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In the fifth book of the Politics Aristotle discusses the issue of change in political constitutions. He focuses primarily (though not exclusively) on constitutional changes which are brought about by faction (stasis). In this chapter I examine Aristotle's account of faction. I support two main theses: Aristotle distinguishes different types of faction based on the diverse motives of agents of faction. Those who start faction may be motivated by a wide variety of considerations ranging from ideological concerns to personal vengeance. Aristotle studies the phenomenon of faction from two related but distinct perspectives. On the one hand, he tries to explain the phenomenon of faction by reference to factors which influence the psychology of those who start faction. On the other, he offers a sociological account of the origins of faction in terms of ideological conflict and the injustice of the constitution. The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I try to substantiate the first thesis. In particular I argue that Aristotle distinguishes two different types of faction: politically motivated faction and faction due to personal rivalry. I draw a further distinction within the first type of faction. On the one hand, those who desire greater political power may believe that their current constitution deprives them of their fair share of political power. I call this subtype of politically motivated faction "injustice-induced faction." On the other, the desire for greater political power may be triggered by an unjust desire to have more. I call the second subtype of politically motivated faction "greed-induced faction." These diversely motivated factions have common political consequences. The generated political dissent threatens the existence of the constitution.

I study how a variety of structural and strategic factors affect terrorist mobilization, the likelihood of a splinter faction forming, and the positions adopted by terrorist leaders. The factors considered include the state of the economy, the viability of institutions for the nonviolent expression of grievance, the ability of the factional leaders to provide nonideological benefits, and the risks associated with splintering. The model highlights that, for strategic reasons, changes in the structural environment often entail trade-offs between decreasing terrorist mobilization and increasing extremism. For instance, strengthening the economy or institutions for the nonviolent expression of grievance is found to decrease terrorist mobilization, increase the extremism of terrorist factions, and decrease the likelihood of a splinter faction forming. These results suggest competing micro-level effects of such changes on the expected level of violence that, because they are offsetting, might not be observed in macro-level data analyses, which have been the mainstay of empirical studies of terrorism. Adapted from the source document.

Local parties tend to break into factions competing with each other in much the same way as pol'al parties. The pol'al charge 'bossism' tends to have little effect in a stable pol'al economy, such as Albany, despite its appropriateness. In pol'ly unstable, econ'ly depressed Schenectady, the charge 'bossism' is used indiscriminately with some apparent effect. Pol'al patronage, once the basic pol'al cement, is still a focal point of pol'al activity but is giving way to other bases of org, such as faction. However, the growing division between the secure & pol'ly active bottom in the local economy is separating the traditional source of pol'al leadership from the masses. In such a context, it is easier for an insurgent to build a personal pol'al movement than it is to transform an existing factional split into a successful reform movement. Furthermore, the business community tends to adjust to an incumbent org & in time to defend it regardless of party label & countless allegations of wrongdoing. Finally, general public unconcern approaches a condition of militant apathy against which no amount of campaigning has any effect. 'The leader' becomes more meaningful than the issue. AA.

AbstractWe model faction formation in a world where party politicians' objective is the development of an informed program of governance. Politicians' preferences reflect their own views and their information that, when aggregated via intraparty deliberations, influences the party manifesto. By joining a faction, a politician increases the influence of its leader on the manifesto, but foregoes his individual bargaining power. For broad model specifications, we find that a faction formation process allows power to be transferred to moderate politicians. This facilitates information sharing, increasing the capacity of the party to attain its objective. These positive welfare effects may hold even when factionalism restricts intraparty dialogue, and hold a fortiori when information is freely exchanged across factions. We conclude that the existence of ideological factions may benefit a party: It provides a means to tie uninformed or extremist politicians to more moderate and informed faction leaders.

Local parties tend to break into factions com peting with each other in much the same way as political parties. The political charge "bossism" tends to have little effect in a stable political economy, such as Albany, despite its appropri ateness. In politically unstable, economically depressed Sche nectady, the charge "bossism" is used indiscriminately with some apparent effect. Political patronage, once the basic political cement, is still a focal point of political activity but is giving way to other bases of organization, such as faction. However, the growing division between the secure and politi cally unconcerned top as against the insecure and politically active bottom in the local economy is separating the traditional source of political leadership from the masses. In such a con text, it is easier for an insurgent to build a personal political movement than it is to transform an existing factional split into a successful reform movement. Furthermore, the business community tends to adjust to an incumbent organization and in time to defend it regardless of party label and countless allegations of wrongdoing. Finally, general public unconcern approaches a condition of militant apathy against which no amount of campaigning has any effect. "The leader" becomes more meaningful than the issue.

Through Dr Lal's refreshingly clear and powerful prose and sharply observed stories, we enter the inner world of Indo-Fijian feeling and aspiration. One universal that emerges with particular clarity in the Indo-Fijian experience is the ceaseless struggle to find community in a changing world, balancing the beauty of ritual and tradition against the transcendent value of education and modern rationality. The volume poses the question of how people draw upon historical memory and immediate circumstances to create a social world, and how that world can be shared with others in multicultural society. The answer seems to lie somewhere between history and poetry, as in Dr Lal's 'factions.' Andrew Arno
University of Hawaii
at Manoa, Honolulu