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Fear of life, fear of death, and fear of causing death form a combination that prevents reasoned changes in laws concerning end-of-life situations. This is shown systematically in this article using the methods of conceptual analysis. Prevalent fears are explicated and interpreted to see how their meanings differ depending on the chosen normative stance. When the meanings have been clarified, the impact of the fears on the motivations and justifications of potential legislative reforms are assessed. Two main normative stances are evoked. The first makes an appeal to individual self-determination, or autonomy, and the second to the traditional professional ethics of physicians. These views partly share qualifying elements, including incurability and irreversibility of the patient's medical condition, proximity of death, the unbearable nature of suffering, and issues of voluntariness further shade the matter. The conclusion is that although many motives to change end-of-life laws are admirable, they are partly contradictory, as are calls for autonomy and appeals to professional ethics; to a degree that good, principled legislative solutions remain improbable in the foreseeable future. ; Peer reviewed

Fear is among the most powerful of human feelings. Urban fear, the fear of being victims of crime and violence in urban space, particularly so. Urban fear shapes space and is in turn shaped by space. The relationship between fear and space has been studied in terms of three key dimensions: urban (geo)politics, or the political economies of security; otherness, the way social cleavages (e.g., race/ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality) mediate the encounter in urban space; and space, the role of the built environment and (modernist) spatialities and urban planning. In line with the recent affective turn in social and cultural geography, the concept of landscapes of fear has provided a fruitful theoretical instrument to understand the co-constitution of emotions and practices in this field. By connecting the dimensions of (geo)politics, otherness, and space, the mobilization of the concept of landscape has allowed understanding how context-specific, yet trans-scalar, atmospheres of fear are (re)produced at the intersection of political-economic, socio-cultural, and technical factors. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

While urbanisation has always been welcomed as a driver to economic amelioration, it has also been criticised for raising expectations and complicating the lives of urban residents. With urban development, wellbeing is often compromised as income disparity increases, quality of life decreases. Of late, crime has been a major concern. Criminal activities have eroded the sense of urban wellbeing and caused the desertion of neighbourhoods. While the Malaysian government tries to achieve sustainable urban development by containing urban sprawl, crime is undoing these efforts. Interviews with residents in crime-prone areas show that many are increasingly threatened by criminal activities in their neighbourhoods and have shown high tendencies to move out of the neighbourhoods. Steps to contain this problem is by having neighbourhood-level security measures as well as heightened involvement in community safety initiatives

It is widely thought that electoral strategies fall into one of two camps. Either they play to fear of the alternative or they are based on the hope of a better tomorrow. This is simplistic but is nevertheless a useful frame of reference.In the US, perhaps the best example of the politics of hope was Ronald Reagan, whose sunny demeanour and promise of 'morning in America' won the votes of millions. Bill Clinton similarly swept to power in 1992 to the soundtrack of Fleetwood Mac's "Don't stop thinking about tomorrow".

• Dr. Maclay Lyon, named earlier by the health board to be in charge of school inspection, emphasized last night the danger of influenza and the need for better medical inspection in Kansas City Public Schools• Dr. Lyon says 35 volunteer physicians are needed and that only 15 have agreed to help so far; volunteers are to giver there names to Dr. Lyon at 501 Bryant Building• The school board and health board have no funds to pay physicians to inspect schools and are dependent on philanthropy; Lyons said that an effort has been started to introduce a bill in the legislature to provide means for the issuance of bonds for school inspection ; Newspaper article ; 10A

A Japanese airbase on the Pacific Island of Iwo Jima gave the island vital military significance, A young marine finds himself in the frontline of the seaborne invasion force taking part in one of World War II's fiercest battles. This is his story.

Currently artificial emotions are being extensively used in robots. Most of these implementations are employed to display affective states. Nevertheless, their use to drive the robot's behavior is not so common. This is the approach followed by the authors in this work. In this research, emotions are not treated in general but individually. Several emotions have been implemented in a real robot, but in this paper, authors focus on the use of the emotion of fear as an adaptive mechanism to avoid dangerous situations. In fact, fear is used as a motivation which guides the behavior during specific circumstances. Appraisal of fear is one of the cornerstones of this work. A novel mechanism learns to identify the harmful circumstances which cause damage to the robot. Hence, these circumstances elicit the fear emotion and are known as fear releasers. In order to prove the advantages of considering fear in our decision making system, the robot's performance with and without fear are compared and the behaviors are analyzed. The robot's behaviors exhibited in relation to fear are natural, i.e., the same kind of behaviors can be observed on animals. Moreover, they have not been preprogrammed, but learned by real interactions in the real world. All these ideas have been implemented in a real robot living in a laboratory and interacting with several items and people. ; The funds have been provided by the Spanish Government through the project called "A new approach to social robotics" (AROS), of MICINN (Ministry of Science and Innovation) and through the RoboCity2030- II-CM project (S2009/DPI-1559), funded by Programas de Actividades I+D en la Comunidad de Madrid and cofunded by Structural Funds of the EU.

Over the last three years Europe and North America have been hit by an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals motivated by jihadist ideology. Who are the individuals who have carried out these attacks? Were they born and raised in the West? Or were they an "imported threat", refugees and migrants? How did they radicalize? Were they well educated and integrated, or social outcasts? Did they act alone? What were their connections to the Islamic State? The answers to these and other questions have large implications for our understanding of the threat facing us and, consequently, help us design sounder policy solutions built on empirical evidence. This study, the first of its kind, seeks to analyze the demographic profile, radicalization trajectories and connections to the Islamic State of all the individuals who have carried out attacks inspired by jihadist ideology in North America and Europe in the three years since the proclamation of the caliphate in June 2014.

