which can assess ability to meet other obligations given by these two states, including those arising from allied systems. International repercussions of armed conflict in Ukraine may therefore affect not only the future status of Crimea and Ukraine, but also the credibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union (including the UK) and the United States. In this context the conflict in Ukraine can become a reason for forcing the review and possibly redefinition of the assumptions of Poland's security policy. That is be¬cause security of Poland was based on three pillars: the NATO and EU membership, and the part¬nership with the United States. The binder of these pillars is the convince of keeping alliance commitment by the U.S. and partners from EU and NATO. The article discusses the evolution of Poland's security policy. The article focuses on assessing the weight given by Poland to the com¬pounds allied with NATO, the European Union and the United States and asks how the violation of the Ukrainian territorial integrity and the response to this delict given by the main actors of transatlantic relations can influence on Poland's security policy

For twenty-five years Poland's international environment had been considered stable and free from direct military threats. The crisis in Ukraine and Russia's military intervention in the Crimea undermined this belief. Russia's violation of the Ukrainian integrity should meet with an overwhelming response of the international community, especially United States and United Kingdom, who are – together with Russia – the guarantors of Ukraine's security, territorial integrity and independence. The fulfillment of promises US and UK were given to Ukraine could be nowadays regarded as a test, which can assess ability to meet other obligations given by these two states, including those arising from allied systems. International repercussions of armed conflict in Ukraine may therefore affect not only the future status of Crimea and Ukraine, but also the credibility of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union (including the UK) and the United States. In this context the conflict in Ukraine can become a reason for forcing the review and possibly redefinition of the assumptions of Poland's security policy. That is because security of Poland was based on three pillars: the NATO and EU membership, and the partnership with the United States. The binder of these pillars is the convince of keeping alliance commitment by the U.S. and partners from EU and NATO. The article discusses the evolution of Poland's security policy. The article focuses on assessing the weight given by Poland to the compounds allied with NATO, the European Union and the United States and asks how the violation of the Ukrainian territorial integrity and the response to this delict given by the main actors of transatlantic relations can influence on Poland's security policy. ; Przez dwadzieścia pięć lat międzynarodowe środowisko Polski uważane było za stabilne i wolne od bezpoœrednich zagrożeń militarnych. Kryzys na Ukrainie i interwencja zbrojna Rosji na Krymie podważyły to przekonanie. Naruszenie integralnoœci Ukrainy przez Rosję winno spotkać się ze zdecydowaną reakcją społeczności międzynarodowej. Szczególnie zobligowane do działania wydają się być jednak Stany Zjednoczone i Wielka Brytania, które – wraz z Rosją – są od 1994 r. gwarantami bezpieczeństwa, integralności terytorialnej i niezależności Ukrainy. Dotrzymanie przez nie złożonych obietnic można traktować jako probierz dotrzymania innych zobowiązań, w tym takze tych, które wynikają z układów sojuszniczych. Miedzynarodowe reperkusje zbrojnego konfliktu na Ukrainie moga więc dotyczyć nie tylko przyszłego statusu Krymu i Ukrainy, ale tak¿e wiarygodności NATO, Unii Europejskiej (w tym Wielkiej Brytanii) oraz Stanów Zjednoczonych. W tym kontekście konflikt na Ukrainie może stać się powodem wymuszającym przeglad oraz – być może – redefinicję założeń polskiej polityki bezpieczeństwa. Bezpieczeństwo Polski zostało bowiem oparte na trzech filarach: członkostwie w NATO oraz Unii Europejskiej i partnerstwie ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Spoiwem tych filarów jest przekonanie o dotrzymaniu zobowiązań sojuszniczych przez USA oraz partnerów z UE i NATO. Artykuł traktuje o ewolucji polskiej polityki bezpieczeñstwa. Autorka skupia się na ocenie wagi przykładanej przez Polskę do związków sojuszniczych z NATO, Unią Europejską i Stanami Zjednoczonymi i zastanawia się nad wpływem, jaki mogą na nie wywrzeć naruszenie integralności terytorialnej Ukrainy przez Rosję oraz reakcja głównych aktorów stosunków międzynarodowych regionu euroatlantyckiego na ten fakt.

Celem poniższego opracowania jest syntetyczne przedstawienie zaangażowania Unii Europejskiej w rozwiązanie konfl iktu izraelsko-palestyńskiego. Rok 2018 jest dobrym momentem na podsumowanie roli Unii Europejskiej oraz innych aktorów regionalnych i międzynarodowych w rozwiązaniu kwestii palestyńskiej. Obecnie mija 25 lat od podpisania porozumienia z Oslo i 30 lat od deklaracji niepodległości ogłoszonej przez Organizację Wyzwolenia Palestyny. Z kolei w 2017 r. minęło 50 lat od zajęcia przez Izrael Strefy Gazy oraz Zachodniego Brzegu Jordanu. W artykule autorka zdecydowała się przyjąć tezę, iż konfl ikt izraelsko-palestyński stanowi jedno z głównych wyzwań dla polityki zagranicznej UE oraz jest nieodłączną cechą regionalnego układu sił i bez jego uregulowania nie można myśleć o trwałym pokoju na Bliskim Wschodzie86. Implikacje konfl iktu dla Unii Europejskiej są wielowymiarowe oraz dotyczą bezpieczeństwa, dialogu politycznego, kwestii gospodarczych i społecznych. Mają również wpływ na całościową politykę prowadzoną przez Unię wobec regionu śródziemnomorskiego. Powyższe zagadnienie stanowi ponadto ważny przyczynek do pogłębienia badań nad ewolucją Wspólnej Polityki Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa Unii. Artykuł podzielony jest na pięć części. Pierwsza przedstawia źródło, ewolucję oraz poszczególne etapy konfl iktu od końca drugiej wojny światowej. W drugiej części wskazane zostały implikacje zapisów porozumienia z Oslo dla procesu negocjacji pokojowych. W trzeciej zawarto zidentyfi kowane najważniejsze problemy, które uniemożliwiają osiągnięcie trwałego pokoju między Izraelem a Palestyną. W czwartej części przedstawiono stanowisko Unii Europejskiej wobec konfl iktu i rozwiązania dwupaństwowego oraz współpracy dwustronnej z Izraelem i Palestyną. Ostatnia, piąta część stanowi omówienie problemów związanych z zaangażowaniem Unii Europejskiej na rzecz zakończenia konfl iktu. Analiza przeprowadzona w niniejszym artykule oparta została na zróżnicowanych źródłach i literaturze przedmiotu, w