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Satisfied with some important progress being made in health care reform on the home front, these past few days President Obama turned his full attention to foreign policy. In a week packed with international speeches, bilateral meetings and joint declarations, he succeeded in establishing a new ambitious agenda for international cooperation and wasted no time in getting started. In his speech to the UN, he outlined his main foreign policy goals based on four pillars: non-proliferation, climate change, Middle East peace and economic stability. He spoke clearly about his determination to put an end to the international skepticism and distrust the United States faced during the Bush years and enumerated the changes already made: banning the use of torture, closing the Guantánamo base, drawing down forces in Iraq, renewing efforts in the Arab-Israeli conflict by naming a special envoy, seriously addressing climate change and abandoning plans for a land-based missile defense in Eastern Europe. He challenged other leaders to respond in kind by joining US efforts at non-proliferation, fighting terrorism, taking measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combating poverty. A day later in Pittsburgh for the G-20 summit, the President, flanked by British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and French President Sarkozy, revealed a new nuclear facility built by Iran in the city of Qum and called for further sanctions on the Islamic Republic. This well-timed revelation is supposed to give the administration some more leverage when talks with the Iranians start later this week. As it happens, the US had known about this new uranium enriching plant for more than a year but had kept the information secret for later use. In Pittsburgh, with France and Britain safely on his side, the President had further opportunity to press the other two members of the UN Security Council, Russia and China, to cooperate with the new sanctions regime that will most likely include imports of refined oil into Iran. While Russia appears to be leaning towards cooperation (perhaps as a quid pro quo of Obama's decision not to deploy the anti-missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic), it is not as yet clear whether the Chinese will too. This week has been a good one for China, which seems to be coming of age as an international player both in climate change and as a partner for economic stability in the G-20. But the revelation at Qum was certainly a pre-emptive coup that put the Iranians on the defensive, and gave Obama an opportunity to publicly test the other Permanent Members of the Security Council to prove their commitment to non-proliferation.As the United States moves aggressively to engage with the rest of the world and vows to renew its pledge to international law and institutions, the expectation is that others will take their share of responsibility and respond to global challenges. Obama's moral authority flows not only from what he says, and how he says it, but also by virtue of who he is: in his case, the man is the message and the intended drastic cut with his predecessor could not be more apparent. However, as Realists constantly remind us, foreign policy is about national interest defined as power, and while the change of tone and of emissary is well-noted, we are likely to see some change, but also a lot of continuity in US foreign policy. Barack Obama's first speech at the United Nations General Assembly was well-received around the world but had less impact on a home audience whose main concerns are unemployment, health care reform and economic recovery. Inevitably, the usual suspects accused him of treason for recognizing America's past mistakes in public and for socializing with tyrants. Others denounced his narcissistic impulses, for trying to portray American foreign policy as "all about Obama". While it is easy to dismiss the extreme critics, it is important for the rest of the world to realize how much the United Nations' legitimacy and prestige has suffered in the United States during the last ten years, and not only due to derisions by Bolton and Bush. TV images of the UN headquarters in New York seem distant and irrelevant to most Americans, who view the organization as an anachronistic shibboleth that embodies all fluff and no substance and whose activities are hard to take seriously in most cases, be it when it deals with Rwanda, Darfur or with Iranian sanctions. At this year's opening session, the General Assembly room, with a badly lit podium and a very unbecoming blue-greenish background, was showing its age in spite of a 2002 facelift (it was built in 1952). And while Obama was as dynamic and articulate as usual, his televised speech was followed by that of Mohammad Khadafy from Libya, which lasted one hour and a half and included bizarre statements and phrases that can only be accounted for by a serious onset of senility. Besides calling for a UN investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination, and surreally complaining about how far most of those present had had to travel to get to New York (was jetlag his excuse to explain away his own state of mental confusion?), he repeatedly called President Obama "my son" (I cringed at imagining the right wing blogs reaction to that) and referred to the UN Security Council as the "Terror Council". His difficulty to find a place in New York where he would be allowed to pitch his tent was followed with amusement by the media and further added to his own oddity, and by extension, to the inadequacy of the UN as a serious forum. While later Prime Minister Netanyahu's excellent, Churchill-like speech brought the audience back to the 21st century and restored some respectability to the venue, the UN lost credibility again when Iranian president Ahmadinejad went on a new rant later in the day and again and proceeded once more to deny the Holocaust's existence. In addition to this rarified atmosphere, the main foreign policy topic that is of concern for the American public, and the one that would have made them