Over the last three years Europe and North America have been hit by an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals motivated by jihadist ideology. Who are the individuals who have carried out these attacks? Were they born and raised in the West? Or were they an "imported threat", refugees and migrants? How did they radicalize? Were they well educated and integrated, or social outcasts? Did they act alone? What were their connections to the Islamic State? The answers to these and other questions have large implications for our understanding of the threat facing us and, consequently, help us design sounder policy solutions built on empirical evidence. This study, the first of its kind, seeks to analyze the demographic profile, radicalization trajectories and connections to the Islamic State of all the individuals who have carried out attacks inspired by jihadist ideology in North America and Europe in the three years since the proclamation of the caliphate in June 2014.

A decline in the number of wars, genocides and human rights abuses over the past decade? The Human Security Report 2005 uncovers surprising trends in global conflict. ; Other UBC ; Unreviewed ; Other

Fear has long served elites. They rely on fear to keep and expand their privileges and control the masses. In the current crisis of the capitalist world system, elites in the United States, along with other central countries, promote fear of crime and terrorism. They shaped these fears so that people looked to authorities for security, which permitted extension of apparatuses of coercion like police and military forces. In the face of growing oppression, rebellion against elite hegemony remains possible. This book offers an analysis of the crisis and strategies for rebellion.

We tune in on fear to make it visible and detect its drifts. We collect verbal signals of coming fear burrowed in the crackles of political and other speeches by leading figures: Familiar words people use to express fear. From the EmoLex database (Mohammad and Turney in Comput Intel 29(3):436–465, 2013), we develop a computer-readable "Fear Index" to chase fear in the West. We aim a view from above to see how fear has changed, or hasn't. We first look how valid is the "Fear Index" on texts (fearful novels and historical documents) expected to display specific profiles of fear. Then trace the trend fear follows in speeches of European leaders. The "Fear Index" decreases in the speeches and documents of European political and economic spheres (President Donald Tusk—European Council—, President Mario Draghi—European Central Bank—, and the Global Trade Alert agency). The "Fear Index" spirals upwards among humanitarian leaders (Pope Francis, the Archbishop Justin Welby, and the International Committee of the Red Cross). We record no significant change in the trend of the "Fear Index" in the speeches of President Vladimir Putin. Humanitarian and political leaders changing in counterpoint prompt questions about empathy, or lack of that, in a now bipolar West.

We tune in on fear to make it visible and detect its drifts. We collect verbal signals of coming fear burrowed in the crackles of political and other speeches by leading figures: Familiar words people use to express fear. From the EmoLex database (Mohammad and Turney in Comput Intel 29(3):436–465, 2013), we develop a computer-readable "Fear Index" to chase fear in the West. We aim a view from above to see how fear has changed, or hasn't. We first look how valid is the "Fear Index" on texts (fearful novels and historical documents) expected to display specific profiles of fear. Then trace the trend fear follows in speeches of European leaders. The "Fear Index" decreases in the speeches and documents of European political and economic spheres (President Donald Tusk—European Council—, President Mario Draghi—European Central Bank—, and the Global Trade Alert agency). The "Fear Index" spirals upwards among humanitarian leaders (Pope Francis, the Archbishop Justin Welby, and the International Committee of the Red Cross). We record no significant change in the trend of the "Fear Index" in the speeches of President Vladimir Putin. Humanitarian and political leaders changing in counterpoint prompt questions about empathy, or lack of that, in a now bipolar West.

In this research, I attempt to discuss the fear' in the poetry of the Ummayad poet al-Furazdaq poetry. In the introduction.The paper consists of four section; the first focuses on the poet's political fear, the second focuses on the poet's fear of time, the third focuses on fear of the poet and what the poet says and the fourth describes the various techniques used by al-Furazdaq to resist fear. Al-Furazdaq clearly lived in a state of fear in the various stages of his life. His political fear was caused by the political strategies of the time such as the marginalisation of the other and restrictions on freedom of speech. In his poetry, Al-Furazdaq resists the fear of politics through employing culture. He used strategies of imposing the self and magnifying it in addition to threatening the other through marginalisation. The poet's fear of time was represented mainly with aging and death. Al-Furazdaq seemed more occupied with politics than matters of death and perhaps that is because he was more concerned with tribal matters rather than religion.

Americans can be divided into two groups: those who own guns and those who do not. Although people who own guns and people who do not own guns are often separated along social, cultural, and political lines, it is unclear whether these divisions might extend to population differences in emotional experience. In this paper, we use national cross-sectional data from the 2014 Chapman University Survey on American Fears (n = 1385) to test whether gun owners are more or less afraid than people who do not own guns. We build on previous work by testing two hypotheses with a broad range of fear-related outcomes, including specific phobias and fears associated with being victimized. The symptom perspective argues that gun ownership is a behavioral expression of fear, that gun owners need guns to protect themselves because they are irrational cowards. Although binary logistic regression models provided minimal support for this idea, there was some evidence to suggest that the odds of gun ownership are higher for people who report being afraid of being victimized by a random/mass shooting. The palliative perspective claims that gun ownership mitigates fear, that owning a powerful weapon is somehow soothing to individuals and their families. Ordinary least squares and negative binomial regression models suggest that people who own guns tend to report lower levels of phobias and victimization fears than people who do not own guns. This general pattern is observed across multiple indicators of fear (e.g., of animals, heights, zombies, and muggings), multiple outcome specifications (continuous and count), and with adjustments for age, gender, race/ethnicity, education, household income, marital status, the presence of children, religious identity, religiosity, religious attendance, political orientation, region of residence, and urban residence. Additional longitudinal research is needed to confirm our findings with a wider range of covariates and fear-related outcomes.