szczególności z lat 2015–2018 oraz badaniach własnych autorki. W opracowaniu zastosowano ujęcie krytyczne i problemowe, uwzględniające zachowanie podstawowych aktorów, ważnych z punktu widzenia omawianego tematu oraz wykorzystano następujące metody badawcze: czynnikową, instytucjonalno-prawną, analizy zawartości oraz elementy metody decyzyjnej. ; The aim of the article is to present the European Union's commitment to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict. 2018 is a good time to take stock of the role of the European Union and other regional and international actors in resolving the Palestinian issue. Currently, it is 25 years since the signing of the Oslo Agreement, 30 years after the declaration of independence announced by the PLO. A year earlier, 50 years have passed since Israel seized the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The article assumes the thesis that the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict is one of the main challenges for the EU's foreign policy, is an inherent feature of the regional balance of power and without its regulation it is impossible to think about a lasting peace in the Middle East. Its implications are multidimensional and concern security, political dialogue, economic and social issues. The confl ict also has an impact on the overall policy pursued by the Union towards the Mediterranean. The article is divided into fi ve parts. The fi rst presents the source, evolution and individual stages of the confl ict from the end of the Second World War. In the second part, the implications of the provisions of the Oslo Agreement for the negotiation process were indicated. The third identifi es the most important problems that prevent a lasting peace between Israel and Palestine. In the fourth part author shows the position of the European Union towards the confl ict and a two-state solution, and bilateral cooperation with Israel and Palestine. The fi fth part discusses the problems related to the involvement of the European Union in ending the conflict. The analysis carried out in this article is based on diversified sources, literature on the subject, in particular from 2015–2018, and the author's own research. The study uses a critical, problematic approach, taking into account the behavior of the basic actors, important from the point of view of the discussed topic, and the following research methods were used: factor analysis, institutional and legal, content analysis and elements of the decision method.

A politological analysis is presented in this book of the more than seventy year long period of US — Panama relations. Particular interest is devoted to the diplomatic and international law aspects, since in the author's opinion they are of paramount, fundamental significance. The main stream of these considerations is preceded (section 1) by a description of the circumstances governing the founding od Panama as an independent state. The author sees this as the resultant of a number of causes, both internal and also external, and hence not merely as a product of US policies. In section 2 is presented the initial state of bilateral relations, in particular the circumstances accompanying the signing of the Hay — Bunau-Varilla agreement, analysis of its clauses and also the legal and practical consequences of this agreement as the plane of the links between' Panama and the United States. Panama — US relations in the years from 1904—1964 are shown (section 3), analysing selected problems in a dynamic conception. Dealt with here are such problems as: guaranteeing independence and the policy of intervention, titular and eminents sovereignty military and economic questions and also matters concerning the conflict of 1964. It is the author's view that the situations analysed determine the principal lines of division and differences in the interests of the two sides, and also make it possible to discern — in a negative sense — future and desired foundations of these bilateral relations. Also comprehended in the field of interest is the question of the interpretation of the 1903 convention^ the evolution of Panama's attitude towards its principal terms and also certain legal modifications. The last two sections deal with the story of the negotiations lastingover many years and also the analysis of the currently binding agreements on the Panama Canal. Attention is drawn to the internal and international determinants governing the attitudes of the two sides. The author evaluates the new foundation of US — Panama relations in finding answers to the question: to what degree have the three groups of already historical controversies between the two sides been eliminated. These involve: 1) the legal and factual position of the Canal Zone; 2) the legal situation of the canal; 3) the rights held by USA extending over the whole Panamese relations results from the overcoming of a certain barrier, impossilbe to surmount in the earlier period, which determined the limiting (referring both to intentions and also to pacts negotiated) to modification of the Hay — Bunau-Varilla agreements without making any changes in its basic terms. In this sense the actual treaties are an incomparable qualitative state (chiefly due to annulling the clause on the permanence and titular sovereignty of Panama over the Canal Zone) that is achieveable due to the determination of the Torrijos government and also of the Carter administration. The present situation is of a clearly temporary character (up to 2000 AD). Although many anachronistic regulations have been annulled and in many cases conditions for cooperation have been created, intractable problems for the future are discernible. These result from the different interpretations by the two sides of the function of the Panama Canal. Panama aims to extract maximum direct and indirect advantages from the canal. As a small country its policy is to achieve demilitarisation and neutrality understood as the elimination of foreign bases and the obtaining of international guarantees safeguarding against external intervention. For the USA the economic question, although important (the advantages are rather indirect), does not play such a dominant role. Moreover, the canal itself has a strategic significance, the more so in view Of the lack of stability in Central America. From the aspect of Panamese rights further doubts are raised by the plans for building a canal at sea level. Among the varied problems to be confronted in the coming decade, these major items are most likely to govern US — Panama relations: the economic viability, of exploiting the canal, the method of implementing its strategic function and matters relating to the plans for building a new canal.

