Suchergebnisse

"Executives, Executive Politics, and the LGBTQ Community" published on by Oxford University Press.

Intro -- Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- Chapter 1: A Stroke of the Pen, the Law of the Land -- Chapter 2: What Are Executive Actions? -- Chapter 3: Executive Orders in History -- Chapter 4: Executive Orders Today -- Chapter 5: Controversies and Debates -- Chapter 6: Executive Orders and You -- Chapter 7: Getting Involved -- Glossary -- For More Information -- Index -- Back Cover.

Cover -- Title Page -- Copyright -- Contents -- What Are Executive Orders? -- Who Issues Executive Orders? -- Executive Orders in Action -- What Happens Next? -- Glossary -- Further Information -- Bibliography -- Index -- About the Author -- Back Cover.

The Senate has responsibilities under both Article I (outlining legislative prerogatives) and Article II of the Constitution. As a result, the upper body handles legislative and executive business differently. This report discusses the Senate's lawmaking responsibilities under Article I; executive business, which consists of treaties and nominations.

Previous studies dwell on either how the U.S. Constitution supposedly envisions the conduct of policymaking between the president and Congress, or why the executive branch persistently outmaneuvers Congress. Yet insufficient attention is paid to the fact that the unitary executive is for the purpose of exacting collective decision-making between the two branches of government. This paper is a preliminary endeavor to put American presidency in perspective. In outlining the constitutional foundation of the unitary executive theory, I trace the sources of executive power in the context of separation of powers, and checks and balances as its functional mechanism. Then, I look into the evolving conduct of modern presidents to explore how executive power is often befuddled with executive unilateralism ever since America was built on the principle of presidentialism. By illuminating how some entrepreneurial presidents managed to expand their claims on prerogative powers, I argue that the precedents set by their predecessors in combination with their use of rhetoric unwittingly enable them to justify executive unilateralism at times. I conclude by stipulating whether Barack Obama can overcome the presidency of George W. Bush, by constructing his own version of the unitary executive yet refraining from the entrapment of executive unilateralism. ; 미국 대통령제에 대한 기존 문헌은 대체로 미국 연방헌법에 토대를 두는 행정부와 입법부 간 정책결정 소재지에 관한 논의나 혹은 대통령을 중심으로 하는 행정부가 입법부보다 우위를 선점하는 배경에 초점을 맞춘다. 그러나 정작 단일행정부체제는 행정부와 입법부 간 집합적 정책결정을 강요하려는 목표를 달성하기 위해 구상되었다는 사실을 간과한다. 이 논문은 이러한 미비점을 보완하고자 미국의 통치질서로서 대통령제에 대한 일고를 제안한다. 우선 단일 행정부체제 이론의 헌법적 토대에 관한 개요를 제시하면서 집행권한의 근원을 권력분립과 그 작동기제인 균형과 견제의 맥락 속에서 살펴보고자 한다. 그리고 성공적으로 대권(prerogative powers)에 대한 주장을 관철한 역대 대통령의 족적을 통해 역대 대통령의 선례와 더불어 집행권한을 둘러싼 수사가 결과적으로 행정부 일방주의를 정당화하는 데 기여했다는 점을 강조하고자 한다. 마지막으로 오바마가 과연 실질적으로 행정부 일방주의의 덫에 빠져들지 않고 전임 대통령인 조지 W. 부시에 의해 또 다른 선례로 남겨진 논란 많은 대통령제를 넘어서는 새로운 단일 행정부체제를 위업으로 성취할 수 있을지에 대해 전망하며 결론을 맺고자 한다. ; This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2010-327-B00027). ; OAIID:oai:osos.snu.ac.kr:snu2011-01/102/0000040203/2 ; SEQ:2 ; PERF_CD:SNU2011-01 ; EVAL_ITEM_CD:102 ; USER_ID:0000040203 ; ADJUST_YN:Y ; EMP_ID:A076716 ; DEPT_CD:216 ; CITE_RATE:0 ; FILENAME:11jip1601.pdf ; DEPT_NM:정치외교학부 ; EMAIL:okyeonh@snu.ac.kr ; SCOPUS_YN:N ; CONFIRM:Y

"In this book, readers will learn about the Executive Branch of the United States government. Vibrant, full-color photos and carefully leveled text will engage young readers as they learn more about the president's duties, who else is in the executive branch, and the work they all must do to ensure that the federal government and society runs smoothly"--

The MAP Commission feels strongly that it is time to restructure key support functions and to realign programs and services to eliminate duplication of effort, inefficiencies and poor service quality. The MAP Commission's study and all previous studies confirm that state government is, in many senses, broken, and is in need of repair. The members of MAP believe this comprehensive report adds one more compelling reason to rethink and reinvent state government in the Palmetto State.

PurposeThis paper seeks to examine the differences between executives and investors in the perception of determinant factors in executive compensation.Design/methodology/approachFrom a survey instrument comprised of archival executive compensation determinant items, a factor analysis is performed to examine the construct determinant perceptions unique to executives and non‐executive investors.FindingsThe authors find differences in factors between executives and non‐executive investors in a manner expected by agency theory. Non‐executive investors place greater weight on factors related to performance and less weight on human capital factors, while executive investors place greater weight on human capital factors in determining executive compensation.Research limitations/implicationsThis study is limited in that the sample may not be representative of the population of chief executive officers or shareholders in the USA.Practical implicationsDiffering factors suggest that there is a misalignment of measures desired to be the foundation of executive compensation. The differing measures used to potentially motivate agents (executives) by principals (investors) results in an agency cost.Originality/valueThe authors have documented a difference between executives and investors in factors desired to determine executive compensation.