pay attention, namely, the war in Afghanistan was hardly mentioned by Obama in this occasion. After eight years of war in Afghanistan, the effort seems to be unraveling on all fronts. European NATO members, whose soldiers are fighting and dying in Afghanistan, are unwilling or unable to commit more troops; the Taliban has renewed its offensives with new intensity in the south and the east of the country, and the Afghan election was plagued with corruption, proving what many already suspected, that President Hamid Karzai is an extremely unreliable partner and a corrupt leader who will not be able to hold the country together. At the same time, Al Qaeda has found refuge in neighboring Pakistan so the US initial counterterrorist mission, namely to hunt down and exterminate Al Qaeda, has mutated into one of counterinsurgency against an indigenous group, the Taliban, fighting against the government and the foreign forces to regain its power. All this in a country that has never been a nation, a narco-state whose economic base is the production and trafficking of opium, and where several empires, from the Macedonians to the British and the Soviets were once defeated. The President's plan so far has been to train the Afghan army so that it can hold off the Taliban, support government institutions, gain the trust of villagers and create structures of governance in rural areas so that Al Qaeda won't be able to move in again. This week a Pentagon memo by General Crystal was leaked by Bob Woodward of Watergate fame. Published in the Washington Post on September 21st, it presents a grim picture of the war and warns that success is uncertain. It calls for new resources and a new counterinsurgency campaign. While the number of troops requested is not specified, it warns that "under-resourcing" the effort could be fatal. Woodward, never one to sell himself short, has called his leaked memo the equivalent of the 1971 Pentagon Papers leaked by Daniel Ellsberg in the New York Times, which revealed the expansion of the Vietnam War from 1965 on, that had been kept secret from the American public. Of course the memo is not the equivalent of Ellsberg and Russo's revelations, but still, it refocused attention on the intractability of this war. The President's response has been that after the Afghan election, the White House is re-assessing its strategy and that until he is satisfied with a new strategy he will not send more troops. It is clear that the administration is having doubts about a conflict it once called a war of necessity. Public opinion is also turning against what will soon be the longest war in American history, as casualties continue to increase and there is no end in sight. As the term "military surge" is being increasingly used to denote McCrystal's new demands, comparisons with the war in Iraq are inevitable. Similarly to the Iraq war, elections have represented a turning point. But the surge in Iraq began with the so-called Sunni awakening, when the Iraqis themselves decided they had had enough of the violence and organized against those that insisted on it (mainly outsiders, Al Qaeda-in-Iraq). Also, in Iraq's leader Al-Maliki, the US found a relatively reliable and legitimate partner, one who instigated the political class to resolve their differences by political means. Finally, Iraq had an economic base that could be restored to produce substantial national wealth, and a mostly urban, well-educated population with some institutional experience. In contrast, Afghanistan is a mainly rural country, a tribal society which repudiates any attempts at centralization and profoundly distrusts the government in Kabul more, in some cases, than the foreign troops. The central government is rotten and weak, Karzai an unreliable leader who stole the election and whose brother is the head of the drug mafia. Can more US troops make up for all these weaknesses?Obama is thus in a delicate situation: he can't be "at war" with his own generals (indeed, General McCrystal was appointed by Obama only in March, after he dismissed the previous general in charge). On the other hand, if he allows more troops to be deployed, there is danger that Afghanistan may become his Vietnam. He therefore needs to choose between continuing a counterinsurgency operation, training more Afghan forces, protecting the local populations, getting into their villages and gaining their trust, or withdrawing ground troops and focusing on counter-terrorism, using drones and other off-shore means and special forces to go after the terrorist bases. Vice-President Biden is advocating a middle ground strategy: leaving enough troops on the ground to prevent Al Qaeda from returning to Afghanistan, but redefining the mission as one of narrow counter-terrorism and move away from nation-building and a protracted counter-insurgency operation that would signify more US casualties and more discontent at home. After all, the main reason why the US went to Afghanistan was to confront and eliminate Al Qaeda, which has since then moved across the border to the tribal areas of Pakistan. As several domestic arrests have demonstrated this week, Al Qaeda threats are just as likely to come from Springfield Illinois, Queens New York or Dallas Texas as from abroad or from the virtual Al Qaeda organizing through the worldwide web. Recalibrating his approach to Afghanistan is thus imperative, and it must be done for the right reasons, regardless of personal gain or saving face.Obama has had a very successful September, but his ambitious agenda both at home and abroad faces many pitfalls ahead. A youthful president, brimming with self-confidence, with a huge electoral mandate and with the best team of experts in history, can still be thwarted by unsolvable problems, domestic and foreign enemies and by serendipity itself. As a student of history and a John F Kennedy admirer, Obama knows this, and he should measure his decisions and temper his ambitions accordingly. Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science and Geography Director, ODU Model United Nations Program Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia

