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Satisfied with some important progress being made in health care reform on the home front, these past few days President Obama turned his full attention to foreign policy. In a week packed with international speeches, bilateral meetings and joint declarations, he succeeded in establishing a new ambitious agenda for international cooperation and wasted no time in getting started. In his speech to the UN, he outlined his main foreign policy goals based on four pillars: non-proliferation, climate change, Middle East peace and economic stability. He spoke clearly about his determination to put an end to the international skepticism and distrust the United States faced during the Bush years and enumerated the changes already made: banning the use of torture, closing the Guantánamo base, drawing down forces in Iraq, renewing efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict by naming a special envoy, seriously addressing climate change and abandoning plans for a land-based missile defense in Eastern Europe. He challenged other leaders to respond in kind by joining US efforts at non-proliferation, fighting terrorism, taking measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combating poverty. A day later in Pittsburgh for the G-20 summit, the President, flanked by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Sarkozy, revealed a new nuclear facility built by Iran in the city of Qum and called for further sanctions on the Islamic Republic. This well-timed revelation is supposed to give the administration some more leverage when talks with the Iranians start later this week. As it happens, the US had known about this new uranium enriching plant for more than a year but had kept the information secret for later use. In Pittsburgh, with France and Britain safely on his side, the President had further opportunity to press the other two members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, to cooperate with the new sanctions regime that will most likely include imports of refined oil into Iran. While Russia appears to be leaning towards cooperation (perhaps as a quid pro quo of Obama's decision not to deploy the anti-missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic), it is not as yet clear whether the Chinese will too. This week has been a good one for China, which seems to be coming of age as an international player both in climate change and as a partner for economic stability in the G-20. But the revelation at Qum was certainly a pre-emptive coup that put the Iranians on the defensive, and gave Obama an opportunity to publicly test the other Permanent Members of the Security Council to prove their commitment to non-proliferation.As the United States moves aggressively to engage with the rest of the world and vows to renew its pledge to international law and institutions, the expectation is that others will take their share of responsibility and respond to global challenges. Obama's moral authority flows not only from what he says, and how he says it, but also by virtue of who he is: in his case, the man is the message and the intended drastic cut with his predecessor could not be more apparent. However, as Realists constantly remind us, foreign policy is about national interest defined as power, and while the change of tone and of emissary is well-noted, we are likely to see some change, but also a lot of continuity in US foreign policy. Barack Obama's first speech at the United Nations General Assembly was well-received around the world but had less impact on a home audience whose main concerns are unemployment, health care reform and economic recovery. Inevitably, the usual suspects accused him of treason for recognizing America's past mistakes in public and for socializing with tyrants. Others denounced his narcissistic impulses, for trying to portray American foreign policy as "all about Obama". While it is easy to dismiss the extreme critics, it is important for the rest of the world to realize how much the United Nations' legitimacy and prestige has suffered in the United States during the last ten years, and not only due to derisions by Bolton and Bush. TV images of the UN headquarters in New York seem distant and irrelevant to most Americans, who view the organization as an anachronistic shibboleth that embodies all fluff and no substance and whose activities are hard to take seriously in most cases, be it when it deals with Rwanda, Darfur or with Iranian sanctions. At this year's opening session, the General Assembly room, with a badly lit podium and a very unbecoming blue-greenish background, was showing its age in spite of a 2002 facelift (it was built in 1952). And while Obama was as dynamic and articulate as usual, his televised speech was followed by that of Mohammad Khadafy from Libya, which lasted one hour and a half and included bizarre statements and phrases that can only be accounted for by a serious onset of senility. Besides calling for a UN investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination, and surreally complaining about how far most of those present had had to travel to get to New York (was jetlag his excuse to explain away his own state of mental confusion?), he repeatedly called President Obama "my son" (I cringed at imagining the right wing blogs reaction to that) and referred to the UN Security Council as the "Terror Council". His difficulty to find a place in New York where he would be allowed to pitch his tent was followed with amusement by the media and further added to his own oddity, and by extension, to the inadequacy of the UN as a serious forum. While later Prime Minister Netanyahu's excellent, Churchill-like speech brought the audience back to the 21st century and restored some respectability to the venue, the UN lost credibility again when Iranian president Ahmadinejad went on a new rant later in the day and again and proceeded once more to deny the Holocaust's existence. In addition to this rarified atmosphere, the main foreign policy topic that is of concern for the American public, and the one that would have made them pay attention, namely, the war in Afghanistan was hardly mentioned by Obama in this occasion. After eight years of war in Afghanistan, the effort seems to be unraveling on all fronts. European NATO members, whose soldiers are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, are unwilling or unable to commit more troops; the Taliban has renewed its offensives with new intensity in the south and the east of the country, and the Afghan election was plagued with corruption, proving what many already suspected, that President Hamid Karzai is an extremely unreliable partner and a corrupt leader who will not be able to hold the country together. At the same time, Al Qaeda has found refuge in neighboring Pakistan so the US initial counterterrorist mission, namely to hunt down and exterminate Al Qaeda, has mutated into one of counterinsurgency against an indigenous group, the Taliban, fighting against the government and the foreign forces to regain its power. All this in a country that has never been a nation, a narco-state whose economic base is the production and trafficking of opium, and where several empires, from the Macedonians to the British and the Soviets were once defeated. The President's plan so far has been to train the Afghan army so that it can hold off the Taliban, support government institutions, gain the trust of villagers and create structures of governance in rural areas so that Al Qaeda won't be able to move in again. This week a Pentagon memo by General Crystal was leaked by Bob Woodward of Watergate fame. Published in the Washington Post on September 21st, it presents a grim picture of the war and warns that success is uncertain. It calls for new resources and a new counterinsurgency campaign. While the number of troops requested is not specified, it warns that "under-resourcing" the effort could be fatal. Woodward, never one to sell himself short, has called his leaked memo the equivalent of the 1971 Pentagon Papers leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in the New York Times, which revealed the expansion of the Vietnam War from 1965 on, that had been kept secret from the American public. Of course the memo is not the equivalent of Ellsberg and Russo's revelations, but still, it refocused attention on the intractability of this war. The President's response has been that after the Afghan election, the White House is re-assessing its strategy and that until he is satisfied with a new strategy he will not send more troops. It is clear that the administration is having doubts about a conflict it once called a war of necessity. Public opinion is also turning against what will soon be the longest war in American history, as casualties continue to increase and there is no end in sight. As the term "military surge" is being increasingly used to denote McCrystal's new demands, comparisons with the war in Iraq are inevitable. Similarly to the Iraq war, elections have represented a turning point. But the surge in Iraq began with the so-called Sunni awakening, when the Iraqis themselves decided they had had enough of the violence and organized against those that insisted on it (mainly outsiders, Al Qaeda-in-Iraq). Also, in Iraq's leader Al-Maliki, the US found a relatively reliable and legitimate partner, one who instigated the political class to resolve their differences by political means. Finally, Iraq had an economic base that could be restored to produce substantial national wealth, and a mostly urban, well-educated population with some institutional experience. In contrast, Afghanistan is a mainly rural country, a tribal society which repudiates any attempts at centralization and profoundly distrusts the government in Kabul more, in some cases, than the foreign troops. The central government is rotten and weak, Karzai an unreliable leader who stole the election and whose brother is the head of the drug mafia. Can more US troops make up for all these weaknesses?Obama is thus in a delicate situation: he can't be "at war" with his own generals (indeed, General McCrystal was appointed by Obama only in March, after he dismissed the previous general in charge). On the other hand, if he allows more troops to be deployed, there is danger that Afghanistan may become his Vietnam. He therefore needs to choose between continuing a counterinsurgency operation, training more Afghan forces, protecting the local populations, getting into their villages and gaining their trust, or withdrawing ground troops and focusing on counter-terrorism, using drones and other off-shore means and special forces to go after the terrorist bases. Vice-President Biden is advocating a middle ground strategy: leaving enough troops on the ground to prevent Al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan, but redefining the mission as one of narrow counter-terrorism and move away from nation-building and a protracted counter-insurgency operation that would signify more US casualties and more discontent at home. After all, the main reason why the US went to Afghanistan was to confront and eliminate Al Qaeda, which has since then moved across the border to the tribal areas of Pakistan. As several domestic arrests have demonstrated this week, Al Qaeda threats are just as likely to come from Springfield Illinois, Queens New York or Dallas Texas as from abroad or from the virtual Al Qaeda organizing through the worldwide web. Recalibrating his approach to Afghanistan is thus imperative, and it must be done for the right reasons, regardless of personal gain or saving face.Obama has had a very successful September, but his ambitious agenda both at home and abroad faces many pitfalls ahead. A youthful president, brimming with self-confidence, with a huge electoral mandate and with the best team of experts in history, can still be thwarted by unsolvable problems, domestic and foreign enemies and by serendipity itself. As a student of history and a John F Kennedy admirer, Obama knows this, and he should measure his decisions and temper his ambitions accordingly. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

