Suchergebnisse

Intro -- الفهرس -- الباب الأول : علاقات إسرائيل مع الأميركيتين -- الباب الثاني : علاقات إسرائيل مع القارة الأوروبية -- الباب الثالث : علاقات إسرائيل مع دول ومناطق آسيا -- الباب الرابع : علاقة إسرائيل مع إفريقيا والعالم العربي -- الباب الخامس : علاقات إسرائيل مع أستراليا ونيوزلندا والباسيفيك -- الباب السادس : علاقات إسرائيل مع المنظمات الدولية، وتجارتها الدولية -- المشاركون -- الخرائط

The Belgian foreign policy carried out by the prime minister Guy Verhofstadt & foreign minister Louis Michel is described as voluntaristic with ethical overtones & contrasted with the US policy of unilateralism. The state of the two countries' mutual relations before & after September 11 is outlined, & the growing division over the war in Irak is investigated. Excerpts from Michel's speeches are quoted to demonstrate the voluntaristic content & form of Belgian foreign policy within the EU & in Central Africa. The split within the EU on supporting the US intervention in Irak, with Belgium joining France & Germany in opposing George W. Bush's decision to invade this country, is described. It is pointed out that Belgium disagrees with the unilateral approach to foreign affairs adopted by the Bush government, as it: (1) replaces the principle of fellowship with followship, (2) dismisses the principle of multilateral consultation propagating its slogan of the "coalition of the willing," & (3) does not respect the "rules-based system" of international conduct. The prospects of Belgium's place in a future configuration of transatlantic relations are assessed, concluding that this country's voluntarism is less damaging to fellowship than American unilateralism. Z. Dubiel

Reading the news about Iran today one can hardly imagine that relations between the Netherlands and Iran were excellent until 1979. Mohammed-Reza Pahlavi, the last shah of Persia, was known in The Netherlands as a visionary and reformer. Persia was represented as a mythical land with an ancient civilization. The Dutch royal family enjoyed visiting the shah, and large and small Dutch companies were successful in Iran.

When in the 1970s awareness spread about repression under the shah, the Dutch government was faced with difficult choices. How could these relations be continued, now that public opinion had turned against it? The Dutch government decided to ignore the criticisms, and firmly held on to the idea of the shah as an enlightened despot. As such, it did not see the Iranian Revolution coming, and suffered the consequences.

A little appreciated member of the international community in 2004, Belgium has developed the previous years into a constructive diplomatic element that takes to heart its international responsibility (examples: troops in Lebanon, Afghanistan, Balkans, and an effective diplomatic intervention concerning the Democratic Republic of Congo). Responsibly for this success are called Belgian impartiality, its open ears, imagination and collaboration regarding multilateralism. Furthermore, the EU's enlargement by 10 states is discussed, the rejecting of the European Constitution by France and the Netherlands, and the strengthened position of the BENELUX within the EU. A second topic: relations with the neighboring countries France, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Luxembourg. A last item discusses cooperation in multilateral development projects. References. O. van Zijl

Halevi, Ilan: Towards a Palestinian foreign policy? - S. 5-10 Beck, Martin: Forms of Palestinian resistance to occupation: a rational choice perspective. - S. 11-29

The European Union's merchandising policies have been a successful enterprise, whereas sensitive political items of safety, defense and international policies were not its priority. Since the 1990's however the EU tries to define itself in relationship to the rest of the world, of which the Common Foreign and Safety Policy (Gemeenschappelijk Buitenlands- en Veiligheidsbeleid, GBVB) is a good example with which the EU promotes and defends its interests internationally. Moreover, through the GBVB, the EU takes part in crisis control activities, as for example on the Balkans. An analysis of EU interventions and behavior during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, with explanations for the limited successes achieved, in particular by lack of its member states to cooperate in a unified action, partly based on differences of opinion, partly on a lack of national profit to be gained from the region concerned. Differences of opinion often based on conflicting national interests, and highly influence - negatively - on the GBVB's effectivity. To be more influential on a global scale, member states should compromise their proper interests into a unified voice, and bind together their bilateral relations into cooperation. Furthermore, problems regarding coherence and continuity exist by means of an often changing chairmanship of the EU, making the flow of information and mandates irregular, therewith reducing the GBVB's into a reactive organ, where dynamic activity is needed. References. O. van Zijl