Suchergebnisse

Globale helsespørsmål har mange berøringspunkter med internasjonal fred og sikkerhet, men har blitt viet relativt lite oppmerksomhet i diskusjoner i FNs sikkerhetsråd. Denne artikkelen gir en oversikt over kunnskapsgrunnlaget for sammenhengen mellom helse og internasjonal fred og sikkerhet, og belyser fire hovedgrupper av årsakssammenhenger. For det første kan uhelse føre til væpnet konflikt. For det andre kan helsekriser bidra til å svekke beredskapen mot konflikt. For det tredje kan helseintervensjoner bidra til å stabilisere sårbare samfunn i kjølvannet av konflikt. For det fjerde gjør konflikt det vanskelig å løse helsekriser. Alle disse berører også direkte eller indirekte Norges fire hovedprioriteter som valgt medlem i FNs sikkerhetsråd for perioden 2021–2022. Gjennomgangen av disse fire årsakssammenhengene demonstrerer at globale helsespørsmål på flere områder er klart relevante for global sikkerhet.
Abstract in English:Global Health and Security – an Overview of Academic KnowledgeGlobal health issues are relevant to international peace and security in numerous ways but have so far received little attention in the United Nations Security Council. This article provides an overview of the status of academic knowledge about the ways that global health and international peace and security are connected, and it highlights four main causal relationships. First, societies with poor overall health conditions or with great health inequalities between different groups, are more prone to armed conflict. Second, health crises can weaken societies' resilience and capacity to deal with conflict. Third, health interventions may contribute to stabilize vulnerable post-conflict societies in the wake of conflict. And fourth, armed conflict makes it more difficult to solve health crises. All four aspects of the health and security nexus directly or indirectly touch on Norway's four main priorities as an elected member of the UN Security Council in 2021–2022. The presentation of the various causal relations demonstrates that global health issues are clearly relevant for global security.

In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Along- side this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aes- thetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activi- ties are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice that has consequences beyond the digital, the semi- otic, and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment. ; In recent years, the Swedish Armed Forces have produced and distributed highly edited video clips on YouTube that show moving images of military activity. Alongside this development, mobile phone apps have emerged as an important channel through which the user can experience and take an interactive part in the staging of contemporary armed conflict. This article examines the way in which the aesthetic and affective experience of Swedish defence and security policy is socially and (media-)culturally (co-)constructed and how the official representation of Swedish military intervention (re)produces political and economic effects when these activities are distributed through traditional and social media such as YouTube and digital apps. Based on Isabela and Norman Fairclough's thoughts on political discourse, Michel Foucault's dialectic idea of power/knowledge, and Sara Ahmed's concept of the affective, I discuss how the Swedish digital military aesthetic is part of a broader political and economic practice which has consequences beyond the digital, the semiotic and what might at first glance appear to be pure entertainment.

USA hadde ingen doktriner for opprørsbekjempelse (COIN) da operasjonene i Afghanistan og Irak startet. Mens krigene pågikk ble det, til tross for stor uenighet, innført en slik doktrine i 2007. Krigene førte også til både endringer i organisering og utrustning av amerikanske styrker, og til store endringer av planlagte investeringer av militært ustyr. Begge krigene endte i nederlag, og i tiden etter har USA på ny fokusert på stormaktsrivalisering. Men utgiftene til krigføringen i Afghanistan og Irak, og endringene i investeringsmønster, har svekket USAs evne til å konkurrere militært med Kina og Russland.
Abstract in EnglishAfghanistan, Iraq and the Development of US Military PowerThe United States had no doctrine for Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) when the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq started in 2001 and 2003, respectively. In 2001 the US armed forces were designed for Great Power competition and conflict. During the course of the wars, substantial changes were made in the organization and equipment of the forces, and a COIN doctrine was introduced in 2007. In turn, large scale modernization of, and investments in, equipment suited for Great Power conflict were reduced in scale or cancelled. The cost of the wars and the changes in operational focus have blunted the US's ability to compete militarily with China and Russia.

