Suchergebnisse

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "The military exchange services operate a wide range of retail activities, such as department stores, florist shops, barber and beauty shops, gas stations, and restaurants. Hamburger restaurants represent a major segment of the exchange services' name-brand, fast-food sales. The exchange services use either a direct or an indirect method to operate these restaurants. Under the direct method, the exchange service enters into a franchise agreement with a name-brand company to sell its product on a military installation. As the franchisee, the exchange service builds and operates the restaurant and directly employs and trains the personnel. In turn, the exchange service receives all of the revenues and profits and usually pays the company a licensing fee plus a percentage of the restaurant's sales. Under the indirect method, the exchange service contracts with a name-brand company that, in turn, builds the restaurant and either operates it as a company restaurant or provides a licensed operator. The company or its licensed operator hires, trains, and pays the restaurant personnel and usually pays annual fees and commissions to the exchange service on the basis of restaurant's sales. Under this agreement, the exchange service receives a percentage of the restaurant's annual sales; annual licensing fees; and, in some cases, a signing bonus or minimum guaranteed commissions. GAO's analysis of fiscal year 1998 and 1999 financial data from the Army and Air Force Exchange Service and the Navy Exchange Service Command showed that the indirect method of operating name-brand hamburger restaurants was more profitable than the direct method, regardless of the restaurants' sales volume, restaurant type (free-standing or part of a food court), or location. GAO's investment analysis projected that if new name-brand, hamburger restaurants were to be built, the indirect method would provide a greater return on investment over a 20-year period. Other factors important in choosing between direct and indirect methods include financial and operating risks, customer service issues, employment opportunities for military dependents, and management control of a restaurant's operations. Although the Department of Defense's (DOD) policy on name-brand, fast-food restaurants establishes preferences for when the direct and indirect methods should be used, it does not provide enough guidance or criteria to determine which method to use or when it is appropriate to deviate from the policy. Also, DOD has not been actively involved in monitoring compliance with the policy. As a result, the exchanges have, over time, adopted operating philosophies and business models they believe best suit their particular circumstances."

The 1991 Budget, described by Ruth Richardson in the news media as "the Mother of all Budgets", in effect represents the most brutal assault on the welfare state we have witnessed in New Zealand. Its provisions have been even more far-reaching than the Treasury ideologues and other members of the New Right might have dreamed possible in the heady days of the 1980s. In terms of social policy we have seen a disestablishment of the foundations of the welfare state: the move from universalistic premises to targeting social assistance; the privatisation of the health system; the commercialisation of the Housing Corporation; a reneging on promises in superannuation and education; the emergence of greater state surveillance in the form of "information sharing" between government agencies. All this as part of devising "a strategy for enterprise and growth" based on three objectives – the reform of the labour market (completed under the Employment Contracts Act, 1991), "redesigning" the welfare state, and managing fiscal problems. Ironically, like Saddam's conquest of Kuwait, Ruth Richardson's strategy has turned out to be full of empty promises and U-turns. The "Mother of all Budgets" gave birth to a puny child which has needed all the life support systems that modern neo-liberal politics demand: expert PR to obfuscate the real issues; sheer repetition of claims; the stifling of internal dissent; and the stubborn ideological refusal to admit that many policies have been the product of haste, compromise and collusion. The tertiary education "reforms" put in place as a result of the 1991 July Budget are a perfect illustration – a case in point. The Minister of Finance's speech as the preamble to the Budget reveals in general technocratic terms the place of education: A key element of the Government's strategy is to boost skills and technological knowledge throughout society. In an increasingly competitive world, the quality of our education, science and technology will play a big role in our future prosperity (Budget 1991, p. 7). In practical policy terms for education what does this mean? The document, Education Policy (1991, p. 3) lays out the four key elements of the new policy: Parents as First Teachers; The Achievement Initiative; The National Certificate; and Study Right. Only the last of these is in the area of tertiary education. This paper, accordingly, will concentrate mainly on examining the changes brought about by the introduction of Study Right. It will also outline briefly and make some comment on the new capital charging regime to be introduced for all tertiary institutions in 1993. The paper concludes with a discussion of the notion of competitive neutrality.