The internationalization of Colombian conflict with the setting up of Plan Colombia by Andrés Pastrana, then maintained by Álvaro Uribe, increased foreign policy fragmentation and confusion in the conduct of the country's foreign relations. Three arguments are analyzed: first, Plan Colombia intensified the presidential conduct of diplomatic relations and the fragmentation of foreign relations, and made the role of the Foreign Ministry weaker than before. Second, Plan Colombia made relations with USA more complex and diminished and to some extent worsened Colombia's relations with the European Union and most of its members. And finally, Plan Colombia stimulated the international participation of non-state actors, especially non-government organizations, who started to do a parallel diplomacy in Washington and in Brussels. The presidency of Andrés Pastrana and the first presidency of Álvaro Uribe will be examined within the geographic triangle of Colombia, the USA and Europe. ; La internacionalización del conflicto colombiano y la implementación del Plan Colombia, ambos sucesos instaurados por el gobierno del presidente Andrés Pastrana, y posteriormente, seguidos por la administración del presidente Álvaro Uribe incrementó el problema de la fragmentación de la política exterior y la confusión para conducir las relaciones exteriores del país. Tres argumentos son analizados: primero, el Plan Colombia intensificó la conducta presidencialista en las relaciones diplomáticas y la fragmentación de la política exterior, e hizo el rol del Ministerio de Relaciones más débil que antes. Segundo, el Plan Colombia hizo más complejas las relaciones con Estados Unidos y de alguna manera empeoro las relaciones del país con la Unión Europea y algunos de sus Estados miembros. Y finalmente, el Plan Colombia estimuló la participación internacional de los actores no estatales, especialmente las organizaciones no gubernamentales quienes empezaron a desarrollar una diplomacia paralela en Washington y en Bruselas. La presidencia de Andrés Pastrana y el primer mandato del presidente Álvaro Uribe son examinados en el marco del triángulo de Colombia, Estados Unidos y Europa.

