Straipsnio tikslas yra isnagrineti Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija rinkimu kampanijos metu ir nustatyti, kurie kanalai labiausiai gali susieti auditorija tarpusavyje. Straipsnyje apzvelgiama fragmentacijos reiksme demokratijai ir jos tyrimuose vartojamos savokos, pristatomi empirinio tyrimo poziuriai, besiremiantys auditorijos sutapimo analize. Remiantis reprezentatyvios apklausos duomenimis ir pristatytais poziuriais, analizuo-jama Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorijos fragmentacija. Kadangi nustatytas gana didelis skirtingu kanalu susiklojimas, straipsnyje daroma isvada, kad Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija kol kas nera labai fragmentiska. Taciau palyginimas su ankstesniu metu duomenimis rodo tam tikrus fragmentacijos didejimo polinkius. Labiausiai Lietuvos ziniasklaidos auditorija susiejantis kanalas yra televizija, taciau vis didesne svarba igyja ir populiarus interneto portalai The aim of the article is to analyse the extent of media audience fragmentation in Lithuania during the 2012 Parliament election campaign and to define which media channels are best able to unify the audience. The article reviews the significance of fragmentation in terms of democracy and concepts used in its analysis, and presents approaches for its empirical study, based on audience duplication. On the basis of this approach and data from a representative survey, the fragmentation of Lithuanian media audience is analysed. Since the analysis shows a considerable overlap of audience of different media outlets, the main conclusion is made that the Lithuanian media audience is not (yet) fragmented. The media that unites the biggest share of the audience is television, although popular internet portals are also becoming very important. Adapted from the source document.
This article is an attempt to overview the state of the theory of European integration and it's development perspectives. Distinct and divergent "broad" and "narrow" definitions of integration theory, as well as various understandings of it's meaning and purpose should be regarded as symptoms of it's disintegration and fragmentation. In the absence of the broader theoretical paradigm "mosaic" picture of integration unfolds and gains dominance, thus preventing the understanding of deep and long-term tendencies of the integration process. The reconstruction and renewal of the theoretical paradigm of European integration research through the reflective restoration of the equilibrium between theoretical "explanation" and "understanding" is the necessary prerequisite for the development and progress in this research. Adapted from the source document.
This article is focused on the relation between the political institutional conditions (regime properties) and collective violence. Relying on works of Charles Tilly, two most important properties of regimes (political institutional conditions) that could affect the occurrence and intensity of collective violence are discerned: regime (governmental) capacity and democracy level. Empirical-graphical analysis finds no relation between the democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence. However, statistically significant relationship between the governmental capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence is found. Moreover, higher levels of collective violence are observed in the low capacity- undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis). Adapted from the source document.
Article analyses processes of parliamentary control in Lithuania. The research is based on the "Agent -- Principal" theory approach, which demonstrates a simplified perception of parliamentary control in Lithuania. That induces the application of a limited, ie., information-based, means of parliamentary control in political practice. Parliamentary control in Lithuania is perceived as an act of subordinate coercion by governmental institutions, rather than continuous communication & cooperation. That causes the fragmentation of parliamentary control. Due to semi-presidential system's delegation of authority & accountability, parliamentary control is rather complicated in Lithuania. Efficient parliamentary control is impossible without political parties, which should be prepared to professionally govern or compete. Lithuanian political parties seem unprepared for these tasks. Research suggests that simplified perception of parliamentary control prevailing in Lithuania complicates its implementation in practice, though institutional preconditions for the implementation of efficient parliamentary control are present. Adapted from the source document.
