Suchergebnisse

Wong, Ho Yin. ; Thesis submitted in: October 2008. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2009. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 265-275). ; Abstracts in English and Chinese. ; Abstract --- p.ii ; 緒論 --- p.iii ; Acknowledgement --- p.iv ; Abbreviations --- p.ix ; List of Tables --- p.ix ; Chapter Chapter 1: --- Introductory Chapter --- p.1 ; Chapter 1.1 --- Introduction --- p.1 ; Chapter 1.2 --- The Two Research Questions --- p.3 ; Chapter 1.3 --- Significance of Studying the DPJ --- p.6 ; Chapter 1.4 --- Dissertation Framework --- p.7 ; Chapter 1.5 --- Chapter Conclusion --- p.12 ; Chapter Chapter 2: --- Background of Japanese Politics --- p.14 ; Chapter 2.1 --- Opposition Failure in Japan --- p.15 ; Chapter 2.2 --- External Constraints Faced by Opposition Parties --- p.17 ; Chapter 2.2.1 --- Electoral System --- p.17 ; Chapter 2.2.2 --- Electoral Campaign Law --- p.21 ; Chapter 2.2.3 --- Clientelism and Centralized Government Financial Structure --- p.22 ; Chapter 2.2.4 --- Party Organization of the LDP --- p.23 ; Chapter 2.2.5 --- Voting Behavior --- p.27 ; Chapter 2.2.6 --- Press Club System --- p.28 ; Chapter 2.2.7 --- Conclusion --- p.31 ; Chapter 2.3 --- Opposition Fragmentation in Japanese Politics --- p.32 ; Chapter 2.3.1 --- Opposition Fragmentation under the 55´ة System --- p.32 ; Chapter 2.3.2 --- Opposition Cooperation and the Break Down of the 55´ة System --- p.37 ; Chapter 2.3.3 --- The New Party System and Opposition Coalition Failure --- p.39 ; Chapter 2.3.4 --- The NFP Internal Fragmentation --- p.43 ; Chapter 2.4 --- Opposition Failure and the DPJ --- p.48 ; Chapter 2.4.1 --- The Emergence of the DPJ --- p.49 ; Chapter 2.4.2 --- The Expansion of the DPJ --- p.52 ; Chapter 2.5 --- Chapter Conclusion --- p.54 ; Chapter Chapter 3: --- Theory and Methodology --- p.57 ; Chapter 3.1 --- Party System --- p.58 ; Chapter 3.1.1 --- Four Attributes of a Party System --- p.58 ; Chapter 3.1.1.1 --- Number of Parties --- p.59 ; Chapter 3.1.1.2 --- Relative Strength and Size --- ...

"A key objective of China's reform program was to reduce distortions in the economic system and enhance growth. However, when implemented in incremental and partial ways, local governments or individuals have chance to capture rents inherent in the reform process. Young (2000) warned that the rent-seeking behavior might lead to increasing market fragmentation. Empirical studies have since shown that this did not happen in the product markets. In this paper we argue that as rents from the product markets were squeezed out during the reform process, rent-seeking behavior shifted to the factor markets, especially the capital and land markets. The reform process now needs to be deepened to ensure that the factor markets also become more integrated and efficient." -- Authors' Abstract ; IFPRI3; GRP3; GRP32; Theme 9; Markets and Trade ; DSGD ; Non-PR