I 2001 besluttet Stortinget en vesentlig endring i forsvarskonsept og en betydelig reduksjon i forsvarsstrukturen. Forsvarets hovedoppgave skulle ikke lenger være å utgjøre et mobiliseringsbasert invasjonsforsvar. Beslutningen var et brudd med forsvarskonseptet som hadde dominert norsk forsvarsplanlegging under den kalde krigen og i tiåret som fulgte. Hvorfor ble invasjonsforsvaret forlatt, og hva ble Forsvarets nye hovedoppgave? Artikkelen argumenterer for at det finnes tre dominerende og delvis konkurrerende forklaringer på omleggingen av Forsvaret: en sikkerhetspolitisk, en kulturell og en økonomisk. Den første tilnærmingen ser beslutningen som drevet av et ønske om å bidra mer i utenlandsoperasjoner for å bli oppfattet som en «god alliert» i NATO og USA. Den andre forklarer overgangen med en kulturell endring der en ny og mer «internasjonalisert» forsvarspolitisks diskurs vant frem blant norske beslutningstakere. Den tredje ser endringen som et uunngåelig resultat av invasjonsforsvarets manglende økonomiske bærekraft.
Abstract in English:Security Policy, Culture or Defence Economics? Competing Explanations for the Transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces after the Cold WarIn 2001, the Storting – Norway's parliament – decided on a significant change in Norway's national defence concept and a significant reduction in the defence structure. The Armed Forces' main task should no longer be to constitute a mobilization-based territorial defence force. The decision was a break with the defence concept that had dominated Norwegian defence planning during the Cold War and in the decade that followed. Why was territorial defence abandoned, and what became the Armed Forces' new main task? The article argues that there are three dominant and partly competing explanations for the transformation of the Armed Forces: a security policy explanation, a cultural explanation and an economic explanation. The first approach sees the decision as driven by a desire to contribute more in international operations in order to be perceived as a "good ally" in NATO and the United States. The second explains the transformation with cultural changes among Norwegian decision-makers, through which a new and more "internationalized" defence policy discourse became dominant. The third sees the change as the inevitable result of the financial unsustainability of the old status quo in the Armed Forces.

This brief synthesises the IECEU project's most essential findings on the effectiveness of European Union (EU) missions in four Africa countries: Libya, South Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Central African Republic (CAR). It describes the main elements and impact of the EU missions in these countries, identifies key strategic and operational shortfalls and offers recommendations on how the EU can improve its effectiveness in future conflict prevention and crisis management missions. The EU missions investigated differ in scale, length, objective, budget, priority and context. However, the EU missions presented in this brief share the main characteristic that they have all been deployed under the union's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)2 with the explicit intent of improving the overall security situation and addressing conflicts in Africa. This brief will start by providing a short overview of each case, describing the conflict(s), security situation, mission objectives and obstacles. In this way, it compares the overall effectiveness of EU operational conflict prevention across the four African countries and discusses what lessons can be learned from them. The brief does not include all factors needed to answer thisquestion, but highlights the IECEU project's most significant findings in these cases.

Invasjonen av Afghanistan i 2001 ble delvis rettferdiggjort som en krig for å redde afghanske kvinner. Artikkelen viser hvordan denne – dypt problematiske – «feministiske» innrammingen av krigen på mange måter har overskygget for det som har funnet sted av betydelige fremskritt når det gjelder kvinners situasjon i perioden etter 2001. Videre utforsker jeg hvordan disse fremskrittene ble underkjent som så utbetydelige at de uten større konsekvenser kunne settes til side i en mulig fredsavtale med Taliban. Dermed ble afghanske kvinneaktivister som ønsket å fremme krav om kvinners rettigheter i en eventuell fredsprossess anklaget for å sette sine egne elitistiske behov foran muligheten til å få slutt på krigen. Et liknende motsetningsforhold har oppstått etter at Taliban tok makten i august 2021, i form av et konstruert valg mellom befolkningens mulighet til å overleve den humanitære krisen i kjølvannet av Talibans maktovertakelse på den ene siden, og å insistere på prinsippene knyttet til kvinners rettigheter på den andre.
Abstract in EnglishThe Feminist War and Its VictimsThe 2001 invasion of Afghanistan was partially justified as a war to liberate the country's women. This article shows how the – deeply problematic – 'feminist' framing of the war in many ways eclipsed the significant progress that has taken place in regards to Afghan women's rights since 2001. Furthermore, I explore how such progress came to be denoted as so insignificant as to be easily cast aside in a prospective peace agreement with the Taliban. Afghan women activists who sought to advance women's rights in a potential peace process were accused of prioritizing their own elitist interests above the possibility of ending the war. A similar dichotomy has emerged after the Taliban's seizure of power in 2021, in the shape of a posited choice between the population's ability to survive the humanitarian crisis developing in the aftermath of Taliban's takeover on the one hand, and insisting on principles of women's rights on the other.