The liberalization of capital accounts and the integration of financial markets in recent years have helped to spur growth in many emerging markets and have allowed global investors to diversify risks internationally. Furthermore, increased capita! mobility has helped to tame governments in their fiscal and monetary policies. Nevertheless, the Asian currency and financial crisis and its aftermath have revealed structural problems on the national as well as on the international level and have imposed significant costs on emerging markets as well as on the world economy. • Triggered by these developments, a broad international consensus has emerged to support reforms to strengthen the international financial system. The aim of these reforms will be to create an international financial system that captures the benefits of open and integrated financial markets, and at the same time minimizes the risk of financial crises to emerge and spread to other countries. While the former refers to the need for greater transparency, accountability and prudential regulation, the latter is concerned with the improvement of existing and the creation of new mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of financial crises. International institutions such as the IMF can contribute to the stability of the international financial system. A prominent proposal initially raised by the Clinton administration in fall 1998 designs the creation of a new crisis facility of the IMF to prevent contagion in financial markets. On its recent meeting of April 23, the IMF's Executive Board agreed to provide Contingent Credit Lines for its member countries. The goal of such a facility is to provide preventive credit lines to countries whose economies are fundamentally sound, but which are threatened by financial market contagion and which may lose access to capital markets. In the absence of contagion, these countries should therefore be able to rely on a sustained flow of capital from abroad. The new facility gives rise to a number of questions. First, the distinction between countries in need of ex ante policy adjustments and countries that follow sound economic policies, i.e., the eligibility for the new facility, must be resolved in advance. Second, projections about the likely financial requirements of such a facility and the consequences for the Fund's liquidity position are needed. Another issue relates to the question whether and how private and bilateral creditors should be involved in this new facility. Finally, there is a need for clear guidelines about the terms and conditions that would apply to this new facility. However, as shown in the paper, it will prove difficult to fulfill these criteria and to avoid additional problems related to a precautionary credit line. Based on this skeptical judgment, the paper explores a number of alternative means to foster the stability of the international financial system through a better involvement of private sector creditors. This could be achieved through the introduction of option-type mechanisms that would allow debtors to trigger liquidity support in the case of a crisis. A more radical approach would involve limits to creditors in cases when they would like to reduce their short-term exposure. Another avenue would comprise a reorganization of private claims, either by modifying bond contracts or by adapting bankruptcy procedures. The main task for policy makers, however, remains to increase transparency and improve supervision in financial markets and to pursue sound economic policies.

Russia and other countries in the commonwealth of independent states that have implemented voucher privatization programs have to account for the puzzling behavior of insiders manager-owners-who, in stripping assets from the firms they own, appear to be stealing from one pocket to fill the other. This article suggests that asset stripping and the absence of restructuring result from interactions between insiders and subnational governments in a particular property rights regime, in which the ability to realize value is limited by uncertainty and illiquidity. As the central institutions that govern the Russian economy have ceded their powers to the provinces, regional and local governments have imposed a variety of distortions on enterprises to protect local employment. To disentangle these vicious circles of control, this article considers three sets of institutional changes: adjustments to the system of fiscal federalism by which subnational governments would be allowed to retain tax revenues generated locally; legal improvements in the protection of property rights; and the provision of mechanisms for restructuring and ownership transformation in insider-dominated firms. The aim of these reforms would be to change the incentives that local governments, owners, and investors face; to convince subnational governments that a more sustainable way of protecting employment lies in protecting local investment; to raise the cost of theft and corruption by insiders and local officials; and to allow investors to acquire controlling stakes in viable firms.

