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The paper analyses the course of Dutch financial policy since the demise of Keynesian full employment. How did the public expenditure ratio, the tax burden, and the deficit develop in the last twenty-five years? Why did the government lose control over public spending in the period between 1977 and 1982, even though it proved possible to reduce spending continuously thereafter? Important explanatory variables in this context are economic growth and the ideological orientation of the government. In the 1990s, however, a literature on the common pool resource problem of public budgets developed which emphasizes the impact of the number of actors involved in financial policy-making as well as the institutional design of the budget process for public spending. Combining process tracing and intertemporal comparison, the study demonstrates how fiscal contracts were made and how they were stabilized through the working of the party system. It concludes that if other relevant variables are allowed for, fiscal contracts did have a moderating impact on public spending. ; In dem Papier wird die Finanzpolitik der Niederlande seit dem Ende der keynesianischen Vollbeschäftigungsphase analysiert. Wie haben sich die Staatsquote, die Abgabenquote und das Defizit in den vergangenen 25 Jahren entwickelt? Warum sind die Staatsausgaben in der Phase von 1977 bis 1982 praktisch unkontrolliert gewachsen, wenn es danach gelang, diese kontinuierlich zurück zu führen? Wichtige Erklärungsvariablen sind in diesem Zusammenhang natürlich das Wirtschaftswachstum und die ideologische Ausrichtung der Regierung. In den Neunzigerjahren hat sich eine Literatur zum Allmendeproblem des öffentlichen Haushaltes entwickelt, die zur Erklärung der Entwicklung der Staatsausgaben vor allem auf die Zahl der finanzpolitischen Akteure und die institutionelle Ausgestaltung des Haushaltsprozesses abstellt. Durch eine Kombination von Prozessanalyse und intertemporalen Vergleich wird gezeigt, wie finanzpolitische Vereinbarungen zu Stande kamen und wie sie durch die Funktionsweise des Parteiensystems stabilisiert wurden. Schließlich wird belegt, dass die in Koalitionsabkommen niedergelegten finanzpolitischen Absprachen unter Kontrolle anderer wichtiger Erklärungsvariablen einen mäßigenden Einfluss auf die Entwicklung der Staatsquote hatten.

Report of the Texas State Auditor's Office related to the Department of Public Safety's proposed contract with the North Texas Tollway Authority and Department reimbursements for all costs associated with providing the services required in the contract.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Federal interagency contract service programs are being used in a wide variety of situations, from those in which a single agency provides limited contracting assistance to an approach in which the provider agency's contracting officer handles all aspects of the procurement. This increased use of interagency contracts is a result of reforms and legislation passed in the 1990s, allowing agencies to streamline the acquisition process, operate more like businesses, and offer increasing numbers of services to other agencies. Most of the contract service programs GAO reviewed reported an excess of revenues over costs in at least one year between fiscal years 1999 and 2001. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance directs agencies with governmentwide acquisition contracts (GWAC) or franchise fund programs to account for and recover fully allocated actual costs and to report on their financial results. Agencies are to identify all direct and indirect costs and charge fees to ordering agencies based on these costs. However, some GWAC programs have not identified or accurately reported the full cost of providing interagency contract services. OMB's guidance further directs that agencies return GWAC earnings to the miscellaneous receipts account of the U.S. Treasury's General Fund. However, this guidance conflicts with the operations of agencies' revolving funds, which were established by statutes that allow retention of excess revenues. The Federal Supply Schedules program has generated hefty earnings, largely because of the rapid growth of information technology sales. Rather than adjust the fee, however, the General Services Administration has used the earnings primarily to support its stock and fleet programs. However, the significant amount of earnings means that Federal Supply Schedules program customers are being consistently overcharged for the contract services they are buying."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "DOE is the largest civilian-contracting agency in the federal government, and relies primarily on contractors to operate its sites and carry out its diverse missions. For fiscal year 2003, DOE will spend about 90 percent of its total annual budget, or $19.8 billion, on contracts, including $9.4 billion to operate 16 of its research laboratories (called federally funded research and development centers). Since 1990, GAO has identified DOE's contract management as high-risk for fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. In 1994, DOE began reforming its contracting practices to, among other things, improve contractor performance and accountability. As part of that effort, DOE has at times used competition in awarding contracts to manage and operate its research laboratories. In September 2002, GAO reported on the status of contract reform efforts in DOE. (Contract Reform: DOE Has Made Progress, but Actions Needed to Ensure Initiatives Have Improved Results) (Sep. 2002, GAO-02-798) This testimony discusses some of the findings in that report. GAO was asked to testify on DOE's rationale for deciding whether to compete a laboratory research contract, the extent to which DOE has competed these contracts, and the role of competition and other mechanisms in improving contractor performance."

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "According to information in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), in fiscal year 2001, small businesses received approximately 23 percent of federal contract dollars awarded. However, concerns have been raised that large companies are receiving federal contracts intended for small businesses."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "GAO has reported that the Department of Defense's (DOD) inability to accurately account for and report on disbursements is a long-term, major problem. GAO was requested to determine (1) the magnitude of the adjustments and related costs in fiscal year 2002, (2) why contracts, including payment terms, are so complex, (3) the key factors that caused Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) Columbus to make payment adjustments, and (4) what steps DOD is taking to address the payment allocation problems."

A model of intergovernmental service contracting is tested for U.S. cities of 25,000 and over population. In this model, the decision process is assumed to be shaped by many of the same forces that affect contracting to the private sector, namely, cost considerations, fiscal pressures, and political influences. Considerable support is found for the model, although fiscal stress is not a major impetus for contracting with other jurisdictions. The presence of a city manager facilitates greater intergovernmental contracting, although restrictive state laws limit such arrangements. Above all, when local officials fear loss of service control, less intergovernmental contracting occurs.

