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Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- What Are Executive Orders? -- Who Issues Executive Orders? -- Executive Orders in Action -- What Happens Next? -- Glossary -- Further Information -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author -- Back Cover.

Updates Personnel bibliography no. 87, Executive manpower. ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Updates Personnel bibliography no. 76, Executive manpower. ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Updates Personnel bibliography no. 40, Executive manpower management. ; Cover title. ; Mode of access: Internet.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Are ExecutiveOrders Necessary for Presidents toTake Important Political Action? -- Do Executive Orders Work against theThree-Branch Political System? -- Do Executive Orders Give the President Too Much Power? -- Are Executive Orders Vital in Times of National Emergency? -- Organizations to Contact -- Bibliography -- Index -- Back Cover

This executive order by Governor John C. West gives authority to cooperative undertakings by multiple state agencies.

This executive order by Governor John C. West declares that the Executive Order of November 26, 1973, shall not be enforced effective December 15, 1973, pending action by the Federal Government to raise the national speed limit.

The Senate has responsibilities under both Article I (outlining legislative prerogatives) and Article II of the Constitution. As a result, the upper body handles legislative and executive business differently. This report discusses the Senate's lawmaking responsibilities under Article I; executive business, which consists of treaties and nominations.

Previous studies dwell on either how the U.S. Constitution supposedly envisions the conduct of policymaking between the president and Congress, or why the executive branch persistently outmaneuvers Congress. Yet insufficient attention is paid to the fact that the unitary executive is for the purpose of exacting collective decision-making between the two branches of government. This paper is a preliminary endeavor to put American presidency in perspective. In outlining the constitutional foundation of the unitary executive theory, I trace the sources of executive power in the context of separation of powers, and checks and balances as its functional mechanism. Then, I look into the evolving conduct of modern presidents to explore how executive power is often befuddled with executive unilateralism ever since America was built on the principle of presidentialism. By illuminating how some entrepreneurial presidents managed to expand their claims on prerogative powers, I argue that the precedents set by their predecessors in combination with their use of rhetoric unwittingly enable them to justify executive unilateralism at times. I conclude by stipulating whether Barack Obama can overcome the presidency of George W. Bush, by constructing his own version of the unitary executive yet refraining from the entrapment of executive unilateralism. ; 미국 대통령제에 대한 기존 문헌은 대체로 미국 연방헌법에 토대를 두는 행정부와 입법부 간 정책결정 소재지에 관한 논의나 혹은 대통령을 중심으로 하는 행정부가 입법부보다 우위를 선점하는 배경에 초점을 맞춘다. 그러나 정작 단일행정부체제는 행정부와 입법부 간 집합적 정책결정을 강요하려는 목표를 달성하기 위해 구상되었다는 사실을 간과한다. 이 논문은 이러한 미비점을 보완하고자 미국의 통치질서로서 대통령제에 대한 일고를 제안한다. 우선 단일 행정부체제 이론의 헌법적 토대에 관한 개요를 제시하면서 집행권한의 근원을 권력분립과 그 작동기제인 균형과 견제의 맥락 속에서 살펴보고자 한다. 그리고 성공적으로 대권(prerogative powers)에 대한 주장을 관철한 역대 대통령의 족적을 통해 역대 대통령의 선례와 더불어 집행권한을 둘러싼 수사가 결과적으로 행정부 일방주의를 정당화하는 데 기여했다는 점을 강조하고자 한다. 마지막으로 오바마가 과연 실질적으로 행정부 일방주의의 덫에 빠져들지 않고 전임 대통령인 조지 W. 부시에 의해 또 다른 선례로 남겨진 논란 많은 대통령제를 넘어서는 새로운 단일 행정부체제를 위업으로 성취할 수 있을지에 대해 전망하며 결론을 맺고자 한다. ; This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2010-327-B00027). ; OAIID:oai:osos.snu.ac.kr:snu2011-01/102/0000040203/2 ; SEQ:2 ; PERF_CD:SNU2011-01 ; EVAL_ITEM_CD:102 ; USER_ID:0000040203 ; ADJUST_YN:Y ; EMP_ID:A076716 ; DEPT_CD:216 ; CITE_RATE:0 ; FILENAME:11jip1601.pdf ; DEPT_NM:정치외교학부 ; EMAIL:okyeonh@snu.ac.kr ; SCOPUS_YN:N ; CONFIRM:Y