Suchergebnisse

Past and present attempts to stabilize war-torn Somalia through military, diplomatic and humanitarian interventions highlight the entanglements and interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices that have frequently and effectively undermined statebuilding in south-central Somalia. Existing analyses have focused predominantly on local actors and internal dynamics to account for the continuous political disorder in the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1991. In contrast, this study highlights the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are outside the local and national political settlements, such actors should rather be seen as an integral part of these processes. Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors must be taken into consideration in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization policies. Persistent tactics by Somali elites—mobilizing, appropriating and redirecting foreign resources and agendas—have been at the core of failed statebuilding. Such tactics form part of what French Africanist Jean-François Bayart has described as 'extraversion'. Because Somali elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional governments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation of public revenue or the building up of popular support. ; Past and present attempts to stabilize war-torn Somalia through military, diplomatic and humanitarian interventions highlight the entanglements and interplay between local and foreign elites in policies and practices that have frequently and effectively undermined statebuilding in south-central Somalia. Existing analyses have focused predominantly on local actors and internal dynamics to account for the continuous political disorder in the former Somali Democratic Republic since 1991. In contrast, this study highlights the role of external aid in dysfunctional statebuilding efforts in Somalia. Rather than assuming that foreign actors are outside the local and national political settlements, such actors should rather be seen as an integral part of these processes. Consequently, the power and interests of both Somali and international actors must be taken into consideration in order to understand the shortcomings of stabilization policies. Persistent tactics by Somali elites—mobilizing, appropriating and redirecting foreign resources and agendas—have been at the core of failed statebuilding. Such tactics form part of what French Africanist Jean-François Bayart has described as 'extraversion'. Because Somali elites have regularly turned their participation in transitional governments into a resource appropriation tactic, statebuilding has become an end in itself rather than the outcome of a more profound process of actual state formation that would have entailed the centralization of coercion, the generation of public revenue or the building up of popular support.

Symbole de l'espoir national des États d'Afrique aux indépendances, le football africain s'est radicalement transformé : lors de la Coupe du monde de 1970, aucun des joueurs zaïrois n'évoluait à l'étranger ; en 2006, aucun des footballeurs ivoiriens ne joue dans son pays. Pour comprendre la dynamique de cette extraversion grandissante, il faut prendre en compte un enchevêtrement de facteurs – l'implication d'acteurs locaux dans le transfert de joueurs à l'étranger, la bienveillante attention portée à l'implantation de structures de formation contrôlées depuis l'Europe, la création de sélections d'expatriés ou encore les naturalisations de joueurs étrangers.

AbstractWe examine whether CEO extraversion, an important personality trait associated with leadership, is associated with firms' expected cost of equity capital. We measure CEO extraversion using CEOs' speech patterns during the unscripted portion of conference calls. After controlling for multiple CEO and firm‐specific variables, we find a strong positive incremental association between CEO extraversion and firms' expected cost of capital. Moreover, cost of equity increases when a more extraverted CEO replaces a less extraverted CEO. In addition, we find that firms with relatively extraverted CEOs take more risk and exhibit lower credit ratings, which is associated with higher cost of equity capital. These results are statistically and economically meaningful and do not appear to be driven by reverse causality, endogenous matching, look‐ahead bias, or bias in analysts' earnings forecast.

Ever since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, Western states have identified security problems in Sub-Saharan Africa no longer as purely regional issues, but as international challenges as well. As a result, the EU and its member states and the USA have considerably expanded their attempts to tackle security-related challenges in Africa. Focus has been placed on the prevention and resolution of conflict, political institution and good governance reforms, state building, and combating terrorism. The results of these policies have often failed to meet expectations. In some situations, the objectives have proven to be too ambitious, while in others, Western policies have suffered from shortcomings of their own making. An additional factor, however, is often paid insufficient attention: the attitudes and behaviour of the very governments and political elites that rule weak states. These actors, indiscriminately called "partners" because Western actors rely on their cooperation, often do not share the interests of their external supporters. This report examines how the governments of externally dependent crisis states engage with Western policy prescriptions. Which strategies do local elites employ to shape Western policies in an effort to make them compatible with their own political interests? Three examples of Western efforts to reform fragile states in Africa are presented. They concern fairly typical Western security policies and how these are "successfully" handled by ruling elites in African states: crisis and conflict prevention in Chad, security sector reform in DR Congo, and counter-terrorism in Uganda. The report shows how Western policies towards Africa's crisis-ridden states run the risk of being used as instruments of local government elites. They can fail in their objectives (as in Congo and Chad) or have unexpected consequences, which present new problems such as authoritarian tendencies and increased levels of corruption (as in Uganda). The fact that such states are politically and economically ...

Perceptions of governmental responsiveness matter because of their influence on the willingness of citizens to participate in politics and thereby express their interests and hold policymakers accountable. Where do external efficacy attitudes emerge? In recent years, scholars have examined this question by turning to personality traits, especially extraversion. Extant studies reveal a positive relationship between extraversion and external efficacy, but thus far they have focused on high‐income democracies. How consistent are findings across countries with varying levels of political and economic development? In my view, the answer depends on the level of corruption and its implications for external efficacy. Where low (high) levels of bribery and other forms of malfeasance enable (impede) public influence on governmental decision‐making, greater levels of extraversion will increase (decrease) perceptions of governmental responsiveness. I test my hypothesis with three sources of nationally representative survey data that include countries from North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean. My results have implications for the quality of democracy.

Extraversion is a personality trait commonly required in sales jobs, and a demonstrated element of efficient performance in such jobs. Considering extraversion's subtrait structure relevant for sales positions (sociability – enjoyment of social activities; affiliation –
enjoying and valuing close interpersonal bonds, being warm and affectionate; and ascendance – social dominance, enjoyment of leadership roles and assertiveness), a confirmatory factor analysis was used to test this structure of the extraversion construct, measured using biographical
information (biodata). Biodata were chosen because they are an inexpensive and effective technique for predicting future job success. Our findings confirm the discriminant validity of sociability, affiliation and ascendance, and validate the indicators developed for each of these dimensions
of extraversion.

The process of extraversion is in the heart of the functioning of the Mauritanian State. In the long lasting, it produced a political and commercial elite which knew how to value the mining and fishing resources of the country. With the stake in exploitation of new resources (oil and gold), the extraversion recently strengthened. The international connections multiply, in particular with the countries of the Gulf, and facilitate businessmen powerful and inserted well into the first circles of the power. The " offshore Mauritania " dominates henceforth on the inside of the country and the society, from which elites disconnect gradually. ; Le processus d'extraversion est au cœur du fonctionnement de l'État mauritanien. Dans la longue durée, il a produit une élite politico-commerciale qui a su valoriser les richesses minières et halieutiques du pays. Avec la mise en exploitation de nouvelles ressources (pétrole et or), l'extraversion s'est récemment renforcée. Les connexions internationales se multiplient, en particulier avec les pays du Golfe, et favorisent des hommes d'affaires puissants et bien insérés dans les premiers cercles du pouvoir. La " Mauritanie offshore " prime désormais sur l'intérieur du pays et sur la société, desquels les élites se déconnectent progressivement.