The book contains a thorough analysis of the European Union institutional system as a specific, sui generis international organisation, in the context of its legitimization (its validity and legitimacy). The book is mainly theoretical. Primarily, the author aims at presenting a reliable depiction of the EU institutional system legitimization through the prism of the theoretical output concerning legitimization of the political power, including and accentuating the indicated specificity of the EU as a distinct international organisation. Secondly, he took into consideration the changes introduced into the legal foundations of the EU functioning, pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty – the latest treaty reforming the structures of the Union. In the context of the main theme of the present study, these changes are important not only in terms of the EU institutions themselves, i.e. their competences and reciprocal relations, but also with regard to the fundamental change of the legal character of the EU, and the alterations introduced into the individual Union politics. Thirdly, the author attempts to present the problem of the EU institutional system legitimization in the special circumstances, i.e. in the situation of the most profound economic crisis that the EU members have faced since the beginning of the integration process. The EU is regarded as a specific structure, being neither a state nor a typical international organisation. Such an approach was the starting point for the main premise of the present book – the idea that the thesis about the deficiency of democracy in the EU, formulated in the literature on the subject and in the public debate, is a certain simplification, and the characteristic features of the EU and its institutions, which provoked the formulation of such a thesis, should be considered in a broader context, such as the problem of the EU institutional system legitimization and, alternatively, the deficiency of that legitimization. For the direct democratic legitimization is only one of many sources of legitimacy of the EU institutional system and of the Union as a specific international organisation in general – an extremely important source, perhaps the most important, yet not the only one. Thus, the legitimization of the EU and its institutions should be analysed in a broader perspective, which also includes other sources of legitimization – as it is done in case of every political power which, striving for its legitimization to be as strong as possible, attempts to derive it from the largest number of sources. According to the author of the book, to base the EU institutional system legitimization only on the grounds of the direct democratic legitimization characteristic of a democratic state, would be tantamount to a certain disruption of the right order. It would rather be a symptom of too advanced an integration on the "institutional" level in comparison to the extent of the "material" integration. Until the EU is a structure sui generis, in which case it is a combination of features characteristic of an intergovernmental, international organisation, a supranational organisation or a state, the nature of legitimization of this structure should also be specific. The most important role should be played by the democratic legitimization, which should be completed with other sources, owing to which the functioning of the EU institutional system, and the whole EU, could be recognised as legally valid. Apart from the main thesis also other theses and hypotheses are posed in the book. The first chapter is a certain theoretical introduction and a basis to the deliberations presented in the further parts of this study. In the first subsection, with reference to the literature on the subject, the problem of legitimization (legitimacy) of the political power, i.e. the concept, classifications and sources of legitimization (legitimacy) of the political power, have been synthetically depicted. In another part of chapter one, the author attempts to relate the problem of legitimization to the EU as a specific international organisation and to formulate his own definition of legitimization deficiency with regard to EU institutional system. Bearing in mind that the problem of legitimization deficiency in the EU (EC) has not been discussed on a larger scale until certain stage of development of integration process was reached, in 1.3. subsection, the author raises some questions concerning: the sufficiency of legitimization of the integration process during the first few decades after the Second World War, the grounds for that legitimization and the reasons why, at a certain stage of the EU (EC) development the legitimization of the Union's institutional system started to be considered insufficient, which was manifested in the opinions acknowledging the democracy and legitimization deficiency. The first chapter ends with a passage devoted to the importance of the EU institutional system legitimization, whereas the significance of legitimization to the political power and political institutions in general, consitutes its reference point. The second chapter (subsections 2.3.–2.8.) presents a synthesis of the evolution of the EU (EC) institutional system in the context of its legitimization, from the moment of the EC founding treaties ratification, till the time the changes pursuant to the Lisbon Treaty were introduced. The author focused here mainly on the competences of the particular EC (EU) institutions and their reciprocal relations, which should make it possible to observe two main tendencies in the dynamics of changes taking place in this field, and present its specificity and distinctiveness in comparison to the systems of democratic states. At the beginning of this chapter, a thesis has been formulated (simultaneously, becoming an extension of the attempt to determine why, at a certain stage of the integration process, the issue of democracy/legitimization deficiency started to be discussed – a question that was raised in the first chapter), which states that the legitimization of the EU institutional system will be sufficient, if the law regulations and political practice of their functioning are convergent with the level of advancement of the integration process in various spheres of social life; in other words, the "institutional" integration should correspond with the "material" integration (that is the Union politics). To that end, the author made an attempt to present, in a synthetized form, the development of the "material" integration (subsection 2.1.), which he completed with an analogical endeavour to illustrate the evolution of the EU (EC) institutional system in the context of its legitimization (subsection 2.9). For in accordance with the increasingly common approach, the EU institutions are treated as a system, the concept and principles of which have been presented in 2.2. subsection. In the third chapter, the author presents the EU institutional system in its current form, that is with the changes introduced under the Lisbon Treaty. Here, the selected aspects regarding competences and functioning of the particular EU institutions have been depicted, as well as the relations between them in the context of legitimization. Additionally, three selected problems regarding the EU institutional system have been raised, which are especially important in the context of its legitimization (the relation between the EU institutional system and the institutions of the EU member states, the question of transparency in the functioning of the EU institutions, as well as the Union budgets in the consecutive years). In the last subsection (3.9.) the specific features of the EU institutional system, significant in the context of its legitimization, have been identified. The fourth chapter is devoted to the functioning of the EU institutional system in the perspective of four basic sources of its legitimization, i.e. indirect and technocratic, direct and democratic, utilitarian, and one consisting of "values". The chapter ends with a conclusion outlining the specificity of the EU and its institutional system with regard to the sources of its legitimization, which is especially important in the context of the book's main thesis. The fifth chapter concerns the problem of legitimization of the EU institutions in the context of the economic crisis, which the EU member states struggle with since around the year 2008. The sixth chapter, in turn, regards the so called subjective (empirical, social) dimension of the EU institutions' legitimization, that is, the way this problem is perceived by the citizens of the EU member states. It has been based on the results of opinion polls conducted for the use of Eurobarometer, from among which these questions and answers were selected, which could be applied to illustrate the way the EU citizens perceive the Union institutions in the context of their legitimization. The closing remarks include the most important conclusions drawn from the conducted analyses and the potential reforms and modifications of the EU institutional system, which may allow for the reinforcement of its legitimization, primarily in its democratic aspect. The bibliography contains a list of sources which were cited and referred to in the book.