Yip Kin Fung. ; Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2003. ; Includes bibliographical references (leaves 101-104). ; Abstracts in English and Chinese. ; Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 ; Chapter 2 --- The Distribution of Fluctuations in Financial Data --- p.5 ; Chapter 2.1 --- Empirical Statistics --- p.5 ; Chapter 2.2 --- Data analyzed --- p.8 ; Chapter 2.3 --- Levy Distribution --- p.10 ; Chapter 2.4 --- Returns Distribution and Scaling Properties --- p.12 ; Chapter 2.5 --- Volatility Clustering --- p.19 ; Chapter 2.6 --- Conclusion --- p.21 ; Chapter 3 --- Models of Herd behaviour in Financial Markets --- p.22 ; Chapter 3.1 --- Cont and Bouchaud's model --- p.22 ; Chapter 3.2 --- The Model of Egiuluz and Zimmerman --- p.24 ; Chapter 3.3 --- EZ Model with Size-Dependent Dissociation Rates --- p.28 ; Chapter 3.4 --- Democratic and Dictatorship Self-Organized Model --- p.31 ; Chapter 3.5 --- Effect of Size-Dependent Fragmentation and Coagulation Prob- abilities --- p.33 ; Chapter 3.6 --- Extensions of EZ model --- p.35 ; Chapter 3.7 --- Conclusion --- p.39 ; Chapter 4 --- Review on the Minority Game(MG) --- p.42 ; Chapter 4.1 --- The Model and Results --- p.42 ; Chapter 4.2 --- Crowd-anticrowd Theory and Phase Transition --- p.46 ; Chapter 4.3 --- Market Efficiency --- p.48 ; Chapter 5 --- MG with biased strategy pool --- p.52 ; Chapter 5.1 --- The Model --- p.53 ; Chapter 5.2 --- Numerical Results and Discussion --- p.53 ; Chapter 5.3 --- Theory: MG with Biased Strategy Pool --- p.61 ; Chapter 5.4 --- Conclusion --- p.69 ; Chapter 6 --- MG with Randomly Participating Agents --- p.71 ; Chapter 6.1 --- The Model with One RPA --- p.71 ; Chapter 6.2 --- Results for q = 0.5 --- p.72 ; Chapter 6.3 --- Inefficiency and Success Rate --- p.76 ; Chapter 6.4 --- Results for q ≠ 0.5 --- p.82 ; Chapter 6.5 --- Many RPAs --- p.85 ; Chapter 6.6 --- Conclusion --- p.86 ; Chapter 7 --- A Model on Coupled Minority Games --- p.88 ; Chapter 7.1 --- The Model --- p.89 ; Chapter 7.2 --- Results and Discussion。 --- ...

对于转型期中国的劳动争议,为何国家一边推动以法律规则为本位的劳动监管体系,另一边又不断恢复各种软化法律规则约束力的调解机制?为何从中央到地方再到各部门官僚都偏好于以调解的方式来处置劳动争议?而且,为什么90年代以来大规模的建章立制没有提升准司法的裁决率和司法的判决率,反而使得劳动争议的调解率长期居高不下?国家是如何维持强大的调解能力的?劳资双方又为何愿意接受国家的调解?最后,国家对调解的偏好又会对工人维权行动带来什么样的影响?对于上述问题,本文提出一种"司法化与"政治化并行的双向运动的解释框架。虽然转型期的中国国家在司法机构建设、法律制定、等方面显示出一定的"司法化特征,但是与此同时国家也不断将司法体系"政治化,不仅干预和限制司法权力的行使,也在实际执行过程中软化法律规则的约束力。这种双向运动既根源于革命根据地时期和计划经济时期的制度遗产,也因转型期威权政体内部利益分化而不断强化。这两者也给劳资双方塑造了特殊的政治机会结构,既默许资方规避司法诉讼来压制工人维权,也促使工人高度依赖于国家调解来获得有限的经济赔偿。结果,"调解优先成为劳动争议处置的支配性策略,调解机制逐渐替代了劳动监察、行政裁决和司法判决等直接诉诸国家强制性权力的处置方式。这也是长期以来中国劳动争议调解率居高不下的主要原因。这种双向运动分别在宏观层面和微观层面带来了不同的后果。在宏观层面,"调解优先的策略发挥了分化工人的功能,使得制度化维权渠道中的劳动争议日益个体化和原子化。在微观层面,工人们"准司法化的维权观与国家"去司法化的维稳观之间产生了激烈的张力,形成了"挤出效应,迫使越来越多的维权工人退出法庭并走向街头,采取直接的、对抗性的、激进的、乃至暴力化的抗争行动。 ; An expansion of mediation in China's labor disputes resolution has gathered significant momentum since the middle of the 2000s. This tendency stems from the state's long-term dependency on politicized mediatory measure to contain labor's disruptive impulses. And the fragmentation of interests inside the authoritarian regime further marginalizes laws and judicial institutions in resolving grievance. These two factors have together shaped a political opportunity structure as "mediate first for both the labor and capital, and consequently, given a great impetus to the Grand Mediation campaign. By mobilizing grass-roots and non-judicial mediatory agencies to proactively intervene in labor conflict, the Grand Mediation has reinforced the state's capacity in managing contentious issues without resorting to either heavy handed repression or adversarial litigation. However, regarding the contradiction of the politicized mediation with workers' judicialized preference, the state's over-reliance on mediation may impel workers to alienate from institutionalized channel and subsequently deteriorates China's industrial relation. It is further argued that the prevailing of Grand Mediation may trigger off disruptive and violent labor protests in the long run. All in all, the tendency of "mediate first reveals a ...