Is trade with developing countries in Asia a threat to employment in France ? Catherine Mathieu, Henri Sterdyniak Growth rates have been particularly high in south-east Asian developing countries for the last two decades (averaging 7 %), as compared to those of the rest of the world. Asian dynamic economies are sometimes accused to be a cause for the low growth rates in Europe, and some other times considered as an opportunity for industrial countries to export to these areas. Even though trade between Europe and developing countries in Asia has developed over this period, it stills represents a very small part of European imports : imports from this area only account for 1,4 % of the EC GDP. However these imports mainly consist in low price commodities, which means that they represent a more important part of the European production than they seem to. But, besides, low import prices also mean lower inflation rates, thus allowing increases of the purchasing power in the EC. Developing countries in Asia have external trade surpluses both with the EC and the USA, but no global surplus since they are in deficit with Japan. There are only few european direct investment inflows to developing countries in Asia, European firms generally opting for contracts with local firms. The undervaluation of these industrializing countries currencies, as compared to that of the purchasing power parities, reflects both economic underdeveloped economies and export-oriented policies. This strategy has revealed sucessful. It allows Asian economic partners to import low price products and to export investment goods. Yet, the emergence of this area has entailed massive job destructions in several sectors of the French industry. A simulation made with the OFCE-Mosaique macroeconomic model indicates that, depending on the assumptions made, from 190 000 up to 230 000 jobs have been lost in France, because of the increase of Asian industrial exports all over the world (including French imports). Imports from low wages areas induce unskilled workers dismissals, an increase in social inequalities, and in the number of the unemployed in developed countries if no redistribution takes place. However, taxing imports from these countries would be selfishness and has no justification. Europe should find a way to help developing countries to grow, meanwhile having sustantial internal growth rates again. This requires more active economic policies (lower interest rates and expansionary policies), a fiscal reform to compensate for the gaps between social and private labour costs, and redistribution in favour of the workers hit by imports from low wages countries. ; Les pays de l'Asie du Sud- Est ont connu dans les deux dernières décennies un fort dynamisme économique et des taux de croissance de l'ordre de 7 %, qui contrastent avec la généralisation du chômage de masse et la faible croissance en Europe. Aussi certains ont accusé la politique commerciale agressive des pays d'Asie en développement d'être responsable des difficultés européennes, tandis que d'autres mettaient l'accent sur les facteurs internes de dynamisme de ces pays et voyaient dans leur émergence une chance à saisir pour l'Europe. Si les échanges de l'Asie en développement avec la CE ont crû rapidement, ils restent modestes et ne représentent en 1992 que 1,4 point du PIB communautaire pour les importations, 1 point du PIB pour les exportations. Toutefois, comme les importations sont réalisées à bas prix, elles évincent une part plus importante de la production européenne. En sens inverse, elles induisent des baisses de prix et des gains de pouvoir d'achat en Europe. Les pays d'Asie en développement, pris dans leur ensemble, ont un solde commercial globalement équilibré, mais sont excédentaires vis-à-vis de l'Europe et des Etats-Unis, et déficitaires vis-à-vis du Japon. Les investissements directs des firmes européennes dans cette région sont d'ampleur négligeable : les délocalisations passent surtout par des accords de sous-traitance. La sous-évaluation des monnaies des pays d'Asie en développement par rapport aux taux de change de PPA correspond à la fois à leur niveau de développement et à une stratégie visant à limiter les importations aux biens d'équipement indispensables et à inciter leurs producteurs à se tourner vers l'exportation. Cette stratégie s'est avérée gagnante. Mais elle permet à leurs partenaires de bénéficier d'importations à bas prix et d'exporter des biens d'équipement. Cependant l'émergence de cette zone a entraîné de fortes destructions d'emplois dans certains secteurs de l'industrie française. En tenant compte de leurs exportations, de leurs achats en France, de leur concurrence sur les marchés tiers, une évaluation macroé- conomique, réalisée avec le modèle Mosaïque, chiffre les pertes d'emplois en France à 190 000 ou 230 000, selon les hypothèses retenues. Les importations en provenance des pays à bas salaires évincent de leurs emplois les travailleurs non qualifiés et augmentent les inégalités sociales et le chômage dans les pays riches si aucune mesure de redistribution n'est prise. Aussi, une politique active de subvention aux secteurs et aux travailleurs directement concurrencés est-elle nécessaire. Par contre, la proposition consistant à remplacer des cotisations employeurs par une « TVA sociale » est illusoire. Il est erroné d'accuser ces pays de dumping monétaire, salarial, ou social. Une taxation spécifique des produits en provenance des pays à bas salaires serait foncièrement égoïste et injustifiable. L'Europe doit savoir accueillir les nouveaux pays industrialisés, permettre aux pays de l'Est et du Sud de suivre leur exemple, en même temps qu'elle doit retrouver elle-même une croissance plus satisfaisante. Cela nécessite une politique économique plus active (baisse des taux d'intérêt, relance économique) ; une réforme fiscale pour rapprocher le coût social du coût privé du travail (en particulier pour le travail non-qualifié) ; des mesures pour redistribuer aux travailleurs directement touchés par la concurrence des pays à bas salaires les gains que procure le commerce avec ceux-ci.

