Rwanda – Fair Prices to Farmers
In: Africa research bulletin. Economic, financial and technical series, Band 55, Heft 10
ISSN: 1467-6346
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In: Africa research bulletin. Economic, financial and technical series, Band 55, Heft 10
ISSN: 1467-6346
In: Socialinių mokslų studijos: mokslo darbai = Societal studies : research papers, Band 5, Heft 3, S. 769-792
ISSN: 2029-2244
SSRN
Working paper
In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 126, S. 1-12
In: European review of contract law: ERCL, Band 11, Heft 3
ISSN: 1614-9939
In: Working with older people: community care policy & practice, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 13-15
ISSN: 2042-8790
SSRN
Working paper
This paper examines the impact of frequent changes of investor protection regulation on the bid premium levels and the reception of the bid by the minority shareholders in blockholder regimes. In order to document the corporate governance function of takeover regulation, we explore a comprehensive data set representing more than 90% of the takeovers organized in Romania between 1998 and 2012. The peculiar institutional framework in Romania allows factoring in the analysis a hitherto unexplored structural element, namely the parallel control transactions managed by the government, outside the stock market structures. After controlling for the influence of corporate governance and ownership attributes of targets, our main findings suggests that various market price components are strong predictors of both bid premiums and tender success. Besides, the alignment of legal details to the requirements of the European takeover regulation has a surprising negative effect on minority claimants. If the shareholders are indeed able to distil the pertinent information about a bid, our overall result suggests that the balance between competing concerns of protecting minority shareholders and facilitating value-creating transactions is still open to debate in emerging markets
BASE
This paper examines the impact of frequent changes of investor protection regulation on the bid premium levels and the reception of the bid by the minority shareholders in blockholder regimes. In order to document the corporate governance function of takeover regulation, we explore a comprehensive data set representing more than 90% of the takeovers organized in Romania between 1998 and 2012. The peculiar institutional framework in Romania allows factoring in the analysis a hitherto unexplored structural element, namely the parallel control transactions managed by the government, outside the stock market structures. After controlling for the influence of corporate governance and ownership attributes of targets, our main findings suggests that various market price components are strong predictors of both bid premiums and tender success. Besides, the alignment of legal details to the requirements of the European takeover regulation has a surprising negative effect on minority claimants. If the shareholders are indeed able to distil the pertinent information about a bid, our overall result suggests that the balance between competing concerns of protecting minority shareholders and facilitating value-creating transactions is still open to debate in emerging markets
BASE
This paper examines the impact of frequent changes of investor protection regulation on the bid premium levels and the reception of the bid by the minority shareholders in blockholder regimes. In order to document the corporate governance function of takeover regulation, we explore a comprehensive data set representing more than 90% of the takeovers organized in Romania between 1998 and 2012. The peculiar institutional framework in Romania allows factoring in the analysis a hitherto unexplored structural element, namely the parallel control transactions managed by the government, outside the stock market structures. After controlling for the influence of corporate governance and ownership attributes of targets, our main findings suggests that various market price components are strong predictors of both bid premiums and tender success. Besides, the alignment of legal details to the requirements of the European takeover regulation has a surprising negative effect on minority claimants. If the shareholders are indeed able to distil the pertinent information about a bid, our overall result suggests that the balance between competing concerns of protecting minority shareholders and facilitating value-creating transactions is still open to debate in emerging markets
BASE
This paper examines the impact of frequent changes of investor protection regulation on the bid premium levels and the reception of the bid by the minority shareholders in blockholder regimes. In order to document the corporate governance function of takeover regulation, we explore a comprehensive data set representing more than 90% of the takeovers organized in Romania between 1998 and 2012. The peculiar institutional framework in Romania allows factoring in the analysis a hitherto unexplored structural element, namely the parallel control transactions managed by the government, outside the stock market structures. After controlling for the influence of corporate governance and ownership attributes of targets, our main findings suggests that various market price components are strong predictors of both bid premiums and tender success. Besides, the alignment of legal details to the requirements of the European takeover regulation has a surprising negative effect on minority claimants. If the shareholders are indeed able to distil the pertinent information about a bid, our overall result suggests that the balance between competing concerns of protecting minority shareholders and facilitating value-creating transactions is still open to debate in emerging markets
BASE
In: Challenge: the magazine of economic affairs, Band 52, Heft 6, S. 29-59
ISSN: 1558-1489
In: Georgia Tech Scheller College of Business Research Paper No. 18-6
SSRN
Working paper
In the late 1970s, grain prices had tanked, farm auction notices filled newspapers, and people had forgotten that food didn't grow in grocery stores. So, on February 5, 1979, thousands of tractors from all parts of the US flooded Washington, DC, in protest.--Amazon.com
In: Organization science, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 867-888
ISSN: 1526-5455
Whereas the deliberative democracy approach to ethics seeks to bridge universalist reason and contextual judgment to explain the emergence of intersubjective agreements, it remains unclear how these two are reconciled in practice. We argue that a sensemaking approach is useful for examining how ethical truces emerge in equivocal situations. To understand how actors navigate through ethical complexity, we conducted an ethnographic inquiry into the multistakeholder practices of setting Fairtrade Minimum Prices. We offer three contributions. First, we develop a process model of ethics as sensemaking that explains how actors come to collectively agree on what is ethical in complex situations, even if no complete consensus arises. Second, our findings suggest that moral intuition and affect also motivate ethical judgment alongside moral reasoning. Third, an ethical sensemaking perspective explains some of the pitfalls actors confront in coping with ethical complexities in practice and how they attend to the challenges arising from stark inequalities in extreme contexts.