Selv om norske myndigheter ligger på verdenstoppen i digitalisering av offentlige tjenester, står landets forsvar fremdeles «på stedet hvil». I kjernen av problemet finner vi en styringsmodell der 14 ulike forsvarsgrener og selvstendige driftsenheter kjemper om makt og innflytelse. Dette gjelder særlig i spørsmålet om hvem som skal ha ansvar og myndighet når Forsvarets IKT-systemer skal knyttes sammen for å øke cyberberedskapen. Hvordan kan vi beskrive, forklare og forstå de digitale problemene som Forsvaret står oppe i? Nyere forskning gir ikke klare svar, blant annet fordi de fleste studiene er opptatt av å studere utfordringene som kommer utenfra og inn mot Norge. Spørsmålet om hvorfor Forsvaret ikke klarer å forsvare seg mot cyberangrep, eller hvorfor etaten ikke holder tritt med resten av samfunnet, forblir derfor ubesvart. Ved å bruke instrumentelle og kulturelle perspektiver fra organisasjonsteorien finner vi store huller i forsvarsevnen på grunn av intern fragmentering og rivalisering.
Abstract in English:National Defence in a Digital Crisis?Even though the Norwegian authorities are world leaders in digitalization of public services, its armed forces are falling behind. In its essence, the problem lies in a management model with 14 different services striving for power and influence. This is particularly so when it comes to whom should have supreme authority as information and communication technology (ICT) systems are standardised across the force. How can we describe, explain and comprehend this digital complexity? Contemporary research does not provide clear answers, much due to over-emphasis on external cyberthreats. The question of why Norway's armed forces are incapable of providing a proper defence against cyberthreats therefore remains unanswered. By means of instrumental and cultural theories, we find grave deficiencies due to internal rivalry and organisational fragmentation.

NATO har i det seneste årti orienteret sig mod de defensive aktiviteter i cyberspace, men i slutningen af 2017 gjorde alliancen det klart, at fremtidig planlægning af militære operationer også kommer til at indeholde muligheden for offensive cyberspaceoperationer (OCO). Inklusionen af OCO sker ved hjælp af en såkaldt "effektbaseret model". Ifølge denne model efterspørger NATOs øverstkommanderende – igennem det nyoprettede NATO Cyber Operations Centre – en specifik cybereffekt hos medlemsstaterne. Nærværende artikel peger på modellens muligheder og udfordringer. For selvom OCO indeholder et potentiale som redskab for løbende forstyrrelser af modstanderens netværk, så indeholder OCO også en række begrænsninger og faldgruber, når de skal integreres i en forespørgselsdreven og effektbaseret model: Det gælder i særlig grad manglende koordination omkring effekter (risiko for kollisioner) samt vanskeligheder ved inddæmning og vurdering af effekter. Disse begrænsninger svækker signalet om, at alliancen nu mestrer og for alvor vil gøre brug af cyberdomænet. Ønsker NATO at sende et klart signal, bør alliancen drøfte internt, hvordan man forholder sig til de aktiviteter, der ikke blot knytter sig til væbnet konflikt, som cyberspace også – og primært – tilbyder.
Absract in English
For the past decade, NATO has prioritised a strengthened cyber defence. However, at the end of 2017, the alliance made it clear that future operational planning will include the possibility of offensive cyberspace operations (OCO). The integration of OCO will happen through an effect-based model where the NATO commander – through the new NATO Cyber Operations Centre – requests a specific effect from member states. This article assesses the risks and opportunities of this model. It argues that even though OCO holds much potential for constant disruptions of an adversary's networks, OCO comes with several limitations and pitfalls when integrated through a request- and effect-based model. These include the risk of confliction and the difficulty of containing and assessing cyber effects. Such limitations weaken the ability to signal that NATO has the capacity to master this new domain. If NATO wants a to send a clear signal to adversaries, then the alliance needs to start discussing how it can utilise the possibilities below the threshold of armed conflict, which cyberspace primarily offers.

