Suchergebnisse

American and international public looks up to American presidents as the chief creators of American foreign policy. A review of the contemporary history of US foreign policy is mostly a review of foreign policy platforms and initiatives of American presidents. Although fundamental prerequisites exist - constitutional powers, executive office of the President as support in the creation and implementation of certain decisions, the expectations of the Congress and the public that President should lead the nation in the foreign policy arena - not all American presidents have taken an equal interest in foreign policy decision-making and the creation of American foreign policy; this has depended on their personal interests and experiences. Despite significant constitutional restrictions of the president's autonomous action in foreign policy and occasionally successful attempts of the legislature to assume control over foreign policy, as well as frequent challenges to presidential powers and numerous actions by the public, we can conclude that American presidents are nevertheless dominant figures in the field of American foreign policy. (SOI : PM: S. 192)

Henry Kissinger is one of the most eminent and influential intellectuals in American foreign policy. His work and achievements may be divided into three phases of his participation in the creation of American foreign policy. In the first - scholarly - phase of his career, he criticized US foreign polic His works from that period clearly reflect his "realpolitik" outlook. Particularly important for his life and work is the second phase when he was able, as a national security adviser and later as Secretary of State for presidents Nixon and Ford, to use his remarkable intellectual capital and successfully practice realpolitik as the creator and proponent of American foreign policy. After his retirement from foreign policy administration, Kissinger did not cease to use his clout in the field of international relations and American foreign policy. He has been one of the most significant American intellectuals who have exerted an influence on American foreign policy. (SOI : SOEU: S. 133)

Following the disintegration of the socialist system in Europe and the end of the bloc-based relations, American politics has changed the course of its operation. In present-day circumstances, Southeastern Europe is becoming increasingly prominent in American foreign-policy projections, particularly during Clinton's administration. Clinton has defined a clear-cut policy towards Europe's southeast due to its vicinity to certain neuralgic points of American engagement (Near East, the Caspian region, the Gulf, eastern Mediterranean). In this way American politics has proved its leading global role. At the time of scarcity of foreign-policy events, Clinton's team has thus been served on a platter a major foreign-policy arena, in which its engagement - which has all the symptoms of a long-lasting one - has not proved too costly. (SOI : PM: S. 20)

An analysis of the US foreign policy strategy shows that a more intensive advocacy of human rights and democracy is us usually a characteristic for democratic American presidents and their administrations. The numerous challenges of the new world order which Bill Clinton was faced with, required the redefinition of the role, goals, and interests of the sole remaining superpower in the new international community. The promotion of democracy and liberal market values and the protection of universal human rights have been the guidelines for Clinton's administration's foreign policy during both of his mandates. Due to the specific features and intensity of geopolitical changes, which resulted in armed conflicts in the South-Eastern Europe, the consequence of the American policy towards the newly-created countries (the so-called young democracies on the Old Continent, including the new Russia) was that the first NATO's military "out of area" campaign on Kosovo was justified as an attempt to stem the flood of refugees and to make an end to the violation of ethnic and other human rights. Since the US have announced their intention to intervene when and if (and based on their interests), they deem that basic human rights and democratic values are violated, it can be said that a new pattern of behaviour has emerged which would have to be adopted by the other members of the new world order as well. (SOI : PM: S. 122)

Germany's security dilemma is to fulfill the larger role in Europe and global security that is expected after reunification, while not rekindling a sense of threat particularly among neighbors to the east. Opinion surveys of Germans and Central/East Europeans reveal substantial difficulties were Germany to become more assertive. Changes in German behavior and constitutional interpretation suggest a maturation or "normalization" of German foreign policy. Thus far, th changes have emphasized traditional forms of diplomacy and alliance behavior focused on using the enlarged capacities of a reunited Germany that more direc pursue German interests. An alternative way by which to perform a larger security role are discussed, particularly in light of data regarding the mutual perceptions of Germans among neighboring peoples and leaders. (SOI : PM: S. 62)

The author claims that all major efforts concerning European security have always been linked with the end of a war. Thus the end of the cold war has been marked with the expansion of NATO and an attempt to create a new security. By analysing the political scope of the expansion, the military and strategic framework, the Russian reactions, and the economic significance, the author comes to the conclusion that the expansion is not conducive to the establishment of an integral system of European security. The purpose of this development by Clinton's team was primarily to outline the new European borders (the key aspect of Clinton's foreign policy) and, in the future, to create the conditions for further expansion and admittance of new members. Only in the remote future, through constant expansion and links with other European organisations, NATO could turn into the central system of European security. (SOI : PM: S. 97)

