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The micro-foundations of party unity are still an understudied topic in comparative politics. This article explores the effects of political ambition on party loyalty in Members of the Chamber of Deputies' (MCDs) claimed votes based on attitudinal data. Ambition theory posits that ambitious politicians should act according to the (s)electorate they are aiming to win for the next election, therefore acting prospectively in their legislative votes. Findings suggest that MCDs seeking office in the national executive branch are more likely to follow the party line and less likely to side with their district or vote inconsistently. While inclusiveness of candidate selection procedures alone does not have an effect, its interaction with differing ambitions does. The results provide us with a first systematic analysis of ambition and its effect on party loyalty in 14 countries by examining the individual MCD more closely.

AbstractThe aim of this contribution is twofold: first, to verify empirically how and to what extent party organizations vary within countries, in time; second, to enhance the role of political factors in explaining organizational variance. While mainstream literature has generally overestimated cross-national party convergence, a renewed interest in the study of variance has recently gained ground. We thus focus on seven European countries, from 1990 to 2010, by combining party organizational data from the Party Organization Data Handbook and the Political Party Database Project, with domestic cultural, socioeconomic, technological data from the European Values Survey and the World Bank, as well as supranational economic data provided by the OECD. We are interested in verifying how much of the variance in party organizations can be explained by resorting to the parameters of the party systems vis-à-vis domestic and supranational extra-political factors. Our results show that the explanatory power of party systems' parameters is stronger than the predictive ability of contextual variables.

This study catalogues party finance laws in multiple countries and identifies institutional factors that correspond to laws countries choose to adopt. Using data from international sources, we assessed differences in the regulation of money in elections in over 120 states. We classified countries into four types of party finance regimes along two axes: one that reflects regulations affecting party income and a second that reflects rules intended to make party finance more transparent. We found that two institutional factors are associated with the extent of government regulation in financing politics: the type of legal system and the use of proportional representation. Our study provides a new conceptual framework to categorize party finance regimes based on various types of regulations and the linkages between institutional factors and the extent of regulation. This conceptual typology offers a method to assess relationships between finance systems and political outcomes.

This study catalogues party finance laws in multiple countries and identifies institutional factors that correspond to laws countries choose to adopt. Using data from international sources, we assessed differences in the regulation of money in elections in over 120 states. We classified countries into four types of party finance regimes along two axes: one that reflects regulations affecting party income and a second that reflects rules intended to make party finance more transparent. We found that two institutional factors are associated with the extent of government regulation in financing politics: the type of legal system and the use of proportional representation. Our study provides a new conceptual framework to categorize party finance regimes based on various types of regulations and the linkages between institutional factors and the extent of regulation. This conceptual typology offers a method to assess relationships between finance systems and political outcomes.

This study catalogues party finance laws in multiple countries and identifies institutional factors that correspond to laws countries choose to adopt. Using data from international sources, we assessed differences in the regulation of money in elections in over 120 states. We classified countries into four types of party finance regimes along two axes: one that reflects regulations affecting party income and a second that reflects rules intended to make party finance more transparent. We found that two institutional factors are associated with the extent of government regulation in financing politics: the type of legal system and the use of proportional representation. Our study provides a new conceptual framework to categorize party finance regimes based on various types of regulations and the linkages between institutional factors and the extent of regulation. This conceptual typology offers a method to assess relationships between finance systems and political outcomes.

For perhaps a quarter of a century, from the mid-1930s to the year 1960, the Indochinese Communist Party—later the Workers' Party of Vietnam and now the Vietnamese Communist Party—celebrated the anniversary of its foundation on 6 January each year. The thirtieth anniversary (6 January 1960) was given special prominence in Hanoi and was marked by the publication of an official Party history in Vietnamese, French, English and other languages. Then, quite abruptly in September of the same year, the Party's Third National Congress approved a resolution to the effect that in future the anniversary would be commemorated on 3 February, which thereafter was held to be the 'correct' date.

One of the most controversial elements of political tolerance concerns support for hate speech. We argue that there are two factors that can reduce tolerance for hate speech: 1) moral foundations and 2) party cues. U.S. citizens' tolerance of hate speech will be reduced when it is framed as a violation of a specific moral foundation, opposed by a political party, or when the morality violation is utilized by party elites. Using two survey experiments, we manipulated the target of hate speech (i.e. Muslims or the American flag), whether the speech violated a moral foundation (i.e. harm or loyalty), and which political party supported or opposed the hate speech in question. For flag burning, moral frames and party cues on their own reduced U.S. citizens' tolerance relative to a non-political control, while moral frames and party cues were successful in reducing tolerance of anti-Muslim speech compared to a free speech appeal. Partisans were generally responsive to cues from the in-party. We also found instances of moral repackaging, where morally incongruent appeals from the in-party reduced tolerance of flag burning among Democrats. Among Republicans, harm morality decreased tolerance of anti-Muslim speech when invoked by the in-party, but increased tolerance when used by the out-party – an indication of the power of party cues to repackage moral arguments and to trigger backlash. These results provide a better understanding of what factors can affect tolerance for hate speech, providing political leaders and social justice advocates with a roadmap to alleviate this problem.

One of the most controversial elements of political tolerance concerns support for hate speech. We argue that there are two factors that can reduce tolerance for hate speech: 1) moral foundations and 2) party cues. U.S. citizens' tolerance of hate speech will be reduced when it is framed as a violation of a specific moral foundation, opposed by a political party, or when the morality violation is utilized by party elites. Using two survey experiments, we manipulated the target of hate speech (i.e. Muslims or the American flag), whether the speech violated a moral foundation (i.e. harm or loyalty), and which political party supported or opposed the hate speech in question. For flag burning, moral frames and party cues on their own reduced U.S. citizens' tolerance relative to a non-political control, while moral frames and party cues were successful in reducing tolerance of anti-Muslim speech compared to a free speech appeal. Partisans were generally responsive to cues from the in-party. We also found instances of moral repackaging, where morally incongruent appeals from the in-party reduced tolerance of flag burning among Democrats. Among Republicans, harm morality decreased tolerance of anti-Muslim speech when invoked by the in-party, but increased tolerance when used by the out-party – an indication of the power of party cues to repackage moral arguments and to trigger backlash. These results provide a better understanding of what factors can affect tolerance for hate speech, providing political leaders and social justice advocates with a roadmap to alleviate this problem. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion