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Intro -- U. S. EXPORT CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES -- U. S. EXPORT CONTROL: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES -- LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1: DON'T LET THIS HAPPEN TO YOU!: ACTUAL INVESTIGATIONS OF EXPORT CONTROL AND ANTI-BOYCOTT VIOLATIONS -- INTRODUCTION TO U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS -- 1. COMMERCE CONTROL LIST BASED CONTROLS -- 2. LICENSE CONDITIONS -- 3. DEEMED EXPORTS -- 4. STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM -- 5. TRANSSHIPMENT AND RE-EXPORTS -- 6. FREIGHT FORWARDER -- 7. "CATCH-ALL" CONTROLS -- 8. DENIAL OF EXPORT PRIVILEGES -- 9. FALSE STATEMENT/MISREPRESENTATION OF FACT -- 10. ANTIBOYCOTT VIOLATIONS -- 11. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY -- Chapter 2: INTRODUCTION TO THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENTS EXPORT CONTROLS -- OVERVIEW -- WHAT IS AN EXPORT? -- HOW TO DETERMINE IF YOU NEED A COMMERCE EXPORT LICENSE -- WAYS TO EXPORT -- WHERE TO GET ASSISTANCE -- SUMMARY OF STEPS TO TAKE TO PROCESS YOUR EXPORT -- EXPORTER RESPONSIBILITY -- APPLYING FOR AN EXPORT LICENSE -- EXPORT LICENSE APPLICATION PROCESSING -- HOW TO AVOID DELAYS -- Chapter 3: EXPORT CONTROLS: CHALLENGES WITH COMMERCE'S VALIDATED END-USER PROGRAM MAY LIMIT ITS ABILITY TO ENSURE THAT SEMICONDUCTOR EQUIPMENT EXPORTED TO CHINA IS USED AS INTENDED* -- WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY -- WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS -- WHAT GAO FOUND -- ABBREVIATIONS -- RESULTS IN BRIEF -- BACKGROUND -- CHINA'S SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING CAPABILITY HAS STEADILY ADVANCED -- COMMERCE'S VEU PROGRAM IN CHINA MARKS A SHIFT TOWARD AN END-USER-BASED SYSTEM OF EXPORT CONTROLS FOR SEMICONDUCTOR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS -- CHALLENGES WITH VEU PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION MAY LIMIT COMMERCE'S ABILITY TO ENSURE THAT SEMICONDUCTOR EQUIPMENT AND MATERIALS ARE USED AS INTENDED -- AGENCY ACTIONS TO ADDRESS PRIOR GAO RECOMMENDATIONS -- CONCLUSIONS -- RECOMMENDATIONS -- AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION

Changes in the membership, guidelines, & procedures of the Australia Group (AG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), & Wassenaar Arrangement are surveyed. In response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, new ideas on the role of export controls in counterterrorism were put forward in the AG, the NSG, & the Wassenaar Arrangement. MTCR participating states agreed to the text of an International Code of Conduct (ICOC) aimed at discouraging ballistic missile proliferation. A decision on implementing the ICOC is expected in 2002. The NSG continued to discuss how to respond to decisions by Russia related to nuclear supply, which are considered to violate the NSG guidelines. 1 Table. Adapted from the source document.

The Biden administration promises to make difficult choices to protect US security and prosperity from predatory Chinese behavior, then comes up with reasons it can't.
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