Suchergebnisse

Biotic factors such as pests create biodiversity effects that increase production risks and decrease land productivity when agriculture becomes more specialized. We show in a Ricardian two-country trade setup that production specialization is incomplete under free trade because of the decrease in land productivity. Pesticides allow farmers to reduce these biodiversity effects, but they are damaging for the environment and for human health. When regulating farming practices under free trade, governments face a trade-off: they are tempted to restrict pesticide use compared to under autarky because domestic consumption partly relies on imports and thus depends less on them, but they also want to preserve the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. We show that at the symmetric equilibrium under free trade, restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky. As a result, trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries, and of some or all of the crops that are country-specific, depending on the intensity of the biodiversity effects.

Production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests create biodiversity effects that impede productivity. Pesticides reduce these effects but are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments weigh these side-effects against the competitiveness of their agriculture. In a Ricardian two-country setup, we show that free trade results in an incomplete production specialization, that restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky and that trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries and some of the specialized crops. If biodiversity effects are large, the price volatility of all crops is larger than under autarky.

Production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests create biodiversity effects that impede productivity. Pesticides reduce these effects but are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments weigh these side-effects against the competitiveness of their agriculture. In a Ricardian two-country setup, we show that free trade results in an incomplete production specialization, that restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky and that trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries and some of the specialized crops. If biodiversity effects are large, the price volatility of all crops is larger than under autarky.

Production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests create biodiversity effects that impede productivity. Pesticides reduce these effects but are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments weigh these side-effects against the competitiveness of their agriculture. In a Ricardian two-country setup, we show that free trade results in an incomplete production specialization, that restrictions on pesticides are generally more stringent than under autarky and that trade increases the price volatility of crops produced by both countries and some of the specialized crops. If biodiversity effects are large, the price volatility of all crops is larger than under autarky.

We examine the importance of production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests in determining the pattern of trade and the distribution of prices in a Ricardian two-country setup. These elements create biodiversity eff ects that result in an incomplete specialization at the free trade equilibrium. Their influence on idiosyncratic production risks evolves depending on the countries' openness to trade. Pesticides allow these eff ects to diminish but they are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments have to counterbalance these side-eff ects with the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. Nevertheless, restrictions on pesticides under free trade are generally more stringent than under autarky.

We examine the importance of production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests in determining the pattern of trade and the distribution of prices in a Ricardian two-country setup. These elements create biodiversity eff ects that result in an incomplete specialization at the free trade equilibrium. Their influence on idiosyncratic production risks evolves depending on the countries' openness to trade. Pesticides allow these eff ects to diminish but they are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments have to counterbalance these side-eff ects with the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. Nevertheless, restrictions on pesticides under free trade are generally more stringent than under autarky.

We examine the importance of production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests in determining the pattern of trade and the distribution of prices in a Ricardian two-country setup. These elements create biodiversity eff ects that result in an incomplete specialization at the free trade equilibrium. Their influence on idiosyncratic production risks evolves depending on the countries' openness to trade. Pesticides allow these eff ects to diminish but they are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments have to counterbalance these side-eff ects with the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. Nevertheless, restrictions on pesticides under free trade are generally more stringent than under autarky.

We examine the importance of production risks in agriculture due to biotic elements such as pests in determining the pattern of trade and the distribution of prices in a Ricardian two-country setup. These elements create biodiversity eff ects that result in an incomplete specialization at the free trade equilibrium. Their influence on idiosyncratic production risks evolves depending on the countries' openness to trade. Pesticides allow these eff ects to diminish but they are damaging for the environment and human health. When regulating farming practices, governments have to counterbalance these side-eff ects with the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. Nevertheless, restrictions on pesticides under free trade are generally more stringent than under autarky.

Recent years have seen global food prices rise and become more volatile. Price surges in 2008 and 2011 held devastating consequences for hundreds of millions of people and negatively impacted many more. Today one billion people are hungry. The issue is a high priority for many international agencies and national governments. At the Cannes Summit in November 2011, the G20 leaders agreed to implement five objectives aiming to mitigate food price volatility and protect vulnerable persons. To succeed, the global community must now translate these high level policy objectives into practical actions. In this paper, we describe challenges and unresolved dilemmas before the global community in implementing these five objectives. The paper describes recent food price volatility trends and an evaluation of possible causes. Special attention is given to climate change and water scarcity, which have the potential to impact food prices to a much greater extent in coming decades. We conclude the world needs an improved knowledge base and new analytical capabilities, developed in parallel with the implementation of practical policy actions, to manage food price volatility and reduce hunger and malnutrition. This requires major innovations and paradigm shifts by the global community.