Review of the book by Roberto Dominguez, EU Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. ; Reseña del libro de Roberto Dominguez, EU Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.

The "Bolivarian Revolution" (or "chavismo") is the process and political regime led by Hugo Chavez in Venezuela since 1998. This article argues that the political phenomenon can be understood as a case of "totalitarian democracy"(Talmon) or "illiberal"(Zakaria). Both concepts refer to forms of democracy that are related to political messianism, populism and other forms of semi-autocratic leader, apparently favoring a majority will, but acting to the detriment of the rule of law, constitutionalism, the system of individual freedoms and the division of powers. It is further argued that, given the revolutionary nature of Chavez´s foreign policy, this way of understanding and practice of democracy has been exerting a growing influence in Latin America. ; La "Revolución Bolivariana"� (o "chavismo"�) es el proceso y régimen político liderados por Hugo Chávez en Venezuela desde 1998. En este artículo se sostiene que dicho fenómeno político puede ser comprendido como un caso de "democracia totalitaria"� (Talmon) o "iliberal"� (Zakaria). Ambos conceptos aluden a formas de democracia que se relacionan con el mesianismo político, el populismo y otras formas de liderazgo semi-autocrático, aparentemente privilegiando una voluntad mayoritaria, pero actuando en desmedro del estado de derecho, el constitucionalismo, el sistema de libertades individuales y la división de poderes. Se argumenta además que, dado el carácter revolucionario de la política exterior del chavismo, esta manera de comprender y practicar la democracia ha ido ejerciendo una influencia creciente en América Latina.

This article addresses the issue of populist foreign policy in Argentina and employs a multi-methods research that combines discourse analysis, foreign policy analysis, and historical political reconstruction of Kirchnerism. Theoretically, we refer to populism as an "Ideational Approach" and we consider Destradi and Plegaman's thematic lines in order to investigate populism in world politics. Throughout the paper, we argue that left-wing populist foreign policy does not discriminate against international cooperation and globalization per se but in a Manichean vision of the world, it criticizes western rich countries, and proposes the creation of new regional alliances.