The internationalization of Colombian conflict with the setting up of Plan Colombia by Andrés Pastrana, then maintained by Álvaro Uribe, increased foreign policy fragmentation and confusion in the conduct of the country's foreign relations. Three arguments are analyzed: first, Plan Colombia intensified the presidential conduct of diplomatic relations and the fragmentation of foreign relations, and made the role of the Foreign Ministry weaker than before. Second, Plan Colombia made relations with USA more complex and diminished and to some extent worsened Colombia's relations with the European Union and most of its members. And finally, Plan Colombia stimulated the international participation of non-state actors, especially non-government organizations, who started to do a parallel diplomacy in Washington and in Brussels. The presidency of Andrés Pastrana and the first presidency of Álvaro Uribe will be examined within the geographic triangle of Colombia, the USA and Europe. ; La internacionalización del conflicto colombiano y la implementación del Plan Colombia, ambos sucesos instaurados por el gobierno del presidente Andrés Pastrana, y posteriormente, seguidos por la administración del presidente Álvaro Uribe incrementó el problema de la fragmentación de la política exterior y la confusión para conducir las relaciones exteriores del país. Tres argumentos son analizados: primero, el Plan Colombia intensificó la conducta presidencialista en las relaciones diplomáticas y la fragmentación de la política exterior, e hizo el rol del Ministerio de Relaciones más débil que antes. Segundo, el Plan Colombia hizo más complejas las relaciones con Estados Unidos y de alguna manera empeoro las relaciones del país con la Unión Europea y algunos de sus Estados miembros. Y finalmente, el Plan Colombia estimuló la participación internacional de los actores no estatales, especialmente las organizaciones no gubernamentales quienes empezaron a desarrollar una diplomacia paralela en Washington y en Bruselas. La presidencia de Andrés Pastrana y el primer mandato del presidente Álvaro Uribe son examinados en el marco del triángulo de Colombia, Estados Unidos y Europa.