Straipsnio tikslas - nustatyti, kokia itaka demokratijos veikimo verti-nimui ir pasitikejimui parlamentu daro politiniai veiksniai - partines siste-mos fragmentacija, poliarizacija ir valdanciosios koalicijos dydis. Tyrime, apimanciame desimt Vidurio ir Rytu Europos saliu nuo 1991 iki 2011 m., ivertinamas ir dvieju ekonominiu veiksniu - ekonomikos augimo ir nedarbo lygio - poveikis politines paramos rodikliams. Stipriausias statistinis rysys nustatytas tarp nedarbo lygio ir pasitenkinimo demokratija: kuo daugiau ne-turinciuju darbo, tuo maziau teigiamai vertinanciuju demokratijos veikima. Taip pat paaiskejo, kad demokratijos veikimo vertinimui neigiamai atsiliepia mazas parlamentiniu partiju skaicius ir dideles valdanciosios koalicijos. Pasi-tikejimas parlamentu buvo mazesnis tais atvejais, kai ideologiniai skirtumai tarp parlamentiniu partiju buvo dideli, ir tuomet, kai ekonomika traukesi arba augo tik labai nedaug. Ketvirtoje straipsnio dalyje siekiama nustatyti, kodel dideles valdanciosios koalicijos veda prie mazesnio patenkintuju demokrati-ja procento. Cekijos ir Bulgarijos lyginamoji analize parode, kad didele val-dancioji koalicija apriboja parlamento politini vaidmeni, sudaro palankias salygas grieztai ir nepopuliariai ekonominei politikai vykdyti ir palieka di-dele rinkeju dali be priimtinu politiniu alternatyvu. Siu politinio gyvenimo reiskiniu visuma didina nepasitenkinima demokratijos veikimu The article examines the effect of parliamentary fragmentation, polarization and ruling coalition size on satisfaction with democracy and trust in parliament. Statistical analysis, encompassing 10 CEE countries from 1991 to 2011, is used to measure the impact of political factors, while the effect of economic growth and unemployment rate is also evaluated. The strongest finding suggests that there is a negative relation between unemployment rate and satisfaction with democracy. Furthermore, satisfaction with a political regime is undermined by a small number of parliamentary parties and large ruling coalitions. Trust in parliament tends to be lower when ideological differences among parliamentary parties are sizable, as well as at the times of economic recession or marginal growth. Fourth section of the article deals with the question of why large ruling coalitions lead to lower satisfaction with democracy. A comparative analysis of political realities in the Czech Republic and Bulgaria has shown that a large ruling coalition diminishes the political role of parliament, provides a strong ground for the implementation of a strict and unpopular economic policy and leads to the lack of viable political alternatives in the ranks of parliamentary opposition. The complex of these political phenomena contributes to the low satisfaction with democracy. Adapted from the source document.
From the end of the Cold war there is no shortage of academic analyses & political considerations on the possible directions of foreign & security policy of Ukraine. The researches usually stress the strategic location of the country. It is asserted that its foreign & security policy is conditioned not only by domestic (political, socio-economical) factors, but also by the position of the country between "overlapping integrational spaces." Ukraine is influenced by Western "neighborhood" which has extended to the Central Eastern Europe & is manifesting itself through the Eastern policies of the EU & NATO. From the other side, Ukraine is influenced by Russia & structures backed by Russia (Commonwealth of Independent States -- CIS, Common Economical Space -- CES). Thus, Ukraine becomes the special object of contest between East & West. Sometimes this contest creates the stability & cooperation, sometimes -- the conflict. Ukraine tries to use these situations to strengthen its state identity & crystallize the geopolitical functions. Using these insights the article analyses what & how the complex of domestic & external factors influenced the foreign & security policy of Ukraine during the transformation of political regime in 2004-2005 & after the "Orange revolution." It is asserted that Ukraine met the 2004 Presidential elections in very difficult situation: the efforts of the external actors to influence the geopolitical self-determination of the country intensified its domestic problems (fragmentation of the society & the state, crisis of the oligarchic political system etc). During this pressure the strategy of Yushchenko & Timoshenko alliance that relied on the fight with the corrupt political economical system & stressed the orientation to the West was more effective. Although the victory of the alliance created the premises of the pro-Western policy, the integration of Ukraine with the West is still very murky. This integration can create the conflicts with Moscow. Whereas the West is politically not prepared to propose the quicker integration plan. Hence a lot will depend on the capabilities of Kiev to sustain the consolidated Yushchenko-Timoshenko alliance, which won the presidential elections & declared the Western orientation, & to win the parliamentary elections in spring of 2006. The victory would be signal that Ukraine is prepared to continue the liberal reforms & pro-Western foreign policy. The article also proposes the guidelines for Lithuanian foreign policy towards the Ukraine. Adapted from the source document.
An unambiguous assessment of the results of changes in the post-communist political regime of Ukraine is hardly possible. The political system of this country has experienced both periods of democratic expectations & democratic setbacks during the last fifteen years. For example, in 1990-1994, before the first competitive parliamentary elections, there was a clear fragmentation among the old (communist) political elite in Ukraine; the country's first democratic constitution was adopted in 1996. However, after Leonid Kuchma was elected President in 1994, authoritarian tendencies gradually recrudesced, "oligarchic" clans took hold of the country's political system, & the elections were increasingly blatantly manipulated & rigged to the advantage of the ruling elite. This cycle of political development recurred ten years later. Manipulations of the results of the 2004 presidential election raised a massive protest among the inhabitants of Ukraine, which was symbolically dubbed the "Orange Revolution." A new influx of democratic expectations forced the ruling elite to concede to re-running the second round of Ukraine's presidential election, which was won by the opposition. However, the political crisis which struck the new government in September 2005 & the mutual accusations of corruption raised by the former "revolutionary" comrades-in-arms -- President Viktor Yushchenko & former Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko -- raised new questions regarding the vitality of the democratic processes in Ukraine. The main question examined in this article is therefore whether the vacillation of Ukraine's political regime is not a regular, permanent condition. Having two main aims -- (1) to construct