Aus traditioneller Sicht erscheint Vollbeschäftigung heute als utopisches Ziel. Aus dieser Sicht wäre mittelfristig mit einer Beschäftigungslücke von 6,5 Millionen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zu rechnen. Stille Reserve und versteckte Arbeitslosigkeit sind dabei noch nicht mit einbezogen. Arbeitsmarkt- und Sozialpolitik unterstützen heute schon eine Vielfalt institutioneller Alternativen zur regulären Erwerbstätigkeit, d.h. der ununterbrochenen Vollzeitbeschäftigung. Diese Alternativen - z.B. Fortbildung und Umschulung, Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen, Elternurlaub und vorzeitige Verrentung - entsprechen einem Beschäftigungspotential (Vollzeitäquivalent) von 2,5 Millionen und tragen in entsprechendem Umfang zu einer Annäherung an das Vollbeschäftigungsziel bei. Eine Strategie flexibler Arbeitsmarktübergänge könnte diese Alternativen verbessern und ihr Beschäftigungspotential mittelfristig um weitere 1 , 5 - 2 Millionen bereichern. Anstatt einen zweiten Arbeitsmarkt zu errichten* der absehbar vom ersten Arbeitsmarkt abgeschottet wird und dessen Funktionsweise beeinträchtigt, kombinieren Übergangsarbeitsmärkte reguläre Erwerbsarbeit mit anderen gesellschaftlich oder persönlich nützlichen Aktivitäten wie Lernen, Erziehen, kulturelles Gestalten, politische Beteiligung und soziales Engagement. Übergangsarbeitsmärkte könnten auf diese Weise einen effizienten Elastizitätspuffer schaffen, der in Rezessionsphasen expandiert und in Expansionsphasen kontrahiert. Sie wären eine realistische und moderne Alternative zur Zweidrittel-Gesellschaft, in der die einen zuviel an Arbeit und die anderen zu wenig haben. Im Hauptteil der Arbeit werden fünf Übergangsmärkte unterschieden: Übergänge zwischen Kurz- und Vollzeitbeschäftigung bzw. zwischen Arbeiten und Lernen, Übergänge zwischen Arbeitslosigkeit und Beschäftigung, Übergänge zwischen Bildung und Beschäftigung, Übergänge zwischen privaten oder sozialen Aktivitäten und Erwerbstätigkeit, und schließlich Übergänge zwischen Beschäftigung und Rente oder Pension. 18 existente oder mögliche Beschäftigungsbrücken werden beschrieben: Ihr schon heute realisiertes Beschäftigungspotential in Ost- wie in Westdeutschland wird identifiziert, Möglichkeiten ihrer Verbesserung und Erweiterung werden diskutiert, und das Beschäftigungspotential von Innovationen wird geschätzt. Der nachfolgende Teil der Arbeit befaßt sich mit der Finanzierung einer zukunftsgerechten Arbeitsmarktpolitik. Arbeitnehmer in Übergangsarbeitsmärkten beziehen gleichzeitig reguläre, tariflich ausgehandelte Vergütung und Transferzahlungen. Dies setzt in der Regel eine Kombination mehrerer Finanzierungsquellen voraus. Aber auch die Anreizstrukturen müssen verändert werden, um die Akzeptanz von Übergangsmärkten bei Erwerbstätigen wie Betrieben zu fördern. Das System der Arbeitslosenversicherung muß deshalb konsequenter als bisher auf eine Beschäftigungsversicherung mit breiterer Finanzierungsbasis umgestellt werden. Um institutionelle Inkongruenzen bei Gebietskörperschaften, Bundesanstalt für Arbeit wie Sozialversicherungsträger zu vermeiden, wird ein regelgebundener Bundeszuschuß zu den Beiträgen der Bundesanstalt für Arbeit vorgeschlagen. Auch unter den günstigsten Bedingungen wird die Strategie von Übergangsarbeitsmärkten das Ziel eines neuen Verständnisses von Vollbeschäftigung nicht erreichen. Die hier geschätzte verbleibende Beschäftigungslücke von mehr als zwei Millionen verweist darauf, daß es nach wie vor auf eine koordinierte Geld-, Fiskal- und Lohnpolitik ankommt, um qualitatives Wachstum im privaten und öffentlichen Bereich zu fördern. Mehr noch: eine solche Politik ist notwendige Voraussetzung für die Erweiterung von Übergangsmärkten, ebenso wie letztere wiederum die erforderliche Flexibilität für qualitatives Wachstum schaffen. Insofern sind Arbeitsmarkt- und Beschäftigungspolitik untrennbare Zwillinge. ; Full employment seems to be a utopian goal from the traditional point of view. From this perspective, a gap of 6.5 million employment opportunities would have to be expected for Germany in the medium-term. The silent reserve and hidden unemployment are not yet included in this calculation. In these days, labour market policy and social policy already Support a variety of institutional alternatives to regulär labour force participation, which means uninterrupted full-time employment These alternatives - such as further training and retraining, temporary public job creation, paid parental leave and early retirement - correspond to an employment potential of 2.5 million (full-time equivalent) and contribute respectively in reducing unemployment. The strategy of flexible transition labour markets could improve these alternatives and enhance their employment potential by 1.5 - 2 million in the medium-term. Instead of establishing a second labour market which would quite likely be segmented from the first labour market with negative repercussion on the latter, transition labour markets combine regulär employment with other activities like learning, educating, cultural creativity, political participation, social work, all of which are userul in personal or social terms. Through this, transition labour markets would create an efficient buffer of elasticity which expands in recessionary periods and contracts in boom periods of the economy. They would be a realistic and modern alternative to the two-third-society in which some have too much work and others too little. In the main part of the paper, five transition markets are distinguished: Transitions between short-time and full-time work or between work and training, transitions between unemployment and employment, transitions between education and employment, transitions between private or social activities and employment, and finally transitions between employment and retirement. 