The need for an environmental foreign policy in Ecuador derives from the global character of environmental issues, the country's responsibility towards its privileged mega diversity, the unavoidable link between poverty and environmental degradation as well as from international commitments. While an environmental foreign policy must be centrally commanded by a government agency, it should be designed through a participatory process capable of engaging all the actors who are actually involved in environmental issues. This article suggests several concrete themes that should be part of the Ecuadorian environmental international agenda. ; La necesidad de una política exterior ecuatoriana en lo ambiental surge de la naturaleza global del medio ambiente, de la responsabilidad del Ecuador como país privilegiado por su megadiversidad, de la vinculación inevitable entre la pobreza que le aqueja y la degradación del ambiente y de los compromisos internacionales por él adquiridos. Una política exterior ambiental debe resultar de un proceso de diseño en que participen todos los actores de la temática ambiental, aunque su ejecución debe estar centralizada en un órgano gubernamental. Se sugieren algunos temas específicos que deberían formar parte de una agenda internacional del Ecuador en lo ambiental.

Foreign policy towards Latin America in the period March to September 2019 was somewhat characterised by a low level of activity mainly due to the country's electoral landscape, which was shared with two other neighbouring countries: Bolivia and Uruguay. On 11 August, officialism was defeated in the PASO elections by a greater than expected difference, which undermined the legitimacy of the President-in-Office with the particularity that the elections defined only pre-emptive ones. The result was a context of great uncertainty regarding the near future (the general elections would be in October, two months later, and the handover in December, four months later). Between 12 August, the day on which the relative calm that the exchange rate had had weeks before the elections came back to the aires, and on 27 October, the day of the general elections, we saw the paradox of a legitimate candidate who had no office or formal decision-making power, who actually began to roll out an international agenda which he intensified after he finally became successful in October, but also with a smaller margin than expected, living side by side with a president whose political livelihood seemed to be tempting and who became a key priority: recovering in the elections, disciplining dissident voices within their space and positioning themselves as the leader of the future opposition, as well as the manism built around the possibility to turn it back and its impressive scenisation in the mass marches around the country. In this complex context, there are three issues to highlight outside bilateral relations with individual countries in the region: firstly, the situation in Venezuela addressed jointly by the Lima Group. Secondly, the signing of a free trade agreement between Mercosur and the EU, which the Argentinian government was tasked with promoting in its speeches as the main achievement of its external policy and even more so in recent years of Argentinian diplomacy. Thirdly, in April Argentina formally withdrew from Unasur, ...

This article offers a reflection on the foreign politics of George W. Bush. Based on the argument that, in the past, the differences in the foreign politics of democrats and republicans have not been significantly different, the article suggests that there is probably no reason to think this will change in the future. According to the author; both parties define their foreign politics within flexible parameters. Yet, the author suggests possibly different foreign policy attitudes of the new administration towards Latin America and especially related to the themes of ALCA and Plan Colombia. ; Este artículo reflexiona acerca de la política exterior de George W. Bush, partiendo del argumento de que no son significativas las diferencias que han caracterizado en el pasado la política exterior de los demócratas y republicanos, y no hay razones para pensar que lo sean en el futuro. El autor señala que ambos partidos definen su política exterior dentro de parámetros flexibles; y anticipa algunas actitudes que la nueva administración estadounidense podría adoptar en materia de política exterior, con énfasis en las relaciones con América Latina, especialmente en los temas del ALCA y Plan Colombia.

