This paper is an analysis of the foreign Aid Policies of two OECD Development Assistance Committee member countries – Finland and Ireland. The analysis reveals that both Finland and Ireland share high principles on their relations with the developing world, although their current policy outlooks appear to differ significantly. Despite Finland's good economic performance and prosperity largely generated by the global demand and market access, the government has so far failed to include the increasing of ODA on its priority agenda. In addition to the declining commitment, the selection criteria for Finnish aid recipients appears to be partially commercially motivated. Ireland on the other hand has a solid record of targeting the poorest of the poor with its development assistance and has recently increased development country focus in national policies. The challenge for Ireland is the effective utilisation of these funds and even more importantly keeping the government's public, international commitment to the 0,7 percent recommendation level despite the possible future slowdown of the economy.
The focus of this research is on Finland's role in Soviet Union's calculation of its foreign policy between 1920 and 1930. This was the first decade of both Finnish independence and of Soviet power in Russia. This book answers questions about the objectives of Soviet foreign policy in Finland, on the contacts used by the Soviet legation to obtain information, and on how well the Soviets understood Finland's objectives. People interested in Finland and in Russian perspectives with regards to foreign policy and neighbouring countries will find much new in this book because it relies on formerly unpublished Russian archival material to form the basis for charting Soviet objectives in Finland. The book shows that the Soviets primarily observed Finland in a larger regional context along with other states on its borders in the Baltic Sea region. The global objectives of the revolution and the Soviet Union, but also the domestic political situation in both countries, are reflected on this framework. The period was characterized by forced collectivization in the Soviet Union and, in Finland, by the rise of the right-wing Lapua Movement that emerged at the onset of the Great Depression, laying the foundations for the most severe crisis in the relations during 1929–1930 when the issues surrounding these events destabilized simultaneously the society and political decision-making in both countries.
The focus of this research is on Finland's role in Soviet Union's calculation of its foreign policy between 1920 and 1930. This was the first decade of both Finnish independence and of Soviet power in Russia. This book answers questions about the objectives of Soviet foreign policy in Finland, on the contacts used by the Soviet legation to obtain information, and on how well the Soviets understood Finland's objectives. People interested in Finland and in Russian perspectives with regards to foreign policy and neighbouring countries will find much new in this book because it relies on formerly unpublished Russian archival material to form the basis for charting Soviet objectives in Finland. The book shows that the Soviets primarily observed Finland in a larger regional context along with other states on its borders in the Baltic Sea region. The global objectives of the revolution and the Soviet Union, but also the domestic political situation in both countries, are reflected on this framework. The period was characterized by forced collectivization in the Soviet Union and, in Finland, by the rise of the right-wing Lapua Movement that emerged at the onset of the Great Depression, laying the foundations for the most severe crisis in the relations during 1929–1930 when the issues surrounding these events destabilized simultaneously the society and political decision-making in both countries
Study of how the Academic Karelia Society (AKS) understood Finland's national defense and foreign policy situations and tried to influence both during the period 1922-1939. The study is based on AKS original sources, including AKS personnel interviews and press clippings, as well as Finnish Defense Administration documents. AKS' most important archives disappeared without a trace immediately after the Second World War
Some states are widely recognized by policy makers and scholars as middle powers. The characteristics that were highlighted for these countries have become the basic guidelines for understanding middle powermanship and developing the corresponding theory. While those analyses offer rich in-depth insights into the foreign policy of specific countries, they have so far lacked a further step of generalization. When establishing such power-based rankings, we assume the possibility to determine states' capacities so as to identify their position in said ranking. As appealing as this theoretical model may be, the reality of international politics increasingly challenge it. Thus, we argue that this theoretical inadequacy is due to the fact that middle power theory as it has been developed so far should be understood as an inductive, not a deductive, approach . Consequently, the contemporary reality calls for yet another stage of development in this theory. The choice of Pakistan as our case study arises from the observation that while Pakistan can hardly fit into the current classification(s) of middle powermanship due to its poor economic and development performances, it is a nuclear state and is –at least– in the top twenty armies of the world. Moreover, we find several cases in which Pakistan has used the diplomatic tools characterizing middle powers, such as mediation or niche diplomacy. Our paper aims at answering two questions: (1) can middle power theory bring some light on Pakistan's positioning in world politics? (2) Alternatively, what does the case of Pakistan tell us about the (ir)relevance of middle power theory? We build upon role theory to develop the case of middle powermanship as a status-role bundle, by analyzing three specific cases of Pakistan's foreign policy: Pakistani nuclear posturing, its Afghan policy and its posturing vis-à-vis the Saudi-Iranian regional competition.