The term "unfunded federal mandates" is used to challenge federal obligations imposed on states and localities without accompanying funding. Unfunded mandates were alluded to by both the majority and dissenting opinions in Printz v. United States, in which provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act were invalidated by the U.S. Supreme Court on Tenth Amendment grounds. In this Article, Professor Adler critiques the fiscal, legal, and policy arguments against unfunded federal mandates. This analysis, in turn, raises two broader issues. First, is the concept of unfunded mandates independently useful to the nation's ongoing debate about federal- ism? Second, does the mandate issue provide insight into the key legal question of whether judges or elected officials are best suited to decide the appropriate roles of the federal and state governments? Following a brief history of the debate over unfunded federal man- dates, the Author analyzes the term and its component parts and concludes that the phrase has been used too broadly to challenge actions that are not properly "unfunded," "federal," or "mandates." Next, Professor Adler concludes that past efforts to assess the costs of unfunded federal mandates seriously overstated the costs of such mandates to states and cities. Moreover, he argues that the costs of federal mandates are more than offset by all forms of federal aid and that states and cities remain net beneficiaries in intergovernmental fiscal relations. The legal analysis concludes that, for most purposes, the degree of funding attached to federal programs is not relevant to their validity on Tenth Amendment grounds. Last, the Author challenges the presumption that unfunded federal mandates are "bad" on normative grounds, rather than legitimate, neutral policy choices about what level of government should decide and pay for various aspects of public policy. Because the unfunded federal mandate terminology defies precise definition, because it is legally irrelevant to the validity of federal ...

Testimony issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Federal agencies spend billions of tax dollars each year to buy services--from clerical support to information technology assistance to the management of national laboratories. The federal government spent more than $87 billion in services--a 24 percent increase in real terms from fiscal year 1990. Some service procurements are not being done efficiently, putting taxpayer dollars at risk. In particular, agencies are not clearly defining their requirements, fully considering alternative solutions, performing vigorous price analyses, and adequately overseeing contractor performance. This testimony (1) describes service contracting trends and the changing acquisition environment, (2) discusses the challenges confronting the government in acquiring services, and (3) highlights some efforts underway to address these challenges. GAO found that purchases of services now account for about 43 percent of federal contracting expenses--the largest single spending category. The growth of services has been driven largely by the government's increased purchases of information technology services and professional, administrative, and management support services. Poor contract management has undermined the government's ability to obtain good value for the money and continues to be a major problem for the two biggest service purchasers-the Departments of Defense and Energy. Performance-based service contracts and the integration of strategic human capital management into agency planning are two ways to address some of the contract management and human capital challenges."

In countries with large or potentially large oil and gas deposits, the resource and its extraction tend to become vital cornerstones of the economy. However, uncertainties involved in finding commercial quantities of oil and gas and the intensive capital required for undertaking exploration and production result in significant business risks. The petroleum fiscal systems in many developing countries are now opting for production‐sharing contracts (PSC) as a new model of agreement for the exploration and production of oil and gas resources. This paper extends the principal‐agent theory to foster understanding of partnership between the host government and its foreign contractor in the realm of PSC. The theory highlights the importance of moral hazard and adverse‐selection problems. To avoid these uncertainties and asymmetric information, the principal (national oil company) needs to design an incentive contract that induces the agent (international oil company (IOC)) to undertake actions that will maximise the principal's welfare. Under a PSC, the state has to offer contract terms that are attractive enough for the IOC to enter into an agreement. At the same time, the terms must allow the state to receive maximum economic returns from the venture.

This paper develops a theory of inequality and the social contract aiming to explain how countries with similar economic and political "fundamentals" can sustain such different systems of social insurance, fiscal redistribution, and education finance as those of the United States and Western Europe. With imperfect credit and insurance markets some redistributive policies can improve ex ante welfare, and this implies that their political support tends to decrease with inequality. Conversely, with credit constraints, lower redistribution translates into more persistent inequality; hence the potential for multiple steady states, with mutually reinforcing high inequality and low redistribution, or vice versa. (JEL D31, E62, P16, O41, I22)

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed federal advertising contracts awarded to advertising firms, focusing on: (1) the discretion that federal agencies have in determining a contract's scope of work and the contractor requirements for awarding advertising contracts; (2) whether contractor requirements in the solicitations for contracts were consistent with the scope of work described in the solicitations for the advertising contracts with first-time obligations in fiscal years 1998 and 1999 that were awarded to large advertising firms through full and open competition; and (3) whether there was required documentation for the sole-source justification and approval for the advertising contracts with first-time obligations in fiscal years 1998 and 1999 that were awarded through sole-source procedures."

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "GAO reviewed the amount of excess payments and underpayments made by the Department of Defense (DOD) to its contractors during fiscal year 1999. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS)--Columbus Center, Ohio reports that contractors repaid $670 million in fiscal year 1999 and closer to a billion dollars--$901 million--in fiscal year 2000. The higher amount for fiscal year 2000 reflects the inclusion of repayments made through offsets of other payments ($269 million) in addition to the amount repaid by check ($632 million). Although small in relation to total contract payments, these amounts represent a sizable amount of cash in the hands of contractors beyond what is intended to finance and pay for the goods and services DOD is purchasing. The 39 large contractors covered by GAO's review returned excess payments totaling $351 million in fiscal year 1999. Seventy-seven percent of these excess payments stemmed from contract administration actions and 18 percent stemmed from billing or payment errors. Large contractors reported resolving $41 million in underpayments during fiscal year 1999. Contractors attributed most underpayments to payment errors made by DFAS--Columbus."