Den islamske republikken Iran har bygd et transnasjonalt nettverk av sjiamilitser siden 1979, ofte referert til som dens asymmetriske krigføringsstyrke og 'strategiske dybde'. Mens det er velkjent at Iran har mobilisert disse aktørene for å styrke sin regionale posisjon, har hvordan den har gjort det blitt viet lite vitenskapelig oppmerksomhet. Denne artikkelen forsøker derfor å forklare dette fenomenet ved å undersøke hvordan Iran har mobilisert irakiske sjiamilitser siden 1979. De utvalgte analyseenhetene representerer de mest innflytelsesrike sjiamilitsene med tilknytning til Iran i Irak i dag: Badr Organisation, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq og Kata'ib Hizbullah. Selv om variasjon eksisterer mellom dem, er alle del av et transnasjonalt nettverk som har hjulpet Iran med å delta i skjult og/eller indirekte konfliktintervensjon i Midtøsten i flere tiår. Den komparative casestudien har blitt benyttet som forskningsdesign, med prosessporing og semi-strukturerte intervjuer som metode for datainnsamling. Den empiriske analysen har blitt rettledet av et teoretisk rammeverk som har forsøkt å bygge en bro mellom contentious politics og eksisterende litteratur om dynamikken mellom stater og væpnede opprørere. De empiriske funnene antyder at Iran har opptrådt som en sekterisk entreprenør som på pragmatisk vis har kombinert sine materielle og ikke-materielle ressurser for å mobilisere likesinnede militser til å delta i kollektiv vold og fremme felles krav.
Abstract in English:
The Islamic Republic of Iran has been building a transnational network of Shi'a militias since 1979, commonly referred to as its asymmetric warfare capability and 'strategic depth'. While it is a known fact that Iran has mobilised Shi'a militias in other countries to strengthen its regional position, how they have done it has not received much scholarly attention. The objective of this paper is to explain this phenomenon by examining how Iran has mobilised Iraqi Shi'a militias since 1979. The selected cases are the mobilisation processes of three most prominent Shi'a militias in Iraq today: Badr Organisation, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Hizbullah. Although variation exists between them, they are all cases of Iran's network of armed resistance groups, which have allowed it to engage in covert or indirect conflict intervention in the Middle East. To logically connect the empirical data with the study's research question, I have used a case study research design, with process tracing and the semi-structured interview as methods for data collection. Furthermore, the empirical analysis has been guided by a theoretical framework that has attempted to build a bridge between the existing literatures on state-militia dynamics and contentious politics.

11. september-angrepene og USAs svar utfordret folkerettens regler. Basert på et argument om selvforsvar, lanserte Bush-administrasjonen en global krig mot terrorisme, med fangeleirer, bruk av tortur og utenomrettslige henrettelser. Essayet gir en oversikt over tre folkerettslige hovedproblemstillinger som oppsto i årene etter 2001. Folkerettens regimer om samarbeid for å motarbeide terror var for svake, FN-pakten gav lite klare regler om staters selvforsvarsrett mot ikke-statlige aktører på fremmed jord, og angrepene utfordret folkerettens todeling mellom krig og rettshåndhevelse (humanitærrett og menneskerettigheter). Essayet gjør opp status for hvordan folkeretten utviklet seg på disse områdene etter 2001, og tar stilling til om dette gir grunnlag for å betegne 11. september som et vannskille i folkeretten.
Abstract in English:International Law and 9/11 – a Watershed?The 9/11 attacks and the US global response was a challenge to international law. Based on an argument of self-defense, the Bush-administration launched a global war on terror, established prison-camps, opened up for torture and engaged in targeted killings. The essay provides an overview of the main challenges that arose after 9/11 from the perspective of international law. The international regime for prevention of terrorism was weak, it was unclear to what extent the UN Charter provided states with an independent right to self-defense against non-state actors in foreign states, and the attacks challenged the dichotomy between war and crime (humanitarian law and human rights). The essay analyses how these areas of international law have evolved after 2001 and concludes by assessing whether 9/11 can be deemed a watershed in the development of international law.

On April 25, 2013, UN's Security Council established a 12,600-strong peacekeeping force for Mali. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission (MINUSMA) is to take over and continue the security and stabilization task that the French-led military operation in cooperation with UN's African-led International Support Mission to Mali, AFISMA, initiated in January 2013. The aim of this report is to present a number of long- and short-term perspectives for the recently initiated peace- and state-building process in Mali by focusing on the historical, structural and political causes of the crisis in Mali. Understanding these causes and handling their derived conflict potentials provide a minimum of prerequisites for establishing long-term peace. The report is structured according to four intertwined conflict potentials: Mali's fragile state, the status and background of the Tuareg rebellion, the organized crime and the regional cooperation. .