Today few people deny the existence of regional substate diplomacy (Criekemans 2010). But there is still no common agreement on a region's right to do so and, above all, on their scope of action. This question goes against what used to be the dominant approach in international relations, the state-centric approach that leads to the logic of speaking with one voice. Increasingly, a multilevel-governance approach has contested this state-centric view and proposes an alternative logic of multiple actors speaking with their voice, nuancing strongly the seminal distinction between "sovereignty-bound" and "sovereignty-free" actors (Rosenau 1990). From the 1970s, the world has seen the growing presence of sovereignty-free actors in international relations. Among these actors, non-central or, better, substate, governments of federal states have developed intensive foreign relations. These governments are using a range of techniques: from shaping the federal government's foreign policy to establishing themselves directly in the international arena (Blatter et al. 2008). For minority nation governments this is particularly a challenge, as they have to act internally – where they have developed full-fledged legislative powers within a multinational federation – and externally – where international and national laws are often still reluctant to recognise their right of action (Lejeune 2003). Yet some minority nations have thrived in developing their own international relations. Bavaria, Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, Scotland and Wallonia are often seen as successful international players even if they are not fully sovereignty bound (Michelmann 2009; Criekemans 2010). The international actions of these minority nations have been characterised under the umbrella of "identity paradiplomacy" (Paquin 2003); that is, a willingness to use international relations to foster a nation-building process within a multinational state. This observation was particularly prevalent for minority nations strongly in competition with a federal government about their nationbuilding process, albeit for different reasons, namely Flanders, Quebec and Scotland (Paquin 2004). The case of Wallonia seems to fits less well into the identity paradiplomacy framework, which therefore raises the question of alternative roads to international relations. This is the core question of this chapter: is identity paradiplomacy the only way to go for minority nations? Quebec and Wallonia are both well known for their active foreign relations.
Abstract The research examines the U.S. approach to the independence of the Philippines and its stages at the end of the 1920's and in the early 1930's. The Philippines belonged to the United States from 1898 to 1946. The relationship between the two countries was quite controversial from the very beginning. Many of the different phases and factors resulted in the U.S. Congress passing a law in March 1934, which guaranteed full independence to the Philippines after a ten-year transition period. The birth of the law which led to Philippine independence was a complex political process, with a number of variables influencing the attitudes and the solution. These factors accounting for the formation of the solution changed as time progressed. One of the key variables in terms of the Act of Independence began when the Great Depression began in 1929, which affected especially agricultural producers. As the Philippines was administratively a part of the federal government, in these circles it was seen that only independence could be the solution to close the archipelago outside of the domestic market. In fact, the sugar and coconut imports from the Philippines were not a real competitor to the federal farmers. In addition to the domestic farmers the Cuban sugar producers, who were headed by U.S. investors, felt that Philippine duty-free import was challenging their share of the federal market. They were of the opinion that the independence of the Philippines could guarantee them better market positions in the federal sugar market, and strove to promote the Independence Act as soon as possible. As a result of the worsening unemployment situation Filipino migrant workers started competing for scarce jobs. As a part of the United States Filipinos had free immigration rights. In particular, on the west coast and in the employees' organizations, independence was seen