The complexity of the partisan movement between 1941 and 1945 cannot be understood if one does not equalize it with the communist ideology. Also, one should be reminded of the fact that the winning world powers did not recognize the independent Croatian state. In 1945. Croats had to confirm their integrity within the supranational Yugoslavia. As the Independent State of Croatia stood next to Germany and Italy in foreign policy, that problem was indirectly associated with the defeat of fascism. On the contrary, the partisan movement gained the antifascist status. Croatian antifascism was not only verbal, it had also its historical causes. wing of the Croatian Peasant Party, trying to eliminate their political rivals. Parallelly, in Territorial Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Croatia conflicts began to occur in connection with the strengthening of the national aspirations. Thus, at the end of 1944, A. Hebrang, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Croatia, was removed. (SOI : CSP: S. 439)

The maintenance of peace and stability in the post-cold-war world in the circumstances of cooperation and partnership requires an appropriate approach and manner of resolving the crises triggered off by the collapse of communist federations. Imperial policies and regimes must be eliminated while the process of the geopolitical consolidation and the creation of independent and sovereign states in Central and Eastern Europe (and in Euro-Asia on the whole), built around the democratic and market principles, must be wrapped up. The new political leaders (mostly leftist) in the countries that for over fifty years (and now through the Kosovo crisis) have been developing the trans-Atlantic alliance within the military-political framework of NATO (based on the same values, principles, and goals), are now developing appropriate strategies for the post-cold-war hotspots (based on the accumulated experiences). (SOI : S. 89) + The author analyses the process of democratisation of international relations and the future configuration of international order following the end of the era of bipolar confrontation and the establishment of cooperation in the world which has witnessed the change in the key actors' roles regarding their approach to the resolution of the post-cold-war crises which jeopardise the world's peace and stability. First, the author provides a short outline of the genesis of the evolution of the US foreign policy, from the end of World War II to the beginning of the cold war and the formation of NATO. He points out that today's agenda of the international order, its structures, interventionism, and use of force in achieving political objectives, were already shaped at that time. The suggestions put forward constituted the framework and the foundation for the world politics until the late 80s; the cumulative effect of these responses on today's attempts at solving post- cold-war crises enables us to evaluate the roles and behaviour of individual actors in the resolution of the Kosovo crisis

The author poses the question about the fate of neoconservatism, in the 1980s the official political orientation in the USA. Twenty years later, one can see how anti-communism and anti-modernism, neoconservatism's fundamental ideological premises, have changed the political practice and awareness, both (and equally) in American foreign and national policy. Though conceptually incoherent, neoconservatism has proved to possess exceptional clout. This has led the author to conclude that neoconservatism, despite the claims by neoconservatives themselves that it is dead, still has much leeway, since voters' awareness has been changed: they have got used to the new political context, they vote for well-balanced "mixtures" of rightist and leftist ideologies. (SOI : PM: S. 164)

The process of European integrations, with a growing political, economic, and security interdependence of member states is designed in such a way that, among other things, it can eventually result in developing a collective approach to defense, whose features would be a far cry from any other form of traditional alliances. The signatories of the Maastricht Agreement vowed to shape a common defense policy which would in time lead to the common defense. The common defense policy, whose structure would be built on the basis of the models and trends of the defense policies of the leading West-European countries, should evolve as an integral part of EU's common foreign and security policy. It should address all the aspects of the use of military power, and it will require an analysis of a broad spectrum of possible scenarios which may pose a threat to EU's security. EU countries have demonstrated certain shortcomings in their military capacities e.g. transport equipment and other capacities for deployment. Although in the economic field they have achieved consensus on numerous issues, it is obvious that defense issues such as nuclear weapons, professionalization of the military and the policies of defense industry are still a major bone of contention for EU members. Though EU, WEU, and NATO represent only a segment of the European security architecture, they will most probably serve as the key institutional framework for the development of a common defense policy and common defense. Further expansion of this triangular institutional framework is going to be interdependent, mutually supportive and parallel. (SOI : PM: S. 89)