本研究运用地方政治经济特征来解释商业协会与威权国家关系的分化,以及商业协会之间的系统差异,主张在地方政治经济结构中理解商业协会的角色及其之于威权政体的意义。本研究说明了在转型中国商业协会政治角色的新经验进展,探讨了社会利益能够成功地以制度化的方式输入威权政体的条件。 ; 在国家一面,本项研究说明了支撑地方威权国家维持支配的制度基础。激励地方政府开拓财源的财政制度和刺激官僚追求政绩的晋升制度,促使地方政府及其组成部门利用商业协会来提供必要的财政补给、提供公共品和帮助政府执行治理职能。在社会一面,中国的地方政治经济发展模式并非消弭而是加深了私营企业主之间的利益分化,破坏了商业协会的同质性基础。大型私企、中小型私企、个体与地方政府的互动模式具有本质差别,形成了分化的利益诉求。但是当前的商业协会体系并不能处理这种分化了的社会利益诉求,试图将它们都聚集到同一个结社中,既破坏了结社的内部凝聚力,也阻碍了制度化利益传输的可能。 ; 商业协会与威权国家的关系取决于政府渗透与结社凝聚力两大条件的交互作用。本研究将当下商业协会与威权国家的关系概括为四种类型:"合作型,"对抗型,"支配型和"庇护型。不同类型协会表达利益诉求的能力不同,"合作型与"对抗型都可以曲折的方式实现利益中介,但它们都还不是制度化的利益中介过程。通过"去政治化的政治整合过程,当前中国的商业协会对威权政体的政治稳定起到了正面作用。基于上述分析,合理的推论是:若地方政治经济特征存在系统差异,则商业协会的整体状况也应存在系统差异。本研究所建立的关于商业协会政治影响力的Logistic回归模型说明,商业协会的层级越高,组织凝聚力越高,与政府的"合作型关系越强,其被政府咨询以及实际影响政策的可能性也越高。在中国,在更高的政府层级上商业协会具有更可见的政治影响力。 ; This research reveals how the differentiated relation between business associations and authoritarian state and the systematic organizational variations are configurated by local political economy, and argues the political significance of business associations in authoritarian state should be located in the specific political economic structure. This research displays recent development of business associations' political role in transitional China, and identify the conditions that facilitate organizational social interest pursuits to be successfully inputted into authoritarian state. ; On the one hand, this research discusses the institutional bases which motivate the local authoritarian state to maintain continuing domination over society. Both the fiscal institution driving local state to expand revenue incomes and the bureaucratic promotion institution driving officials to accumulate political achievements motivate the local government to achieve following benefits from penetrating and dominating business associations: extract money from society, provide public goods, and facilitate the governance functions. On the other hand, the specific developmental pattern of local market economy actually has deepened the fragmentations among emerging private ...