Los Estados Unidos, como el poder geopolítico dominante en el Medio Oriente, han estado luchando por estabilizar la región con el fin de alcanzar sus objetivos políticos y lograr sus intereses. Particularmente desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, Estados Unidos ha priorizado, instituido y considerado las políticas del Medio Oriente como vitales para asegurar sus "intereses nacionales" hasta los ataques terroristas a las torres gemelas en la ciudad de Nueva York. Como es claro, los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001 marcaron un cambio dramático, no solo en las políticas de Estados Unidos, sino también en la retórica estadounidense, así como en los discursos internacionales. Luego de los ataques terroristas, las políticas de Estados Unidos con relación al Medio Oriente pasaron de ser una cuestión de "seguridad nacional", lo cual básicamente hacía más énfasis en "la seguridad defensiva", a ser una cuestión de "seguridad preventiva de los intereses nacionales" principalmente bajo la administración neoconservadora de George W. Bush. Como consecuencia, Estados Unidos adelantó dos incursiones militares en Afganistán (2001) y en Iraq (2003) donde se puso en la tarea de cambiar unilateralmente y de manera sensible el régimen de dichos Estados con el objeto de asegurar sus intereses nacionales y procurar la paz mundial a largo plazo. Es importante resaltar aquí que Estados Unidos autorizó el completo apoyo (por lo menos retóricamente) a las Naciones Unidas para desarmar el régimen Talibán en Afganistán. Este estudio revisa y conceptualiza la política exterior actual de los Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea con respecto al Medio Oriente —aunque no son idénticas— antes y después de los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre. El argumento aquí presentado es que los objetivos de la política exterior con relación al Medio Oriente, tanto de los Estados Unidos como de la Unión Europea, giran principalmente alrededor de dos puntos: la seguridad del petróleo y la protección del Estado de Israel en una región predominantemente árabe. De manera similar, aunque no exactamente de la misma forma, tanto Estados Unidos como la Unión Europea tienen intereses en establecer buenas relaciones con los Estados árabes así como en promover la democracia y la economía del mercado libre en el Medio Oriente. Este estudio también revisa las iniciativas de política exterior con el Medio Oriente del presidente Barack Obama e intenta indicar algunos puntos clave.

El propósito para desarrollar esta investigación es identificar las características de las relaciones exteriores de Colombia, desde el año 1811 hasta el presente. La autora de este trabajo ha dedicado hasta este momento dos días a la semana, desde el mes de noviembre del año 2011 para su desarrollo. Ha leído las obras de los más importantes tratadistas colombianos que han estudiado el tema, diarios de circulación nacional, páginas de internet del gobierno donde se encuentra información acerca del tema, entre otras fuentes. Todo esto se ha venido realizando con el fin de tener un documento que sirva para investigaciones futuras como fundamento o marco teórico, además de proporcionar una síntesis de la política exterior colombiana durante el tiempo abarcado por el estudio. ; The main reason of this research is to identify the most relevant features of the foreign relations of Colombia, from 1811 to the present. It has been devoted two days per week, from November 2011 to this moment, to do the research. The author of this document has read the most important Colombian authors who have written about Colombian foreign affairs, national newspapers, the government websites that contain important information about the topic, among other important sources, in order to elaborate a document that can be used as a framework for future research on the Colombian foreign policy.

La política exterior de Mali y su independencia de Francia están indisolublemente relacionadas con Modibo Keita, uno de los líderes del Partido del Reagrupamiento Democrático Africano y de la unidad africana. Keita se destaca por su antiimperialismo, anticolonialismo y por la unidad del continente con la creación de la Federación de Mali, embrión de un gobierno panafricano dentro de la Organización de la Unidad Africana. Su innovador concepto de cooperación, en el Movimiento de Países No Alineados, realza la política exterior de Mali, comprometida con la unidad africana a pesar de los particularismos, aprovechados por los colonialistas para dividir al continente. ; Mali's foreign policy and its independence from France are inextricably linked to Modibo Keita, one of the leaders of the African Democratic Rally Party and of African unity. KEITA stands out for his anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and for his work on the unity of the continent with the creation of the Federation of Mali, embryo of a pan-African government within the Organization of African Unity. His innovative concept of cooperation in the Non-Aligned Movement enhanced Mali's foreign policy, which is committed to African unity despite local diff erences that are used by colonialists to divide the continent. ; 97-105 ; fidelediarra@hotmail.com ; semestral

