Research performed under contract no. Co-4620 with Area Redevelopment Administration Department of Commerce, U.S.A. ; Cover title. ; chiefly tables ; Bibliographical footnotes. ; Mode of access: Internet.
Thomas Joe, consultant. ; Jack T. Casey, chairman. ; Cover title. ; v.1. Transcript of proceedings. -- v.2. Background material and testimony. ; Mode of access: Internet.
56Recognition of acts of foreign States — Contract concluded in violation of proper law — Circumstances in which proper law will not be applied — Contract concluded in Kingdom of Bulgaria contrary to Bulgarian fiscal legislation in order to save Jewish property from despoliation — Enforceability of contract in courts of Israel — The law of Israel.
The federal government has never explicitly de clared that prevention of inflation is its responsibility, and only recently has a strong opinion arisen that such a declaration should be made, possibly by amendment of the Employment Act of 1946. Some of those who desire price stability believe that, to achieve it, the federal government should add control over installment purchases and over major wage contracts to its repertoire. They feel that fiscal policy, depending upon Congress, is untrustworthy and that a tight monetary policy does not quickly reach important sectors of the economy. Op position to federal assumption of responsibility for price sta bility comes especially from those who fear that its implemen tation will slow up economic growth. In their view, the "cost- push" is chiefly responsible for our recent inflation and for the prospect that creeping inflation lies ahead. It should be ac cepted as a fact of economic life, with some effort to miti gate its inequities through widespread extension of escalation. Such a step is, however, to be opposed both on grounds of equity and of theory. Widespread escalation is not feasible, and creeping inflation, if accepted as policy, will create eco nomic disorder rather than accelerated growth.
The American federal system has always been characterized by the co-operative interrelationship of federal, state, and local governments which serve the same people, generally share the same goals, and are faced with the same demands. Co-operative federalism as we know it is not de centralization but noncentralization, predicated on broad na tional legislative and fiscal powers joined with a traditional penchant for maintaining maximum local control over govern mental activities. The pattern of intergovernmental relations in the twentieth century has remained within the co-operative tradition established earlier, modified only as necessary in light of the great expansion of government activity in American so ciety since 1913. Because of the present pervasiveness of government in the United States, this means that every level of government is involved in virtually every governmental ac tivity. Intergovernmental relations may involve informal co operation, contracts for simple sharing, interchange of person nel, interdependent activities, grants-in-aid, tax offsets, and shared revenues. The precise character of the co-operative relationship is tailored to fit each program through the politi cal process in which representatives of the federal, state, and local governments and concerned private interests all partici pate. Intergovernmental relations in the twentieth century have evolved through four periods and into a fifth, each of which has contributed something important to the present pat tern of American federalism. Noncentralized government has been maintained in the face of many centralizing pressures only because its mechanisms have been sufficiently flexible to respond to the changing interests of the American people.