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We find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985–2010. We apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self-selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets. The results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology, and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the "risk premium" on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility.

We find that the adoption of numerical fiscal rules reduces government borrowing costs in a sample of 101 advanced and developing countries for 1985–2010. We apply a variety of propensity score matching methods to address the self-selection problem of policy adoption and find strong evidence that fiscal rules have large and significant treatment effects on lowering government borrowing costs in both international and domestic financial markets. The results are robust to changes in country sample and alternative estimation methodology, and are consistent with fiscal rules helping to build policy credibility by reducing the probability of default and the "risk premium" on government debt that compensates lenders for this possibility.

A growing literature has argued that electoral turnout decreases the more government policy constrained by economic and institutional factors. This paper investigates whether a certain type of policy constraint, fiscal rules, lowers turnout. Since fiscal rules set limits for government fiscal policy, they should lower the incentive for citizens to participate electorally. However, using parliamentary turnout data in a large panel of democratic countries, little robust evidence is found in favor of fiscal rules having a depressing effect on electoral turnout. Analysis of European individual-level data also suggests that national fiscal rules do not affect inequality in electoral turnout between income groups either. Difference-in-discontinuity evidence from Italian municipalities further suggests that the results are causally identified.

From 2001 the fiscal policy in Chile has been based on a structural surplus rule. Under this rule, the government is committing itself to maintain its expenditures equal to the structural revenue minus the target for the structural surplus, which is expressed in terms of the GDP. The calculation of the structural balance depends on trend output, the long-run copper price and the structural income from Codelco's molybdenum sale. While the latter is calculated with a reference price determined as the average of past prices, panels of independent experts, who meet once a year, determine the two former. The fact that independent experts have substantial influence on the fiscal budget makes the Chilean fiscal rule different from similar rules applied in other countries. Compliance with the rule is not a legal obligation but a voluntary undertaking on the part of the government. Although the fiscal revenue has increased substantially in recent years due to a soaring copper price, the structural balance has remained stable at 1 % of the GDP. Hence, public saving has increased rapidly, accumulating in two sovereign wealth funds, which are administered by the Central Bank.

Fiscal rules are laws aimed at reducing the incentive to accumulate debt, and many countries adopt them to discipline local governments. Yet, their effectiveness is disputed because of commitment and enforcement problems. We study their impact applying a quasi-experimental design in Italy. In 1999, the central government imposed fiscal rules on municipal governments, and in 2001 relaxed them below 5,000 inhabitants. We exploit the before/after and discontinuous policy variation, and show that relaxing fiscal rules increases deficits and lowers taxes. The effect is larger if the mayor can be reelected, the number of parties is higher, and voters are older.

We propose a fiscal rule that fulfills a specific debt reduction objective while maintaining significant fiscal flexibility-two overarching concerns in Israel. Not unlike the Swiss ""debt brake,"" the rule incorporates an error-correction mechanism (ECM) through which departure from the debt objective affects binding medium-run expenditure ceilings. Two variants of our ECM rule are shown to be superior to a comparable deficit rule in terms of attaining the debt objective and allowing for fiscal stabilization while supporting medium-term expenditure planning. Given its relative sophistication

Unstable government debt dynamics can typically be corrected by various fiscal instruments, like appropriate adjustments in government spending, public transfers, or taxes. This paper investigates properties of state-contingent debt targeting rules which link stabilizing budgetary adjustments around a target level of long-run debt to the state of the economy. The paper establishes that the size of steady-state debt is a key determinant of whether it is possible to find a rule of this type which can be implemented under all available fiscal instruments. Specifically, considering linear feedback rules, the paper demonstrates that there may well exist a critical level of debt beyond which this is no longer possible. From an applied perspective, this finding is of particular relevance in the context of a monetary union with decentralized fiscal policies. Depending on the level of long-run debt, there might be a conflict between a common fiscal framework which tracks deficit developments as a function of the state of the economy and the unrestricted choice of fiscal policy instruments at the national level.

The public finances crisis has brought binding fiscal rules proposals back to the forefront. The paper analyses their justifications and specifications, either in a classical or in a Keynesian framework. In the recent period there is no evidence that public deficits were caused by fiscal indiscipline and induced too high interest rates; there is no evidence that economically relevant rules can be designed. The paper provides an analysis of fiscal rules implemented either at country level (like the UK golden rule), or at the EU level (the Stability and Growth Pact). The paper shows that fiscal rules did not work before and during the crisis. The paper discusses the EU project, the "Fiscal Pact", which risks to paralyse fiscal policies and to prevent economic stabilisation. The priority today is not to strengthen public finance discipline but to question economic developmentswhich make public deficits necessary to support output.

The public finances crisis has brought binding fiscal rules proposals back to the forefront. The paper analyses their justifications and specifications, either in a classical or in a Keynesian framework. In the recent period there is no evidence that public deficits were caused by fiscal indiscipline and induced too high interest rates; there is no evidence that economically relevant rules can be designed. The paper provides an analysis of fiscal rules implemented either at country level (like the UK golden rule), or at the EU level (the Stability and Growth Pact). The paper shows that fiscal rules did not work before and during the crisis. The paper discusses the EU project, the "Fiscal Pact", which risks to paralyse fiscal policies and to prevent economic stabilisation. The priority today is not to strengthen public finance discipline but to question economic developmentswhich make public deficits necessary to support output.