El desafío en los inicios de la gestión de Evo Morales, implicaba la recuperación tanto de un espacio propio dentro de la esfera política regional como también la identificación de la política exterior con los rasgos más característicos de la población indígena. Las acciones de nacionalización, los reclamos autonomistas por parte de las regiones de la Media Luna y los avances de la relación con Venezuela, marcan los ejes de una política exterior signada por los recursos energéticos, la viabilidad como país y la construcción de una nación con elementos particularmente diferenciadores. El presente trabajo analiza los lineamientos que hasta el presente ha tenido la política exterior boliviana en los cuatro años de mandato de Morales, haciendo especial hincapié en sus aspectos regionales y sus vinculaciones con Argentina, Chile, Brasil y Venezuela. ; The challenge at the beginning Evo Morales' first administration was the recovery of both its own space in the regional political arena and the identification of the foreign policy with the main demands of the indigenous population. Actions such as the nationalization, the claims for autonomy from the regions of the Media Luna and the progress of the relationship with Venezuela, are the axes of a foreign policy oriented by energy resources, the country's viability and the construction of a nation with differentiated elements. This paper examines the main orientations of the Bolivian foreign policy in the four-years of the Morales administration by focusing on the regional aspects and the relations with Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Venezuela. ; 105-121 ; victoria.zapata@gmail.com ; semestral

"They say that foreign policy must be defined in accordance with national interest. But who decides which are the national interests and how these interests are identified and ordered? ", the Panamanian political analyst Nils Castro asks of himself in this article, from the perspective of a small country fighting to rescue its rights and to defend its interests against a great power. This was, and is the case of Panama, looking to recover his dominion over the most valuable portion of its territory, occupied by the United States, obtained through complex negotiation. ; "Se dice que la política exterior debe definirse de conformidad con el interés nacional. ¿Pero quién decide cuáles son los intereses nacionales y cómo se identifican y jerarquizan dichos intereses?", se pregunta el politólogo panameño Nils Castro en este trabajo, desde la perspectiva de un país chico que lucha por rescatar sus derechos y defender sus intereses frente a una gran potencia, como fue el caso de Panamá, que buscaba recobrar su dominio sobre la porción más valiosa y codiciada de su territorio, ocupada por Estados Unidos, lo cual se logró a través de una negociación muy compleja.

This article analyzes the nature of the conflict generated in South America by the adoption of the new military agreement between the U.S. and Colombia. The article will evaluate the political and the geostrategic implications of this agreement, especially its repercussions for the regional integration process of South America. It will also analyze the stances of the local actors in order to consider prospective scenarios, and will assess the U.S. approach to South American integration under the Obama administration.

Este artículo estudia la transición en la política exterior uruguaya durante el período 2000-2011 con énfasis en las metas y prioridades, el proceso de toma de decisiones y la interacción entre formulación de la política exterior y los determinantes de la política doméstica. El argumento sostiene que el ascenso de la izquierda uruguaya al gobierno generó el surgimiento de una nueva aproximación a las relaciones internacionales, caracterizado por la promoción de la integración regional, la cooperación sur-sur y el desarrollo. El análisis se concentra en tres períodos presidenciales incluyendo el gobierno actual a fin de establecer los elementos de cambio y continuidad a lo largo del período. ; This article studies the transition in the Uruguayan foreign policy during the period 2000-2011 focusing on goals and priorities, the decision-making process and the interaction between policy formulation and the determinants of domestic politics. It argues that the accession of the Uruguayan Left to government caused the emergence of a new approach to international relations characterized by the promotion of regional integration, South-South cooperation and development. The analysis concentrates on three presidential periods, included current administration, to establish the degree of change and continuity throughout the period. ; 129-152 ; iclement@fcs.edu.uy ; semestral