The internationalization of Colombian conflict with the setting up of Plan Colombia by Andrés Pastrana, then maintained by Álvaro Uribe, increased foreign policy fragmentation and confusion in the conduct of the country's foreign relations. Three arguments are analyzed: first, Plan Colombia intensified the presidential conduct of diplomatic relations and the fragmentation of foreign relations, and made the role of the Foreign Ministry weaker than before. Second, Plan Colombia made relations with USA more complex and diminished and to some extent worsened Colombia's relations with the European Union and most of its members. And finally, Plan Colombia stimulated the international participation of non-state actors, especially non-government organizations, who started to do a parallel diplomacy in Washington and in Brussels. The presidency of Andrés Pastrana and the first presidency of Álvaro Uribe will be examined within the geographic triangle of Colombia, the USA and Europe. ; La internacionalización del conflicto colombiano y la implementación del Plan Colombia, ambos sucesos instaurados por el gobierno del presidente Andrés Pastrana, y posteriormente, seguidos por la administración del presidente Álvaro Uribe incrementó el problema de la fragmentación de la política exterior y la confusión para conducir las relaciones exteriores del país. Tres argumentos son analizados: primero, el Plan Colombia intensificó la conducta presidencialista en las relaciones diplomáticas y la fragmentación de la política exterior, e hizo el rol del Ministerio de Relaciones más débil que antes. Segundo, el Plan Colombia hizo más complejas las relaciones con Estados Unidos y de alguna manera empeoro las relaciones del país con la Unión Europea y algunos de sus Estados miembros. Y finalmente, el Plan Colombia estimuló la participación internacional de los actores no estatales, especialmente las organizaciones no gubernamentales quienes empezaron a desarrollar una diplomacia paralela en Washington y en Bruselas. La presidencia de Andrés Pastrana y el primer mandato del presidente Álvaro Uribe son examinados en el marco del triángulo de Colombia, Estados Unidos y Europa.

The internationalization of Colombian conflict with the setting up of Plan Colombia by Andrés Pastrana, then maintained by Álvaro Uribe, increased foreign policy fragmentation and confusion in the conduct of the country's foreign relations. Three arguments are analyzed: first, Plan Colombia intensified the presidential conduct of diplomatic relations and the fragmentation of foreign relations, and made the role of the Foreign Ministry weaker than before. Second, Plan Colombia made relations with USA more complex and diminished and to some extent worsened Colombia's relations with the European Union and most of its members. And finally, Plan Colombia stimulated the international participation of non-state actors, especially non-government organizations, who started to do a parallel diplomacy in Washington and in Brussels. The presidency of Andrés Pastrana and the first presidency of Álvaro Uribe will be examined within the geographic triangle of Colombia, the USA and Europe. ; La internacionalización del conflicto colombiano y la implementación del Plan Colombia, ambos sucesos instaurados por el gobierno del presidente Andrés Pastrana, y posteriormente, seguidos por la administración del presidente Álvaro Uribe incrementó el problema de la fragmentación de la política exterior y la confusión para conducir las relaciones exteriores del país. Tres argumentos son analizados: primero, el Plan Colombia intensificó la conducta presidencialista en las relaciones diplomáticas y la fragmentación de la política exterior, e hizo el rol del Ministerio de Relaciones más débil que antes. Segundo, el Plan Colombia hizo más complejas las relaciones con Estados Unidos y de alguna manera empeoro las relaciones del país con la Unión Europea y algunos de sus Estados miembros. Y finalmente, el Plan Colombia estimuló la participación internacional de los actores no estatales, especialmente las organizaciones no gubernamentales quienes empezaron a desarrollar una diplomacia paralela en Washington y en Bruselas. La presidencia de Andrés Pastrana y el primer mandato del presidente Álvaro Uribe son examinados en el marco del triángulo de Colombia, Estados Unidos y Europa.

Foreign policy and defense policy are the main instruments any State has in hands in order to get a position in the international system. This requires by itself a close coordination and liaison between both of them. At the same time, both policies are fed by similar elements such as history, geography, the domestic political processes, and both should be treated and formulated as state policies. Parallel to defense policy, in foreign policy there are elements of strategic nature such as compatibility between military and diplomatic interests of the state, the military power and the political influence, as well as the contribution of the diplomacy to the execution of the military acquisition policies. All of this, should tell us that coordination and liaison between both policies is an easy and natural matter, but, on the contrary, the real situation is far from that. Moreover, because of their same nature, foreign and defense policies are difficult to coordinate and align adequately. The same is valid with respect to the agencies that have to define and apply those policies, the secretaries or ministries. There are two levels of coordination between both policies: the primary level that requires for certain basic assumptions and the advanced level, that implies the definition of the great national strategy. This issue is applicable in its origin to Chile, since their defense and foreign policies traditionally had followed separate courses and even conflictive ones. This situation was rather acceptable and reasonable in the past, but is not longer more, and must be corrected urgently. ; La política exterior y la política de defensa constituyen los principales instrumentos a través de los cuales el Estado se posiciona en el sistema internacional. Esto requiere una vinculación y coordinación muy estrecha entre ambas. Al mismo tiempo, las dos políticas se nutren de elementos similares, como la historia, la geografía, los procesos políticos internos; además, ambas son –o deben ser– Políticas de Estado. ...