2020 is the year of publication of a new military doctrine of the Russian Federation. The document will, undoubtedly, be received as an interesting object of analysis, expected to show not only direct intentions, but also the hinking patterns representative for the Russian political elites. It is, therefore, advisable to process the history of public diplomacy – the leading tool of building soft power – a long-standing component of Russian Federation's capability, which due to the composition of determinants typical for the late-Westphalian international order gained an unprecedented level of meaning (or even can be seen as a leading factor).For these reasons, the author – after adopting a working definition – attempts to retrace the direct and indirect (implied) instances of including public diplomacy into the most important strategic documents and legal acts, issued by Russia in the years 1991-2016. The analysis shows the evolution of Russia's political elites' approach to all of the dimensions of public diplomacy (shift from superficial westernisation and a liberal discourse on the international order, through demonstrations of assertiveness, to a narrative adopotion of the role of one of the poles of the new international order), and provides insight into the composition of the political, social end economic determinants behind the transition. Also discussed are the shifts within the specifics of the methods of public diplomacy – such as the perception of the role of diaspora, or the link between image, economic diplomacy and economic development. These changes are presented on the background of the state of the international system, and the analysis is an addition to the extensive literature on the Russian Federation's informational influence. ; Na rok 2020 przewidziano publikację nowej doktryny militarnej Federacji Rosyjskiej – dokument ten niewątpliwie odebrany zostanie jako interesujący przedmiot analizy, ukazujący nie tylko bezpośrednie zamierzenia, ale również wzorce myślenia rosyjskich elit politycznych. Wskazane jest zatem przypomnienie długiej historii uwzględniania w rosyjskich dokumentach koncepcyjnych wiodącego narzędzia budowy soft power – komponentu potencjału Federacji Rosyjskiej, który posiada co prawda długą tradycję, ale wskutek układu uwarunkowań, charakteryzującego ład późnowestfalski, w XXI stuleciu osiągnął znaczenie wcześniej niespotykane; można wręcz stwierdzić, że w realiach ostatnich dziesięcioleci wybił się on na pierwszy plan.Z tych względów, autor – po przyjęciu roboczej definicji zjawiska – podejmuje się prześledzenia bezpośrednich i pośrednich (dorozumianych) przypadków uwzględnienia dyplomacji publicznej w najważniejszych dokumentach strategicznych i aktach prawnych, przyjmowanych w Rosji na przestrzeni lat 1991-2016. Przeprowadzona analiza ukazuje ewolucję podejścia rosyjskich elit politycznych do wszystkich wymiarów dyplomacji publicznej (przesunięcie od powierzchownej okcydentalizacji i liberalnego dyskursu o ładzie międzynarodowym, poprzez manifestację asertywności, aż do adaptacji kreatywnej i narracyjnego objęcia roli bieguna ładu multipolarnego), a także dostarcza wglądu w skład uwarunkowań politycznych, społecznych i gospodarczych, które stały za tymi przekształceniami. Uwidocznione zostały także przemiany w zakresie charakteru wykorzystywanych metod prowadzenia dyplomacji publicznej – jak chociażby percepcji roli diaspory czy związku działań wizerunkowych z dyplomacją ekonomiczną i rozwojem gospodarczym. Przesunięcia te zostają ukazane na tle stanu systemu międzynarodowego, a ich analiza stanowi dodatek do bogatej historii badań w zakresie oddziaływań informacyjnych Federacji Rosyjskiej. ; На 2020 год запланирована публикация новой военной доктрины Российской Федерации - этот документ, несомненно, будет воспринят как интересный предмет анализа, показывающий не только непосредственные намерения, но и образ мышления российской политической элиты. Поэтому целесообразно вспомнить долгую историю в российских концептуальных документах ведущего строительного инструмента мягкой силы - компонента потенциала Российской Федерации, имеющего давнюю традицию, но в связи с системой обусловленностей, характерной для позднего вестфальского мира, в 21 веке приобретшего как никогда ранее актуальное значение; можно даже утверждать, что в реалиях последних десятилетий он вышел на первый план.В связи с этим, автор, приняв рабочее определение явления, исследует прямые и косвенные (подразумеваемые) случаи, когда публичная дипломатия рассматривалась в важнейших стратегических документах и правовых актах, принятых в России в 1991-2016 годах. Проведенный анализ показывает эволюцию подхода российской политической элиты ко всем измерениям публичной дипломатии (переход от поверхностной западной ориентации и либерального дискурса о международном порядке, через проявление ассертивности, до творческой адаптации и повествовательного описания роли полюса многополярного порядка), а также дает представление о политических, социальных и экономических факторах, которые стали причиной этих трансформаций. Также были показаны изменения в области характера используемых методов публичной дипломатии - например, понимание роли диаспоры или связь между имиджевыми мероприятиями экономической дипломатии и экономическим развитием. Эти трансформации представлены на фоне международной системы, а их анализ является дополнением к богатой истории исследований в области информационных влияний Российской Федерации.

The article discusses issues of the evolution of agrarian groups in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. These parties played a significant role on the political scene in interwar Europe. The subject of political analysis was Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and two post-Yugoslavian states – Slovenia and Croatia. The references also include the casus of Polish agrarian groups. These parties played a significant role on the political scene in interwar Europe. On the one hand, they expressed the socio-economic and political interests of the rural population, and in the region in question they constituted a significant part of society. On the other – they were an important element of party systems, participating in subsequent local and parliamentary elections and creating government cabinets. Modernization, political and socio-economic changes after 1945, changed the significance of agrarian groups. After the communist regime gained power in these countries, agrarian groups were treated as the most serious rival. As a result, independent people's groups were banned and their leaders – St. Mikołajczyk in Poland – he had to flee the country for fear of arrest, and others – I. Maniu in Romania or N. Petkow in Bulgaria were arrested and convicted in rigged trials. The situation of agrarian groups was formed in two models – satellite agrarian groups centered around the communist monopartite (Poland, Bulgaria) or agrarian groups (Hungary, Romania) were banned. Their activity was continued by some activists in exile. After democratic changes in 1989, it was possible for these groups to resume legal activity. The article discusses various scenarios of organizational and, to a lesser extent, program changes. People's parties competed for seats in local and parliamentary elections under "their own banner" (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia), or chose a strategy to build a broader parliamentary coalition – the case of the Democratic Convention of Romania or the party in Croatia. It is also worth mentioning the unification and disintegration processes in the groupings in question, which resulted in the progressive marginalization of the agrarian movement on political stages. Modernization, political and socio-economic changes after 1945 changed the significance of agrarian groups. ; Artykuł omawia kwestie ewolucji ugrupowań agrarnych w państwach Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Przedmiotem analizy politologicznej poczyniono: Bułgarię, Rumunię, Węgry oraz dwa państwa postjugosłowiańskie – Słowenię oraz Chorwację. W odniesieniach pojawia się również casus polskich ugrupowań agrarnych. Partie te odgrywały znaczną rolę na scenie politycznej w międzywojennej Europie. Z jednej strony wyrażały interesy społeczno-gospodarcze oraz polityczne ludności wiejskiej, a w omawianym regionie reprezentowały istotną część społeczeństwa. Z drugiej – stanowiły ważny element systemów partyjnych, uczestnicząc w kolejnych wyborach lokalnych i parlamentarnych oraz tworząc gabinety rządowe. Zmiany modernizacyjne, ustrojowe i społeczno-gospodarcze po 1945 roku zmieniły znaczenie ugrupowań agrarnych. Po zdobyciu władzy w omawianych państwach przez partie komunistyczne ugrupowania agrarne były traktowane jako najpoważniejszy rywal. W rezultacie niezależne ugrupowania ludowe zostały zdelegalizowane, a ich przywódcy – St. Mikołajczyk w Polsce – musiał uciekać z kraju w obawie przed aresztowaniem, a inni – I. Maniu w Rumunii czy N. Petkow w Bułgarii – zostali aresztowani i skazani w sfałszowanych procesach. Sytuacja ugrupowań agrarnych uformowała się w dwóch modelach – zachowano satelickie ugrupowania agrarne skupione wokół monopartii komunistycznej (Polska, Bułgaria) lub zdelegalizowano ugrupowania agrarne (Węgry, Rumunia). Ich działalność była kontynuowana przez część działaczy na emigracji. Po demokratycznych zmianach w 1989 roku zaistniała możliwość wznowienia legalnej działalności przez te ugrupowania. Artykuł omawia zróżnicowane scenariusze zmian organizacyjnych, a w mniejszym stopniu programowych. Partie ludowe ubiegały się o miejsca w wyborach lokalnych i parlamentarnych pod "własnym szyldem" (Polska, Węgry, Słowenia) bądź wybierały strategię budowy szerszej koalicji parlamentarnej – casus Konwencji Demokratycznej Rumunii czy partii w Chorwacji. Należy również wspomnieć o procesach zjednoczeniowych i dezintegracyjnych w omawianych ugrupowaniach, które skutkowały postępującą marginalizacją ruchu agrarnego na scenach politycznych. ; В статье рассматриваются вопросы эволюции аграрных групп в странах Центральной и Восточной Европы. Эти партии сыграли значительную роль на политической арене в межвоенной Европе. Предметом политического анализа были Болгария, Румыния, Венгрия и два постюгославских государства – Словения и Хорватия. Статья отсылает также к случаю польских аграрных групп. Эти партии сыграли значительную роль на политической арене в межвоенной Европе. С одной стороны, они выражали социально-экономические и политические интересы сельского населения, а в данном регионе они составляли значительную часть общества. С другой – были важным элементом партийных систем, участвуя в последующих местных и парламентских выборах и создавая правительственные кабинеты. Модернизация, политические и социально-экономические перемены после 1945 года изменили значение аграрных групп. После того, как коммунистический режим пришел к власти в этих странах, аграрные группы стали считаться самым серьезным конкурентом. В результате независимые народные группы были запрещены, а их лидеры – С. Миколайчик в Польше, ему пришлось бежать из страны изза страха ареста, а другие – Ю. Маниу в Румынии или Н. Петков в Болгарии были арестованы и осуждены в сфальсифицированных судебных процессах. Ситуация с аграрными группировками формировалась по двум моделям: сателлитные аграрные группы, сосредоточенные вокруг коммунистической монопартии (Польша, Болгария), или запрещенные аграрные группы (Венгрия, Румыния). Их деятельность была продолжена некоторыми активистами в изгнании. После демократических перемен в 1989 году эти группы смогли возобновить легальную деятельность. В статье рассматриваются различные сценарии организационных и, в меньшей степени, программных изменений. Народные партии боролись за места на местных и парламентских выборах под своим «собственным знаменем» (Польша, Венгрия, Словения) или выбрали стратегию для создания более широкой парламентской коалиции – пример Демократической конвенции Румынии или партии в Хорватии. Стоит также упомянуть процессы объединения и дезинтеграции в рассматриваемых группировках, которые привели к постепенной маргинализации аграрного движения на политических сценах. Модернизация, политические и социально-экономические изменения после 1945 года изменили значение аграрных групп.