Foreign policy is understood as a public policy, aimed at the achievement of the interests of a State, through interaction with the other actors in the international system. Its design and implementation must be based on the ability of governments to consolidate the political and economic spaces through medium- and long-term strategic alliances with the other players in the international system. The main purpose of this essay is to analyze the evolution of Colombia's foreign policy and the influence that the various models have had throughout history, marked mainly by the respice polum, as paradigm prevalent during the greater part of our historical evolution. Also, it will consider the theoretical pillars that institutionalism brings in its design, implementation and transformation, generating with it, fundamental tools of required study. ; La política exterior se entiende como una política pública, encaminada a la consecución de los intereses de un Estado, mediante la interacción con los otros actores del sistema internacional. Su diseño y aplicación, debe fundamentarse en la capacidad que tengan los gobiernos en consolidar los espacios políticos y económicos mediante alianzas estratégicas de mediano y largo plazo, con los demás actores del sistema internacional. El propósito principal de este ensayo, es analizar la evolución de la política exterior colombiana y la influencia que los distintos modelos, han tenido a lo largo de la historia, marcado principalmente por el réspice polum, como paradigma prevalente durante la mayor parte de nuestro devenir histórico. Así mismo, estudiará los pilares teóricos que el institucionalismo aporta en su diseño, aplicación y transformación, generando con ello, herramientas fundamentales de obligado estudio.

En estas últimas décadas se han gestado y, progresivamente, consolidado diversos proyectos de integración y cooperación regionales cuyo desarrollo representa nuevas alternativas en lo político, económico, social, comercial y cultural, por lo que la política exterior mexicana debe ser capaz de articular planes y proyectos que si bien contemplen la dinámica global, atiendan de manera particular las oportunidades que· ofrecen las distintas regiones del mundo, entras las que se destaca de manera particular, por su dinamismo y posicionamiento en los asuntos mundiales, la Cuenca del Pacífico. ; The last few decades have seen the gestation and progressive consolrdatron of varrous projects of regional integration and cooperation, the development of which entails new alternatives in matters political, economic, social, commercial, and cultural. For this reason, Mexican foreign policy must be capable of drawing up plans and projects that, while contemplating global dynamics, pay special attention to the opportunities offered by the various regions of the world, among which the Pacific Rim stands out dueto its dynamism and positioning in world affairs. ; Sección: Estudios. ; Instituto de Relaciones Internacionales (IRI)

La política exterior del gobierno de Hugo Chávez hacia África ha despertado el interés por conocer cuál es el estado reciente de las relaciones con esta región. Es por esto que en este artículo se pretende esbozar una descripción de esta política pública, partiendo de tres dimensiones: la político-diplomática, la comercial y la sociocultural. En este sentido, el trabajo hace un recorrido por los principales temas encarados y las acciones y proyectos emprendidos por la Casa Amarilla hacia la totalidad de los países de este continente. ; Venezuela's foreign policy towards the African continent during the Hugo Chávez government has sparked an interest in learning about the recent developments in this matter. Th at is why the aim of this article is to outline a description of that public policy on three dimensions: the diplomatic one, the commercial one and the socio-cultural one. In this sense, the paper discusses the main issues faced and the actions and projects undertaken by the Yellow House toward the totality of that continent's countries. ; 41-60 ; mflorenciagiacchi@gmail.com ; semestral

En este artículo se examina la manera como el Estado paraguayo enfrentó las dificultades para el establecimiento de una política exterior durante el periodo democrático, y los cambios suscitados a partir de las modificaciones de las relaciones de poder mundial en los últimos 20 años. Para ello, se realiza un análisis de la política exterior en el régimen dictatorial de la época de Stroessner. En segundo lugar, se observan las continuidades y discontinuidades dentro de la política externa durante el periodo de la transición democrática. En tercer lugar, se identifican los ejemplos de continuidad y discontinuidad más sobresalientes de la política externa del Paraguay durante los dos últimos periodos presidenciales. Por último, se concluye explicando los caminos que ha atravesado el Estado paraguayo en el proceso de transición para alcanzar los incipientes cambios en la política exterior hacia el final de la misma. ; This paper analyses the way as the Paraguay state has faced the difficulties in order to establish a foreign policy in the democratic period. The paper also evaluates the changes fostered by the global transformation in the world power relations in the last 20 years. To do so, we firstly analyze the foreign policy during the dictatorial regimen of Stroessner. Secondly, we examine the continuities and ruptures in the foreign policy during the period of democratic transition. Thirdly, we identify outstanding examples of continuity and rupture in the Paraguay foreign policy in the two last administrations. Finally, we conclude the paper explaining the difficulties experienced by the Paraguayan state in this transition period in order to achieve some changes in its foreign policy in the last year of this period. ; 105-127 ; larce@ cadep.org.py ; semestral