The 2018 presidential elections in Mexico marked a historical precedent, with the victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, in the presidency. Although foreign policy in Mexico is regulated through constitutional principles, the paradigm shift towards the so-called "Fourth Transformation", that includes new processes, in structures, within the State. With this, it is intended to modify dynamics, mainly within the institutions, and their different actors, in the political and economic framework, from the perspective of decision-making and main functions. Hence, the present paper, has as main objective, to identify the economic interests of Mexico posed by the new government, to relate them to the proposal for the new dynamics of foreign policy. It is based on the assumption that, despite the fact that the new government intends to carry out a dynamic of political and economic diversification abroad, concrete actions have not yet materialized, in Asia, for example, with China, Japan and South Korea; and with the United States, the main trading partner, although progress was made with the negotiation processes of the new T-MEC trade agreement, the political capacity and positioning of the new government, compared to its main trading partner, are not clear in any of its edges. Therefore, the work develops a descriptive and analytical methodology, of the dynamics of the new government, considering the foreign policy actions and approaches, towards its main trade partners in the Asia region. ; Las elecciones presidenciales de 2018 en México, marcaron un precedente histórico, con la victoria de Andrés Manuel López Obrador, en la presidencia. Aunque la política exterior en México está regulada a través de principios constitucionales, el cambio de paradigma hacia la llamada "Cuarta Transformación," comprende nuevos procesos, en las estructuras, dentro del Estado. Con ello, se pretende modificar dinámicas, principalmente dentro de las instituciones, y sus diferentes actores, en el entramado político y económico, desde la perspectiva de la toma de decisiones y principales funciones. De ahí, que el presente trabajo, tiene como objetivo principal, identificar los intereses económicos de México que plantea el nuevo gobierno, para relacionarlos con la propuesta para las nuevas dinámicas de la política exterior. Se parte del supuesto, de que a pesar de que el nuevo gobierno pretende realizar una dinámica de diversificación política y económica en el exterior, aún no se materializan acciones concretas, en Asia, por ejemplo, con China, Japón y Corea del Sur; y con Estados Unidos, principal socio comercial, aunque se avanzó con los procesos de negociación del nuevo tratado comercial T-MEC, la capacidad política y posicionamiento del nuevo gobierno, frente a su principal socio comercial, no son claras en ninguna de sus aristas de cooperación. Por ello, el trabajo desarrolla una metodología descriptiva y analítica de las dinámicas del nuevo gobierno, considerando acciones y planteamientos de política exterior, frente a sus principales socios comerciales en Asia.