a theory of Ukraine's post-soviet political transformation, & (2) to disclose the possibilities of democracy consolidation in this country -- the article starts with making some "corrections" to the transitologist approach to regime change. Firstly, it is argued that political transformation theories should have a shared concept of democracy, irrespective of the number or type of the stages of democratization distinguished. The experience of post-communist countries shows that formal procedural democratic criteria are insufficient in order to characterize a political system as democratic. Secondly, traditional theories of regime change focus mostly on the analysis of the behavior of the main political actors (the political elite) & their decisions (agreements). The structural conditions (eg., the characteristics of socio-economic development) should be also included into theoretical thinking about regime change. Thirdly, the analysis of elites & their agreements is sufficiently developed to explain how & when the transition to democracy occurs. However, the democratic consolidation stage has remained somewhat mystified by 'transitologists.' The article argues that an assumption should probably be made that the behavior of political elite factions competing in the political system is always rational & self-interested, ie., democracy (or any other form of political regime) becomes "the only game in town" only if & when it is mostly advantageous for the political elite functioning in that system. Taking into account the above mentioned "corrections" to the transitologist approach, in the article, there is produced a model for analyzing post-soviet regime transformations. The model consists of three main explanatory variables: (1) the structure of political elite, (2) the 'rules of game' prevalent in the system, & (3) the strategies of political elite aiming at gaining business and/or mass support. Consequently, various interrelations of these variables may produce four possible ideal-type outcomes of regime change -- (1) democracy, (2) 'democracy with adjectives,' (3) zero-sum game (a very unstable option when political regime may be temporarily democratic but is at a huge risk of downfall), (4) authoritarianism. In post-soviet countries, it is not enough to examine the structure of political elite & the institutions in order to predict the consolidation of one or another form of political regime. 'Building politicians' "alliances" with business & (or) mobilizing mass support may negate any such predictions & produce additional (regressive, in terms of democratization) impulses to further regime change. The very possibilities of the political elite to form "alliances" with business & (or) to mobilize the masses are mostly determined by the structural characteristics of the country. Thus, the analysis of the latter may not also be omitted in examining post-soviet transitions. Political regime in Ukraine, which beginning of 1990s started evolving as a probable liberal democracy or at least 'democracy with adjectives,' after 1998 Verkhovna Rada elections moved to the situation of the zero-sum game. Such transition was conditioned by two factors. First, the changes within political elite structure -- the communist camp, which occupied an important, although not the most important place in the pluralist political elite structure in 1994-1998, became an anti-systemic political force after the adoption of the 1996 Constitution. For these reasons, only two opposing elite factions (oligarchs-"centrists" vs. national democrats) remained in the political system of Ukraine after the 1998 elections, the ideological confrontation of which was constantly increasing & became particularly acute at the outset of the "Orange Revolution" in 2004. Second, the fact that the business class in Ukraine was forming with the "assistance" of politicians allowed the political elite to build an alliance with business community already in 1994-1996 & maintain these tight clientelist relations even after the privatization period was over. When at the end of 2004 the national democrats gathered mass support & became virtually equal or even more influential than the so-called "centrists," who traditionally draw support from business structures, the zero-sum game in Ukraine became especially acute. Such it remains by now, even after the Orange revolution is over. In more than ten years of independence the business community of Ukraine has consolidated its positions in the Verkhovna Rada & accumulated control over almost all national TV channels & other media outlets, as well as separate industrial regions. Therefore even anti-oligarchically disposed government cannot ignore this power. The ruling elite that cares about its survival & political success is forced to co-ordinate its decisions with the interests of various business clans. On the other hand, since Ukraine's business class consists of several competing clans, any government decisions that seek to limit the political influence of business groups immediately affect the interests of competing business clans. The government cannot remain neutral in principal. Any attempts of the supposed "deoligarchisation" will only result in provoking sharper disagreements between business groups because the curtailment of the positions of one clan will open new prospects for the strengthening of the influence of its competitors. It may be argued that for these reasons there will always be at least one (and, most likely, the strongest one) oligarchic political camp supported by an "alliance" with business. In other words, Ukraine's political regime does not have any chance to be consolidated in the liberal democracy perspective. Another structural characteristic of Ukraine is the politically unorganized working class. At least several competing political forces claim to represent the workers' interests -- the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Socialist Party of Ukraine, & the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. The internal competition among the left-wing forces encourages at least one of them (the Communist Party of Ukraine, the Progressive Socialist Party) to take a radical, anti-systemic position in order that potential supporters may distinguish it from other leftist parties. Therefore, it is likely that the political system of Ukraine will preserve a left-wing segment that will not wield much power but will propagate an anti-systemic ideology without "communicating" with other political forces. Due to its anti-systemic nature it will not be able to participate in the government of the state & the votes of the left-wing voters (comprising the basis for mass support) will probably be collected by the national democrats. This circumstance enables predicting that the zero-sum game will remain very intensive in Ukraine in the future as well. Thus, the permanent instability of the state & both -- democracy & authoritarianism -- in Ukraine (a zero-sum game) may actually be considered to be its consolidated political regime form. Adapted from the source document.