18 existing or possible employment bridges are described: their realized employment potential in East Germany and West Germany is identified, possibilities of improvement and extension are discussed, and the employment potential of innovations is estimated. The following part of the paper tackles financing problems of a corresponding modern labour market policy. Workers in transition labour markets receive regulär salaries and transfer payments during this period. This normally requires a combination of several financing resources. In addition, incentive structures will have to be changed for increasing employees' and firms1 acceptance of transition markets. The System of unemployment insurance, therefore, will have to be transformed into a System of employment insurance with a broader financing basis. A regulär and conditional grant of the federal State to the federal employment office (i.e., the integrated office for unemployment insurance and active labour market policy) is proposed to avoid institutional incongruencies among State agencies, the federal employment office, and other institutions of social security. Even under the most favourable conditions, the strategy of transition labour markets alone would not reach the goal of full employment in the new sense. The remaining employment gap of more than two million hints on the further necessity of coordinating money policy, fiscal policy and wage policy for enhancing qualitative growth in the private and public sphere. Even more: such a policy would be the precondition for extending transition markets as well as the latter to provide the necessary flexibility for qualitative growth. In this sense, labour market policy and employment policy are twins that cannot be separated.

This paper examines the design of social investment funds (SIFs) and explores the ways they affect agents incentives to propose, select, and implement good projects. Compared with other forms of decentralized service provision, SIFs possess features of administratively delegated authority and deep political devolution. Where existing political institutions fail to deliver assistance to vulnerable groups, a well-designed SIF may represent a useful administrative alternative. This article reviews several features that provide incentives for both SIF staff and project beneficiaries and concludes with practical guidelines for designing and appraising social investment funds.

Introduction This report deals with the methods that have been evolved in the USA for reallocating the costs of development infrastructure (roads, water supply, and other facilities) between the public and private sectors. In the past it has been assumed that the public sector should meet most of these costs, recouping them by means of general and local taxation and user charges. In both America and the UK, housebuilders and other developers have generally been expected to provide on-site services (local estate roads, link-up to mains water and drainage, car parking ,etc.), but the public sector has been responsible for off-site provision -- major roads, water supply, sewerage, and a range of other physical infrastructure and community facilities. But it is not inevitable that all of these costs should be met by the public sector. It can be argued that there is a good case for those costs being met, at least in part, by the landowners, developers, and employers who will benefit from them. The problem is to find practical and consistent methods of allocating those costs and of requiring developers and others to meet them or to provide the necessary facilities themselves. In the UK there has been some movement in this direction in recent years, mainly by means of planning agreements under Section 52 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971.* Such agreements have been limited in extent and not applied in any comprehensive or consistent manner. The Water Act 1989 introduced provisions enabling water companies to levy charges towards the capital cost of new installations, and there are provisions concerning highways in earlier legislation. But there has been no general application of the principle that "the developer pays." In the USA, on the other hand, there has been a long tradition of requiring developers to provide roads, parks, local school sites, and various other facilities within their developments. In recent years this type of requirement has been extended to a wider range of purposes (e.g. traffic lights, school buildings). Smaller developers can make payments in lieu of actual provision. But many American cities and counties have gone well beyond much on-site requirements. In these cities, developers are now expected to contribute towards the costs of off-site roads, bridges, intersections, water mains and sewerage, storm water drainage, high schools, major open space, public car parking, libraries -- even "law and order." some cities have extended the concept so as to require office developers to contribute to the provision of public transport (mass transit), low-cost housing, and child-care facilities. Various novel methods have been developed for achieving this. The most widespread is the concept of "development impact fees," which prescribe a standard scale of charges for new development. There is a variety of other fiscal devices for similar purposes. In addition, some cities are making extensive use of "Development Agreements" which, instead of standard fees, rely