Suchergebnisse

One of the main objectives of Pakistan's export policy has
been the promotion of exports of manufactured goods. This is an
objective which many under¬developed, predominately primary-exporting
countries have in common because of their interest in export
diversification. The general arguments used to justify such a policy,
e.g., improvement in the terms of trade and increased stability of
export proceeds—will not, however, be discussed in this paper1.
Attention will instead be focussed on the economic consequences of the
specific measures adopted by Pakistan, namely, a combination of export
duties and subsidies which discriminate in favour of processed goods and
against raw materials. The fact that in Pakistan the chief beneficiaries
of discrimination have been manufactures of jute and cotton, products
which also constitute most of the country's raw material exports,
facilitates the economic evaluation of this policy. It can thus be
assumed that if jute and cotton were not exported as manufactures they
could be exported in raw form, or in other words, that the problem
con¬sists in selecting that combination of exports in raw and
manufactured form which maximizes net foreign exchange earnings.
Furthermore, the textile industry is not a very good case for applying
the external economy argument (i.e., subsidies to industries which
provide training to the labour force in new skills, etc.,) be¬cause the
industry would exist in any case to supply the internal market,
economies of scale are limited and the skills employed are fairly
rudimentary. In the follow¬ing, all our discussion will be concentrated
on the jute and cotton situation, the special problems of other
manufacturing fall outside the scope of our analysis.

ABSTRACTThis paper analyses how strategic export policies are affected by introducing an imperfectly competitive intermediate good into a Bertrand duopoly model with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign final‐good firm export to a third‐country market. It is shown that when the home and foreign markets for the intermediate good are segmented, the optimal export policy towards the final good is a tax. In contrast, under integrated markets, the optimal export intervention is a subsidy. Whether bilateral export intervention is welfare improving compared with free trade, depends on the degree of product differentiation between the home and foreign final goods.

Although taking place mainly in the private sector, the French arms industry is a very tightly controlled activity, and decision making on arms exports are made within a genera! framework which takes info account the chief aspects of France global policy.Mercantile considerations are not the main factor in French arms exports. Actually, France has used very counsciously and systematically its arms exports to further its global policy, especially its ambition to build Europe around itself.However, the effective contribution of these arms exports to the attainment of France main goals has been rather dubious and volatile.

'Seit Beginn der Perestrojka ist der sowjetische Rüstungsexport kontinuierlich zurückgegangen. Diese Tendenz setzte sich auch nach dem Zerfall der UdSSR fort. Erst 1993 wurde eine Trendwende erkennbar. Die Russische Föderation hat in den vergangenen beiden Jahren ihre Präsenz auf den internationalen Waffenmärkten spürbar erhöht. Auf nahezu allen wichtigen Waffenmessen wurden russische Systeme ausgestellt und stießen dabei auf zunehmendes Interesse. Trotz einiger Verbesserungen im Berichtswesen bestehen indes weiterhin Unklarheiten hinsichtlich des exakten Umfangs und der Lieferstruktur sowie der Organisation russischer Rüstungsexporte. Im vorliegenden Bericht werden die Entwicklungen der russischen Rüstungsexportpolitik in den Jahren 1993 und 1994 dargestellt und analysiert. Neben quantitativen und organisatorischen Aspekten wird dabei auch die Frage erörtert, inwieweit Rüstungsexporte zu einer Finanzierung des Konversionsprozesses beitragen können. Als Quellen dienen vornehmlich die in den Datenbanken des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien (BIOst) und des Internationalen Konversionszentrums Bonn (BICC) erfaßten russischen und westlichen Veröffentlichungen zur russischen Sicherheits- und Konversionspolitik.' (Autorenreferat)