Suchergebnisse

Labor costs (salary and benefit costs) for federal civilian employees often constitute a substantial portion of an agency's budget, typically exceeding 50% of its total budget. Even for those agencies that have considerable amounts of contract or grant funding, labor costs are an important part of the budget. Federal fiscal years can have three different lengths in hours, depending when they begin and end: 2,080 hours, 2,088 hours, or 2,096 hours (typically in leap years). The US Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 lists the number of hours for each fiscal year. Federal employees are generally paid every two weeks, so there are 26 pay periods (or 26.1 or 26.2) in a year. There are a number of other issues that affect the budget for salary costs. For some agencies, overtime is a big issue. Working and taking compensatory time has no impact on budgeting for labor costs. Adapted from the source document.

We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labour market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages respond in a highly non-linear manner to shocks, exhibiting downward rigidity, and magnifying the response of unemployment to negative shocks. We also consider layoffs and show that for a range of shocks labor hoarding occurs while wages are cut. We argue these features are consistent with recent evidence.

The end of every fiscal year creates something of a spectacle in Washington Merchants and contractors camp outside government offices in the hopes that a few million federal dollars might flow their way, and East Coast branches call their managers in California, to sneak in a few last-minute purchases before midnight Pacific Standard Time. Federal contracting data show a 75% spike In West Coast spending on small contracts on the last day at the fiscal year. Despite attempts at reform, it appears the end-of-the-year spending surge is alive and well the authors write. Adapted from the source document.

Pt. 1: January 27, 1994: the economic and budget outlook, fiscal years 1995-1999; February 8, 9, 10, 1994: the President's fiscal year 1995 budget proposal; February 22, 1994: putting Americans back to work; March 4, 1994: America's schools: meeting the challenge. - III,507 S. - graph. Darst., Tab. - (S. HRG. 103-544). - ISBN 0-16-044552-3; Pt. 2: March 3, 1994: defense overhead waste and management; March 9, 1994: review of the Defense Department roles and missions; March 9, 1994: the President's fiscal year 1995 defense budget request. - III,328 S. - graph. Darst., Tab. - (S. HRG. 103-544). - ISBN 0-16-044554-X

It is often presumed that state and local governments contract out services in order to address budget shortfalls. In this study of public school districts in Washington state, however, results show that districts with stronger fiscal balances are more likely to contract out services than those experiencing fiscal stress. The study finds that teaching salaries as a share of the budget appear to be unaffected by the level of contracting out. It may be, therefore, that school districts find it politically desirable to absorb uncertainty during more solvent times by using slack or last-minute projected surpluses to cover spending for contracting out auxiliary services that can easily be reduced later without affecting staff. This notion of providing a buffer in the budget has implications for the public sector at large. Adapted from the source document.

THE ISSUE OF A 'FLOATING WAGE' IS CENTRAL TO THE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE REFORM OF THE WAGE SYSTEM IN CHINA. THIS WAGE REFORM SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A 'STRUCTURAL WAGE SYSTEM' IN 1985 BUT SUCH AN OVERALL REFORM NEVER TOOK PLACE. ONE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DEBATE ABOUT FLOATING WAGES WAS A RADICAL AND INTERESTING REDEFINITION OF THE LIMITS TO ENTERPRISE INDEPENDENCE. THE DISCUSSION ABOUT REFORM IN CHINA, AS WITH A SIMILAR DISCUSSION IN HUNGARY, SEEMS TO GRAVITATE INEVITABLY FROM THE 'COLLECTIVE CONTRACT SYSTEM', FAMILIAR FROM PRESENT-DAY SOVIET REFORM PROPOSALS, TOWARDS THE PREVIOUSLY TABOO SUBJECT OF 'OWNERSHIP RELATIONS'.

Arguably, Germany had the world's most independent central bank. Surprisingly, however, recent work has found political business cycles in German monetary aggregates. It is hard to explain this with standard models of opportunistic government behavior. Instead, we show that the cycles originate from shifts in money demand tolerated by the Bundesbank. Such shifts occur because, when inflation preferences differ between political parties & election results are uncertain, rational investors avoid entering into long-term financial contracts before elections. Contrary to the Bundesbank's stated commitment to a monetaristic policy rule, it appears to have allowed these changes to have an impact on monetary aggregates. 4 Tables, 2 Figures, 2 Appendixes, 36 References. Adapted from the source document.

Introduction : marketing justice -- Enrollment : precarity, casualization, and alternative admissions -- "Charter review" : policy as culture and ideology -- The legal ed moral economy bubble -- Law school 2.0 : marketing integration, educating investors -- Shared governance in the proprietary legal academy -- "They want the rebels gone" : contract relations in a fiscal state of exception -- The policy cascade : deregulation and moral hazard -- Conclusion : the trouble with differentiation