on negotiated agreements with individual developers. Some local governments use all these methods, and new measures are constantly being devised. This is what this report is about. I now briefly summarize its structure and content. Part One deals in detail with development impact fees, since this is the most widely used method of charging developers for the costs of the infrastructure needs that their development generates. Chapter 1 explains the concept of impact fees and illustrates their use. This is intended as an "appetizer" for what follows. Its intention is to explain the context within which impact fees and similar devices have evolved, the scale and pace of development, and the changing climate of local government finance. The miscellaneous information that it displays is drawn from a wide variety of sources, from scholarly books to newspaper cuttings. It is impressionistic and serves to demonstrate that, while much of the language of land-use planning in America will be familiar to the British reader, the context within which it operates is something different. Chapters 3 to 6 are the meat of Part One. In these chapters I set out the concept of impact fees as it has developed in the somewhat demanding judicial atmosphere that prevails in most states, where the Courts are very protective of private property rights and tend to take a cautious view of fiscal and regulatory innovations. To safeguard against the risk of successful legal challenge, the proponents of impact fees have adopted a belt-and-braces approach, and the result is a distinctly complex and demanding process for devising and validating impact fees. It is necessary to set out the lineaments of the system in this fairly detailed manner, as it provides the basis from which a somewhat simpler approach could be developed. It was reassuring to find that in California, where impact fees originated and are most widely used, the courts have taken a less rigorous approach to impact fees. Provided they can be satisfied that appropriate legislative or regulatory powers exist for the purpose, that the fees adopted have a rational basis and are reasonable in relation to the relevant expenditure, and that they are administered in a consistent and equitable manner, they do not demand an unrealistic degree of precision in the methods of calculation and attribution. I think that in the UK our approach would be similar, but it is useful to be aware of the more theoretical formulation. Chapter 7 indulges in a digression housing, suggesting that the costs of infrastructure and the level of fees could be moderated if Americans were less prodigal in their use of land and applied more effectively what they know about land-use planning or, in their terms, "growth management" (which can mean either facilitating or restricting development). There is more about housing in Part Two. Part One concludes with a case study of Raleigh, North Carolina, and its recent experience in introducing an impact fees system. Part Two of the report reviews more briefly a a variety of other methods, both traditional and novel, of exacting or soliciting contributions from developers to the provision of infrastructure and community facilities. I deal first with the longest established forms of developer contributions: those implemented through traditional subdivision regulations. Secondly I deal with "contract zoning," another adaptation of a traditional regulatory system, which relates to variances granted to exchange for some undertaking given by the developer. I then consider the much more recent "linkage programmes," which are in some respects similar to impact fees but where the concept has been extended beyond what is normally regarded as infrastructure to include the provision by office developers of low-cost housing -- and child-care facilities. I describe separately arrangements that require housebuilders to include a proportion of low-cost housing to their projects or, more often, offer zoning incentives to do so. I include a short note on excise taxes as an alternative to impact fees. I explain the concept of the Special Assessment District, where a supplementary local tax is levied on occupiers in a specific area to pay for services that benefit solely that area. This mechanism has been extended in some states to facilitate developments on the scale of a new town, and I describe the Florida legislation. I deal more fully with the scope for negotiated agreements with developers, which are favoured by many experienced local government officials and major developers, as it is a much more flexible method and offers more scope for the exercise of negotiating skills on both sides than a standard fees scale. I describe the Californian legislation. In Chapter 8 I deal with various methods used in California to finance transportation systems. Chapter 7, on Development Agreements, is particularly relevant to the US situation and the possible reform of Section 52/1971. All these methods are in use in the US, and they demonstrate that a developer is pursuing his project usually needs the co-operation of the local authority and other bodies, both in securing his building permit and in ensuring that his development is adequately serviced. He may prefer a predictable scale of fees and to know in advance that will be required of him; but he may also be prepared to negotiate a higher contribution, especially if he needs a higher standard of provision or seeks higher priority among competing projects. Part Three provides a general assessment of what has gone before, and offers some conclusions on its relevance to the US and a possible legislative approach to