Doce años después del resurgimiento de la izquierda en América Latina, presenciamos su ocaso y la emergencia de la derecha. En el presente artículo, la autora se pregunta si esta situación responde a una crisis coyuntural de los gobiernos progresistas de América Latina o en realidad se trata del fracaso de esos proyectos alternativos que solo produjeron cambios cosméticos. Analiza el fracaso de los intentos por crear nuevas reglas de juego en el sistema internacional, en la política nacional y en la construcción regional por parte de los gobiernos progresistas, debido a la utilización de medios anticuados –basados en esquemas y conceptos de los tiempos de la Guerra Fría– en un contexto global diferente. El artículo inicia con una exposición sobre las visiones generales de las propuestas progresistas, para posteriormente analizar los casos de Brasil y Venezuela, y finalizar con las conclusiones sobre el supuesto del trabajo. ; Twelve years after the resurgence of the left in Latin America, we are now witnessing its dawn and the emergence of the right. In the present article, the author asks if this situation responds to a situational crisis of the progressive governments of Latin America or, if in reality, we are witnessing the failure of these alternative projects that only produced cosmetic changes. The author analyzes the failed attempt to create new rules in the international system, national politics and the regional construction by the progressive governments, because of the use of outdated means —based on schemes and concepts of the Cold War— in a different global context. The article begins with a general exposition of the progressive proposals to later analyze the cases of Brazil and Venezuela, ending with conclusions of the main hypothesis.

Doce años después del resurgimiento de la izquierda en América Latina, presenciamos su ocaso y la emergencia de la derecha. En el presente artículo, la autora se pregunta si esta situación responde a una crisis coyuntural de los gobiernos progresistas de América Latina o en realidad se trata del fracaso de esos proyectos alternativos que solo produjeron cambios cosméticos. Analiza el fracaso de los intentos por crear nuevas reglas de juego en el sistema internacional, en la política nacional y en la construcción regional por parte de los gobiernos progresistas, debido a la utilización de medios anticuados –basados en esquemas y conceptos de los tiempos de la Guerra Fría– en un contexto global diferente. El artículo inicia con una exposición sobre las visiones generales de las propuestas progresistas, para posteriormente analizar los casos de Brasil y Venezuela, y finalizar con las conclusiones sobre el supuesto del trabajo. ; Twelve years after the resurgence of the left in Latin America, we are now witnessing its dawn and the emergence of the right. In the present article, the author asks if this situation responds to a situational crisis of the progressive governments of Latin America or, if in reality, we are witnessing the failure of these alternative projects that only produced cosmetic changes. The author analyzes the failed attempt to create new rules in the international system, national politics and the regional construction by the progressive governments, because of the use of outdated means —based on schemes and concepts of the Cold War— in a different global context. The article begins with a general exposition of the progressive proposals to later analyze the cases of Brazil and Venezuela, ending with conclusions of the main hypothesis.

Entre 1975 y 1978, Robert W. Drexler estuvo a cargo de las operaciones antinarcóticos en la embajada norteamericana enBogotá en calidad de Encargado de negocios y subjefe de la misión diplomática. En el pasado había sido vicecónsul en Barranquilladurante el último año de gobierno de Gustavo Rojas Pinilla.

The article offers a balance of French President Nicholas Sarkozy's foreign policy on the basis of his first year of government and of the presidency of the European Union, to be held by France the forthcoming six months. It deals with change and continuity, in other words, with what is new and what is old in the foreign policy of a nation that, independently of the incumbent government, continues to be strongly conservative and follows premises established by former president Charles De Gaulle during the 60s.The article focuses on Sarkozy's campaign speeches and particularly on his statement to French ambassadors at the Elysée, on 27 August 2007. Finally, it refers to Sarkozy's implementation of foreign policy ; El artículo ofrece un balance de la política exterior del presidente francés Nicolás Sarkozy a partir de su primer año de gobierno y de la presidencia de la Unión Europea que Francia ejercerá el semestre próximo. Trata de cambio y de continuidad, esto es, de lo que hay de antiguo y de nuevo en la política exterior de una nación que, independientemente del gobierno de turno, continúa siendo marcadamente conservadora y basada en las premisas fijadas por el ex presidente Charles De Gaulle en los años sesenta. El artículo centra la atención en los discursos pronunciados por Sarkozy durante la campaña y en especial en la exposición realizada ante los embajadores franceses en el Elíseo el 8 de agosto de 2007. Por último, se refiere a la aplicación de la política exterior por el presidente.