Denne artikkelens hovedargument er at det i overveldende grad er økonomien som har vært den drivende faktor bak Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen, inkludert da invasjonsforsvar ble forlatt som forsvarskonsept i 2001. De sikkerhetspolitiske endringene har først og fremst vært utnyttet retorisk for å begrunne nedbygging av forsvarsstrukturen, når den økonomiske nødvendigheten ikke lenger lot seg skjule. Kostnader forbundet med økt deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner har kun i svært beskjeden grad bidratt til reduksjonen i forsvarsstrukturen – kostnadene var her alt for lave til å kunne gi noen troverdig årsaksforklaring alene. Årsaken er i stedet at forsvarsbudsjettene etter den kalde krigen ikke kompenserte for den reelle kostnadsutviklingen i sektoren. Det resulterte i et kjøpekrafttap som gradvis tæret på Forsvaret.
Abstract in English:Economy – the Driving Force behind Norwegian Defence Transformation after the Cold WarThe main conclusion of this article is that to an overwhelming degree, economic factors have been the driving force behind the transformation of the Norwegian Armed Forces following the end of the Cold War, including the discontinuation of anti-invasion defence as a level of ambition in 2001. The changes in international affairs have been used rhetorically to justify the downsizing of the force structure, when the financial necessity could no longer be concealed or ignored. Additional costs caused by participation in international operations overseas have only to a very limited extent contributed to the sweeping reduction of the armed forces, since these costs were far too small to explain the cutbacks. The actual financial reason is that the defence budgets throughout the 1990s and 2000s did not compensate for the growth in real term costs in the defence sector, particularly those pertaining to the acquisition and operation of modern weapon platforms and systems. This resulted in a loss of purchasing power which gradually wore down the force structure.

During the 17th and 18th century the German nobility called a planned marriage a pro-ject of marriage, because marriages had a long phase of planning, in which more then two people were involved. Noble projects of marriage had at least the function to create ever-lasting friendship between two noble families. This custom was part of the economic and po-litical strategies of the families involved and had often effects on the development of whole territories. Noble projects of marriage consequently concerned the family law as well as the law of the nobility and the church.I shall discuss the strategies of marriage of a special social group, the so-called Cath-olic German Reichsritterschaft during the 17th and 18th centuries. This noble group was re-garded as a strong partner of the German Imperial Catholic Church, the Reichskirche. Last but not least its members owed their remarkable political careers to the Church, but their idea of marriage were never-the-less in opposition to the canonical marriage laws; in fact, in planning exactly these political careers, which they owed to the Church, their concept of marriage clashed with the impediments to marriage that too close kinship posed. My paper aims at ana-lysing the marriage law of the Church as a papal instrument of influence over this special group of nobles. ; During the 17th and 18th century the German nobility called a planned marriage a pro-ject of marriage, because marriages had a long phase of planning, in which more then two people were involved. Noble projects of marriage had at least the function to create ever-lasting friendship between two noble families. This custom was part of the economic and po-litical strategies of the families involved and had often effects on the development of whole territories. Noble projects of marriage consequently concerned the family law as well as the law of the nobility and the church.I shall discuss the strategies of marriage of a special social group, the so-called Cath-olic German Reichsritterschaft during the 17th ...

It is becoming increasingly popular among Danes to use early voting. The article describes the changes that have been made in the electoral law to accommodate the use of early voting and describes the historical development in the use of early voting. In addition, we show that there is considerable variation in the use of early voting at the municipal level, and that it is especially the citizens of the island municipalities, rich municipalities and metropolitan municipalities that use early voting. In the third part of the analysis, we examine individual differences in the use of early voting with the help of a data set with over two million Danish voters in the municipal elections in 2013. We show that early voting is primarily used by the oldest citizens and citizens with a nontechnical education – two groups that traditionally have turned out at high rates. Finally, we analyze the characteristics that can help to predict which citizens use early voting. ; It is becoming increasingly popular among Danes to use early voting. The article describes the changes that have been made in the electoral law to accommodate the use of early voting and describes the historical development in the use of early voting. In addition, we show that there is considerable variation in the use of early voting at the municipal level, and that it is especially the citizens of the island municipalities, rich municipalities and metropolitan municipalities that use early voting. In the third part of the analysis, we examine individual differences in the use of early voting with the help of a data set with over two million Danish voters in the municipal elections in 2013. We show that early voting is primarily used by the oldest citizens and citizens with a non-technical education – two groups that traditionally have turned out at high rates. Finally, we analyze the characteristics that can help to predict which citizens use early voting.

The Nordic countries have long been renowned for their contribution to international peace and security. This contribution – occasionally viewed by both Nordic and non-Nordic policy-makers and academics as a particular model for facilitating peace and development in international affairs – is based on a combination of active contributions to peaceful conflict resolution, a high level of development aid and a continuous commitment to strengthening international society. However, recently Scandinavians have been making headlines for reasons that seem to contrast with their well-established brand as humane internationalist peacemakers. This article identifies the characteristics of the Nordic model for international peace and security and discusses how and why it has changed.