When food prices spike in countries with large numbers of poor people, hunger and malnutrition are very likely to result in the absence of public intervention. For governments, this is also a case of political survival. Government actions often take the form of direct interventions in the market to stabilize food prices, which goes against most international advice to rely on safety nets and world trade. Despite the limitations of food price stabilization policies, they are widespread in developing countries. This paper attempts to untangle the elements of this policy conundrum. Price stabilization policies arise as a result of international and domestic coordination problems. At the individual country level, it is in the national interest of many countries to adjust trade policies to take advantage of the world market in order to achieve domestic price stability. When countercyclical trade policies become widespread, the result is a thinner and less reliable world market, which further decreases the appeal of laissez-faire. A similar vicious circle operates in the domestic market: without effective policies to protect the poor, such as safety nets, food market liberalization lacks credibility and makes private actors reluctant to intervene, which in turn forces government to step in. The current policy challenge lies in designing policies that will build trust in world markets and increase trust between public and private agents. ; Lorsque les prix alimentaires flambent dans des pays avec un grand nombre de personnes pauvres, en l'absence d'intervention publique la faim et la malnutrition sont très probables. Pour les gouvernements, intervenir est aussi une question de survie politique. Les interventions publiques prennent souvent la forme d'interventions sur le marché pour stabiliser les prix, ce qui va à l'encontre de la plupart des recommandations internationales, qui sont plutôt d'utiliser des filets de sécurité sociaux et de laisser le marché fonctionner librement. Cependant, malgré les limites des ...

When food prices spike in countries with large numbers of poor people, hunger and malnutrition are very likely to result in the absence of public intervention. For governments, this is also a case of political survival. Government actions often take the form of direct interventions in the market to stabilize food prices, which goes against most international advice to rely on safety nets and world trade. Despite the limitations of food price stabilization policies, they are widespread in developing countries. This paper attempts to untangle the elements of this policy conundrum. Price stabilization policies arise as a result of international and domestic coordination problems. At the individual country level, it is in the national interest of many countries to adjust trade policies to take advantage of the world market in order to achieve domestic price stability. When countercyclical trade policies become widespread, the result is a thinner and less reliable world market, which further decreases the appeal of laissez-faire. A similar vicious circle operates in the domestic market: without effective policies to protect the poor, such as safety nets, food market liberalization lacks credibility and makes private actors reluctant to intervene, which in turn forces government to step in. The current policy challenge lies in designing policies that will build trust in world markets and increase trust between public and private agents. ; Lorsque les prix alimentaires flambent dans des pays avec un grand nombre de personnes pauvres, en l'absence d'intervention publique la faim et la malnutrition sont très probables. Pour les gouvernements, intervenir est aussi une question de survie politique. Les interventions publiques prennent souvent la forme d'interventions sur le marché pour stabiliser les prix, ce qui va à l'encontre de la plupart des recommandations internationales, qui sont plutôt d'utiliser des filets de sécurité sociaux et de laisser le marché fonctionner librement. Cependant, malgré les limites des politiques de stabilisation des prix alimentaires, elles sont très répandues dans les pays en développement. Ce chapitre s'attache à éclairer cet état de fait. Les politiques de stabilisation des prix émergent comme le résultat de problèmes internationaux et domestiques de coordination. Il est dans l'intérêt de nombreux pays d'ajuster leurs politiques commerciales pour utiliser le marché mondial à des fins de stabilisation domestique. Mais, lorsque ces politiques commerciales se généralisent, le résultat est un marché mondial plus étroit et moins fiable, ce qui diminue d'autant l'attrait du libre-échange. Un cercle vicieux similaire opère sur le marché domestique. En l'absence de politiques à même de protéger les pauvres efficacement, comme des filets de sécurité sociaux, la libéralisation des marchés alimentaires manque de crédibilité, ce qui rend les acteurs privés réticents à s'investir, poussant les gouvernements à intervenir. L'enjeu politique actuel est donc de proposer des politiques qui permettent d'améliorer les confiances dans les marchés mondiaux et entre les acteurs privés et publics.