The European Union is a space o f continuous negotiations and an arena hosting the clashes of diverse integration options and concepts represented by EU member states and institutions. Furthermore, the disintegration of the EU (which dates back to the Maastricht Treaty) is becoming more and more visible. It is reflected directly by the presence in the European debate concerning multi-speed Europe and the current actions taken by the Eurozone states aimed at escalating the integration among selected states. Poland is also taking part in the debate concerning the future o f the European Union. The author of this paper attempted to examine Poland's place in the political and economic space o f the European Union by referring to the theory of integration. The research objective o f the paper is to analyse the Polish integration policy between late 1989 and 2012 within the context o f the international and European integration theory. The advanced research reflection in this scope in relation to Poland as the selected and important EU member state fits into the debate on the relevance of the European Union uniting concepts. The author posed the following research hypotheses in the dissertation: 1 .Considering the current stage o f development of the European Union, the Polish integration policy does not firmly support strictly one international or European integration concept. The Polish integration policy does not have a cohesive and stable integration policy concept and it is largely dependent on the policy and objectives of the current government (this is not only typical o f Poland) and the integration level. 2.Poland is strongly fixed in western structures, which makes the integration policy a vital component of development. What is more, the outlook on the European Union continues to evolve in the Polish political and social space. Poland sees the European Union as the main point o f reference in many political, economic, and social areas. 3.The organisation of the European Union does not only see Poland affect the form of the integration process, but also sees member states and EU organisations affect the functioning of Poland. The influence of a given state on the form o f the European Union mostly depends on the state's strength and significance in the EU community. This premise sees the place o f a given state in the system conditioned by the current factors, for example the European Union expansion process. Therefore, the interests o f Poland do not always correspond to the interests of the European Union, and the other way around. This deepens the EU's intergovernmental dimension. 4.Member states constitute the most important element o f the European Union. It is a union of states and nations supported by community institutions. This structure covers the convergence o f its methods, theories, and areas. This makes it impossible to profile the structure only from the perspective of the specified international integration theory. 5.The current stage o f the European Union's development, its challenges, and its problems show that the integration process continues to evolve and its result is impossible to foresee. 6.The current economic crisis influences the perception and management o f the European Union. The expectations include the intensification of intergovemmentalism and the establishment of multi-speed Union. If Poland remains outside of the Eurozone, it will find itself on the periphery o f the integration process, which is rather far from its very centre. Based on these research findings, Polish politics with regard to and, later, as part o f the EU can be divided into several principal periods. Period 1: (1989-1997) a time of consolidating Polish independence and security. This time was associated with the choice of a principal direction of the Polish foreign policy after 1989, i.e. Western Europe and declaration of Poland's will to take part in the process of its integration, without having any concrete vision for further course of those processes. This approach was often marked by a claiming attitude, both among political elites (marked by high instability) and the society (a simplified attitude, no social debate or knowledge about integration processes). During that period, Polish politics with regard to the EU cannot be ascribed to any specific model, since that policy was in statu nascendi at the time and was targeted at the EU membership, an objective in its own right. Period 2: (1998-2004) a time of negotiating Poland's accession to the EU, and the candidate's becoming accustomed to the rules o f EU's workings. There was still no vision o f integration processes from the Polish perspective and related opinions were expressed in a very cautious way. The primary aim was membership in the EU, such that was available at a given moment. At the same time, we should stress an important moment in the process of changes: the breakthrough o f the years 1999/2000. The interest in issues related to Poland's integration with the EU grew more intense then. The Polish government began to address this issue not only from the local perspective (a balance o f benefits and losses), but also expressed opinions on the reformation of the EU as a whole. Poland came as a difficult candidate for an EU member state (Polish support for US activities in Iraq and Afghanistan). This "difficulty" also emerged in the government's seeking to secure Poland's financial interests in connection with the accession. It was a period of preparations for membership, marked by a high level o f uncertainty (no clear vision, conflicting views: strong Union or preservation of independence, Common Foreign and Security Policy or working with the USA). Period 3: (2005-2007) a process aimed at building a vision of "Europe of Solidary Nations" in the EU by the government o f K. Marcinkiewicz and J. Kaczyński. Decisive, though not quite stable, support for international liberalism in the Polish integration policy. This manifested itself in reinforcing the Euro-realistic stance, both within Poland and abroad, by many considered, in fact, Eurosceptic. Period 4: (since 2008 to this day) a period of an integration vision being developed by D. Tusk's government, especially the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, R. Sikorski. It is a time of big changes and evolution in the Polish integration policy. An important issue at this time was a real sense of benefits coming from Poland's integration with the EU and the Polish government's pro-European attitude. The integration policy being developed shows a more flexible approach to the concept of independence (emergence o f collective independence) and thinking about the Polish foreign policy from the EU perspective. Additionally, we observed a return to constructing strategic partnership between Poland and Germany, rationalisation of partnership with the USA, Poland's active contribution to solving EU problems (e.g. the economic crisis), working towards a better "Eastern policy" as part of the EU. R. Sikorski was the first Polish Minister o f Foreign Affairs to have officially used the concept of federalism and vow his support for it in integration processes, mindful of Polish experiences and historical heritage in this respect. The Polish government expresses a firm objection to the idea of "multi-speed" Europe and builds an image o f Poland as an active member state (presidency at the EU Council), enjoying a good economic situation and having a society with an enthusiastic approach to the integration processes and strong Europe, and seeking to be as close to the "epicentre" o f countries behind this process.The analysis o f the integrative concepts presented in this paper shows that the different periods of the Polish integration policy (establishment and execution) saw and continue to see various levels in the majority of the international integration theory elements (of course, this is not just a Polish characteristic in the European Union, but rather a predominant trend in the Union's integration process). This has been and continues to be conditioned in large part by the foreign policy objectives of the given government, as well as by the current challenges and problems Poland is facing. In the case of the Polish integration policy, as in most other EU member states, we can observe an aggregation of interests, concepts and attitudes. This research project seeks to systematise them.