recasting Section 52 to provide for both Development Agreements and Developer Contributions in a form compatible with UK conditions. In conclusion, I should emphasize that this is not a work of scholarship and therefore lacks entirely the scholarly apparatus of footnotes and bibliography. I have freely pillaged (but I hope not plagiarized) a wide range of materials generally without acknowledgement. But, so far as I am aware, there is no single publication that deals with all the varieties of systems described in this report. It is, of course, written by a visitor to the US and from a British perspective. But in my own experience it is always interesting to see how someone from another country describes processes with which one is familiar: even their errors and omissions can prove instructive. The work on this report was done during my tenure of a Nuffield and Leverhulme Travelling Fellowship in 1989-90 while on secondment from the Department of the Environment. I readily record my appreciation of the Fellowship programme, which affords the opportunity to those in government service to combine their experience of practical administration with the benefits of new experience. In the course of my fellowship I prepared a second report on Aesthetic Control: methods used in the USA to control the design of buildings. Both reports are being published by IURD, and both deal with the relationship between public and private interests in the development process. Although I cannot attempt here to acknowledge all those who have helped me in the course of this study -- academic colleagues, developers, realtors, homebuilders, city, county, state, and federal officials, and many others -- I must express my thinks to my two main hosts, Professor Michael Stegman, Director of the Department of City and Regional Planning at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Professor Peter Hall, Director of the Institute of Urban and Regional Development in the University of California at Berkeley. I worked for several weeks at both of these institutions and had every assistance from them. I must also thank Dr. Derek Nicholls, the Director of the Department of Land Economy at Cambridge University in England, where I now enjoy similar facilities. Finally, I should record that the contents of this report are the author's responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Department of the Environment. It is published with the Department's permission as a contribution to debate on the subject. J.D. November 1990 Department of Land Economy CAMBRIDGE CB3 9BP England

Capital account liberalization, it is fair to say, remains one of the most controversial and least understood policies of our day. One reason is that different theoretical perspectives have very different implications for the desirability of liberalizing capital flows. Another is that empirical analysis has failed to yield conclusive results. The answer, another influential strand of thought contends, is that this efficient-markets paradigm is fundamentally misleading when applied to capital flows. Limits on capital movements are a distortion. It is an implication of the theory of the second best that removing one distortion need not be welfare enhancing when other distortions are present.

The Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s not only highlighted the welfare consequences of transparency in the financial sector but also linked this relatively narrow problem to the broader context of transparency in governance. It has been observed that objections to transparency, often on flimsy pretexts, are common even in industrialized countries. This article argues that transparency is indispensable to the financial sector and describes its desirable characteristics: access, timeliness, relevance, and quality. The authors emphasize the need to weigh the costs and benefits of a more transparent regulatory policy, and they explore the connection between information imperfections, macroeconomic policy, and questions of risk. The article argues for developing institutional infrastructure, standards, and accounting practices that promote transparency, implementing incentives for disclosure and establishing regulations to minimize the perverse incentives generated by safety net arrangements, such as deposit insurance. Because institutional development is gradual, the authors contend that relatively simple regulations, such as limits on credit expansion, may be the most reasonable option for developing countries. They show that transparency has absolute limits because of the lack of adequate enforcement and argue that adequate enforcement may be predicated on broader reforms in the public sector.

Although the link between improved infrastructure services and economic growth is uncertain, it is clear that reforms aimed at creating competition and regulating natural monopolies establish an environment conducive to private sector participation, incentives for companies to strive for efficiency savings that can ultimately be passed on to consumers, and greater provision of services (such as faster roll-out of infrastructure or innovative solutions to service delivery for customers not connected to an existing network). In determining the form that infrastructure restructuring might undertake or the design of a regulatory agency, policymakers can generally benefit from a review of the experiences of other countries. A key element of any decision making process should be a review of how the various types of reform will affect the efficiency of the sector and whether they will increase private financing of its significant investment needs.