Federalism in 2030
In: Graz Law Working Paper No 01-2022; C Bezemek, Constitutionalism 2030 (2022)
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In: Graz Law Working Paper No 01-2022; C Bezemek, Constitutionalism 2030 (2022)
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In: International Constitutional Law, Volume 4, p. 171
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In: Australian journal of public administration: the journal of the Royal Institute of Public Administration Australia, Volume 61, Issue 2, p. 69-77
ISSN: 0313-6647
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Volume 38, Issue 2, p. 167-191
ISSN: 1747-7107
We offer a theoretical approach to federalism by defining a theoretical approach as a general account of the subject. It is general in that it applies in any political situation, at any time in history when political entities that are recognizable as nations existed. It is an account in being a systematic examination of the subject that is connected to the overall structure of analysis in one or more academic disciplines, in this case law and political science. Following this approach, we reach the conclusion that federalism must be understood as a matter of political identity. People's individual commitments in the political realm, their sense of who they are and where they belong, will determine the descriptive reality and the prescriptive necessity of federal arrangements. Adapted from the source document.
In: Publius: the journal of federalism, Volume 30, Issue 2, p. 1-16
ISSN: 0048-5950
Ethiopia adopted ethnic federalism and restructured the regions along ethnic lines as soon as the EPRDF took political power by overthrowing the Marxist military government in 1991. The aim of this paper is to examine the merits and the demerits of federalism. The paper particularly assesses federalism in Africa by taking the case of Ethiopia as an example. The paper argues that in order to ensure the success of federalism, it should not be imposed from above. Since its introduction in 1991 and officially sanctioned in the country's 1994 Constitution, ethnic federalism and Article 39 of the Constitution that awarded the self-rule states (regions) the right to secede has become the major source of intense debate. For some, ethnic federalism and the right to secede discourage ethnic tensions in the country and encourage the various ethnic groups to live together peacefully. However, for others, this "experiment" can go out of hand and may lead the country into never-ending ethnic wars and eventually to disintegration. This paper, by taking into account of Ethiopia's and other countries' experiences, will examine both sides of the arguments.
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This Essay addresses a gap in the federalism literature. Scholars have offered two distinct visions of federal-state relations. The first depicts states as rivals and challengers to the federal government, roles they play by virtue of being autonomous policymakers outside the federal system. A second vision is offered by scholars of cooperative federalism, who argue that in most areas states serve not as autonomous outsiders, but supportive insiders – servants and allies carrying out federal policy. Legal scholarship has not connected these competing visions to consider how the state's status as servant, insider, and ally might enable it to be a sometime dissenter, rival, and challenger. The literature has not developed a vocabulary for describing how states use regulatory power conferred by the government to resist federal policy, let alone a full account of the implications of this practice. It has thus neglected the possibilities associated with what we call "uncooperative federalism." In this Essay, we provide an initial descriptive and normative account of this undertheorized aspect of our federalism. We also explore what a strong commitment to uncooperative federalism would mean for the doctrines on commandeering and preemption, offering some counterintuitive conclusions about the ways in which weakening the protections for state autonomy might push states to engage in stronger forms of dissent.
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In: Perspectives on political science, Volume 19, Issue 4, p. 216
ISSN: 1045-7097
In: FSU College of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 614
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Working paper
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In: The responsive community, Volume 10, Issue 3, p. 49-52
ISSN: 1053-0754
In: University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 19, Issue 1
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In: Journal of contemporary studies: JCS, Volume 4, Issue 4, p. 71-77
ISSN: 0272-7595
In: Australian journal of public administration, Volume 61, Issue 2, p. 69-77
ISSN: 1467-8500
Famously, federalism combines self‐rule with shared rule or unity with diversity. Typically, the mix is achieved by creating or preserving two levels of government, each with a direct relationship with the people, and by dividing power between them. Traditionally, unity is achieved through the exercise of power by the central government, in relation to the polity as a whole. Diversity is the consequence of the exercise of power by sub‐national governments over a portion of the population, generally territorially identified. The boundaries of power between the two spheres are secured by entrenching them in a written Constitution established as fundamental law, which is interpreted and applied by a court or courts.