Poland towards Russia between 1992 and 2015 and outline their specifics. The author attempted at a synthesis of major manifestations of Polish-Russian cooperation and most sticking points in the intergovernmental (international) relations during that period. An important objective was to show the sources and examples of a divergence of interests, and point to the goals, which were based on these premises, established by the foreign policy-makers in Poland and Russia and pursued in mutual relations and international affairs. Between 1992 and 2015, in Poland's foreign policy towards the East and national security policy, the relations with Russia and the Ukraine were of utmost importance. On the economic level, considering the volume of mutual trade turnover, Poland's main partner in the East was the Russian Federation, whereas on the political level, the Ukraine was seen as a strategic partner. Along with the Ukraine, Russia played a key role in Poland's security policy in the discussed period. It should be emphasized that Polish-Russian and Polish-Ukrainian relations were very closely linked, and so was Poland's policy towards Russia and the Ukraine. In Poland's foreign policy towards Russia, or in broader terms, in Polish-Russian relations between 1992 and 2015, seven stages can be distinguished; each having their own characteristic. Despite some new specifics in each particular stage, they all shared an element of continuity. The constant theme was a great divergence of interests between Poland and Russia, particularly with regard to the European security system, and the role of NATO in shaping this security, as well as further stages of the alliance's enlargement, especially by countries of the post-Soviet area; energy security and Poland's strive for diversification of fuels supplies faced with Russia's actions aimed at the diversification of routes of sending its gas and crude oil to Western Europe bypassing the Ukraine and Poland; a historic dispute, in which a thorough, satisfying for the Poles, explanation of the Katyn Forest massacre was particularly high on the agenda among other issues; opposing visions of building an order in Eastern Europe, and first and foremost, in the Ukraine. With the passing of time, especially after Poland's NATO and the EU accession, the future of Eastern European countries, particularly the Ukraine and Belarus, has become a fundamental issue in Polish-Russian relations. Both Russia and Poland treated Eastern European countries as a sort of a safety buffer. However, the two countries had entirely different visions of how this buffer ought to be shaped. The political leadership in Poland saw the strenghtening of national security in the strenghtening of the Ukrainian buffer through the Ukraine's membership in NATO and the EU, whereas for the political leadership in Russia, the strenghtening of national security through Ukrainian buffer meant preserving its outside NATO status, or incorporating it in the the security system built under the aegis of Russia on the area of CIS. A characteristic of the Polish-Russian relations in that period was a great imbalance to Poland's disadvantage, resulting from the differences in broadly understood physical potential of the two countries and, consequently, their international roles (Poland being a medium-size country situated in Central Europe and Russia being a superpower in Central Eurasia). The capacities of Poland to shape the situation in Eastern Europe on its own were incomparably lower than Russia's. Therefore, Poland was trying to make use of European and Euro-Atlantic multirateral structures, mainly through the Eastern Dimension realized by the EU and NATO, to have as much influence as possible, on the desired developments in Eastern Europe. The eastern policy under successive RP governments was characterized by their overrating, frequently, of their own capacities, lack of objectivity in assessment of the situation across our eastern border, and application of double standards, particularly in the policy towards Russia. Polish-Russian political relations throughout the post-Cold War period were critical, and improvements were relatively short-lasting. Not only Russia, but also Poland is to blame for such a state of events. The Polish side, due to historical reasons and imbalance of potential, expected Russia to take more initiative in coming to an agreement with Poland. However, it has to be admitted that in many activities undertaken by Poland with regard to European security, in particular Eastern European subregion, the interests of Russia were completly disregarded, although they did not have to be accepted fully. An example of this was Polish diplomacy in the second half of 2013 intended not to allow Russia to be included in the negotiations on the EU association agreement with the Ukraine about issues that had economic implications for Russia's interests. In their policy towards Russia, foreign policy-makers in Poland, forgot, all too often, or, were unwilling to remember, about the principle that in order to meet the security needs of one's own country, one should also consider the security needs of other countries, the neighbouring ones in the first place. Analyzing the policies under succesive III RP governments on European security and relations with the post-Soviet countries, it is hard to share the view prevailing in our country that Poland did its best to develop partnership and good neighbourly relations with Russia. Among politicians, publicists and the Polish society, there was a large group of people who took a stance, though it was not always formally articulated, that Poland has a right, or even a duty to remain hostile towards Russia. On the other hand, Russia should not act unfavourably towards Poland, regardless of Poland's anti-Russian policy, although, obviously, it was declared otherwise. One of the few stages showing a distinct improvement in Poland's policy towards Russia and a mutual willingness to normalize our political relations, was the one between 2008 and 2010, when an unsuccesful attempt was made at pragmatizing foreign policy towards Russia. Since the end of 2007, this new foreign policy, gradually encompassing other areas, led to a greater or lesser modification of the policy to date towards Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia by basing it on the so-called positive realism. These new trends increased cooperation between Poland and Russia and, eventually, a considerable progress was achieved in normalizing our relations. Between 2008 and 2010, Polish policy towards the East not only changed in practice, it was also a conceptual change. The crash of the presidential plane at Smoleńsk (April 10th, 2010), in which 96 peple were killed, including President of RP Lech Kaczyński and His Spouse, was a major, if not primary reason why the normalization process (2008–2010) was seriously hampered to the point of a standstill between 2011 and 2013. The Smoleńsk air disaster, and conflicting stands over its causes in particular, exacerbated divisions in the Polish society and strenghtened reluctance, if not hostility, towards Russia. A large part of the Polish political class and society did not accept a version of an inadvertent air disaster (plane crash), whose causes, like not following correct procedures, lay on both Poles and Russians. The surveys conducted during the years following the Smoleńsk air disaster showed that over 30% of the Polish society were convinced that it had been an attempt on the life of the Polish delegation en route to a commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the Katyn Forrest massacre, and that the Russian government and secret services had been involved. After the Smoleńsk air disaster, foreign policy towards Russia and Polish-Russian relations became a ground for political struggle in our country. For many politicians and conservatist right-wing journalists, a demonstrated degree of anti-Russian sentiment became the main criterion of patriotism. In a large part of the Polish society, a belief was strenghtened that actions should be taken to weaken and isolate Russia, and to minimize, rather than increase cooperation between the two countries. This meant that internal conditions within our country, which could possibly motivate the foreign policy-makers to stop viewing Russia as the main threat and encourage a breakthrough in thinking about that issue, deteriorated markedly. Consequently, Polish-Russian relations between 2011 and 2013 remained in a state of deadlock. In the foreign policy of Poland between 1992 and 2015, Russia played the leading role. This, however, stemmed from Russia being perceived by the policy-makers as the main threat to our national security, not a recognized partner in pursuing this security. Throughout that period, in all successive stages of Polish security policy, Russia was regarded as the main threat. Each political leadership in Poland, especially since the mid 1990s, treated Russia in this way, and these were not merely anti-Russian declarations, but a guiding principle of the foreign policy. Behind it, was a conviction that Russian imperialism was timeless and Russia would never accept the sovereignty of Poland. It was an obvious reference to the classical Polish geopolitical thought about Russia posing main threats to our national security. During the crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine, between 2014 and 2015, the foreign policymakers in Poland revived the stance of a military threat on the part of Russia. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, such loud voices were heard about a possible military attack on Poland. Unlike the earlier periods, when there was an informal presumption that Russia was a threat to the security of Poland, in 2014, for the first time, in III RP's security policy, Russia was formally pointed to as a direct military threat. It was articulated in official state documents, including Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej from November, 2014, and in addresses delivered by the Polish government officials (for instance in exposé of Foreign Minister R. Sikorski and his follower G. Schetyna). The crisis and conflict in south-eastern Ukraine did not substantially change Poland's policy towards Russia. What did change between 2014 and 2015, however, was that much more emphasis than ever was placed on Russia being a threat to our national security, and there being a serious risk of a Russian direct invasion of Poland. During 2014 and 2015, the process of politicizing fear (policy of fear) of Russia was at its height. For Poland, a major outcome of the Ukrainian conflict and crisis was decreased national security and growing fears, among them the fear of Russian invasion, which does not mean that such a threat was real. During the years 2014 and 2015, Polish-Russian political relations at the highest level came almost to the point of being frozen. Important direct implications of the Ukrainian conflict for Poland's security were, apart from a growing fear of Russia, increased desires towards strenghtening its own defense capability, strenghtening NATO cohesion, increased involvement of NATO in our sub-region's security and closer bilateral Polish-American cooperation regarding military security. Resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine as quickly as possible was in the interests of Poland. However, Polish diplomacy did not engage much in the conflict deescalation. They were very sceptical about the successive agreements aimed at ending the military operations negotiated within the frames of the so-called Normandy format (Mińsk I and Mińsk II). It seems that, considering the geopolitical situation in the Ukraine and divisions of the Ukrainian society, this country should remain a buffer state. Alternatively, coming out of this role should occur gradually, through a simultaneous Europeization of the Ukraine and Russia. Poland should not be interested in the "revolutionary" speeding up of the processes occuring in the Ukrainian society. Responsible politicians willing to serve the best interests of their nation should be aware of the limitations in pursuing even the most support worthy goals. The policy of every country, the foreign policy of Poland and the Ukraine included, should be founded on a realistic assessment of one's own capabilities so that aspirations would not outgrow the real possibilities of their attainment. Poland, aspiring to the role of the EU main expert in Russian and the post-Soviet area affairs, through insisting in the EU on the earliest possible Ukraine association with the EU, contributed in a way to the situation when the Ukraine had to choose between the EU and Russia. Polish politicians did not anticpate the negative outcomes of such acceleration for the Ukraine itself (including the loss of Crimea and strong separatist tendencies in the East of the Ukraine), as well as for Russian- Ukrainian relations and the security of Poland. Therefore, the firm support and involvement of the Polish political class in the so-called democratic revolution in the Ukraine during 2013 and 2014, can hardly be regarded as a succcess. Polish policy towards the East ended in yet another failure, which was shown as confirmation when Poland was not included in the talks aimed at resolving the Ukrainian crisis, which were held by officials from the Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France since the middle of 2014. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict was a turning point in Polish security policy and Polish-Russian relations. The Polish government officially began to treat Russia as the largest threat to the national and international security. A considerable part of the political elites in Poland did not see the threat in excessive dependence of Polish economy on Russian energy resources or other economic threats, but in a direct military attack. Generally speaking, it is unknown to what extent the Ukrainian crisis and conflict will, in the long run, have an impact on changes in Polish policy towards the East, particularly towards Russia and the Ukraine. It exposed the ineffectiveness of our foreign policy to date towards the East. In this context, a question arises: What will be mid- and long-term implications of the Ukrainian conflict for the modification or a radical alteration to Polish foreign policy towards the East? Another fundamental question pertains to Polish-Russian relations: What policy should Poland pursue towards Russia now and in the future? Will the foreign policy and security policy be directed, like in 2014 and 2015, at instransigence and confrontation, or will the normalization tendency prevail as regards Russia, and will the relations with the Ukraine be redefined? However, at the end of 2015, nothing implied that the foreign and security policy-makers intended to transform in any way the policy towards Russia and the Ukraine to date. It does not mean that changes will not be implemented in the years to come. It will be closely connected with the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the modification of the policy of Germany and the entire European Union as well as the policy of the United States on the post-Soviet area. The crisis and conflict in eastern Ukraine strenghtened the legitimacy of argumentation that the main player in the post-Soviet area is Russia. None of the serious problems in this area can be resolved without the participation of Russia, and all the more, against Russia, which obviously, does not mean that the proponents of this stance overrate the capabilities of Russia in terms of shaping the closer and farther international environment. On this account, Polish policy will be hardly effective if at least some of Russia's interests in the post-Soviet area, especially in Eastern Europe, are taken into consideration, as was proven to date. Bearing in mind long-term consquences, the strategic conceptions of the Polish policy towards the East, should opt for the closest possible ties of Russia with political and economic structures of the EU and Euro-Atlantic structures (Europeization of Russia). This, in turn, should result in the evolution of the economic-political system of Russia into liberal democracy. The Ukrainian crisis and conflict classified the effectiveness of the Polish conception aimed at occidentalizing the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova without simultaneously occidentalizing Russia. As was indicated by the proponents of this conception, its implementation assumed an inevitable cost such as a political conflict with Russia. The crisis and conflict in the Ukraine between 2014 and 2015 should be a good reason to change this stance. The biggest price for its implementation was paid by the Ukraininas themselves. Therefore, in the context of these experiences, Poland should suport not in opposition to Russia, but together with Russia, which does not imply that this process has to be fully synchronized. The direction of actions in this matter is of key importance. Despite the many contentious issues in Polish-Russian relations and different historical memory of Poles and Russians, in the long-term interests of Poland's security, lies implementing a cooperative and integrating, not a confrontational conception. For the normalization of Polish-Russian relations, it is essential that the successive governemnets of Poland and Russia should have a political will to a less confrontational approach towards disputable issues and resolve emerging problems in a compromising way, which is one of the "scarcest commodities" in the Polish-Russian relations. A compromise should not be treated as a failure, as is often believed, also by the Poles. It also requires changes in mutual perception. A true normalization of mutual relations between Poland and Russia will not be possible if the majority of political elites, media and society in both countries will see the other not even as a difficult partner of rival, but an enemy. The divergence of interests does not have to lead to hostility. The governing groups in Poland and Russia face a challenge in improving Polish-Russian relations. They can either attempt to broaden the area of common interests or to highlight the discrepancies and divergence of interests, and thus strenghten social attitudes prone to either cooperation or confrontation.