as the easiest way to limit immigration. In addition to the economic cycle other significant factors were the changes in foreign policy, and in particular the rise of Japan as a powerful superpower in the Far East. The federal government and the majority of the Congress represented opposing views of the independence issue. The Congress was able to show strength in this confrontation. The main sources of the material consist of the U.S. government documents, the Congress document collections, foreign relations document collections, memoirs and other documents. ; Tiivistelmä Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Yhdysvaltain suhtautumista Filippiinien itsenäistymiseen ja siihen liittyneisiin vaiheisiin 1920 -luvun lopulla ja 1930-luvun alkupuoliskolla. Filippiinit kuuluivat Yhdysvalloille vuosina 1898–1946. Maiden välinen suhde oli hyvin kiistanalainen alusta alkaen. Monien eri vaiheiden ja tekijöiden seurauksena Yhdysvaltain kongressi hyväksyi maaliskuussa 1934 lain, joka takasi Filippiineille täyden itsenäisyyden kymmenen vuoden siirtymäajan jälkeen. Filippiinien itsenäistymiseen johtaneen lain synty oli monimutkainen poliittinen prosessi, jossa oli useita suhtautumiseen ja ratkaisuun vaikuttaneita muuttujia. Näiden tekijöiden osuus ratkaisun muodostumiseen muuttui ajan edetessä. Yksi keskeisimmistä muuttujista itsenäisyyslain suhteen oli vuonna 1929 Yhdysvalloissa alkanut suuri lamakausi, josta kärsivät erityisesti maataloustuottajat. Koska Filippiinit oli hallinnollisesti osa liittovaltiota, näissä piireissä nähtiin, että ainoastaan itsenäisyys voisi saattaa saariston sisämarkkinoiden ulkopuolelle. Filippiineiltä tuotava sokeri ja kookosöljy eivät olleet todelliset kilpailijat liittovaltion viljelijöille. Kotimaan viljelijäväestön lisäksi Kuuban sokerintuotantoon investoineet amerikkalaiset sijoittajapiirit kokivat Filippiinien tullivapaan tuonnin vievän heiltä markkinoita. He katsoivat, että Filippiinien itsenäisyys takaisi paremmat markkina-asemat liittovaltion sokerimarkkinoilla ja pyrkivät edistämään itsenäisyyslain mahdollisimman pikaista säätämistä. Alati pahenevan työttömyyden seurauksen filippiiniläiset siirtotyöläiset kilpailivat hupenevista työpaikoista. Filippiiniläisille oli taattu vapaa maahanmuutto-oikeus. Etenkin länsirannikolla ja työntekijäjärjestöissä saarten itsenäistyminen nähtiin olevan helpoin tie maahanmuuton rajoittamiseen. Taloudellisten suhdanteiden ohella muita merkittäviä tekijöitä olivat muutokset ulkopolitiikassa ja etenkin Japanin nousu voimakkaaksi suurvallaksi Kaukoidässä. Liittovaltion hallinto ja kongressin enemmistö edustivat vastakkaisia näkemyssuuntia itsenäisyyskysymyksessä. Kongressi pystyi osoittamaan voimansa tässä vastakkainasettelussa. Tutkimuksen keskeisin lähdeaineisto koostuu Yhdysvaltain hallinnon asiakirjoista, kongressin asiakirjakokoelmista, ulkoaisainhallinnon asiakirjakokoelmista, muistelmista sekä lähdeteoksista.
Ex ante assessment of regulatory impact upon businesses: A neo-institutional study on the context, international influences, and Finnish experiences Regulatory impact assessment (RIA) has an established place in the European Union and its member states. This article considers evolving Finnish ex ante RIA concerning certain regulatory costs to firms. Drawing upon a neo-institutional theoretical framework and proposing three generally oriented hypotheses we received the following results. (1) The rationality of theevolving Finnish ex ante RIA of selected administrativeregulatory costs to firms gives rise issuesgiven the low implementation rate of thegeneral natonal RIA guidelines. (2) Reference to the ex ante RIA of regulatory costs to firmsin other countries has served the legitimation of preferred procedures in Finland rather than offerssolid evidence on the rationality of the foreign procedures. (3) Without a stronger contextualization of the evolving Finnish ex ante RIAmof regulatory costs to firms its procedures risk adverse effects because of their confined scope, the uneven quality of their input data, and their weak connections to the general national ex ante RIA. These results suggest the redesign of the Finnish RIA to take better into account the institutional, political, historical and cultural characteristicsof governance in this country. Keywords: regulatory impact assessment, public policy evaluation, public policymaking, lawmaking, legal policy, deregulation ; Peer reviewed