Suchergebnisse

This paper investigates the use of reputation in an economy where principals hire agents for two different kinds of tasks, in which the agents have differing aptitudes. Principal-agent matches are remade every period, but a principal can acquire some information on the past behavior of her current agent. I consider two different reputation mechanisms—one in which an agent's past record of defections makes no reference to the kind of task (Integrated Reputation), and another in which information about past defections is available separately for each task (Fragmented Reputation). The two kinds of reputation can be interpreted as "personal honor" and performance record (e.g. credit history) respectively.I first characterize the equilibria under the two mechanisms and make some welfare comparisons, showing that IR strictly welfare dominates FR over a significant range of parameter values. I then show that, when both mechanisms are available, integrated reputation will not be used in equilibrium by principals. Thus if the economy is in equilibrium using only the IR mechanism, and the FR mechanism becomes subsequently available, then IR will become obsolete. In the appropriate ranges of parameter values, this change reduces welfare.

IN POLAND, THE DEEP SPLIT IN SOLIDARITY WHICH HAS BEGUN TO APPEAR IN THE 1990S HAD ITS ROOTS BEGINNING AS EARLY AS 1981. THE APPEARANCE OF UNITY WHICH HAS CONCEALED GROWING DIVISIONS IS BECOMING MORE VISIBLE AS TIME GOES ON. THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES: SOLIDARITY SPLTS IN TWO; THE POST-SOLIDARITY ERA; POST-SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS; THE IMPACT OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM; AND, WHY THE PARTIES ARE SO WEAK. POLAND'S NEW DEMOCRACY IS ABOUT TO CONFRONT MANY CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES. AMONG THESE, TWO STAND OUT AS CRUCIAL: WHETHER TO OPT FOR PARLIMENTARY AS OPPOSED TO PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT, AND WHETHER TO SELECT PROPORTUNATAL REPRESENTATION AS OPPOSED TO A SYSTEM OF PLURALITY ELECTIONS.